

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

**December 1990**

**III**

**Assembly Documents**

**WEU**

**PARIS**



ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

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**Assembly Documents**

WEU

PARIS





The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
CHEVALIER Pierre	SP
KEMPINAIRE André	PVV
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. UYTENDAELE René	CVP

#### Substitutes

MM. CAUWENBERGHS Frans	CVP
COLLART Jacques	PS
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FILLON François	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
THYRAUD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	PC

#### Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BALLIGAND Jean-Pierre	Socialist
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOHL André	UCDP
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
ROGER Jean	RDE
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTET Robert	SPD

MM. BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
EICH Tay	Die Grünen
HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

#### Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mr. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
Mr. HÖFFKES Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. HOFFMANN Ingeborg	CDU/CSU
MM. KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans-Peter	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

### ITALY

#### Representatives

MM. BENASSI Ugo	PCI
CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	Communist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MANZOLINI Gianni	Socialist
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.

#### Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
COLOMBO Vittorino	Chr. Dem.
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist

MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio Chr. Dem.  
 GRECO Francesco Communist  
 PASQUINO Gianfranco Ind. Left  
 RAUTI Giuseppe MSI-DN  
 RUBNER Hans SVP  
 SCOVACRICCHI Martino PSDI  
 STEGAGNINI Bruno Chr. Dem.  
 STANZANI GHEDINI Sergio Radical  
 TRIGLIA Riccardo Chr. Dem.  
 N...

## LUXEMBOURG

## Representatives

Mr. GOERENS Charles Dem.  
 Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle Soc. Chr.  
 Mr. REGENWETTER Jean Soc. Workers

## Substitutes

MM. DIMMER Camille Soc. Chr.  
 KOLLWELTER René Soc. Workers  
 KONEN René Dem.

## NETHERLANDS

## Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry CDA  
 EVERS DIJK Huib  
 Mrs. HAAS-BERGER Regina Maria PVDA  
 MM. STOFFELEN Pieter Labour  
 TUMMERS Nicolas Labour  
 van VELZEN Wim CDA  
 VERBEEK Jan Willem Liberal

## Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMMAN Elisabeth Labour  
 MM. DEES Dick VVD  
 DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob CDA  
 EISMA Doeke D66  
 VAN DER LINDEN Pierre CDA  
 MARIS Pieter CDA  
 Mrs. VERSPAGET Joséphine Labour

## PORTUGAL

## Representatives

MM. CANDAL Carlos Socialist  
 ESTEVES Antonio Socialist  
 FERNANDES MARQUES Joaquim Soc. Dem.  
 MOREIRA Licinio Soc. Dem.  
 SILVA MARQUES José Soc. Dem.  
 SOARES COSTA Manuel Soc. Dem.  
 VIEIRA MESQUITA José Soc. Dem.

## Substitutes

MM. AMARAL Fernando Soc. Dem.  
 BRITO Rogério Communist  
 CONCEIÇÃO Fernando Soc. Dem.  
 MOTA TORRES José Socialist  
 PINTO Carlos Soc. Dem.  
 ROSETA Pedro Soc. Dem.  
 VARA Armando Socialist

## SPAIN

## Representatives

MM. ALVAREZ Francisco People's Party  
 BORDERAS Augusto Socialist  
 CUATRECASAS Llibert C.i.U.  
 CUCO Alfons Socialist  
 DIAZ Lorenzo Soc. and Dem.  
 Centre  
 FABRA Juan Manuel People's Party  
 LOPEZ HENARES José Luis People's Party  
 MARTINEZ Miguel Angel Socialist  
 MOYA Pedro Socialist  
 PERINAT Luis Guillermo People's Party  
 de PUIG Lluís Maria Socialist  
 ROMAN Rafael Socialist

## Substitutes

Mr. GAMINDE Ignacio Basque nat.  
 Mrs. GARCIA MANZANARES Blanca Socialist  
 Mr. GARCIA SANCHEZ Daniel Socialist  
 Mrs. GUIRADO Ana Socialist  
 MM. LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO Santiago People's Party  
 NUÑEZ Manuel Socialist  
 PALACIOS Marcelo Socialist  
 PEDREGOSA José Manuel Socialist  
 ROMERO Antonio United Left  
 RUIZ Alberto People's Party  
 SAINZ José Luis People's Party  
 SOLE-TURA Jordi Socialist

## UNITED KINGDOM

## Representatives

MM. COLEMAN Donald Labour  
 COX Thomas Labour  
 EWING Harry Labour  
 Dame Peggy FENNER Conservative  
 Sir Geoffrey FINSEBERG Conservative  
 MM. GARRETT Edward Labour  
 HARDY Peter Labour  
 JESSEL Toby Conservative  
 Sir Russell JOHNSTON Liberal  
 Earl of KINNOULL Conservative  
 MM. MORRIS Michael Conservative  
 PARRY Robert Labour  
 Sir William SHELTON Conservative  
 Sir Dudley SMITH Conservative  
 Mr. SPEED Keith Conservative  
 Sir John STOKES Conservative  
 MM. THOMPSON Donald Conservative  
 WARD John Conservative

## Substitutes

MM. ATKINSON David Conservative  
 BANKS Tony Labour  
 BOWDEN Andrew Conservative  
 FAULDS Andrew Labour  
 HOWELL Ralph Conservative  
 Sir John HUNT Conservative  
 Lord KIRK HILL Labour  
 MM. LAMBIE David Labour  
 LITHERLAND Robert Labour  
 LORD Michael Conservative  
 Lord MACKIE Liberal  
 Lord NEWALL Conservative  
 MM. RATHBONE Tim Conservative  
 REDMOND Martin Labour  
 Lord RODNEY Conservative  
 Mrs. ROE Marion Conservative  
 MM. ROWE Andrew Conservative  
 THOMPSON John Labour

**AGENDA****of the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session  
Paris, 3rd-6th December 1990****I. Report of the Council**

Thirty-sixth annual report of the Council  
(first part)

**II. Political questions**

1. Consequences of developments in  
Central and Eastern Europe for  
European security

*Report tabled by Mr. Lemoine on behalf of the  
Political Committee*

2. Revision of the modified Brussels  
Treaty:

*Report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf  
of the Political Committee*

(a) reply to the second part of the  
thirty-fourth annual report and the  
thirty-fifth annual report of the  
Council

(b) WEU and the European Com-  
munity

3. European security and the Gulf crisis

*Report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the  
Political Committee*

**III. Defence questions**

1. Consequences of the invasion of  
Kuwait: continuing operations in the  
Gulf region

*Report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf  
of the Defence Committee*

**IV. Technological and aerospace questions**

Konversiya – conversion in Soviet mil-  
itary industry

*Report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the  
Technological and Aerospace Committee*

**V. Budgetary questions**

1. Draft budget of the administrative  
expenditure of the Assembly for the  
financial year 1991

*Report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the  
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-  
tration*

2. Accounts of the administrative expend-  
iture of the Assembly for the financial  
year 1989 – the auditor's report and  
motion to approve the final accounts

*Report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the  
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-  
tration*

**VI. Parliamentary and public relations**

Enhancing WEU's public relations

*Report tabled by Mr. Roman on behalf of the  
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-  
tions*

## **ORDER OF BUSINESS**

**of the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session  
Paris, 3rd-6th December 1990**

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### **MONDAY, 3rd DECEMBER**

#### **Morning**

Meetings of political groups.

#### **Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session.
5. Action by the Presidential Committee:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly.  
Debate.
6. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
7. Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty  
(a) reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council:  
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*  
(b) WEU and the European Community:  
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

### **TUESDAY, 4th DECEMBER**

#### **Morning 10 a.m.**

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council.  
Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.
2. European security and the Gulf crisis:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Political Committee.  
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee.  
Joint debate.

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council.  
Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.
2. European security and the Gulf crisis:  
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region:  
Resumed joint debate.

**WEDNESDAY, 5th DECEMBER**

**Morning 10 a.m.**

1. Address by Mr. Bartholomew, Under-Secretary for International Security Affairs, United States Department of State.

**11 a.m.**

2. Address by Mr. Clark, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom.
3. European security and the Gulf crisis:  
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region:  
Resumed joint debate.  
*Votes on the draft recommendations.*
4. Enhancing WEU's public relations:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roman on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft budget.*
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.*
3. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lemoine on behalf of the Political Committee.  
Debate.



**THURSDAY, 6th DECEMBER**

**Morning 10 a.m.**

1. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security:  
Resumed debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. Konversiya – conversion in Soviet military industry:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**CLOSE OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION**



*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly  
for the financial year 1989*

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**THE AUDITOR'S REPORT**

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LETTER FROM THE AUDITOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY – 15th June 1990.

REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1989 – 15th June 1990.

CERTIFICATE OF THE AUDITOR FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1989 – 15th June 1990.

APPENDICES

- I. Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1989 – financial position as at 31st December 1989.
  - II. Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1989.
  - III. Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of WEU London in respect of contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1989.
  - IV. Provident fund – account for the financial year ended 31st December 1989.
  - V. 1989 balance sheet for the Communist Group
  - VI. 1989 balance sheet for the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats
  - VII. 1989 balance sheet for the Liberal Group
  - VIII. 1989 balance sheet for the Socialist Group
- 

***Letter from the President of the Assembly  
to the Auditor submitting the accounts  
for the financial year 1989***

*13th April 1990*

Dear Mr. Chandernagor,

In accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of WEU, I have the honour to submit to you the accounts for the financial year 1989 in accordance with the statements attached hereto, which refer to:

- (a) Summary of income and expenditure – financial position as at 31st December 1989 (Appendix I);

(b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II);

(c) Contributions (Appendix III);

(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).

As is customary, after being audited these tables will be signed by the President of the Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration before being submitted to the Assembly.

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a

saving of F 42 973, whereas the final statement of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 106 113. The difference between these two figures, i.e. F 63 140, shows an excess of receipts over estimates:

	F	F
- Bank interest	81 627	
- Sundry receipts	86 128	
- Sale of publications	34 269	
- Contributions 7%	<u>500 116</u>	
		702 140
- Receipts for 1989 estimated in the budget		<u>639 000</u>
		+ 63 140

3. Excess expenditure under Head V of the operating budget, amounting to F 381 276, has been met by transfers from other heads of the budget.

4. The statement of contributions for the financial year 1989 (revised 1989 budget) received from the Secretary-General of WEU London, is given at Appendix III.

5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident fund are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the joint fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

On 31st December 1989, these amounts totalled F 4 771 055 as shown in Appendix IV. On that date there remained two loans to two staff members amounting to F 833 140.

The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of these funds. On 31st December 1989 the fund was held by Montagu Investment Management Limited in London.

6. Also appended to the accounts of the Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed to the political groups drawn up in accordance with the directives issued by the Presidential Committee (document A/WEU/CP (86) 39) as follows:

- Communist Group;
- Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats;
- Liberal Group;
- Socialist Group.

These reports will be considered as an integral part of the accounts of the Assembly; they give details of the use of credits included in

Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of the Assembly.

Yours sincerely,

Charles GOERENS  
*President of the Assembly*

Monsieur André CHANDERNAGOR  
Premier Président de la Cour des Comptes de France  
13, rue Cambon  
75001 PARIS

*Letter from the Auditor to the President  
of the Assembly*

15th June 1990

Dear Mr. Goerens,

I have the honour to enclose the accounts of the Assembly of Western European Union for the financial year 1989 together with my opinion and report on these accounts.

Yours sincerely,

André CHANDERNAGOR  
(*Premier Président de la  
Cour des Comptes de France*)  
*Commissaire aux Comptes*

Mr. Charles GOERENS  
President of the Assembly of  
Western European Union  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75016 PARIS

*Report of the External Auditor  
to the Assembly of Western European Union  
on the accounts for the financial year 1989*

15th June 1990

I have audited the accounts of Western European Union for the financial year 1989 in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the correct management of the budget and the book-keeping.

The final statement of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 106 113 whereas the statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a saving of F 42 973.

The difference, i.e. F 63 140, is due to higher sundry receipts than estimated; receipts were F 702 140 compared with the corresponding estimates of F 639 000.

The total saving in the budget may be summarised as follows:

	Total credit after transfers F	Total expenditure F	Balance F
<i>Part I:</i>			
<i>Operating Budget</i>			
<i>Head I</i>			
Permanent staff	11 774 508	11 736 338	38 170
<i>Head II</i>			
Temporary staff	3 109 077	3 109 073	4
<i>Head III</i>			
Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 643 195	1 643 189	6
<i>Head IV</i>			
General administrative costs	1 915 052	1 914 288	764
<i>Head V</i>			
Other expenditure	2 005 276	2 005 221	55
<i>Head VI</i>			
Premises	1 963 394	1 963 394	—
<i>Part II</i>			
<i>Pensions Budget</i>			
<i>Head I</i>			
Pensions, allowances and social charges	3 133 492	3 129 518	3 974
Total			42 973

The financial situation compared to that on 31st December 1988 has therefore improved significantly as shown in the following table:

Final statement of income and expenditure on 31st December of the financial year	Saving on expenditure	Difference between estimates and income
1986: + 20 731	+ 241 257	— 220 526
1987: + 35	+ 153 549	— 153 514
1988: + 6 591	+ 82 179	— 75 588
1989: + 106 113	+ 42 973	+ 63 140

In particular, it should be noted that:

- after having been practically nil in 1987 and 1988, the result of the financial year in 1989 is F 106 113;
- the steady decline in available budget credits available at the end of the financial year: from F 241 257 in 1986 to F 42 973 in 1989, which shows a better overall adjustment of credit and actual expenditure, subject to what will be emphasised hereafter regarding changes made by transfer during the

financial year affecting more particularly certain heads and sub-heads of the budget;

- the complete reversal of the situation noted from 1986 to 1988, i.e., the deficit resulting from the shortfall of income compared with estimates; in 1989, there was a positive balance of F 63 140.

In the main, in spite of a further reduction in bank interest (from F 143 669 in 1988 to F 81 627 in 1989), this is due to a more realistic assessment of initial estimates of income.

#### Situation of transfers between heads in 1989

+ —

#### *Part I:* *Operating Budget*

Head I	25 910	149 402
Head II	63 249	299 172
Head III	62 638	97 043
Head IV	41 180	152 128
Head V	388 276	7 000
Head VI	—	—

#### *Part II:* *Pensions Budget*

Head I	142 792	19 300
Total	724 045	724 045

Analysis of transfers within Heads II to V or between these heads, in accordance with Article 6, Part III, of the Financial Regulations, calls for the following comments.

In Head V “other expenditure”, not negligible amounts have been paid into sub-heads 25 (expenses for representation) and 27 (official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk) during the year, i.e., respectively: + 66.36% and + 45.5%, distinctly more than in 1988.

It is to be noted that changes of this magnitude have been possible because no transfers have been made to sub-heads of other heads of the budget, which are apparently systematically over-funded in the initial budget.

This is so for a few budget items which act as a reservoir for flexible modifications during the year of the shape of the budget adopted previously:

#### *Head II (temporary staff)*

*Sub-Head 6.2: interpretation service (during sessions)*  
— 12% (— 10.5% in 1988)

#### *Sub-Head 6.3: translation service*

— 14% (— 15% in 1988)

*Sub-Head 7: interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions*

– 11.5% (+ 10% in 1988)

*Head IV (general administrative costs)*

*Sub-Head 20: printing and publication of documents*

– 12.7% (– 26% in 1988)

A determination of estimates taking account of the conditions in which the previous budget was implemented and as accurate an assessment as possible of requirements for the financial year in question would make it possible to respect more strictly the initial shape of the budgetary appropriations.

Having completed this audit, I thank the President, the Clerk and staff of the Assembly for their co-operation in the exercise of my duties as Auditor.

André CHANDERNAGOR  
(*Premier Président de la  
Cour des Comptes de France*)  
*Commissaire aux Comptes*

***Certificate of the Auditor for the financial  
year 1st January to 31st December 1989***

***15th June 1990***

In application of Article 15 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of Western European Union, I have examined the appended financial statements of the Assembly comprising the summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1989.

My examination included verification of the books and other relevant documents that I deemed necessary.

As a result of this examination, my opinion is that these operations were in conformity with the budget estimates, the financial regulations, the financial instructions and other decisions of the legislative authority, and that they are a correct record of the financial situation for the year ended 31st December 1989.

André CHANDERNAGOR  
(*Premier Président de la  
Cour des Comptes de France*)  
*Commissaire aux Comptes*

## APPENDIX I

*Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1989*

(in French francs)

*Per attached statement*

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III) .....	24 904 994
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*Miscellaneous*

## (A) Sundry receipts

Bank interest .....	81 627
Sundry receipts .....	86 128
Sale of publications .....	34 269

## (B) Pensions

Contributions (7%) .....	500 116	
		702 140

Budget credits .....	25 607 134
----------------------	------------

Total expenditure (see Appendix II) .....	25 501 021
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Excess of income over expenditure .....	F 106 113
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*Financial position as at 31st December 1989**Assets*

Contributions received .....	3 829 220.36
Bank interest .....	49 739.35
Contributions 7% .....	10 673.53
Sundry receipts .....	33 533.53
Non-recoverable taxes .....	453 927.15
	F 4 377 093.92

*Liabilities*

Balance at the bank .....	1 288 104.75
Sums paid .....	2 982 875.93
Excess of income over expenditure .....	106 113.24
	F 4 377 093.92

*Certified correct:*

Charles GOERENS  
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS  
Clerk of the Assembly

Karl-Heinz KLEJDZINSKI  
Chairman of the Committee  
on Budgetary Affairs  
and Administration

## STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE

(in French)

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1989	
A.1. - ORDINARY EXPENDITURE			
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF			
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Basic salaries	8 320 000	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Allowances		
2.1.	Expatriation allowance	825 000	
2.2.	Household allowance	380 000	
2.3.	Allowance for children and other dependent persons	475 000	
2.4.	Rent allowance	82 000	
2.5.	Education allowance	65 000	
2.6.	Allowance for language courses	2 000	
2.7.	Overtime	50 000	
2.8.	Home leave	20 000	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Social charges		
3.1.	Social security	1 120 000	
3.2.	Supplementary insurance	350 000	
3.3.	Provident fund	160 000	
<i>Sub-Head 4</i>	Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials		
4.1.	Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts	-	
4.2.	Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	-	
4.3.	Removal expenses	40 000	
4.4.	Installation allowance	-	
<i>Sub-Head 5</i>	Medical examination	9 000	
Total of Head I		11 898 000	



IX II  
**ND UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1989**  
 ancs)

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		40 000	8 280 000	8 277 925	2 075
	720		825 720	825 719	1
		17 320	362 680	361 980	700
		40 492	434 508	433 924	584
			82 000	79 063	2 937
			65 000	64 054	946
		2 000	-	-	-
	13 830		63 830	63 825	5
			20 000	19 097	903
		37 190	1 082 810	1 082 793	17
	11 060		361 060	361 059	1
		2 400	157 600	157 599	1
		-	-	-	-
		-	-	-	-
		10 000	30 000	-	30 000
		-	-	-	-
	300		9 300	9 300	-
	25 910	149 402	11 774 508	11 736 338	38 170

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1989	
<b>HEAD II – TEMPORARY STAFF</b>			
<i>Sub-Head 6</i>	Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly		
6.1.	Sittings service	1 137 000	
6.2.	Interpretation service	549 000	
6.3.	Translation service	799 000	
6.4.	Other services	40 000	
<i>Sub-Head 7</i>	Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	640 000	
<i>Sub-Head 8</i>	Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	15 000	
<i>Sub-Head 9</i>	Social charges		
9.1.	Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	12 000	
9.2.	Provident fund for interpreters	146 000	
9.3.	Insurance for interpreters	7 000	
<b>Total of Head II</b>		<b>3 345 000</b>	
<b>HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</b>			
<i>Sub-Head 10</i>	Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	406 000	
<i>Sub-Head 11</i>	Hire of committee rooms	5 000	
<i>Sub-Head 12</i>	Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	721 600	
<i>Sub-Head 13</i>	Various services for the organisation of sessions	47 000	
<i>Sub-Head 14</i>	Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	13 000	
<i>Sub-Head 15</i>	Purchase or repair of office furniture	50 000	
<i>Sub-Head 16</i>	Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	–	
<i>Sub-Head 17</i>	Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	435 000	
<b>Total of Head III</b>		<b>1 677 600</b>	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	38 353		1 175 353	1 175 353	-
		65 273	483 727	483 726	1
		114 154	684 846	684 845	1
		4 814	35 186	35 185	1
	-	74 249	565 751	565 751	-
	24 896	-	39 896	39 896	-
	-	2 063	9 937	9 936	1
		35 348	110 652	110 652	-
		3 271	3 729	3 729	-
	63 249	299 172	3 109 077	3 109 073	4
		82 350	323 650	323 647	3
	28 481		33 481	33 480	1
	4 002		725 602	725 602	-
	3 965		50 965	50 965	-
		11 615	1 385	1 385	-
	-	3 078	46 922	46 922	-
	-		-	-	-
	26 190		461 190	461 188	2
	62 638	97 043	1 643 195	1 643 189	6

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1989	
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
<i>Sub-Head 18</i>	Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	500 000	
<i>Sub-Head 19</i>	Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	270 000	
<i>Sub-Head 20</i>	Printing and publication of documents	1 077 500	
<i>Sub-Head 21</i>	Purchase of documents	63 000	
<i>Sub-Head 22</i>	Official cars	115 000	
<i>Sub-Head 23</i>	Bank charges	500	
Total of Head IV		2 026 000	
HEAD V – OTHER EXPENDITURE			
<i>Sub-Head 24</i>	Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	160 000	
<i>Sub-Head 25</i>	Expenses for representation	220 000	
<i>Sub-Head 26</i>	Committee study missions	5 000	
<i>Sub-Head 27</i>	Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk	400 000	
<i>Sub-Head 28</i>	Expenses of experts and the auditor	70 000	
<i>Sub-Head 29</i>	Expenditure on information	410 000	
<i>Sub-Head 30</i>	Expenses for political groups	336 000	
<i>Sub-Head 31</i>	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	
<i>Sub-Head 32</i>	Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	
Total of Head V		1 624 000	
Total		20 570 600	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	–			
	32 810		532 810	532 806	4
	–	13 878	256 122	255 377	745
		137 950	939 550	939 546	4
	702		63 702	63 702	–
	7 668		122 668	122 667	1
		300	200	190	10
	41 180	152 128	1 915 052	1 914 288	764
	28 824		188 824	188 823	1
	146 363		366 363	366 362	1
		5 000	–	–	–
	182 765		582 765	582 764	1
	8 202		78 202	78 202	–
	15 490		425 490	425 490	–
			336 000	336 000	–
		2 000	1 000	949	51
	6 632		26 632	26 631	1
	388 276	7 000	2 005 276	2 005 221	55
	581 253	707 745	20 447 108	20 408 109	38 999

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1989	
A.2. – EXTRAORDINARY EXPENDITURE			
HEAD VI – PREMISES			
<i>Sub-Head 33</i>	Reorganisation of the building	–	
<i>Sub-Head 33.1</i>	Feasibility study	61 000	
<i>Sub-Head 33.2</i>	Work on utilities	792 022	
<i>Sub-Head 33.3</i>	Prime contractorship	374 656	
<i>Sub-Head 34</i>	Installation of committee rooms	–	
<i>Sub-Head 34.1</i>	Interpretation equipment	309 986	
<i>Sub-Head 34.2</i>	Furnishing committee rooms	397 512	
<i>Sub-Head 34.3</i>	Furnishing corridor	–	
<i>Sub-Head 35</i>	National delegation offices	–	
<i>Sub-Head 35.1</i>	Furniture and other office equipment	–	
<i>Sub-Head 35.2</i>	Typewriters	–	
<i>Sub-Head 36</i>	Lounge in the first basement	28 218	
Total of A.2		1 963 394	
Total of Part I		22 533 994	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
			61 000	61 000	-
			792 022	792 022	-
			374 656	374 656	-
			-	-	-
			309 986	309 986	-
			397 512	397 512	-
			-	-	-
			-	-	-
			-	-	-
			-	-	-
			28 218	28 218	-
			1 963 394	1 963 394	-
	581 253	704 745	22 410 502	22 371 503	38 999

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET		Total budget for 1989	
<b>HEAD I – PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES</b>			
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	<b>Pensions and leaving allowances</b>		
1.1.	Retirement pensions	2 466 000	
1.2.	Invalidity pensions	228 000	
1.3.	Survivors' pensions	52 000	
1.4.	Orphans' or dependants' pensions	–	
1.5.	Leaving allowances	–	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	<b>Family allowances</b>		
2.1.	Household allowances	110 400	
2.2.	Children's and dependants' allowances	40 600	
2.3.	Education allowances	40 000	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	<b>Supplementary insurance</b>	73 000	
<b>Total of Head I</b>		<b>3 010 000</b>	
<b>Total</b>		<b>25 543 994</b>	

Charles GOERENS  
President of the Assembly

Georg  
Clerk of the Assembly



	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	20 200		2 486 200	2 486 185	15
	1 000		229 000	228 917	83
	-	-	52 000	51 463	537
			-	-	-
	113 492		113 492	113 492	-
	500		110 900	110 849	51
	-	5 000	35 600	35 502	98
	-	14 300	25 700	22 554	3 146
	7 600		80 600	80 556	44
	142 792	19 300	3 133 492	3 129 518	3 974
	724 045	724 045	25 543 994	25 501 021	42 973

IOULIAS  
Assembly

Karl-Heinz KLEJDZINSKI  
Chairman of the Committee on  
Budgetary Affairs and Administration

## APPENDIX III

**STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY  
BUDGET FOR 1989**

Member states	Contributions to the ordinary budget			Contributions to the extra- ordinary budget	Total payments up to 31st March 1990
	1st payment	2nd payment	3rd payment		
Belgium	485 311.88	1 092 925.83	607 610.52		2 185 848.23
France	987 075.00	2 222 900.00	1 235 818.00		4 445 793.00
Federal Republic of Germany	987 075.00	2 222 900.00	1 235 818.00	1 564 328.95	6 010 121.95
Italy	987 075.00	2 222 900.00	1 235 818.00		4 445 793.00
Luxembourg	16 451.24	37 048.34	20 596.96	27 605.81	101 702.35
Netherlands	485 311.88	1 092 925.83	607 610.52	768 361.57	2 954 209.80
Portugal					0.00
Spain					0.00
United Kingdom	987 075.00	2 222 900.00	1 235 818.00	1 564 328.95	6 010 121.95
Total	4 935 375.00	11 114 500.00	6 179 090.00	3 924 625.28	26 153 590.28

1989 budget ..... 24 904 994.00  
 1987 and 1988 surplus ..... - 82 626.64

24 822 367.36

Contributions brought forward in 1990 .. 1 331 222.92  
26 153 590.28

**Charles GOERENS**  
*President of the Assembly*

**Georges MOULIAS**  
*Clerk of the Assembly*

**Karl-Heinz KLEJDZINSKI**  
*Chairman of the Committee  
 on Budgetary Affairs and  
 Administration*

**APPENDIX IV**  
**PROVIDENT FUND**  
**ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1989**

*in French francs*

	F		F
<i>Balance brought forward:</i>			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1989	4 853 511	Withdrawals	
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	236 053	Management fee	17 442
Repayments of loans by staff members	216 600		
Interest received during the year	349 789		
		Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1989	4 771 055
		Loss on valuation at 31st December 1989	17 456
	5 655 953		5 655 953

**Charles GOERENS**  
*President of the Assembly*

**Georges MOULIAS**  
*Clerk of the Assembly*

**Karl-Heinz KLEJDZINSKI**  
*Chairman of the Committee on  
 Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

## APPENDIX V

*1989 Balance sheet for the Communist Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1988 (bank accounts, cash) .....	—
2. Interest .....	—
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1989 .....	35 793

*Liabilities*

## I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) .....	13 758
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) .....	5 494
3. Seminars and meetings .....	5 634
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .....	3 991
5. Interpretation costs .....	3 287
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) .....	3 052
7. Sundry expenses .....	577

II. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) .....	—
Total .....	35 793

Signatures of the Treasurer (PIERALLI) .....

and two auditors of the group (CANNATA, BENASSI) .....

## APPENDIX VI

*1989 Balance sheet for the Federated Group  
of Christian Democrats and European Democrats**Assets*

F

1. Surplus at 31st December 1988 (bank accounts, cash) .....	200 565.78
2. Interest .....	12 138.81
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1989 .....	<u>142 591.00</u>
Total .....	355 295.59

*Liabilities*

## I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) .....	39 000.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) .....	1 209.30
3. Seminars and meetings .....	42 597.11
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .....	53 064.58
5. Interpretation costs .....	—
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) .....	—
7. Sundry expenses .....	—
Total .....	<u>135 870.99</u>

II. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) .....	<u>219 424.60</u>
Total .....	355 295.59

Signatures of the Treasurer (JUNG, Dudley SMITH) .....

and two auditors of the group (LENTZ-CORNETTE, PARISI) ..

## APPENDIX VII

*1989 Balance sheet for the Liberal Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1988 (bank accounts, cash) .....	43 742.05
2. Interest .....	1 623.11
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1989 .....	<u>49 142.00</u>
Total .....	94 507.16

*Liabilities*

## I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) .....	23 001.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) .....	4 050.00
3. Seminars and meetings .....	13 000.00
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .....	2 460.00
5. Interpretation costs .....	—
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) .....	8 900.00
7. Sundry expenses .....	<u>—</u>
Total .....	51 411.00

II. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) .....	<u>43 096.16</u>
Total .....	94 507.16

Signatures of the Treasurer (VOHRER) .....

and two auditors of the group (MARTINO, ZYWIEZ) .....

APPENDIX VIII

*1989 Balance sheet for the Socialist Group*

*Assets*

F

1. Surplus at 31st December 1988 (bank accounts, cash) .....	185 468.75
2. Interest .....	10 000.00
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1989 .....	<u>108 474.00</u>
Total .....	303 942.75

*Liabilities*

I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) .....	79 044.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) .....	3 023.40
3. Missions and meetings .....	38 854.21
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .....	11 546.00
5. Seminars .....	—
6. Interpretation costs .....	15 000.00
7. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) .....	—
8. Sundry expenses .....	—
Total .....	<u>147 467.61</u>

II. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) .....	<u>156 475.14*</u>
Total .....	303 942.75

Signatures of the Treasurer (GARRETT) .....

and two auditors of the group (LINSTER, TUMMERS) .....

\* Bank Statement No. 227  
 = 6 275  
 + 200 (to be credited)  
 6 475  
 + 150 000 short term  
 156 475.14

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly  
for the financial year 1989*

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**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY  
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1989 <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1989, together with the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, Lagorce (Alternate for Mr. Dhaille) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: Fabra), Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), Dame Peggy Fenner (Alternate: Lord), MM. Garcia Sanchez, Greco, Mrs. Haas-Berger, Mrs Hoffmann, MM. Masseret (Alternate: Hunault), Morris, Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond (Alternate: Lord Mackie), Silva Marques (Alternate: Fernandes Marques), Sinesio, Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Vara.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*



*Communiqué issued at the close of the ministerial meeting  
of the Council of Western European Union*

*Paris, 21st August 1990*

1. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU met on 21st August 1990 to discuss the situation in the Gulf caused by the Iraqi invasion and then the annexation of Kuwait. The meeting was held pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the WEU treaty, the Rome declaration of October 1984 and the platform on European security interests of October 1987, which provides for member countries to concert their policies on crises outside Europe insofar as they may affect European security interests.
2. The ministers of the WEU member states repeat their unreserved condemnation of the invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq and call on Iraq to comply immediately and unconditionally with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660 and 662. They restate their firm determination to continue to take all necessary steps to comply with the embargo of Iraq in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 and to render it effective. They call on the Security Council to take any further useful measures to this end.
3. Ministers declare that the determination their countries intend to display in upholding the law is for the sole purpose of ending aggression and its consequences. The action they have initiated is aimed at upholding respect of the principles which obtain in relations among states, for they concern the whole international community and serve as a safeguard for all its members.
4. Faced with a situation that in the first instance affects the Arab states, ministers emphasise the solidarity linking their countries to the Arab world and their resolve to support its efforts to seek a solution from within which respects the relevant Security Council resolutions in the context of their ongoing co-operation and dialogue with the Arab world.
5. Ministers express their acute concern and indignation at the restrictions on the freedom of movement of nationals of the member countries and at the inhuman treatment inflicted on some of those nationals. They warn Iraq of the grave consequences that would inevitably ensue were their safety to be placed at risk. They reiterate their support for Security Council Resolution 664 and demand that Iraq complies with it without delay.
6. They stress that WEU member countries, bearing in mind the vital European interests in the stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the states of the area, intend to contribute towards further enhancing the unprecedented international solidarity that has developed since the aggression and has led to effective action by the United Nations Security Council. The countries that are suffering from the economic consequences of this action deserve their solidarity.
7. Ministers welcome the measures being taken by member states in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 and in response to the requests for assistance from states in the Gulf region, with the aim of obliging Iraq unconditionally to withdraw its troops from Kuwaiti territory and restore Kuwait's sovereignty.
8. They have decided closely to co-ordinate their operations in the area aimed at implementing and enforcing the measures mentioned in paragraph 7, as well as any further measures the Security Council may adopt, also assuring, by common agreement, the protection of their forces. Building on the experience acquired, including the consultation mechanisms during the Gulf operations in 1987 and 1988, they have instructed an ad hoc group of foreign and defence ministry representatives to ensure the most effective co-ordination in capitals and in the region. This should cover among other things overall operational concepts and specific guidelines for co-ordination between forces in the region, including areas of operation, sharing of tasks, logistical support and exchange of intelligence. Contact points are being nominated in the ministries of defence to assist with co-operation at the practical/technical level and, as an immediate step, to prepare for a meeting of chiefs of defence staff to be held in the next few days.
9. Ministers emphasise that co-ordination within WEU should also facilitate co-operation with other countries deploying forces in the region, including those of the United States.
10. The presidency of the Council will inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the outcome of this meeting.

## INFORMATION LETTER

*from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,  
on the activities of the ministerial organs*

*(May 1990 – August 1990)*

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London, 10th September 1990

Dear President,

Since 2nd August, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Europeans have been faced by the disturbing realities of one of the North/South threats which the Council's Mediterranean Sub-Group is mandated to assess and which had been pushed to one side by the wave of near euphoric optimism generated by the ending of the cold war.

The situation created by Saddam Hussein's aggression, and the unanimous responses of the United Nations Security Council in first condemning the invasion and then denouncing the illegal annexation of Kuwait, have led to a policy of United Nations backed sanctions being put into place and American military support being given to Saudi Arabia and those Gulf states which have requested it. The taking of thousands of European and American hostages by the Iraqi leadership, who imagined that they could thereby place a human shield around their strategic, civilian and military installations, has provided a new dimension to the conflict, setting back the prospect of a diplomatic settlement – the only way of preventing further hostilities.

In this context, Europe had a duty to make its voice heard; it did so on 21st August last with a WEU ministerial meeting and an extraordinary ministerial meeting of European political co-operation which took place on the same day. Annexed to this letter is the text of the communiqué published after the WEU ministerial meeting and of the press statements issued after the meetings of chiefs of staff of the member states on 27th August and of the ad hoc co-ordination group on 31st August. The meeting on 21st August provided confirmation of the unanimous wish of the WEU member states to see the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty and the aggressor's unconditional withdrawal of its forces. It demonstrated their willingness to act in concert both in implementing and complying with the measures agreed by the United Nations Security Council and in committing their armed forces to the blockade of Iraq and to the enforcement of the embargo.

The mechanisms put in place during the previous Gulf crisis in 1987-88 have provided a basis for agreement on the framework for the ad hoc consultations and co-ordination currently taking place within WEU. These consultations and co-ordination are at three levels: the politico-military level with the ad hoc Group of Foreign and Defence Ministry Representatives, that of the naval contact points in the capitals and, lastly, that of the commanders of units deployed in the region. The aim is to ensure tactical co-ordination of operations in the Gulf so as to give maximum effectiveness to the European presence and, more particularly, to facilitate co-operation between Europe and the United States in their support of the Arab states who are united in their condemnation of an unjustified act of aggression. Ministers also thought it necessary to call for a meeting of the chiefs of staff of the member countries. At this meeting – a "first" in WEU's reactivation history – the chiefs of staff agreed on the wording of joint specific guidelines for concerted action by the member states, these guidelines subsequently being approved by the ad hoc co-ordination group on 31st August. The chiefs of staff could meet again at a later date depending on how the situation evolves in the Gulf. The need for confidentiality to ensure the effectiveness of the deterrent forces being assembled does not, for obvious reasons, allow me to give any more details about the agenda of the current consultations taking place within the WEU intergovernmental organs and the ad hoc co-ordination group.

The forthcoming meetings between the Chairman-in-Office and the Presidential Committee will undoubtedly be an opportunity for detailed exchanges of view on WEU's reaction to the events and on its rôle in the international effort being made to checkmate the unacceptable behaviour of the Iraqi aggressor. The fact that WEU, in its own right, co-chaired the naval conference in Bahrain on 8th September along with the two United States and Arab states representatives is tangible proof that our organisation is indeed the only one competent to give practical expression to the European will to react concretely to the direct threats to peace and security in the widest sense. This conference was prepared by a meeting of WEU member states' representatives on the spot.

It is clearly too soon to draw conclusions on the impact of this new Gulf crisis on the future development of European security structures or of WEU operational mechanisms concerning problems "out of Europe". What we can do at least is to itemise the premisses on the basis of which WEU must now undertake a process of reflection; this should be conducted in the coming weeks with the utmost seriousness by the three component parts of our organisation, namely, the Council and its working groups, the Institute for Security Studies and the committees of the parliamentary Assembly.

Apart from the radical transformation in East-West relations and in the European strategic landscape, it is clear that 1990 will also be marked by a split in the turbulent history of the Near and Middle East, i.e. in the Arab world as a whole. Consequently, WEU must not only monitor daily the developments in the Gulf region and in particular their repercussions throughout the Arab world and the Mediterranean basin – as the ministerial meeting on 21st August instructed it to do – but, even more important, it must analyse the long-term consequences of this crisis for the European continent and for the future of security relations between Europe and the Arab world.

With the ending of the cold war, Central and Eastern Europe and the Arab world have seen the emergence of problems partially obscured by the diplomatic acts which sanctioned the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and later by Yalta. For long hidden from view by virtue of the Soviet grip on half the continent, these problems are again surfacing in various places and with varying degrees of intensity. Given that they are likely to call into question issues of sovereignty or frontiers, or even both, particularly in the Balkans, they demand our closest possible attention. In the Arab world, the interlinked issues of decolonisation, oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict have aroused a shady nationalism cause to use force in order to "liberate" and, at the same time, unify an Arab homeland about which the myths are so strong that it is hard to define either their substance or geographical boundaries. The fact is that the Iraqi argument that a proletarian nation has been compelled to use force by the egotistical behaviour of oil oligarchies with no real legitimacy does not fall on deaf ears among Arab public opinion. For all that, a policy of appeasement towards Saddam Hussein is nonetheless unacceptable both from the point of view of international law and human rights and in view of the subsequent risks of the Iraqi leadership using chemical or even nuclear weapons as a means of blackmail. But the response to the Iraqi leader's act of aggression must not be seen as a crusade by the rich. Europe is committed on the ground to the implementation of the Security Council resolutions and because its vital interests are at stake. These interests are not fundamentally different from those of the Arab countries with whom multi-faceted co-operation is in fact both vital and desirable. The practical arrangements for this co-operation will have to be co-ordinated so that it is not dominated by the priority – too often given in the past – to short-term commercial interests favouring immediate financial gain. Could not the present crisis be an opportunity for negotiations aimed at resolving all the region's problems once Iraq has stopped flouting international law?

In this context, the efforts being made by Europe and the Maghreb to map out a joint diplomatic approach, together with the proposals for a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean, take on added importance. There is an urgent need to define a joint European policy in this regard.

The Gulf crisis has confirmed the restoration of United Nations credibility, the Secretary-General excelling in making optimum use in the circumstances of his limited margin of manoeuvre. The unprecedented speed of reaction shown by the Security Council has undoubtedly prevented the conflict spreading and only under United Nations sanctions can there be a sufficiently effective joint implementation of the embargo measures. Lastly, only under United Nations auspices could military action be taken if, in the last resort, it became clear that there was no other way of restoring the territorial integrity of Kuwait.

If the rôle of the United Nations in the Gulf crisis testifies to its renewal, this will increase respect for the rights established under international law, the flouting of which represents an unacceptable retrograde step. However, the United Nations' capacity for action will be even more meaningful if it can devolve to regional co-operation organisations for which the CSCE could provide a model if the prospects for institutionalisation materialise.

The very nature of the current upheavals, the progress of the procedures for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the growing degree of global interdependence all call into question the concept of neutrality which seems no longer tenable in the face of global challenges. The extent of the repercussions in Europe is hard to predict and they will trigger chain reactions from which no European state can consider itself immune.

All this calls, in the final analysis, for strengthened European cohesion both at the diplomatic level and in the field of security. The swift political action by the European Community must not be allowed to conceal the patchy and uncertain nature of some national reactions. The difficult progress towards political union in Europe, the faltering attempts at "Europe in its defence dimension" have

been repeatedly underscored by events. Mr. Martens and a number of observers were right in saying that the crisis has revealed the regrettable lack of a European security policy and that the consequences of that should be weighed at the intergovernmental conference on political union. At least the need for close consultation between the member governments of WEU in deploying their forces and securing the embargo has enabled encouraging progress to be made.

The Helsinki summit is to be welcomed for having contributed to the concert of nations' condemnation of the use of force and to the clear reaffirmation that there can be no compromise which endorses the aggressor's act of impunity. The Helsinki summit has strengthened the international consensus whilst keeping open the option of a diplomatic settlement. It marked an important stage in the prevention of armed conflict. The aggressor, now and in the future, must be made to understand that aggression against one member of the United Nations is tantamount to aggression against all and that he can have no hope of succeeding by counting on the divisions within the Security Council.

The collapse of communism, German unification, conventional disarmament, the increasing number of areas of instability in Europe and on the periphery of our continent are part of the new geostrategic order which demands that the countries of WEU commit all their political, economic and military resources in order that Europe can shoulder full responsibility for its territorial defence and that of its overseas interests. With WEU, Europe has a nucleus around which to build a new European defence structure, a structure which must include operational responsibilities, particularly for intervention outside Europe.

Thus, beyond the events of the Gulf crisis, the urgent need to identify institutional solutions enabling Europe to play its rightful rôle in maintaining peace and international stability will dominate the WEU agenda until the end of this year and beyond.

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In the wake of the Ministerial Council of last April, the Permanent Council has met four times between 30th May and 18th July to oversee the implementation of the ministerial mandates.

The Council has closely monitored developments in the German unification process and the preparations for the Atlantic Alliance summit. The London declaration and the results of the summit were at the centre of the Council's discussions on topical questions on 18th July and of those of its working groups the following day. The summit marked an historical turning-point for the alliance: the cold war was now a thing of the past.

The implications of these events for the CFE negotiations in Vienna and the adaptation of member countries' armed forces were, together with the prospects for the institutionalisation of the CSCE, on the agenda of meetings of the Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group. These groups met separately twice and held a joint meeting on 19th July.

The institutionalisation of the CSCE, as envisaged by Chancellor Kohl in his speech on 25th May, is regarded as a vital stage in the creation of a structure complementary to the present framework of European security consisting of the Community, WEU and NATO. Such a structure would enable the Soviet Union gradually to become fully associated with new forms of pan-European co-operation. That means intensifying the dialogue through regular meetings at various levels of both foreign affairs and defence representatives; the establishment of a Permanent Council with a small secretariat to provide continuity; a communications system dedicated to the 35 member states; more frequent contacts between the armed forces; a joint verification centre and/or a centre for conflict prevention whose responsibilities and method of operation have yet to be discussed.

The Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group have begun to study the prospects for future negotiations on conventional arms control "post CFE", both from the point of view of their specific aims and as regards a definition of their legal framework. At the same time, delegates have stressed the importance of member states ensuring the continuity of the process of negotiating confidence-building measures under the existing mandate until the Helsinki conference in 1992 and that they should do this irrespective of the stage reached in the negotiations by the time of the CSCE summit next November.

German unity has implications for the future CFE treaty and indeed for the choice of an appropriate forum (23 or 35 nation?) for continuing the negotiations on questions not resolved by this treaty (further force reductions and force restructuring, problem of aircraft, and the question of troop levels, for example). The general aim of these negotiations could be the establishment of regional balances and of new military structures based on defensive doctrines. Conventional arms control, confidence-building measures and the creation of new security architectures are, alongside the institutionalisation of the CSCE, the three ways of strengthening stability in Europe. There are two short-term aims; first,

to limit the Soviet army's margin of manoeuvre for offensive action since it will undoubtedly remain the most powerful on the European continent for some time to come; second, to prevent the emergence of regional instability in Central and Eastern Europe.

Detailed consideration also needs to be given to the means of nuclear deterrence in Europe in general and the aims of the future negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles in particular.

Finally, the Council's working groups have continued their exchanges of view on a definition of Europe's future security system. The key question at issue is to know how security co-operation can be established among all the countries of Europe through the intermediary of the CSCE without jeopardising the commitments binding the countries of Western Europe – the European Community, WEU – or those linking these countries with North America.

On the question of the current review of alliance strategy, WEU member states must bring all their weight to bear in this process. Western Europe will in fact have to shoulder a greater responsibility for conventional defence and the new constraints arising from the implementation of the CFE treaty will call for much closer defence co-operation, which will undoubtedly affect the linkage between the component parts of the reorganised European defence posture. It is within WEU that specific proposals must be drawn up enabling Europeans to reply positively to the invitation from the United States for "partnership in leadership" within the alliance and its politico-military bodies.

The Defence Representatives Group has continued its work on co-operation in the field of verification. Meetings of experts are planned. In addition, the feasibility of multinational units is still on the group's agenda, as are preparations for a meeting of chiefs of staff next year.

The Mediterranean Sub-Group met on 18th May and considered the opportunities of a possible conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean, about which there have been several initiatives and proposals. There was also a discussion of the results of the Rome meeting (21st-22nd March) on the prospects for regional co-operation in the Western Mediterranean; this meeting was attended by the five countries of the Arab Maghreb Union and by four member states of WEU.

Having finished its report on naval deployments, the sub-group agreed to continue a process of joint reflection on the complex problems of including talks on naval resources on the agenda of a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean. What now has to be done is to examine in greater depth the arguments underlying the western position on this question, as defined in the context of the CFE negotiations.

The sub-group decided to update the report on the implications for European security of ballistic missile proliferation with respect to the chemical capabilities of those countries possessing missiles. A "tour de table" was primarily devoted to the worrying scale of the armaments programme in Iraq, which seems determined to acquire a long-range strike capability.

Lastly, the sub-group was briefed on developments in the Saharan peace process.

The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space held several meetings at both plenary and expert level in order to prepare specific proposals which would enable the Ministerial Council, at its next meeting, to give its opinion on the opportuneness of setting up a satellite observation agency. Given the highly-specialised nature of the studies in hand, the Presidency decided to assign the highest degree of confidentiality to these studies. Consequently, it is not possible to comment on their progress in this information letter.

In the coming months, it will be more important than ever that the activities of the three components of our organisation are coherent, having due regard of course to their political and intellectual independence. This is something that we shall all have to keep uppermost in our minds. I am therefore pleased that my colleagues and I will soon have the opportunity to meet the Assembly's committees. This will allow a more flexible and substantive dialogue to develop between the Assembly and the Council and contribute to the necessary strengthening of our organisation's work for European security.

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On 18th July, the Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies outlined to the Permanent Council the work programme he planned to implement with the help of the four research fellows appointed on 13th June 1990. The Council endorsed the basic guidelines of this programme, namely, stimulating the wider debate on European security and carrying out study and research for the governments of the member states, and it congratulated Mr. John Roper on the energetic way in which his team had set to work on four subjects of equal importance, i.e.:

- the European security identity in the context of European union;

- the development of new European security structures taking account of the situation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe;
- the evolution of national defence policies, the new alliance strategy and the ensuing restructuring of forces;
- the economic, industrial and technological factors involved in creating a European defence "pillar", and the North-South dimension of European security.

From this autumn onwards, the Institute will play an important rôle through its contributions to the discussions on security policy consultation within WEU both at the level of the working groups and the Ministerial Council.

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The re-emergence or appearance – depending on the country concerned – of pluralist democratic régimes in Central and Eastern Europe espousing the market economy have prompted the countries of Western Europe to provide aid through economic co-operation under Community auspices or on a regional basis. At the initiative of the Council of Europe and the WEU Assembly, contacts have been forged and developed. The Council has recognised the important rôle of these two bodies and welcomed the initiatives.

At their Council meeting in Brussels, WEU Ministers instructed the Presidency and the Secretary-General to establish contacts for two-way information with the democratically-elected governments in Central and Eastern Europe. Preparations are in hand for a visit to Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

From 3rd to 6th July 1990, I visited Poland at the invitation of the Director of the Polish Institute of International Relations. The initiative for this invitation came from the Polish Foreign Minister during talks I was privileged to have with him last March in Luxembourg on the fringes of the Assembly's extraordinary session.

During my visit, I gave a speech on the present and future rôle of WEU to the Polish Institute of International Relations (PISM). I was received by Professor Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Onyszkiewicz, Deputy Minister of National Defence and former Solidarity spokesman, Professor Geremek, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the SEJM, and, lastly, by Professor Lamentowitsj, on secondment to the Centre for International Studies of the Senate.

Professor Makarczyk, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave a dinner in my honour attended by representatives of WEU countries. (France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were present at ambassadorial level.)

The talks centred on the future of the Warsaw Pact after the CFE treaty had been signed. My interlocutors expressed interest in the idea of multinational forces, which could become a symbol of European reconciliation, and also in the activities of WEU in its three component parts. The Polish leadership wished to develop a political consultation process with their Baltic and Balkan neighbours, with those to the West and to the East, whilst at the same time strengthening the CSCE process. My interlocutors underlined their interest in belonging to the Council of Europe, without waiting for the elections the following spring, and in being accorded observer status at WEU. They were keen to demonstrate that they belonged within the sphere of western-style parliamentary and pluralist democracies.

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In the field of public relations and information on the rôle and activities of WEU, my colleagues and I attended the following events:

- on 8th May, Mr. Anthony Elford represented the secretariat at the NATO exercise "Bold Game 90" in the Baltic Sea, involving exercises with fast patrol boats. It also provided an opportunity to explain to the German, Danish and Norwegian officers taking part the rôle and activities of WEU, particularly in the Gulf crisis of 1987-88;

- from 14th to 18th May, Mr. E. F. Destefanis, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, attended an international seminar in Nice and Toulon on "Les îles et la sécurité en Méditerranée" organised by the Observatoire stratégique méditerranéen; Mr. Destafanis spoke on the current aspects of security in the Mediterranean;

- on 14th May, Mr. Anthony Elford visited Airbase 132 at Colmar-Meyenheim for a verification exercise as part of preparations for the establishment of the French verification unit;

- on 15th May, at the secretariat, I received a delegation from the German Defence College and addressed them on the subject of WEU;
- on 16th and 17th May, the Deputy Secretary-General and I attended SHAPEX 90 on the theme “European transition – challenges for NATO”; the exercise focused on the measures to be taken to enhance and ensure stability in Europe in the years to come. Among the subjects discussed were WEU, defence at the borders, the concept of multinational units and future structures for pan-European co-operation. The activities of the working groups illustrated the growing interest being shown in NATO and SHAPE circles in the activities of WEU;
- on 17th May, I attended a meeting of the “Bremer Tabak-Collegium” in Brussels, during which Mr. Woerner spoke on the security of Europe in this decade;
- on 17th May, Mr. Arnaud Jacomet represented the secretariat at the East-West conference organised by the British Atlantic Group of Young Politicians which took place from 14th to 17th May at Lancaster House: he spoke on “The rôle of WEU in the new relations with Eastern Europe”;
- on 22nd May, I addressed the NATO Defence College in Rome on “A security design for Europe”;
- on 31st May, I addressed the Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels on the subject “Europe’s security in a European union”;
- on 3rd and 4th June at Orta San Giulio (near Milan), I addressed the 7th International Workshop on NATO political-military decision-making organised by the Centre for Strategic Decision Research;
- on 19th June, Mr. E. F. Destefanis gave a talk about WEU and its activities to Brigadier Erik Rossander and 42 students of the Swedish War College who were on an official visit to the United Kingdom;
- on 20th June, I addressed the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, on the subject “Allies and adversaries” as part of a forum which was held from 19th to 21st June on “A ready navy, politics, budgets and naval forces in the 21st century”;
- on 22nd June, I took part in a conference organised by the Defence Study Centre of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Brussels, where I spoke on “The emerging security structure of Europe and the European Community”;
- on 29th June, I took part in a conference on the building of a new Europe organised by the Federal Trust for Education and Research at the offices of the European Commission in London;
- on 2nd July, I gave a speech on “The changed conditions of European security” at a seminar organised by the Paul Loebe Institute in Berlin;
- on 9th July, I visited Luxembourg to attend an East-West conference on the future of Europe, organised at the Bourglinster Castle by the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies and the Luxembourg Harvard Association;
- from 11th to 13th July, Mr. Diarmid Williams attended the annual international symposium organised by the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter and he presented a paper;
- on 16th July, Mr. A. Jacomet represented WEU at a dinner discussion organised by the European-Atlantic Group which was preceded by a talk by Mr. Michael Legge on “Security in the 90s: NATO’s rôle”;
- on 17th July, Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, spoke on the problems of arms co-operation during a seminar on this subject organised in Brussels by the Defence Systems Management College;
- on 28th July, I gave a talk on the new conditions of European security and the future rôle of WEU at the 18th annual conference of the Standing Conference of Atlantic Organisations which was being held at Fontainebleau and whose general theme was “Ending the division of Europe”.

Throughout this period, I have continued to have contacts with the press, radio and television to explain the orientation of WEU’s activities and its rôle in the current European context and in the Gulf crisis.

*Communiqué issued at the close of the ministerial meeting  
of the Council of Western European Union*

*Paris, 18th September 1990*

The foreign affairs and defence ministers of the member countries of Western European Union, at their extraordinary meeting in Paris,

- unreservedly condemn the new breaches of international law by the Iraqi authorities and the assault on personnel arising from the violation of diplomatic premises in Kuwait city, and following Iraq's intolerable act of aggression against another Arab country; they recall that the authors of these violations will carry a personal responsibility,

- express their resolve to apply and ensure the strict implementation of the embargo decided on by the United Nations Security Council in all its forms – the only way of reaching a political and peaceful solution to the crisis,

- decide to exchange information on all violations of which they may be aware, and jointly to identify any shortcomings in their embargo measures in order to rectify them as soon as possible,

- welcome the fact that, since their meeting on 21st August last, all the member states have made an effective contribution to the common effort, and that the co-ordination is proceeding effectively with other countries' forces deployed in the region,

- decide, as far as they are concerned, to take all further measures necessary, as soon as possible, for the full and effective enforcement of the embargo, with particular attention to air traffic, and call upon the Security Council rapidly to adopt the appropriate decisions to this end; these decisions should apply if necessary to any countries not complying with the embargo,

- endorse the decision by some member states to reinforce their air and ground forces in the region or to assist partners in deploying such forces and support the decisions taken or envisaged by the member states with a view to further deployments should the situation so demand,

- decide to strengthen the WEU co-ordination and to extend the co-ordination at present operating in the maritime field to ground and air forces and, within this framework, to identify the forms that these new deployments will take, to seek to ensure that they are complementary, to harmonise the missions of member states' forces and to pool their logistic support capabilities as required,

- intend to strengthen co-ordination with other countries having forces in the region, in particular the Arab states and the United States of America,

- are resolved to continue providing humanitarian aid to those countries particularly affected by the crisis,

- underline the solidarity linking their countries to the Arab world.



**DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE  
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1990 <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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THE SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET OF THE ASSEMBLY CONCERNING THE WORK ON ADAPTING  
THE BUILDING**

**APPENDIX**

Financial statement of work as at 31st July 1990 – Letter from the architect's  
office

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, Lagorce (Alternate for Mr. Dhaille) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: Fabra), Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), Dame Peggy Fenner (Alternate: Lord), MM. Garcia Sanchez, Greco, Mrs. Haas-Berger, Mrs. Hoffmann, MM. Masseret (Alternate: Hunault), Morris, Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond (Alternate: Lord Mackie), Silva Marques (Alternate: Fernandes Marques), Sinesio, Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Vara.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

### *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

#### *I. General*

1. In its supplementary budget for 1989, the Assembly, as the contracting authority, asked the Council for the sums necessary for work to adapt the building in accordance with the plans submitted by the office of Mr. Madon, the architect, and approved by the Council. This budget also included other requirements stemming from the building of two large conference rooms on the ground floor and a lounge in the basement, as well as the transfer of the national delegation offices to the second floor.
2. Of these sums, amounting to F 8 535 335 for all the sub-heads concerned and which formed the extraordinary section of the supplementary budget for the financial year 1989, F 1 963 394 was used during that financial year and the difference (F 6 571 941) was carried over to the financial year 1990 in application of Article 10 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.
3. Now that the work in question has been almost entirely completed and accepted, it is necessary to adjust initial estimates and assess the extra sums that are essential if the Assembly is to meet its contractual commitments.
4. In this connection, it should be stressed that the need to make the premises and equipment available to the Assembly before the opening of the June 1990 session was an absolute constraint. The contracting authority, assisted by the Council representative, was therefore faced with the need to take immediate decisions which sometimes meant overspending, as was the case when a firm which defaulted had to be replaced quickly. It should also be pointed out that extra expenditure was needed to install video message equipment and receivers in the national delegation offices which the Presidential Committee considered essential because of the transfer of the national delegation offices to the second floor.
5. The analysis of commitments under each sub-head of the "Extraordinary expenditure" section of the budget set out in the table below justifies the request for these supplementary sums.

#### *II. Analysis of the various budget heads*

##### *6. Sub-Head 33 "Reorganisation of the building"*

- 6.1. A first financial statement relating to the work was transmitted to the Council on 12th April 1990, which showed that sums initially included in Sub-Head 33 of the "Extraordinary expenditure" section of the supplementary budget had been overspent by F 342 098.23.
- 6.2. The office of Mr. Madon, the architect, prepared a further statement as at 31st July 1990 (see appendix) which included a summary of work carried out and fees. Taking into account extra work and other work that was less than expected, the financial position on that date represented a grand total (work plus fees) of F 6 757 847.30 excluding tax.
- 6.3. Compared with total credits initially included in the supplementary budget for 1989 (Sub-Head 33 of the "Extraordinary expenditure" section), this total exceeds the total estimates by F 344 672, i.e. 5.32 %.
- 6.4. It should be stressed that these figures are not yet final since, as the architect specified in his letter accompanying the statement of 31st July 1990, "negotiations with firms to work out the general, final balance due have not yet been completed". These negotiations relate in particular to work which has not yet been accepted and the penalties to be applied.
- 6.5. It will therefore be possible to establish the final position only when the current negotiations are completed and all the work has been accepted, but the final financial statement should not be very different from that set out in the abovementioned summary of work and fees.
- 6.6. Finally, it seems useful to give details of the sum of F 176 400 excluding tax that has been charged to Sub-Head 33.3 for co-ordination of work on the site. Initial estimates under this sub-head did not take account of this work which, in accordance with the decision taken on 6th November 1989 by the representatives of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Council and the Office of the Clerk, was also assigned to Mr. Madon's office. The corresponding expenditure could have been charged to Sub-Head 33.2 since it is strictly linked with the execution of work, but it was preferred to

charge it to Sub-Head 33.3 so as to harmonise the Assembly's budget with the financial statement prepared by the prime contractor.

#### 7. *Sub-Head 34 "Installation of committee rooms"*

7.1. The international call for tenders for installing simultaneous interpretation equipment in the two conference rooms and fourteen interpretation booths had extremely positive results since, as a result of competition, this equipment cost F 929 958, i.e. a saving of F 310 202 compared with the estimate under Sub-Head 34.1.

7.2. Conversely, fitting out these rooms cost F 128 652 more than the sum of F 600 000 granted by the Council for this purpose. However, it should be recalled that the Assembly's initial estimates amounted to F 825 000 and that the Council, in substantially reducing this sum, said it might grant further sums on the basis of the results of the call for tenders.

7.3. There were various tenders for fitting out the corridor but the architect has not yet expressed his opinion since he intends to propose furnishings that are both aesthetically coherent with the installation as a whole and functional. The initial estimate of F 36 000 should therefore be maintained.

7.4. There is thus a surplus (saving) under Sub-Head 34 of F 181 550.

#### 8. *Sub-Head 35 "National delegation offices"*

8.1. Organisation of the national delegation offices was far more complex and expensive than expected because the furniture in the offices of the former WEU agencies was nearly all so old and in poor condition that it was unsuitable for use. The venetian blinds, too, were unusable.

8.2. In order to keep expenditure as low as possible, the following steps were taken:

(a) Nine tables and ten chairs from the old conference rooms and ten other arm chairs were repaired	F 21 362
(b) Furniture (desks, arm chairs, typing desks, etc.) was purchased, plus other office fittings (shelves with pigeon holes, lamp shades, etc.) strictly essential to complete the furnishing of the various offices	53 963
(c) The venetian blinds in the offices of the nine delegation chairmen were replaced by net curtains	16 631
(d) Furniture already in the building had to be handled and transferred	11 430
(e) Name plates were fitted to nineteen doors	4 156
	F 107 542

8.3. In addition, there was the cost of installing a video message system and a wiring system for listening to debates (F 152 899). At its meeting on 7th March 1990, the Presidential Committee agreed that these were essential since the new delegation offices were so far from the chamber and decided that they should be installed in time for the June 1990 session.

8.4. Expenditure charged to Sub-Head 35.1 thus amounts to F 260 441. A further subsequent amount of F 50 000 should be added, needed to complete the replacement of the venetian blinds by net curtains in the other eleven delegation offices, to purchase additional furniture, in particular for the German Delegation, and to install wall plugs for receivers in the secretariat offices of certain delegations.

8.5. Total actual expenditure and estimated supplementary expenditure under Sub-Head 35.1 therefore amounts to F 310 441, i.e. F 192 441 more than the credits included in the budget. Sub-Head 35 as a whole is affected by this result since expenditure under Sub-Head 35.2 coincides with credits granted.

#### 9. *Sub-Head 36 "Lounge in the first basement"*

The sums granted proved insufficient, in particular because requirements had been assessed with a view to fitting out the lounge alone, whereas it was also necessary to place chairs in the telephone booths, behind the bank and travel agency counters and in the sound room. Furthermore – a more important undertaking – the area affected by the work had to be emptied and the archives they contained transferred to adjacent premises. This expenditure amounted to F 123 150, i.e. overspending of F 68 150.

10. In conclusion, as shown in the detailed table below, this supplementary budget amounts to F 424 000 excluding tax, account being taken of surpluses (savings) and sums overspent. The Assembly therefore asks the Council for additional credits corresponding to this amount, which represents a total increase of 4.96 % compared with the initial budget.

*Table relating to the management of the extraordinary expenditure  
section of the supplementary budget of the Assembly  
concerning the work on adapting the building*

	Credits used in 1989	Credits carried over to 1990	Total	Cost of work and supplies	+ or -
Head VI					
Sub-head 33					
33.1 .....	61 000	7 300	68 300	61 000	+ 7 300
33.2 .....	792 022	5 087 978	5 880 000	6 114 308	- 234 308
33.3 .....	374 656	151 219	525 875	643 539	- 117 664
Sub-head 34					
34.1 .....	309 986	930 174	1 240 160	929 958	+ 310 202
34.2 .....	397 512	202 488	600 000	728 652	- 128 652
34.3 .....	0	36 000	36 000	36 000*	-
Sub-head 35					
35.1 .....	0	118 000	118 000	310 441**	- 192 441
35.2 .....	0	12 000	12 000	12 000	-
Sub-head 36 .....	28 218	26 782	55 000	123 150	- 68 150
	1 963 394	6 571 941	8 535 335	8 959 048	- 423 713
Rounded up to .....					- 424 000

\* Estimate.

\*\* Of which F 50 000 not yet spent.

## APPENDIX

*Financial statement of work as at 31st July 1990*  
*– Letter from the architect's office*

Serge Madon et Associés  
Architecture et Ingénierie Générale

Paris, 31st July 1990

Subject: Reorganisation of a WEU building  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson, 75016 Paris  
Ref.: 0890027

.....

I enclose a financial statement on the work as at 31st July 1990 which includes:

1. a statement of work and fees as at 30th July 1990;
2. a summary of initial contracts for the work: the summary of 15th January 1990 updated following the default of SOGELEC (No. 7) and its replacement by FLORES (No. 7A) and STABI (No. 7B);
3. a statement of extra work that had to be carried out, as at 31st July 1990;
4. a statement of work not actually effected, as at 31st July 1990.

I venture to point out that the statement of extra work includes all sums for joint expenditure pro rata to the firms as well as the penalties for delays proposed by the architect.

Details will be sent to you at the end of August of extra work or work that was not actually effected in the form of re-updated exchanges of statement.

Finally, I would inform you that the negotiations with firms to complete the general, final balance have not yet been completed.

I would remind you that the work of the firms Glauselec and AM.2A has not yet been accepted. The statement submitted is therefore subject to a few minor variations in the official final stage.

I am at your disposal for any further information you may require.

.....

A. COQUET

Assembly of WEU,  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75016 PARIS

\*  
\* \*

REORGANISATION OF THE WEU BUILDING  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75016 Paris

July 1990

CONTRACTING AUTHORITY: WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75016 Paris  
Tel.: 47.23.54.32

PRIME CONTRACTOR: SMA  
85, rue du Dessous-des-Berges  
75013 Paris  
Tel.: 45.86.26.26

*Summary of the operation as at 30th July 1990*  
(Work + Fees)

Initial contracts for the work .....	F 5 850 238.70 excl. tax
Extra work which had to be carried out, as at 30th July 1990 ..	+ F 836 080.10 excl. tax
Work not actually effected, as at 30th July 1990 .....	- F 572 010.71 excl. tax
TOTAL WORK as at 30th July 1990 .....	F 6 114 308.10 excl. tax
FEES	
Architect .....	F 467 139.20 excl. tax
On site co-ordination .....	F 176 400.00 excl. tax
TOTAL FEES .....	F 643 539.20 excl. tax
GRAND TOTAL (Work + Fees) .....	F 6 757 847.30 excl. tax

\*  
\* \*

REORGANISATION OF THE WEU BUILDING  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75016 Paris

July 1990

CONTRACTING AUTHORITY: WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75016 Paris  
Tel.: 47.23.54.32

PRIME CONTRACTOR: SMA  
85, rue du Dessous-des-Berges  
75013 Paris  
Tel.: 45.86.26.26

*Recapitulation of contracts*

No.	Lot	Firm	Cost exc. tax	Cost inc. tax
1	Demolition/Fabric/Masonry	Antony Bâtiment	441 200.00	523 263.20
2	Partitions/Joinery/Fittings	Menuiseries des Moutiers	1 610 572.00	1 910 138.39
3	Metalwork/Metal joinery/Doors	AM-2A	555 754.00	659 124.24
4	Tiling/Earthenware	Antony Bâtiment	62 255.00	73 834.43
5	Stoneware	Antony Bâtiment	219 590.00	260 433.74 (259 959.74)
6	Fitted carpets/Flexible flooring materials	Prévotat et Cie	109 017.00	129 294.16 (129 285.86)
7	False ceilings	7A Flores 7B Stabi	355 400.00 130 000.00	421 504.40 154 180.00
8	Plumbing/Sanitation	Mailfert	130 825.72	155 159.30
9	Glassware	AM.2A	387 287.00	459 322.38
10	Paintwork/Wall coverings/Cleaning	Rigolot	260 000.00	308 360.00
11	Electricity/Low tension	Glauselec	532 838.00	631 945.87
12	Air conditioning/Ventilation/Heating	GTCM Chaussidière	1 055 500.00	1 251 823.00
TOTAL BUILDING .....			5 850 238.70	6 938 383.00 (6 937 900.30)

\*  
\* \*

REORGANISATION OF THE WEU BUILDING  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75016 Paris

July 1990

CONTRACTING AUTHORITY: WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75016 Paris  
Tel.: 47.23.54.32

PRIME CONTRACTOR: SMA  
85, rue du Dessous-des-Berges  
75013 Paris  
Tel.: 45.86.26.26

*Statement of extra work that had to be carried out*

No.	Lot	Firm	Cost exc. tax	Cost inc. tax
1 + 4 + 5	Demolition/Fabric/Masonry Tiling/Earthenware/ Stonework	Antony Bâtiment	+ 98 804.79	+ 117 182.48
2	Partitions/Joinery/Fittings	Menuiseries des Moutiers	+ 117 714.00 *	+ 139 608.80 *
3 + 9	Metalwork/Metal joinery/ Doors	AM.2A	+ 120 000.00 *	+ 142 320.00 *
6	Fitted carpets/Flexible flooring	Prévotat et Cie	+ 2 540.00	+ 3 012.44
7	False ceilings	7A Flores 7B Stabi	+ 15 000.00 + 4 500.00	+ 17 790.00 + 5 337.00
8	Plumbing/Sanitation	Mailfert	+ 71 172.84	+ 84 410.98
10	Paintwork/Wall coverings/Cleaning	Rigolot	+ 85 798.80	+ 101 757.38
11	Electricity/Low tension	Glauselec	+ 97 357.50	+ 115 466.00
12	Air conditioning/Ventilation/ Heating	GTCM Chaussidière SNDTP C Curgi	+ 192 408.00 + 28 117.50 + 2 666.67	+ 228 195.89 + 33 347.35 + 3 162.67
TOTAL BUILDING			+ 836 080.10	+ 991 591.00

\* Estimate pending details to be given by the firm.

\*  
\* \*



REORGANISATION OF THE WEU BUILDING  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75016 Paris

July 1990

CONTRACTING AUTHORITY: WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75016 Paris  
Tel.: 47.23.54.32

PRIME CONTRACTOR: SMA  
85, rue du Dessous-des-Berges  
75013 Paris  
Tel.: 45.86.26.26

*Statement of work not actually effected*

No.	Lot	Firm	Cost exc. tax	Cost inc. tax
1 + 4 + 5	Demolition/Fabric/Masonry Tiling/Earthenware/ Stonework	Antony Bâtiment	- 168 659.61	- 200 030.30
2	Partitions/Joinery/Fittings	Menuiseries des Moutiers	- 144 004.11	- 170 788.87
3 + 9	Metalwork/Metal joinery/ Doors	AM.2A	- 124 000.00 *	- 147 064.00 *
6	Fitted carpets/Flexible flooring	Prévotat et Cie	- 3 820.07	- 4 530.60
7	False ceilings	7A Flores 7B Stabi	- 19 401.24 - 34 617.07	- 23 009.87 - 41 055.84
8	Plumbing/Sanitation	Mailfert	- 19 768.86	- 23 445.86
10	Paintwork/Wall coverings/Cleaning	Rigolot	- 1 934.17	- 2 293.92
11	Electricity/Low tension	Glauselec	- 29 101.87	- 34 514.81
12	Air conditioning/Ventilation/ Heating	GTCM Chaussidière	- 26 703.71	- 31 670.60
TOTAL BUILDING			- 572 010.71	- 678 404.70

\* Estimate pending details to be given by the firm.

**DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE  
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1991 <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

1. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, Lagorce (Alternate for Mr. Dhaille) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: Fabra), Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), Dame Peggy Fenner (Alternate: Lord), MM. Garcia Sanchez, Greco, Mrs. Haas-Berger, Mrs. Hoffmann, MM. Masseret (Alternate: Hunault), Morris, Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond (Alternate: Lord Mackie), Silva Marques (Alternate: Fernandes Marques), Sinesio, Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Vara.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

### **1. General**

1. The Assembly's draft budget for 1991 meets two main requirements:
  - (a) to complete the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk; a proposal in this sense was already included in the 1990 budget but only part of this was considered by the Council, which agreed only to the creation of a single post of translator-interpreter and said it would consider all the other proposals after "a management review to assess inter alia the position on staffing";
  - (b) to make estimates under Heads II to V of the operating budget as accurate as possible since, in the previous financial year, only approximate figures could be given in view of uncertainty about the date on which Portuguese and Spanish members would effectively participate in the Assembly's work and how the new member countries would take part in the organisation of the various session services.
2. The present draft budget is therefore not merely a renewal of the previous one but reflects, in financial terms, the political work of the Assembly, which is ever more attentive to developments in Europe and throughout the world. The paragraphs below analyse the abovementioned two points in depth, as well as the other aspects of the draft budget for 1991.

### **2. Restructuring the Office of the Clerk (Head I of the draft operating budget)**

3. It should be recalled that, following the opinion expressed by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, the Permanent Council made consideration of the Assembly's proposals for the creation of five new posts subject to the submission of a management survey of the Office of the Clerk. The instigators of that request apparently wondered whether better organisation of the Office of the Clerk might not allow the increase in its workload to be met, this increase being due to both the reactivation and the enlargement of WEU. However, the independent experts specialised in parliamentary matters who were asked by the Assembly to conduct the survey not only showed that the Assembly's request was fully justified but also felt it had been too modest in working out its requirements. They therefore thought the Assembly should ask for the creation of three grade B posts rather than two, making a total of six new posts to be requested.
4. At its meeting on 16th July 1990, the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee did not accept the experts' conclusions, its members believing that the experts had not analysed in depth the organisation of the Office of the Clerk as a whole but had confined themselves to supporting its proposals. The survey therefore did not correspond to the mandate fixed by the Council, i.e. the staff situation in relation to the management of the Office of the Clerk. In other words, and as the government representatives specified at the abovementioned meeting, they needed information on three essential points:
  - a description and the objectives of each post;
  - the number of staff and their grades in sectors to be strengthened;
  - justification for the additional posts requested.
5. Your Rapporteur has to say that he does not quite grasp the point of view expressed by the Budget and Organisation Committee. The answers to these questions were already set out in the report, and even formed the major part of it. The report also contained the organogram of the Office of the Clerk and a description of all posts, both drawn up in accordance with usual practice in all the co-ordinated organisations, including the WEU ministerial organs. In any event, members of the Budget and Organisation Committee undertook to draw up a detailed list of matters on which they wanted further information from the Assembly.
6. However, at the time of writing this explanatory memorandum, the Assembly has not received this list. Your Rapporteur can therefore but take up examination of the experts' report and systematically analyse the structure of the Office of the Clerk, which should meet the concerns expressed by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee.

7. On the basis of the present situation, the experts noted that "the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly works well but in precarious conditions which may have a considerable impact on any development in the Assembly's rôle". They wondered whether staff "could do even more if circumstances required". They were not certain, as illustrated by three examples:

- The committee secretariats, each consisting of a secretary of high grade and an assistant, have reached their maximum burden of work: increase in the number of increasingly complex reports, increase in the amount of documentation that has to be sought, considerable amount of travel, etc. Several secretaries have other equally important duties at other levels.
- The work of the technical services is also growing rapidly. This is also true of the mail and archives service.
- For lack of staff, the study and documentation units cannot be developed to alleviate the burden of the committee secretariats. Only the press service can absorb more numerous and new tasks in acceptable conditions.

The standard of work in the Office of the Clerk is therefore closely linked with the Assembly's rôle in WEU and the very rôle of WEU. It can already be foreseen that this will grow in the years ahead thus raising, here and now, the question of strengthening the staff of the services."

8. On this basis, the authors of the report then studied whether the staff of the Office of the Clerk would be able to meet the increased workload resulting from the development of the Assembly's rôle and concluded that this would involve more important or new tasks at several levels of the organisation. They therefore endeavoured to verify whether the justifications given by the Assembly in its draft budget for 1990 could be considered valid. They concluded that a third grade B3 post should be added to the five posts already requested.

9. In regard to the organogram, they expressed the opinion that, while the research service, the sittings service and the secretariat of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges should all be under the authority of the Clerk Assistant for political affairs (whom they called the legislative Clerk Assistant), they should be kept separate rather than entrusted to a single official directly dependent on the Clerk, as envisaged by the Assembly. On this specific point, the Assembly is not prepared to endorse the experts' opinion and prefers a slightly different solution which will be described below.

10. One can but pay tribute to the rigour of the experts' analysis and recognise that their conclusions are logical and well founded. Their report admittedly does not include quantitative data such as the number of pages of reports drafted by each committee, which certain members of the Budget and Organisation Committee would have liked to see, but it may be wondered how much importance such data have for the purpose of assessing intellectual work which show the professionalism of the committee secretaries and their ability to organise their research efficiently and make a synthesis of the arguments with their personal contribution.

11. The organogram proposed by the Assembly at Appendix II hereto shows clearly that the Office of the Clerk has two main branches – political affairs and administrative and financial affairs – under the respective responsibility of the two Clerks Assistant under the authority of the Clerk. Furthermore, the Clerk is also directly responsible for the secretariat of the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and the sittings service, which ensures that the Rules of Procedure are applied correctly during debates (sittings, registry of speakers, minutes).

12. The political affairs branch consists of the committee service (Defence Committee, Political Committee, Technological and Aerospace Committee and Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations), the Press and External Relations Service and the Research Office. In adopting this structure, the Assembly follows the experts' opinion only in part since it believes that the sittings service – which the experts propose should continue under the responsibility of the Clerk Assistant for political affairs (the expression legislative Clerk Assistant proposed by those experts not having been adopted) would not form a homogeneous whole with the political branch of the Office of the Clerk. In any event, the Clerk Assistant for political affairs is fully taken up during sessions with matters connected with the committees' activities and the Assembly's public relations (meetings with the press). This service should consequently be placed under the direct authority of the Clerk in accordance with practice constantly followed hitherto. The way the Assembly has organised the political branch of the Office of the Clerk takes into account the breakdown of work between the committees as provided for in the Charter and Rules of Procedure. It believes, indeed, that each of the abovementioned committees should have a secretariat consisting of a secretary and an assistant. A smaller structure with, for instance, a single secretariat for two committees is not possible because each committee works in accordance with its own specific programme. A single secretary and a single assistant would be unable to afford proper assistance to two committees at once, particularly as all committee reports are prepared during the same period of the year.

13. In view of prospects for its future activities, the workload of the Office of the Clerk and in particular of its political branch will grow. At its meeting on 9th July 1990, the Presidential Committee instructed the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to study the creation of "a standing committee... to ensure the Assembly's continuity of action following procedures similar to those practised in the Assembly of the Council of Europe. The WEU Assembly might thus communicate technical recommendations to the Council between sessions and also more easily adopt positions on topical political questions". This new element merely adds weight to the opinion expressed by the experts and supports their conclusions, which imply assigning four new posts to the political branch of the Office of the Clerk, i.e.:

- (a) a grade A5 secretary and a grade B3 assistant for the Political Committee. The Clerk Assistant for political affairs could thus devote himself wholly to tasks included in his attributions (assisting the Clerk in the area for which he is responsible, directing the committee service, co-ordinating the work of the committee secretaries, helping to prepare written and oral parliamentary interventions, organising the Assembly's participation in seminars, colloquies, conferences, etc.);
- (b) a grade A3/4 official and a grade B3 assistant for a research office which would include the documentation service. It goes without saying that, as soon as this office is set up, the official responsible will have to study how to set up a network of correspondents and obtain access to many different sources of information. The material organisation of this office will therefore be the subject of separate budgetary proposals.

14. Finally, the experts' proposal to combine the Press and External Relations Service in its present form with the political branch of the Office of the Clerk has already been put into effect.

15. Where the administrative and financial branch is concerned, the organogram shows clearly that the Clerk Assistant concerned assumes direct responsibility for the administration and finance service proper and co-ordinating the translation and publications service, as well as temporary services during sessions (except for the sittings service, which is under the authority of the Clerk), i.e. the summary record, the verbatim report and the typing pool.

16. The staff of the administrative service proper carry out various duties. The Clerk Assistant – who, as head of the administration and finance service and with the assistance of a grade B4 official, has general responsibility for the service – also ensures the secretariat of the Committee for Budgetary Affairs and Administration and attends all meetings of the Presidential Committee. He also deals personally with all matters relating to the permanent and temporary staff of the Office of the Clerk. Here it should be underlined that the organisation of each session involves the recruitment of some two hundred persons of all categories (counsellors, parliamentary secretaries, verbatim reporters, summary reporters, interpreters, translators, etc.), which means organising and updating files over a period of several months before and after sessions. With the assistance of the head of general services, he also organises ordinary and extraordinary sessions, colloquies and the more important committee meetings held outside Paris, and this requires a whole series of contacts with the authorities concerned and the study and adoption of measures necessary to ensure that work proceeds smoothly with due respect for agreements with the authorities concerned.

17. The accounts section was strengthened in 1988 with the creation of a grade B3 post of accountant to assist the already existing grade B6 chief accountant. The Council's favourable decision normalised a situation which had become precarious, as the auditors had pointed out in their reports on the audits of the Assembly's accounts. As the section has now been computerised, the two officials assigned to it are able to carry out all their accounting and book-keeping operations clearly and accurately. Where this section is concerned, the organogram is therefore unchanged.

18. The grade A2 official who replaces the Clerk Assistant when absent is specifically responsible for general services. His duties include determining requirements for equipment of all kinds needed for the work of the Office of the Clerk. He investigates markets prior to calling for offers for the supply of such equipment and organises and co-ordinates the activities of the mail and archives service, storage of and accounting for equipment and the reproduction workshop. He is also responsible for the security service in the Office of the Clerk in co-ordination with the security service of the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

19. In referring to the administrative service, the experts noted the growth in material tasks resulting from the Assembly's opening towards the exterior (mail, printing, etc.). In this connection, a detailed study prepared by the Office of the Clerk and appended to the experts' report mentions a considerable increase in the workload in the archives, i.e. some 300% compared with 1988, although only one person is assigned to the service. The experts therefore concluded that there should be a second grade B3 official in the administrative service. The Assembly considers that this minimal request should be

given wholehearted support particularly as the official concerned would also be expected to type for the general services to improve the situation of the whole administrative and financial service where there is at present only one typist, who is the assistant to the Clerk Assistant.

20. Scrutiny of the way the reproduction service is run reveals an enormous mass of work in the printing workshop, estimated at 2 500 000 printed pages per year. It should be underlined that the three officials in this service also carry out tasks involving responsibility for all equipment belonging to the Office of the Clerk, for office supplies and the maintenance of the premises. Now, too, there are new tasks connected with the operation of the sound system installed in the basement for controlling the equipment in the two new conference rooms. No increase in staff is envisaged but a proposal is made below for regrading the three posts.

21. In the context of general services, the creation of a post of chauffeur was supported by the experts, who recognised the need for this recruitment. If the Council persists in not authorising the creation of this post, whose holder might also be usefully employed as a messenger and usher, the solution adopted for the Institute for Security Studies might be extended to the Assembly. A security guard would then be asked to drive the official car in case of need.

22. No change is proposed in the Translation and Publications Service, which has two sections: English and French. The latter benefited in 1990 from the creation of a new grade L3 post of translator-interpreter, a proposal for whose regrading is made below. Staff in this service are nevertheless working at the limit of their possibilities. All documents prepared by the Assembly in one of the two working languages are translated into the other and, in addition, many documents in other official languages are translated into English and French. This represents a considerable volume of work, i.e. about 1 800 to 2 000 pages of Assembly texts translated by each section every year. In addition, day-to-day correspondence is translated into one or other of the two working languages, the translators' work is revised, the work of the temporary teams who translate the texts of debates has to be co-ordinated and supervised and, finally, the process of printing documents has to be followed through, including two proof-readings of all texts prior to publication. It is to be expected that the workload of the Translation and Publications Service will tend to increase considerably with the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. It is therefore not excluded that the situation of this service will have to be reviewed in the near future.

23. The analysis of the organogram of the Office of the Clerk in the previous paragraphs is a complement to the experts' report and should answer the many questions raised by the government representatives. The conclusions reached by the experts can only be confirmed and Head I of this draft budget therefore includes sums necessary for creating the following posts:

- 1 grade A5 post of secretary to the Political Committee;
- 1 grade B3 post of assistant to the Political Committee;
- 1 grade A3/4 post of head of the Research Office;
- 1 grade B3 post of assistant in the Research Office;
- 1 grade B3 post of assistant in general services and the archives;
- 1 grade C3 post of chauffeur.

24. In the framework of the proposals relating to the structure of the Office of the Clerk, the Assembly believes it necessary to propose the regrading of the grade L3 post of translator-interpreter *on a personal basis*. The holder of this post has twenty-seven years' linguistic experience, including sixteen in NATO (of which ten years at grade L4 when she carried out the corresponding duties). Transferred to the WEU Assembly after working for the WEU agencies for security questions, she now, under the responsibility of the Clerk Assistant for administrative and financial affairs, co-ordinates interpretation teams recruited for sessions and between sessions. She herself also forms part of these teams, thus enabling the Assembly to recruit twenty instead of twenty-two interpreters for sessions and five instead of six for other meetings, so that considerable savings can be made. She also makes a significant contribution to the French translation section, particularly as she also translates from Italian and Spanish. The proposal to give a grade L4 to the holder of this post on a personal basis therefore seems fully justified.

25. A last proposal included in this draft budget concerns the regrading from category C to category B of the posts of the three officials assigned to the storage of and accounting for equipment and the reproduction service.

In its reports on the budgets of the ministerial organs, the Assembly has on several occasions drawn the Council's attention to the problem of the staff's career possibilities, an essential condition for ensuring maximum motivation. This problem now arises more specifically for the three grade C officials (one C6 and two C4) who, having reached the ceiling of their grades, have no further prospect of progress although their work has changed not only quantitatively but qualitatively (see paragraph 20). Such regrading is thus fully in line with the principle that there should be concordance between

duties to be carried out, qualifications and the professional category of staff. To raise the three officials concerned to category B (the grade C6 official to grade B4 and the two grade C4s to grade B3) is justified by their qualifications and increased knowledge. It should be pointed out that their colleagues in the reproduction service of the WEU ministerial organs are already in category B.

To move these three officials to category B would, in the immediate future, have financial advantages for only one of them, who would become entitled to the expatriation allowance, but in the years to come they would be entitled to the subsequent steps provided for in category B.

26. A total sum of F 2 476 000 is therefore included under Sub-Heads 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Head I of this draft budget, corresponding to the proposals to create six new posts and regrade four existing ones.

### ***3. Heads II to V of the draft operating budget***

27. Apart from Head I "Permanent staff", where estimates were worked out on the basis of the new organogram of the Office of the Clerk, criteria followed in determining estimates under other heads of the operating budget take account of management experience relating in particular to the first year following enlargement.

28. The results of experience were the basis for assessing requirements, particularly in regard to the organisation of the various temporary services recruited for sessions and the teams of interpreters recruited for meetings outside sessions. It should, moreover, be underlined that, for this purpose, estimates are based on the assumption that the Assembly holds two four-day part-sessions each year and meets for a total of forty days at other times of the year (twenty-four days in Paris and sixteen elsewhere), which implies 200 days' interpretation work. Any unforeseen requirement outside this normal working context such as, for instance, the holding of an extraordinary session can only be the subject of a request for additional credits through the presentation of a supplementary budget in accordance with normal procedure.

29. It was precisely because of past experience that it proved possible to reduce the number of verbatim reporters to twenty instead of the total of twenty-five included in the budget for 1990 since Portugal and Spain are unable to second such staff for sessions. Debates in Portuguese and Spanish will therefore be recorded and transcribed immediately by two Portuguese editors seconded by the Portuguese Assembly and two Spanish editors recruited by the Assembly in Paris. Nor does any further provision have to be made for recruiting four typists to work for these two verbatim reporters' teams as was the case in the budget for the previous financial year.

30. Another important change concerns the ushers, whose number has been cut by nine, i.e. from thirteen to four, the remaining four still being assigned to the chamber. This change is linked with the need to improve the security service, which had a few weak points due to the fact that the French authorities can no longer, as in the past, second police inspectors during sessions. Controls on the premises will henceforth be ensured, in accordance with the agreements reached with the security service of the Institute for Security Studies, by WEU security guards, with a qualified guard at the entrance to WEU and two others at the entrance to the Palais d'Iéna. Sums required for the recruitment of these three guards have been included under Sub-Head 6.4 of Head II.

31. Where the interpretation service is concerned, as has already been stated (see paragraph 24) teams for sessions will consist of twenty interpreters instead of twenty-two as hitherto, the duties of co-ordinator and third member of the team in the French booth being carried out by the translator-interpreter of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. When working out requirements for meetings between sessions, account was also taken of that official's participation in teams.

32. Thus, there is a reduction in real terms in total estimates under Head II, which are at a level between that of total real expenditure in 1989, when the Assembly had seven members, and expected expenditure in 1990, now that there are nine members (which became effective only as from the June session), the latter expenditure also including the cost of the extraordinary session.

33. Under Head III "Expenditure on premises and equipment", estimates under only two sub-heads call for comment, the other sub-heads reflecting a situation comparable to that of previous financial years. These two sub-heads are Sub-Head 10 "Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises" and Sub-Head 17 "Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment".

34. In regard to "Joint expenditure" which, by decision of the Council, continues to be managed by the administrative service of the Institute for Security Studies, the relevant estimates represent 30% of the annual total expenditure assessed by that service. This heading includes the cost of the upkeep of the building, water, electricity, fuel, cleaning and insurance. Work on reorganising the building carried out in 1990 implies a significant increase in the relevant expenditure compared with the financial year 1990, the Assembly's share of which (a total of 30%) is assessed at F 125 000.

35. Estimates under Sub-Head 17 "Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment" are analysed in detail in Appendix IV. It should be noted that the programmes for modernising equipment provide in 1991 only for the replacement of one offset machine (total cost for hire and maintenance: F 60 000) and the hire of more electric or electronic typewriters for use during sessions since six old-fashioned mechanical typewriters assigned to national delegations are no longer usable. It should be stressed that the same programme includes the financial implications until 1995 of the gradual replacement of other equipment as it becomes obsolete.

36. These two requirements, which are additional to minor adjustments under other sub-heads of Head III, justify the total increase of F 228 000 under this head compared with the budget for 1990, the amount of F 50 000 that was frozen and not used having been deducted from credits for 1990.

37. There are no substantial variations in estimates under Head IV compared with the previous budget, except under Sub-Head 22 "Official car". Account has been taken of the fact that the creation of a new post of chauffeur would bring about a saving of some F 80 000 since it would no longer be necessary to hire a chauffeur-driven car for the President of the Assembly. If this new post is not created, this sum will obviously have to be added to the estimate under Sub-Head 22, which would then amount to F 125 000.

38. There is an increase under Head V as a whole of F 281 000 compared with 1990, the sum of F 208 000 frozen and not used having been deducted. Most of this increase relates to the adjustment to Sub-Heads 25 "Expenses for representation", 27 "Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk" and 30 "Expenses for political groups", these being the sectors of expenditure that are the most strictly dependent on the Assembly's activities. In particular, sums for the political groups have been increased by 20% in response to urgent requests from their chairmen, who intend to develop the activities of their groups (organisation of meetings, seminars and debates with persons with authority in defence matters, etc.) to help to strengthen the rôle that will become incumbent on the WEU Assembly in the new architecture of Europe. Where Sub-Head 29 "Expenditure on information" is concerned, this has been left at the level of the previous financial year to allow the press service to acquire additional computerised equipment to meet the need to store and have access to all its card indexes: a Sony 5 1/4 rewritable optic drive costing F 45 000 to store data on large-capacity (600 Mb) interchangeable disks.

39. Figures in the Assembly's operating budget analysed below, compared with those for the previous financial year and taking account of foreseeable receipts, may be summed up as follows:

	1991	1990	Growth rate
Total expenditure .....	25 943 500	23 020 500	+ 12.69 %
Receipts .....	105 000	110 000	- 4.54 %
NET TOTAL .....	25 838 500	22 910 500	+ 12.78 %

40. Considering only Heads II to V, whose management is marked by the Assembly's budgetary autonomy, a comparison between the two financial years shows the following result, the amount for 1990 having been reduced by the sums frozen and not used (F 396 000):

	1991	1990	Growth rate
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .....	9 504 500	9 332 500	+ 1.84 %

41. In concluding this analysis, your Rapporteur wishes to stress that the modest rate of increase under Heads II to V as a whole testifies to the Assembly's effort to apply strictly economical criteria in working out its budget estimates. These have been verified sub-head by sub-head on the basis of experience in the last two years so as to facilitate budgetary management and conform strictly to the initial budgetary structure that the auditor advocated when the Assembly's accounts for 1989 were audited.

#### **4. Pensions budget**

42. No new pensions are foreseen in 1991. Estimates under this section of the budget therefore represent the total pensions of thirteen former officials (eleven retirement pensions, one invalidity pension and one survivor's pension), adjusted, as for permanent staff, by a rate of increase in salary scales of 7.10%.



43. Where receipts in the pensions budget are concerned, account has been taken of contributions corresponding to the creation of six new posts and the regrading of four existing ones. These contributions amount to about F 96 000 and would have to be removed from the budget if these proposals were not accepted.

**5. Summary of the estimates in the draft budget of  
the Assembly for 1991 (operating and pensions budgets)**

44. As shown in the tables at Appendix V, the net grand total of estimates in the Assembly's draft budget for 1991 (operating budget plus pensions budget less receipts) is F 28 412 500, i.e., compared with the net grand total of the budget for the financial year 1990, a growth rate of 11.46%.

**Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts  
for the financial year 1991**

Details	Expenditure	Receipts
<b>PART I: Operating budget</b>		
<i>Section A:</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Permanent staff	16 439 000	
<i>Head II:</i> Temporary staff	3 546 000	
<i>Head III:</i> Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 754 000	
<i>Head IV:</i> General administrative costs	2 109 500	
<i>Head V:</i> Other expenditure	2 095 000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		105 000
	25 943 500	105 000
NET TOTAL		25 838 500
	25 943 500	25 943 500
<b>PART II: Pensions budget</b>		
<i>Section A:</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Pensions, allowances and social charges	3 275 000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		701 000
	3 275 000	701 000
NET TOTAL		2 574 000
	3 275 000	3 275 000
NET TOTAL BUDGET		28 412 500

*Budget estimates***PART I: OPERATING BUDGET***Section A – Expenditure****Head I – Permanent staff***

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1991	Budget for 1990 (revised)	Expected expenditure in 1990	Actual expenditure in 1989
Sub-Head 1 – Basic salaries	11 296 000	9 389 000	9 085 000	8 277 925
Sub-Head 2 – Allowances:				
2.1. Expatriation allowance 1 230 000				
2.2. Household allowance 520 000				
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons 630 000				
2.4. Rent allowance 80 000				
2.5. Education allowance 55 000				
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2 000				
2.7. Overtime 55 000				
2.8. Home leave 30 000				
	2 602 000	2 027 000	1 975 000	1 847 662
Sub-Head 3 – Social charges:				
3.1. Social security 1 500 000				
3.2. Supplementary insurance 470 000				
3.3. Provident fund 180 000				
	2 150 000	1 836 000	1 750 000	1 601 451
Sub-Head 4 – Expenses relating to the recruit- ment and departure of permanent officials				
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi- dates for vacant posts 16 000				
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families 30 000				
4.3. Removal expenses 165 000				
4.4. Installation allowance 168 000				
	379 000	30 000	80 000	–
Sub-Head 5 – Medical examination	12 000	10 000	10 000	9 300
TOTAL OF HEAD I	16 439 000	13 292 000	12 900 000	11 736 338

### *Explanations*

#### *Sub-Heads 1 and 2*

Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to permanent staff in accordance with Chapter III of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 1st July 1989<sup>1</sup>, adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 5% as from 1st July 1990 and 4% as from 1st July 1991. Adjustments taken into account amount to F 1 060 000.

Estimates take account of the financial implications of the proposals for restructuring the Office of the Clerk (creation of six new posts and regrading of four existing posts, amounting to F 2 476 000).

The table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk, showing grades, is given at Appendix I and the organogram at Appendix II.

#### *Sub-Head 3*

Estimated expenditure for "Social charges" is based on commitments stemming from:

- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)<sup>2</sup>;
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)<sup>3</sup>;
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).

#### *Sub-Head 4*

No officials are expected to leave in 1991. Estimates under this sub-head relate only to the new posts included in the organogram of the Office of the Clerk.

#### *Sub-Head 5*

The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried out at the OECD medical centre.

1. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU Council and the councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA).

2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and old-age pensions.

3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the beneficiaries he has named.

**Head II – Temporary staff**

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1991	Budget for 1990 (revised)	Expected expenditure in 1990	Actual expenditure in 1989
Sub-Head 6 – Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly				
6.1. Sittings service 1 320 000				
6.2. Interpretation service 604 000				
6.3. Translation service 839 000				
6.4. Other services 66 000				
	2 829 000	3 217 000*	3 035 000	2 379 109
Sub-Head 7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	556 000	640 000	505 000	565 751
Sub-Head 8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	15 000	15 000	35 000	39 896
Sub-Head 9 – Social charges				
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 10 000				
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters 130 000				
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 5 000				
	146 000	173 000	147 000	124 317
TOTAL OF HEAD II	3 546 000	4 045 000*	3 722 000	3 109 073

\* Including a sum of F 378 000 frozen in case an ordinary session had to be held away from Paris, F 240 000 of which was used to cover the cost of interpretation at the extraordinary session held in Luxembourg on 22nd and 23rd March 1990.

**Explanations****Sub-Head 6**

Estimates under this sub-head relate to:

(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at Appendix III.

(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post office technician, typewriter mechanic, guards for the security service, etc.).

Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1989 in the co-ordinated organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the same way as for permanent staff, the adjustment amounting to F 158 204.

In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, increased by 6%.

**Sub-Head 7**

This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, travelling time and travelling expenses).

Estimates are based on the recruitment of five interpreters for each meeting (200 working days, of which 120 in Paris), the sixth interpreter being the permanent official recruited in 1990. Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. the note on Sub-Head 6 above). Their salary adjustment for 1991 amounts to F 28 000.

*Sub-Head 8*

Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of all grades which the Office of the Clerk may have to recruit exceptionally in 1991. They include an overall sum covering salaries, possible travelling expenses and insurance.

*Sub-Head 9*

Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:

*Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters*

Staff recruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 40% by staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capital and premiums as from May 1988.

*Provident fund for interpreters*

In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations the IACI, WEU has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund, or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters.

*Insurance for interpreters*

A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from working. The premium of 1.1% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk (0.7%) and the interpreters (0.4%).

**Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment**

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1991	Budget for 1990 (revised)	Expected expenditure in 1990	Actual expenditure in 1989
Sub-Head 10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	525 000	400 000	430 000	323 647
Sub-Head 11 – Hire of committee rooms	10 000	10 000	3 000	33 480
Sub-Head 12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	570 000	555 000	558 000	725 602
Sub-Head 13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	65 000	100 000*	63 000	50 965
Sub-Head 14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	15 000	13 000	16 000	1 385
Sub-Head 15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	35 000	35 000	35 000	46 922
Sub-Head 16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	–	2 000	15 000	–
Sub-Head 17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment	534 000	461 000	430 000	461 188
<b>TOTAL OF HEAD III</b>	<b>1 754 000</b>	<b>1 576 600*</b>	<b>1 550 000</b>	<b>1 643 189</b>

\* Including a sum of F 50 000 frozen in case a session had to be held away from Paris. This was not used.

*Explanations**Sub-Head 10*

Estimates under this sub-head represent the 30% share of joint expenditure relating to joint services shared by the WEU organs in Paris. Following the abolition of the agencies, the Council confirmed the validity of the previous system of sharing this expenditure and made the administrative service of the WEU Institute for Security Studies responsible for managing joint services.

*Sub-Head 11*

For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for hiring a room or installing portable interpretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the Assembly to cover such expenditure if necessary.

*Sub-Head 12*

As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment, telephone booths, telex, screens and other installations in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions.

*Sub-Head 13*

Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises, transport of reproduction equipment loaned free of charge, etc.).

*Sub-Head 14*

As in the past, this sum is requested to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk.

*Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17*

Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for equipment given at Appendix IV to this budget.

*Head IV – General administrative costs*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1991	Budget for 1990 (revised)	Expected expenditure in 1990	Actual expenditure in 1989
Sub-Head 18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	560 000	480 000	540 000	532 806
Sub-Head 19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	280 000	280 000	250 000	255 377
Sub-Head 20 – Printing and publication of documents	1 154 000	1 120 000	1 090 000	939 546
Sub-Head 21 – Purchase of documents	70 000	65 000	65 000	63 702
Sub-Head 22 – Official car	45 000	140 000	180 000	122 667
Sub-Head 23 – Bank charges	500	500	500	190
<b>TOTAL OF HEAD IV</b>	<b>2 109 500</b>	<b>2 085 500</b>	<b>2 125 500</b>	<b>1 914 288</b>

### *Explanations*

#### *Sub-Head 18*

Estimates under this sub-head take into account the fact that the creation of the Institute for Security Studies will necessarily involve an increase in the cost of operating the telephone switchboard, whereas this was lower last year because of the abolition of the former agencies. For other categories of expenditure (postage, telex, etc.), expenditure is also tending to rise due to intensification of the work of the Assembly, particularly its Press Service. Every step has been taken to contain the cost of mailing documents as far as possible.

#### *Sub-Head 19*

In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work and the foreseeable variation of prices in this sector (+3%), the increase in the estimate compared with the previous financial year is slight. This has been made possible by modernising reproduction equipment, thereby economising paper and consumable goods.

#### *Sub-Head 20*

Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in prices (3%).

#### *Sub-Head 21*

There is a slight increase in estimates under this sub-head as compared with the financial year 1990 due to the need to purchase a wider range of documentation essential for the preparation of studies and reports.

#### *Sub-Head 22*

Estimates under this sub-head take account of the recruitment of a chauffeur to drive the official car of the Office of the Clerk. They include the cost of running the car (garage, petrol, servicing, insurance, etc.) and of hiring a second chauffeur-driven car during Assembly sessions. If the recruitment of a chauffeur is not authorised, these estimates will have to be increased by F 80 000.

#### *Sub-Head 23*

The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.

### *Head V – Other expenditure*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1991	Budget for 1990 (revised)	Expected expenditure in 1990	Actual expenditure in 1989
Sub-Head 24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	200 000	190 000	178 000	188 823
Sub-Head 25 – Expenses for representation	260 000	230 000	255 000	366 362
Sub-Head 26 – Committee study missions	5 000	5 000	–	–
Sub-Head 27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	630 000	680 000*	590 000	582 764
Sub-Head 28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	30 000	30 000	30 000	78 202
Sub-Head 29 – Expenditure on information	455 000	455 000	460 000	425 490
Sub-Head 30 – Expenses for political groups	484 000	403 000	403 000	336 000
Sub-Head 31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	3 000	50	949
Sub-Head 32 – Non-recoverable taxes	28 000	26 000	15 000	26 631
<b>TOTAL OF HEAD V</b>	<b>2 095 000</b>	<b>2 022 000*</b>	<b>1 931 050</b>	<b>2 005 221</b>

\* Including a sum of F 280 000 frozen in case an ordinary session had to be held away from Paris, F 72 000 of this sum was used to cover the cost of the extraordinary session held in Luxembourg.

### *Explanations*

#### *Sub-Head 24*

The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly for sessions and committee meetings is borne by the governments of member countries, as are those of members of the Bureau and Presidential Committee.

The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of the Assembly, rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairman when these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the work of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.

#### *Sub-Head 25*

The increase compared with the 1990 budget stems mainly from the intensification of the Assembly's work. It should be pointed out that actual expenditure in 1989 was much higher than appropriations under this sub-head because of extraordinary expenditure incurred for the visit of a parliamentary delegation from the Supreme Soviet to the WEU Assembly.

#### *Sub-Head 26*

Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure for committee study visits. As these sums cannot be foreseen accurately, the same amount has been requested as last year.

#### *Sub-Head 27*

Estimates under this sub-head take into account the variation in per diem allowances provided for in the 263rd report of the Co-ordinating Committee; they are based on figures for previous financial years and are due to the intensification of the Assembly's work.

#### *Sub-Head 28*

Estimates for 1991 are unchanged compared with the previous financial year. The Premier Président de la Cour des Comptes of France will continue to audit the Assembly's accounts in 1991.

#### *Sub-Head 29*

The estimate is unchanged compared with 1990, mainly in order to give the press service means of developing its action in accordance with the long-term programme submitted last year.

#### *Sub-Head 30*

The estimate under this sub-head was increased by 20% in 1990 because of the increase in the number of parliamentarians following the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. However, the chairmen of political groups have expressed their concern at the small resources made available to them, particularly now that they intend, through more intensive action, to help to strengthen the rôle that will be incumbent upon the WEU Assembly in the new European structure. There is therefore an increase of 20% in estimates for 1991 compared with the previous year. By decision of the Presidential Committee, each group has an equal fixed share and a further sum in proportion to the number of members listed and has to submit a balance sheet at the close of the financial year. All the balance sheets are appended to the accounts of the Assembly and are consequently subject to verification by the auditor.

#### *Sub-Head 31*

The same amount is requested as for 1990.

#### *Sub-Head 32*

The increase in the estimate under this sub-head is necessary to cover non-reimbursable VAT payments.



## PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

*Section B – Receipts*

	Estimates for 1991	Budget for 1990 (revised)	Expected receipts in 1990	Actual receipts in 1989
1. Sales of publications	35 000	30 000	35 000	34 269
2. Bank interest	60 000	60 000	60 000	81 627
3. Social security reimbursements	10 000	20 000	40 000	86 128
<b>TOTAL RECEIPTS</b>	<b>105 000</b>	<b>110 000</b>	<b>135 000</b>	<b>202 024</b>

*Explanations*

Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are based on experience.

## PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

*Section A – Expenditure**Head I – Pensions, allowances and social charges*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1991	Budget for 1990 (authorised)	Expected expenditure in 1990	Actual expenditure in 1989
<b>Sub-Head 1 – Pensions and leaving allowances</b>				
1.1. Retirement pensions 2 724 000				
1.2. Invalidity pensions 250 000				
1.3. Survivors' pensions 57 000				
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions –				
1.5. Leaving allowances –				
	3 031 000	2 875 000	2 879 000	2 880 057
<b>Sub-Head 2 – Family allowances</b>				
2.1. Household allowances 122 000				
2.2. Children's and other dependants' allowances 30 000				
2.3. Education allowances 14 000				
	166 000	193 000	159 000	168 905
<b>Sub-Head 3 – Supplementary insurance</b>	78 000	83 000	73 000	80 556
<b>TOTAL OF HEAD I</b>	<b>3 275 000</b>	<b>3 151 000</b>	<b>3 111 000</b>	<b>3 129 518</b>

*Explanations*

*Sub-Heads 1 and 2*

In 1991, the Assembly will be paying thirteen pensions, as follows:

- eleven old-age pensions;
- one invalidity pension;
- one survivor's pension.

Estimates of expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provisions of the pension scheme rules.

*Sub-Head 3*

Pensions are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19*bis* of the collective convention in force.

Estimates of expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid by the Assembly.

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

*Section B – Receipts*

	Estimates for 1991	Budget for 1990	Expected receipts in 1990	Actual receipts in 1989
Contributions by permanent officials .....	701 000	572 000	565 000	500 116

*Explanations*


Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by the thirty-six permanent staff members of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) affiliated to the pension scheme.

## APPENDIX I

*Recapitulatory table showing changes in the staff  
of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly  
proposed in the 1991 Budget*

Grade	Duties	1991 budget	1990 budget	+ or -
H.C.	Clerk	1	1	-
A6	Clerk Assistants	2	2	-
A5	Counsellors	5	4	+ 1
A4	First secretaries	2	2	-
L4	Translator-interpreter	1	-	+ 1
A3/4	Secretary	1	-	+ 1
L2/3	Translator-interpreter	-	1	- 1
A2	Controller; Head of private office	2	2	-
A2	Translators ; Documentalist	3	3	-
B6	Chief accountant	1	1	-
B4	Qualified assistants	7	7	-
B4	Equipment accountant; Head of documents reproduction service	1	-	+ 1
B3	Offset operator; Reproduction Clerk	2	-	+ 2
B3	Accountant	1	1	-
B3	Bilingual shorthand-typists	7	4	+ 3
B3	Switchboard operator	1	1	-
C6	Head of documents reproduction service	-	1	- 1
C4	Offset operators service	-	2	- 2
C3	Chauffeur	1	-	+ 1
		38	32	+ 6

## APPENDIX II

*Organigram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly*

Notes:

- \* Service organised/staff recruited during sessions of the Assembly
- \* Posts underlined are those proposed by the group of experts.
- \* Posts proposed for regrading in the 1991 budget.

1) The duties of Head of the Committee Service are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Political Affairs. His assistant helps him in the exercise of all the duties.

2) The Clerk and his assistant are responsible for the secretariat of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

3) The duties of the Clerk Assistant for the English Translation Service are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for the English Translation Service.

4) The duties of the Clerk Assistant for the French Translation Service are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for the French Translation Service.

5) These duties are exercised by the translator/interpreter in the French section of the Translation Service.

6) The Deputy Head of the Administration and Finance Service is responsible for General Services.

7) The assistant to the Deputy Head of the Administration and Finance Service is also the assistant for the Mail and Archives Service.

8) The staff responsible for storing and accounting for equipment is responsible for the operation of the printing machinery.

9) The printing machinery of the Translation and Publications Service are exercised by the most senior reviser who, since 1st October 1986, has been the English reviser. He is helped in the exercise of these duties by his assistant.

## APPENDIX III

*Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions**1. Sitzings service*

Duties	Number	No. of days	Daily remuneration F*	Total F	Total F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly .....	1 a	16	1 002	16 032	46 200
	1 b	18	1 676	30 168	
Heads of sections .....	1 a	8	1 087	8 696	53 904
	1 a	8	1 236	9 888	
	2 b	10	1 766	35 320	
Sergeant-at-arms .....	1 b	10	1 560	15 600	15 600
Parliamentary secretaries .....	2 a	8	881	14 096	45 296
	2 b	10	1 560	31 200	
Precis writers .....	3 a	8	881	21 144	67 944
	3 b	10	1 560	46 800	
Verbatim reporters .....	6 a	8	1 101	52 848	271 248
	14 b	10	1 560	218 400	
Editors .....	2 a	8	881	14 096	45 296
	2 b	10	1 560	31 200	
Principal assistants .....	6 b	10	1 049	62 940	
Assistants to the President's Counsellors .....	1 a	16	530	8 480	
	1 b	18	964	17 352	340 932
Assistants assigned to other Services .....	14 a	8	530	59 360	
	20 b	10	964	192 800	
Ushers .....	4 a	8	442	14 144	41 548
Messengers .....	3 a	10	442	13 260	
Installations attendant .....	1 a	24	442	10 608	
Cloakroom attendant .....	1 a	8	442	3 536	60 996
Offset-assemblers .....	13 a	10	442	57 460	
Mechanic .....	1 a	8	442	3 536	
	106				988 964
Adjustment for 1991 (7.1%) .....					70 216
					1 059 180
Travelling expenses .....					260 000
					1 319 180
				Rounded up to	1 320 000

\* In accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1989.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

**2. Interpretation service**

Duties	Number	No. of days	Total F
Interpreters .....	12 a	8	271 776
	8 b	10	257 744
	20		529 520
Adjustment for 1991 .....			34 170
			563 690
Travelling expenses .....			40 000
			603 690
		Rounded up to	604 000

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

N.B. On 1st July 1988, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2 831. In addition, interpreters recruited outside Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (one or two half days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem) corresponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.

**3. Translation service**

Duties	Number	Daily remuneration F	Estimates <sup>1</sup>	Total F
Revisers .....	5 a	1 111	138 875	272 750
	3 b	1 785	133 875	
Translators .....	5 a	875	109 375	225 550
	3 b	1 549	116 175	
Principal assistants .....	2 a	483	28 980	79 860
	2 b	848	50 880	
Assistants .....	5 a	417	62 550	179 850
	5 b	782	117 300	
	30			758 010
Adjustment for 1991 .....				53 818
Travelling expenses .....				27 000
				838 828
			Rounded up to	839 000

1. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 30 days for assistants.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

## APPENDIX IV

***Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk****(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)*

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets				
			1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
1	<b><i>A. Reproduction and printing equipment</i></b>						
	<b><i>Photocopiers</i></b>						
1.1	1 RX 1065 (1987)	Hire (rate blocked). Maintenance contract (indexed). Property of the Assembly.	74 000 28 000	74 000 18 000	74 000 18 000	74 000 18 000	74 000 18 000
1.2	1 RX 3107	There is no longer a maintenance contract for this machine because of its age. It is planned to replace it in 1992 – Hire – Maintenance		20 000 12 000	20 000 12 000	20 000 12 000	20 000 12 000
1.3	1 Gestetner 2200	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	800	800	800	800	800
2	<b><i>Offset machines</i></b>						
2.1	1 Gestetner 311 (1984)	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	8 600	8 600	8 600	8 600	8 600
2.2	1 Gestetner 339 (1986)	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	2 000	2 000	2 000	2 000	2 000
2.3	1 Gestetner 329 (1985)	Property of the Assembly, it is to be replaced in 1991 Estimated cost of hiring the new machine Estimated cost of maintaining the new machine	50 000 10 000	50 000 10 000	50 000 10 000	50 000 10 000	50 000 10 000
3	<b><i>Electrostatic stereotypers</i></b>						
3.1	1 Gestetner PM/9 (1980)	Property of the Assembly. Reserved for sessions.					
3.2	1 Gestetner DT 1 (1985)	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	1 450	1 450	1 450	1 450	1 450
3.3	1 Gestetner 100PM (1986)	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	3 000	3 000	3 000	3 000	3 000
4	<b><i>Binding machines</i></b>						
4.1.	1 Gestetner 100	Purchased in 1978, this machine is in good condition. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.					
4.2.	1 Orpo Planax	Property of the Assembly. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.					
4.3.	1 Orpo Thermatic	Property of the Assembly. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.					
5	<b><i>Miscellaneous equipment</i></b>						
5.1.	1 Logabax-Ordina 7630 assembling machine with stapler	Purchased in 1977, this machine is serviced when required, since the cost of a maintenance contract is exorbitant. It is planned to replace it in 1993 on a hire purchase basis.	6 000	6 000	82 000	82 000	82 000

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets				
			1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
5.2.	1 AM International 5000 addressograph	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	3 850	3 850	3 850	3 850	3 850
5.3.	1 Fortematic 655 paper-cutting machine	This machine is serviced when required. A single annual service is enough to keep it in good working order.	750	750	750	750	750
	<i>B. Typewriters and calculators</i>						
6	<i>Office of the Clerk</i>						
6.1	8 Olivetti ET 121 electronic typewriters	Purchased between 1981 and 1983, these typewriters are in good condition.					
6.2	1 ET 2400 Olivetti	Purchased in 1989, it is in excellent condition.					
6.3	1 ET 221 Olivetti	Purchased in 1983, this typewriter is in good condition.					
6.4	3 Olivetti calculators	These machines are in good working order.					
7	<i>For use during sessions</i>						
7.1	4 RX 6015 electronic typewriters (English keyboards)	These machines were purchased in 1986 and are assigned to session services.					
7.2	1 IBM electric typewriter (French keyboard)	Assigned to a political group.					
7.3	2 ET 109 typewriters (Italian keyboard)	Assigned to the Italian delegation and the Italian summary reporters.					
7.4	1 Editor electric typewriter (Italian keyboard)	Assigned to the Italian summary reporters.					
7.5	2 Olivetti ET 2400 electronic typewriters - 1 Portuguese keyboard - 1 Spanish keyboard	Purchased in 1989, they are assigned to the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations					
7.6		All typewriters and calculators are serviced twice a year, before each session, by a mechanic recruited for the purpose, but a lump sum should be earmarked for possible repairs at other times.	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000
7.7	Hired typewriters	To meet the requirements of the various services during Assembly sessions, the following hire programme is envisaged for each session: - 15 electric machines with English keyboards - 15 electric machines with French keyboards - 3 electronic machines with French keyboards - 1 electronic machine with German keyboard	39 000	39 000	39 000	39 000	39 000



Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets				
			1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
8	<i>Typewriters in reserve</i>						
8.1	6 Olympia SGE 51 electric typewriters 2 English keyboards 5 French keyboards (one with long carriage)	Purchased between 1966 and 1979, they will be used in case of need (e.g. at the request of journalists or in the event of an electricity cut)					
8.2	21 Olympia mechanical typewriters 19 English keyboards 2 French keyboards						
	<i>C. Miscellaneous equipment</i>						
9	<i>Dictaphones</i>						
9.1	2 Uher 5000	Purchased in 1971, they will remain in service as long as possible.					
9.2	1 Sony BM 80	Purchased in 1987, it is in very good working order.					
9.3	2 Sony BM 75 (1990)						
9.4	11 Grundig Stenorettes	Purchased between 1963 and 1987, they should be replaced gradually as from 1992.		12 000	12 000	12 000	12 000
9.5	1 stenotype machine Grandjean	Purchased in 1974, this machine is in good working order.					
9.6		Provision for an overall sum in the budget for possible repairs to equipment in this category.	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000
	<i>D. Word processors and computers</i>						
10	<i>Computers and Word processors</i>						
10.1	4 Olivetti ETS 2010 1 Olivetti M 24 1 Olivetti M 300	These have been hired on a five-year leasing basis. The three contracts expire in September 1991, March 1993 and July 1995 respectively. Estimates take account of the replacement programme on these dates. Cost of hire.	185 600	145 350	142 600	132 100	98 200
10.2	6 Olivetti ETS 2010	Property of the Assembly.					
10.3		Maintenance contract (indexed) for all word processors and computers described in paragraphs 10.1 and 10.2	105 000	116 700	116 700	128 400	128 400
10.4	2 Macintosh SE 30	Purchased in 1988 and 1990, it is considered sufficient to service them when required.	2 500	2 500	2 500	2 500	2 500
	<i>E. Office furniture</i>						
11	Office of the Clerk	Purchase or replacement of various items of furniture.	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000

**Breakdown by budget classification**

Budget classification		Ref. No. in programme	Budgets				
Head	Sub-Head		1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
III	15. Purchase or repair of office furniture	11	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000
III	17. Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment						
		1.1	102 000	92 000	92 000	92 000	92 000
		1.2	—	32 000	32 000	32 000	32 000
		1.3	800	800	800	800	800
		2.1	8 600	8 600	8 600	8 600	8 600
		2.2	2 000	2 000	2 000	2 000	2 000
		2.3	60 000	60 000	60 000	60 000	60 000
		3.2	1 450	1 450	1 450	1 450	1 450
		3.3	3 000	3 000	3 000	3 000	3 000
		5.1	6 000	6 000	82 000	82 000	82 000
		5.2	3 850	3 850	3 850	3 850	3 850
		5.3	750	750	750	750	750
		7.6	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000
		7.7	39 000	39 000	39 000	39 000	39 000
		9.4	—	12 000	12 000	12 000	12 000
		9.6	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000
		10.1	185 600	145 350	142 600	132 100	98 200
		10.3	105 000	116 700	116 700	128 400	128 400
		10.4	2 500	2 500	2 500	2 500	2 500
	TOTAL		533 550	539 000	612 250	613 450	579 550
	ROUNDED UP		534 000	539 000	613 000	614 000	580 000

## APPENDIX V

*Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1990 to 1991*

	1990 a	1991 b	% $\frac{b-a}{a}$
<b>A. Operating budget</b>			
Head I. Permanent staff	13 292 000 (1)	16 439 000	+ 23.67
Head II. Temporary staff	4 045 000 (2)	3 546 000	- 12.33
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 576 000	1 754 000	+11.29
Head IV. General administrative costs	2 085 500 (3)	2 109 500	+ 1.15
Head V. Other expenditure	2 022 000 (4)	2 095 000	+ 3.61
Total expenditure	23 020 500	25 943 500	+ 12.69
Receipts	110 000	105 000	- 4.54
Net Total	22 910 500	25 838 500	+ 12.78
<b>B. Pensions budget</b>			
Pensions and leaving allowances	3 151 000	3 275 000	+ 3.93
Receipts	572 000	701 000	+ 22.55
Net Total	2 579 000	2 574 000	- 0.19
<b>GENERAL NET TOTAL (A + B)</b>	<b>25 489 500</b>	<b>28 412 500</b>	<b>+ 11.46</b>

(1) Including F 30 000 brought over from the financial year 1989.

(2) Including F 378 000 frozen, F 240 000 of which was unfrozen.

(3) Including F 50 000 frozen.

(4) Including F 280 000 frozen, F 72 000 of which was unfrozen.

APPENDIX VI

*Implications of the various heads for the 1990 and 1991 operating budgets*

	1990			1991		
	Amount	% of		Amount	% of	
		A	B		A	B
A. Operating budget						
Head I. – Permanent staff	13 292 000	57.74	58.02	16 439 000	63.36	63.62
Head II. – Temporary staff	4 045 000	17.57	17.65	3 546 000	13.67	13.72
Head III. – Premises and equipment	1 576 000	6.85	6.88	1 754 000	6.76	6.79
Head IV. – General administrative costs	2 085 500	9.06	9.10	2 109 500	8.13	8.16
Head V. – Other expenditure	2 022 000	8.78	8.83	2 095 000	8.08	8.11
TOTAL	23 020 500	100.00	100.48	25 943 500	100.00	100.40
Receipts	110 000		– 0.48	105 000		– 0.40
NET TOTAL	22 910 500		100.00	25 838 500		100.00

***Draft budget of the administrative expenditure  
of the Assembly for the financial year 1990***

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***Opinion of the Council***

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- 

***Explanatory Memorandum***

1. As shown in document C-B(90)22 (see Appendix I), at its meeting on 15th November 1990 the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee examined the Assembly's draft budget for 1991 and decided to recommend to the Council:

- the withdrawal of all the Assembly's staffing proposals (creation of six new posts, regrading of a grade L3 post and three grade C posts);
- revision of the estimates under Heads I and II of the pensions budget on the basis of salary adjustments proposed by the Co-ordinating Committee of Budget Experts with effect from 1st July 1990.

The estimates as revised by the Budget and Organisation Committee are shown in Annex A to document C-B(90)22 and represent an increase of 4.10% in the operating budget compared with the financial year 1990.

2. At its meeting on 29th November 1990, the Permanent Council decided (see Appendix II) to accept the recommendations of the Budget and Organisation Committee. It also said it was prepared to accept:

- the creation of a grade A2 post for a Portuguese national, provided the relevant expenditure (F 403 000, including social contributions, installation allowance and removal and travelling expenses, etc.) is offset by savings under other heads of the budget, it being understood that, in any event, the growth rate must not exceed 4.10%;
- the creation of a grade A4 post for a Spanish national as from 1st July 1991;
- the regrading of the post of the Secretary to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations from grade A4 to A5 as from 1st July 1991. This regrading was not included in the Assembly's proposals.

3. The refusal of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee to endorse the proposals to restructure the Office of the Clerk is due to the need to keep as close as possible to a zero growth rate which, in the opinion of that committee, should be the guiding principle for the budgets of all the international organisations. Furthermore, the improvement granted by the Council is not a real solution to the Assembly's problems and, moreover, raises a problem of responsibilities since the attribution of

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

*Members of the committee:* Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, Lagorce (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: Roman), Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck (Alternate: Ahrens), MM. Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Garcia Sanchez (Alternate: Fabra), Greco, Mrs. Haas-Berger, Mrs. Hoffmann, MM. Masseret (Alternate: Hunault), Morris, Niegel, Noerens, Rauti (Alternate: Rubner), Redmond (Alternate: Lord), Silva Marques, Sinesio, Triglia, Vara, N...

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

two grade A posts to specific nationalities and the regrading of a post in the organogram which had not been requested by the Assembly represent real interference in the affairs of the Assembly which jeopardises its independence.

To allow the Assembly to have an operating budget within the statutory time-limits, the draft budget for 1991 as amended by the Budget and Organisation Committee and the Council will be submitted for the Assembly's approval on Wednesday, 5th December. The restructuring problems of the Office of the Clerk would have to be the subject of a supplementary budget after they have been re-examined.

APPENDIX I

*Note by the Secretary-General  
on the WEU Assembly budget for 1991  
(Document C-B(90)22, 21st November 1990)*

1. The WEU Assembly draft budget for 1991 (Assembly Document 1241) was circulated to the Budget and Organisation Committee on 10th October 1990 under reference B(90)23, and was examined during the committee's meeting on 15th and 16th November 1990 (BR(90)4 to be circulated).
2. The net total of the proposed draft budget was:
- (a) Operating budget

(b) Pensions budget

TOTAL

F 25 838 500

F 2 574 000

F 28 412 500
- This figure represented an increase of 11.46% over the net grand total of the budget for 1990.
3. The Budget and Organisation Committee considered that the high increases envisaged for salary scales with effect from 1st July 1990 (10.16%) meant a considerable increase overall which needed to be reconciled with the requirement of zero real growth. In the circumstances, no new posts or regradings were acceptable. The committee requested revised figures to take account of this; the revised figures for the operational budget were presented to the committee during the meeting (Annex A). The net total for the pensions budget (F 2 645 000 in document B(90)23 addendum) was revised to F 2 745 000 to take account of the consequent reduction in contribution income (7% of net basic salary) to the pensions budget, because the new posts and regradings were no longer included.
4. Subject to reservations by the Netherlands and United Kingdom Delegations, the committee was able to recommend the Council to give a favourable opinion on the following amended budget for 1991. This represents an increase over the 1990 budget of 4.10% for the operational budget and 4.34% for the net grand total.
5. The committee recommends, subject to the reservations by the Netherlands and United Kingdom Delegations, that the Council give a favourable opinion on the Assembly's draft budget for 1991, as amended.
6. The Council's opinion will be sought at the next meeting on 29th November 1990. It is recalled that this opinion should be conveyed to the Assembly before the next part-session opens on 3rd December 1990.

A. Operating budget		
Head	Credits proposed* F	Credits recommended as revised** F
I. ....	16 925 000	14 362 000
II. ....	3 635 000	3 635 000
III. ....	1 754 000	1 754 000
IV. ....	2 109 500	2 109 500
V. ....	2 095 000	2 095 000
	26 518 500	23 955 500
Income .....	105 000	105 000
Net total operating budget .....	26 413 500	23 850 500
B. Pensions budget		
Expenditure .....	3 366 000	3 366 000
Income .....	721 000	821 000
Net total pensions budget .....	2 645 000	2 745 000
C. Net total budget .....	29 058 500	26 595 500

\* Including the 10.16% salary adjustments.  
\*\* Excluding new posts and regradings.

*Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1990 to 1991**(Partial revision of Annex V (B (90) 23))*

	1990 a	1991 b	$\frac{\% \text{ b-a}}{a}$
	F	F	
<i>A. Operating budget</i>			
Head I. Permanent staff .....	13 292 000	14 362 000	+ 8.05
Head II. Temporary staff .....	4 045 000	3 635 000	- 10.14
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment .....	1 576 000	1 754 000	+ 11.29
Head IV. General administrative costs .....	2 085 500	2 109 500	+ 1.15
Head V. Other expenditure .....	2 022 000	2 095 000	+ 3.61
Total expenditure .....	23 020 500	23 955 500	+ 4.06
Receipts .....	110 000	105 000	- 4.55
NET TOTAL .....	22 910 500	23 850 500	+ 4.10
<i>B. Pensions budget</i>			
Pensions and leaving allowances .....	3 151 000	3 366 000	+ 6.82
Receipts .....	572 000	621 000	+ 8.56
NET TOTAL .....	2 579 000	2 745 000	+ 6.43
GENERAL NET TOTAL (A + B) .....	25 489 500	26 595 500	+ 4.34



## APPENDIX II

*Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,  
to Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly*

30th November 1990

.....

I have the honour to inform you that the WEU Council at its meeting on 29th November 1990 expressed a favourable opinion on the draft supplementary budget of the Assembly for 1990 as contained in C-B(90)23.

The Council also expressed a favourable opinion on the draft Assembly budget for 1991 as contained in C-B(90)22. I should point out that this represents an amendment to the Assembly budget presented in Assembly Document 1241, excluding the additional posts and regradings proposed by the Assembly. However, the Council expressed a desire to enable the two new member states to be represented in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. To this end, the Council was prepared to accept:

- (a) the creation of one post grade A2 for a Portuguese national with effect from 1st January 1991. The cost of this post would be met within the budgetary envelope set out in C-B(90)22. That is to say, after including this post, the increase in the operating budget for 1991 compared with that for 1990 would not exceed the 4.1% in C-B(90)22;
- (b) the creation of one post grade A4 for a Spanish national with effect from 1st July 1991;
- (c) the upgrading from A4 to A5 with effect from 1st July 1991 of the post of Secretary to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

The budgetary implications of (b) and (c) would be in addition to the budgetary envelope in C-B(90)22.

You should know that the Council's opinion on the budget and its acceptance of the creation of the new posts and upgrading are "ad referendum" until 18.00 hrs on 3rd December 1990.

I recognise that under the procedure agreed (C-B(63)8) the Assembly will now consider whether the Council's amendments are acceptable before proceeding further. I am attaching a copy of the procedure document for convenience.

Willem VAN EEKELLEN

Encl. C-B(63)8 Document

Mr. R. PONTILLON  
President of the Assembly of  
Western European Union  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75775 Paris Cedex 16

*European security and events in the Near and Middle East*

PART II

*The Kuwait crisis*

REPORT <sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the Political Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur*

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on European security and events in the Near and Middle East

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Alternate for Mrs. Staels-Dompas) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: *Verbeek*), Beix, Böhm, Brito, Candal (Alternate: *Soares Costa*), Caro, Coleman, Collart (Alternate: *De Bondt*), Cuatrecasas (Alternate: *Diaz*), Eich, *Fabra*, Forni, Foschi, Hitschler, Koehl, van der Linden, Lord *Mackie*, MM. *Martinez*, *Martino*, Müller, Natali, *Péciaux*, *Pieralli*, Mrs. Polfer, MM. *de Puig*, *Roseta*, Sarti, Sir William Shelton, MM. *Stoffelen*, *Thyraud*, *Ward*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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### ***Draft Recommendation***

#### ***on European security and events in the Near and Middle East***

1. The Assembly welcomes the holding of an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Council in Paris on 21st August 1990 to implement Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty with a view to co-ordinating member countries' action following Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

It welcomes the fact that the Council invited the countries taking part in European political co-operation to attend its meeting and that Denmark and Greece were represented, as was Turkey.

It welcomes the fact that the Council placed its action in the framework of the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions and asked the Security Council to define additional measures that would be necessary in applying an embargo on Iraq and the territory of Kuwait. It welcomes the fact that Security Council Resolution 665 meets this request and that it stresses the need to make maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, the first of which was the visit by the Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, to Amman.

The Assembly notes that, in adopting without delay several Security Council resolutions on the first international crisis following the East-West rapprochement, the United Nations has emerged from the paralysis forced upon it by the cold war and the opposition between the military blocs to become the guarantor of peace and international order. It welcomes the fact that WEU, by the decisions taken at the extraordinary meeting of its Council of Ministers on 21st August 1990, affirmed the prestige and authority of the United Nations in the first major international crisis since the end of the cold war and just when a new international order is emerging.

Recognising the importance of co-ordination with the United States, it also welcomes the fact that the Council has expressed the will to support efforts by the Arab states to find a political solution to the conflict.

Finally, it welcomes the establishment of a system of co-ordination of member countries' naval and air action in the Gulf.

It RECOMMENDS that the Council pursue the undertaking thus started and make the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait the prior condition for any settlement of the conflict.

2. The Assembly has noted with satisfaction that useful consultations between member countries and the Soviet Union helped to ensure the adoption of Security Council Resolution 665.

It welcomes the fact that the Twelve reached agreement with the Soviet Union to adopt, at the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly on 27th September, a joint statement on the situation in the Gulf region.

It RECOMMENDS that the Council pursue and develop these consultations in order to maintain and develop the cohesion shown by the international community in imposing respect for the embargo against Iraq.

3. The Assembly has noted with indignation the many violations of the law of nations committed by Iraq and in particular:

- the threat to use chemical weapons which is a violation of the "Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare" that was signed in Geneva on 17th June 1925 and entered into force on 8th February 1928. This threat is particularly serious since chemical weapons were effectively used during the war against Iran and, in particular, against the Kurdish people;
- many violations of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian persons in time of war;
- violations of the 1961 Vienna Convention on the protection of diplomats.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council use every means at its disposal to terminate these violations and bring Iraq to destroy its stocks of chemical weapons under international control and make reparations for the wrongs inflicted upon foreign nationals detained in Iraq against their will and those inflicted on diplomatic representations in Kuwait.

4. The Assembly notes that the twelve EEC countries have announced their decision to afford economic assistance to Arab countries victims of the embargo against Iraq. It considers this to be a positive decision and RECOMMENDS that the Council consider the possibility of convening a conference on Euro-Arab co-operation bringing together the member countries of the EEC and of the Arab League.

It is gratified that the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers in Paris on 21st August provided an opportunity, on the same day, for a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs of the twelve European Community countries to examine the political aspects of the crisis and, in particular, the question of the hostages held by Iraq contrary to international conventions. It considers this to be a good example of task-sharing and close co-operation between WEU and the Twelve.

5. The Assembly considers that the weakness shown by the international community in ensuring that the Iraqi Government respects human rights is one of the sources of the conflict. Many eastern and western countries bear the responsibility for supplying Iraq with a powerful, dangerous military arsenal during and after the war with Iran.

It recalls that it has denounced the delivery of arms to Iraq and illegal transactions in advanced military technology by banks and producing firms in a few member countries of WEU and in the United States.

In Recommendation 475, it also made detailed proposals for terminating the arms race in Iraq and in all Middle Eastern countries.

It regrets that the Council's reply was hardly satisfactory and, in the light of current events, wishes greater attention to be paid to those proposals.

6. The Assembly regrets that, in many cases, the United Nations has been unable to ensure the application of resolutions adopted by the Security Council. It fears that if this situation persists it may lead to new and serious crises.

The Assembly considers that, after Iraq has been made to respect the Security Council decisions and international law, the international community and the United Nations must demonstrate the same cohesion in employing all political and diplomatic means and adopting vigorous measures of economic and political pressure to obtain respect for Security Council decisions by confirming Israel's right to exist within sure, recognised frontiers and the right of Palestinians to self-determination. This would bring about the end of Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. Similarly, a political solution to the present conflict may help to create conditions favourable to a settlement of the Lebanese problem and the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council implement without delay the provisions of Assembly Recommendation 475 adopted in December 1989 which underlined the importance of convening an international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations.

7. The Assembly strongly endorses the appeal made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, for immediate humanitarian assistance for the hundreds of thousands of refugees from different countries who are leaving or who have left Iraq via Jordan.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council ask the governments of member countries to take part in this humanitarian effort.

8. The Assembly notes that, for the second time, Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty has been the basis for co-ordinated action by member countries to foster the restoration of a peaceful order threatened outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council maintain and strengthen in any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty the commitments in that paragraph and ensure that no country is asked to join WEU if it is not effectively prepared to fulfil these commitments.

9. The Assembly notes that none of the WEU member countries alone has adequate means of taking effective action in the Gulf.

It RECOMMENDS that the Council analyse the shortcomings that have thus emerged, particularly in regard to monitoring and data-processing, and speed up consideration of measures to be taken to remedy this situation on the basis of Recommendation 482 on observation satellites.

10. The Assembly welcomes the fact that arbitration by the revitalised United Nations, security through an alliance of WEU countries against aggression and, in Vienna tomorrow, disarmament may help the emergence of a new system of security and international co-operation.

Finally, to achieve this end, it RECOMMENDS that the Council make intensive use of all the prospects revealed by the dramatic crisis in the Gulf for achieving as quickly as possible an effective European defence organisation.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. On the basis of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, which calls on member countries "to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability", since 1970 the WEU Assembly has constantly stressed the implications of events in the Near and Middle East for Europe's security (Recommendations 202 and 480).

2. Several times, and in particular in December 1989 (Recommendation 475), it has urged member governments to seek an international agreement to ban the supply of sensitive products or technology to Middle East countries, especially certain chemical products and "technology necessary for the development of medium- and long-range surface-to-surface missiles". In 1984 (Recommendation 412) it urged them to be vigilant in regard to violations of the laws of war and to act jointly "in the event of an extension of terrorist operations in the Middle East or Western Europe". It also recommended them to "co-ordinate the action of their armed forces for humanitarian operations and international police duties at the request of the United Nations". It welcomed the initiative taken by the Council in 1987 to co-ordinate member countries' action in order to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Gulf. In 1973, it set out in detail what should be Europe's "joint energy policy based on security requirements" (Recommendation 241).

3. In a communiqué issued by its Presidential Committee, the Assembly therefore could but welcome the convening, for the first time since WEU was set up in 1954, of an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council at the level of ministers for foreign affairs and defence on 21st August 1990 in order to respond to the serious crisis caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait by taking co-ordinated measures aimed at ensuring respect for decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council. It also welcomed the fact that the French Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence, who hold the chairmanship-in-office of the Council, organised a meeting with the Presidential Committee at the close of the ministerial meeting.

4. It was thus able to note that, for the second time, the first being when it co-ordinated member countries' minesweeping operations in the Gulf in 1987-88 to ensure freedom of navigation, the Council was drawing the full consequences of paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the

modified Brussels Treaty, thus following the course that the Assembly had been recommending for twenty years. At a time when, with growing détente, understanding and co-operation between member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact, one may wonder about the future of an organisation whose sole aim, one might think, was to organise member countries' participation in NATO's activities, it was essential to underline, in this way, that the only European organisation with security responsibilities still had every reason to exist because of its ability to act to maintain or restore peace in other regions of the world.

5. It was in order to stress this rôle that the Presidential Committee decided to meet on 20th September 1990 to adopt draft recommendations submitted by its Political and Defence Committees without waiting for the Assembly's ordinary session in December. As your Rapporteur has had very little time in which to prepare the explanatory memorandum, he will keep to essentials with only brief reference to other aspects. He has also avoided tackling the military side of the crisis, which is the responsibility of the Defence Committee.

### *II. The Iraqi aggression*

6. It is still difficult to analyse many aspects of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. Like all Middle East states, both countries came into being with the disintegration of the Arab world after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the mandates assigned to the United Kingdom and France by the League of Nations. Both stemmed from the collapse of the dream of a vast Arab state in the aftermath of the first world war, and their frontiers correspond neither to natural boundaries nor to clear ethnic realities. However, national feelings took shape during the two states' seventy years' existence and, in a manner hard to grasp, these feelings cohabit with a sense of belonging to a great Arab nation or of belonging to particular nations, since Iraq's constitution specifies that Iraqis may belong to either the Arab or the Kurdish nation, the latter indeed being the case of about 17% of Iraq's population.

7. Since it became independent in 1932, and above all during the crisis it provoked when Kuwait became independent in 1961, Iraq has tried to assert its rights over Kuwait, on the one hand because it only has an extremely small outlet on the Gulf which is dominated by islands

belonging to Kuwait, and on the other hand because Kuwait has very large oil reserves and resources, while the reserves of Iraq, with a population nine times larger, are about the same<sup>1</sup>. Kuwait is extremely wealthy, with a per capita GNP of \$13 680, i.e. in line with the most prosperous industrialised countries, compared with only \$4 900 in Iraq. This wealth is very unevenly shared between an élite which profits directly or indirectly from oil income, the remainder of the Kuwaiti population and, above all, large numbers of immigrants, mainly from Palestine, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Iran, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and neighbouring Arab countries constituting almost half the country's population.

8. Other, more economic, reasons may be added to these long-term reasons for wishing to take over Kuwait. Although it received considerable financial assistance from its Arab neighbours, and especially from Kuwait, Iraq accumulated very serious debts during its war against Iran from 1980 to 1988. It has an external debt of about \$40 000 million on which it is not managing to pay the interest, more than \$3 000 million per year. Iraq earned \$12 000 million from oil in 1988 and almost \$15 000 million in 1989. However, in 1989, its imports reached \$11 000 million in the civil sector and about \$5 000 million for military equipment, resulting in a balance of payments deficit of \$5 500 million that constantly forced it to ask its creditors to delay the repayment dates. In these circumstances, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Italy reduced further credits and urged their industrialists to be cautious. In Iraq, the freeing of trade decided in 1988 was limited, but inflation reached 25% in 1989. These circumstances were strong encouragement for it to claim Kuwait's wealth and its oil installations and reserves. Iraq also complained vigorously in the months preceding the crisis about the ill will of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia towards accepting a substantial increase in the price of oil as defined by OPEC and reduced output to ensure respect for decisions on prices.

9. There is nothing to confirm Iraq's claim on 2nd August 1990 that a Kuwaiti revolutionary movement, representing a large part of the population, had appealed to Iraq to remove Kuwait's governing régime. On the contrary, Iraq's attempt to set up a government to replace the one it had driven out failed, thus forcing it to proclaim the pure and simple annexation of Kuwaiti territory. This consideration obviously carried great weight with almost the entire international community when it condemned the Iraqi aggression.

1. Kuwait's reserves are estimated at 95 000 million barrels compared with 100 000 million for Iraq. It produces 1 800 000 barrels per day compared with 2 830 000 for Iraq.

# 10. (a) *Chronology of events prior to the meeting of the WEU Council on 21st August 1990*

1990

3rd May

The Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tariq Aziz, criticises the OPEC countries responsible for overproduction.

17th July

The President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, accuses certain Arab Gulf leaders of applying a pro-American policy aimed at bringing down the price of crude oil. The official Iraqi agency INA issues a declaration by the President, made on the occasion of the Arab summit meeting in Baghdad in May, affirming that wars may be provoked "for economic reasons".

18th July

Publication in Baghdad of a message from Iraq, transmitted to the Arab League on 16th July, accusing Kuwait of "stealing" Iraqi oil since 1980 by pumping oil from the Rumaila field in the south of Iraq and "eating into" its territory. Iraq calls on Kuwait to reimburse \$2 400 million, the value of the "stolen" oil and describes Kuwait's conduct as a "military aggression against Iraq".

Baghdad also accuses Kuwait of having taken advantage of the war with Iran to implement "a plan for a progressive, programmed advance towards Iraqi territory".

19th July

Kuwait rejects Baghdad's accusations outright, accuses Iraq of having attempted on several occasions to drill oil wells inside Kuwaiti territory and turns to the Arab League to settle the frontier problems.

21st July

Baghdad accuses Kuwait of preparing the ground for intervention by foreign forces in the Gulf by calling on the United Nations. By taking such action, Baghdad considers Kuwait has refused "the Arab option" and Arab League mediation.

22nd July

Kuwait calls on Baghdad to encourage Arab mediation and reaffirms that it wishes the dispute to be solved through the intermediary of the Arab League.

24th July

President Mubarak visits Baghdad, Kuwait and Riyadh. He trusts his mediation will lead to a four-party meeting between Iraq, Kuwait, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

27th July

The OPEC Ministers decide to raise the reference price per barrel from \$18 to \$21 and fix the production ceiling at 22.5 million barrels per day until the end of the year compared with 22 million in the first half of the year. Iraq had called for a reference price of \$25.

30th July

King Hussein of Jordan visits Baghdad and Kuwait.

31st July

Opening of talks between Iraq and Kuwait in Djeddah.

1st August

Suspension of the Djeddah talks without any agreement being reached.

Announcement of the closing of land frontiers between Iraq and Kuwait.

2nd August

The Iraqi army invades Kuwait. Baghdad declares that "the revolution has driven out the Kuwaiti monarchy" and that the task of the Iraqi forces is to support the "provisional government" that has replaced it. Kuwait calls for assistance from the Arab countries, but Iraq warns them against any intervention. The price of oil rises by 15%. The Emir of Kuwait takes refuge in Saudi Arabia. The United Nations Security Council meets to condemn the invasion (Resolution 660).

The United States bans all trade with Baghdad. Moscow suspends its arms supplies to Iraq. Iraq freezes the repayment of its debts in Washington, London and Paris. The United States, France, the United Kingdom, Japan and the Federal Republic freeze Kuwaiti assets.

3rd August

Meeting in Nicosia of the Arab League Council, which, by 14 votes to 4 (the PLO, Jordan, Sudan and Yemen) and 1 abstention (Mauritania), adopts a resolution condemning the Iraqi aggression. Libya and Iraq did not take part.

Washington urges Ankara and Riyadh to close their oil pipelines carrying Iraqi oil and announces that naval forces are being sent to the Gulf. Baghdad says it will start to withdraw its troops provided there is no threat to the security of Kuwait and Iraq.

Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze meet in Moscow and urge all countries to take political steps to ensure the immediate unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

4th August

The European Community freezes Iraq's assets, suspends co-operation with Iraq

and places an embargo on its imports of Iraqi oil and the export of arms to Iraq.

5th August

President George Bush declares that the United States will never accept the puppet government set up by Iraq.

6th August

The United States Secretary of Defence visits Saudi Arabia. Baghdad closes one of its oil pipelines that passes through Turkey. Hundreds of Americans and Europeans are rounded up in Kuwaiti hotels, apparently to be taken to Iraq.

The United Nations Security Council decrees economic sanctions against Iraq, extended to Kuwait (Resolution 661, adopted by thirteen of its fifteen members). Imports of oil and all other goods from Iraq and Kuwait are banned, as are sales of arms to both countries. The price of a barrel of oil reaches \$28.05.

At the extraordinary meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, members hold almost identical views on the need to apply sanctions to make Iraq understand that the invasion of Kuwait is unacceptable.

7th August

President Bush decides to send fighter aircraft and troops to Saudi Arabia to protect it against a possible Iraqi attack. Switzerland endorses the international sanctions, as does Turkey. The government installed in Kuwait by Iraq proclaims a republic.

8th August

Baghdad annexes Kuwait and affirms that it will not attack Saudi Arabia. The United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union strengthen their naval presence in the area of the Gulf.

9th August

The Security Council declares the annexation of Kuwait illegal (Resolution 662).

10th August

President Saddam Hussein calls for a holy war against American forces. At a summit meeting in Cairo, twelve of the twenty Arab heads of state urge Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait and agree to send an all-Arab force to protect Saudi Arabia.

Meeting in Brussels of the NATO Ministers for Foreign Affairs, who recall that any attack on Turkey will be considered an attack on all members of NATO.

European political co-operation meeting at ministerial level; Iraq's annexation of Kuwait is declared null.



11th August

British fighter aircraft and Egyptian troops arrive in Saudi Arabia. Pro-Iraqi demonstrations are held in Yemen, Mauritania, Algeria, Jordan, Libya and the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

12th August

Saddam Hussein links the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait with Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.

13th August

King Hussein visits Baghdad.

15th August

Saddam Hussein proposes to Iran a final settlement of the war between the two countries on the basis of acceptance of the Algiers treaty on the Shatt Al Arab, Iraqi withdrawal from occupied Iranian territory and the exchange of prisoners of war. 1 000 Moroccan troops join the 3 000 Egyptians already in Saudi Arabia. President Bush says the deployment of American military forces is not intended only to defend Saudi Arabia but also to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

16th August

President Bush holds talks with King Hussein and announces that the King undertakes to apply the sanctions decreed by the United Nations. Iraq orders the 4 000 British citizens and 2 500 Americans in Kuwait to assemble in two hotels.

18th August

Baghdad announces that "nationals of the aggressive nations" will be assembled in strategic civil and military areas of Iraq and Kuwait to serve as a human shield.

The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution insisting that Baghdad allow foreigners to leave (Resolution 664).

The United States asks Iraq to reverse immediately and unconditionally the measures taken against foreigners, which it considers wholly unacceptable. President Bush says he is profoundly troubled and concerned.

19th August

Baghdad asks western and Australian nationals in Kuwait to gather in three large hotels for their protection. Saddam Hussein announces his conditions for freeing foreign nationals, insisting in particular on American forces leaving the Gulf in exchange. Baghdad announces that a number of Austrian, Swedish, Swiss, Finnish and Portuguese nationals will be authorised to leave Iraq.

Washington rejects the latest conditions laid down by Saddam Hussein for freeing foreign nationals. London adopts an identical position.

The five permanent members of the Security Council continue their consultations in order to explore the possibility of joint military action.

21st August

Meeting in Paris of the WEU Council at the level of ministers for foreign affairs and defence, enlarged to include observers from Denmark, Greece and Turkey. Publication of a communiqué (Document 1237).

Meeting in Paris of the European Community ministers for foreign affairs on the question of Iraq taking nationals of member countries as hostages.

Declaration by Mr. Mitterrand, President of the French Republic, on France's aims and action in the Gulf.

Iraq insists on the immediate closing of diplomatic representations in Kuwait. Twenty-one countries refuse to obey.

11. *(b) Events since 21st August 1990*

22nd August

President Bush decides to call up reservists.

Belgium, Spain, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands decide to send units to the Gulf on the basis of the decision of the WEU ministers.

Iraq completes its evacuation of Iranian territory occupied by its forces and frees its Iranian prisoners of war.

23rd August

Saddam Hussein appears on Iraqi television with western hostages.

25th August

By 13 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba), the Security Council adopts Resolution 665 allowing recourse to force to ensure respect for the embargo on Iraq and Kuwait.

Visit by Mr. Kurt Waldheim, President of the Austrian Republic, to Baghdad. Austrian nationals are authorised to leave Iraq and Kuwait.

Blockade of embassies in Kuwait.

26th August

Visit by Mr. Dumas, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, to Moscow and publi-

- cation of a joint declaration calling on Iraq to respect international law and submit to Security Council resolutions.
- 27th August  
Meeting in Paris of the chiefs of staff of WEU countries to implement the decisions taken by the ministers on 21st August.
- 28th August  
Saddam Hussein announces the release of women and children held in Iraq.
- Iraq announces the annexation of the eastern part of Kuwait (Rumaila oil field and islands) to form part of the province of Basrah and the establishment of the eastern part as a new Iraqi province.
- Members of the Moroccan Embassy in Kuwait are forcefully moved to Baghdad. Hungary evacuates the staff from its embassy in Kuwait.
- 29th August  
OPEC decides to increase its members' oil output to make up for the absence of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil on the international market.
- Iraq proposes freeing all the hostages in exchange for guarantees of non-aggression.
- 30th August  
President Bush asks his allies to share expenditure resulting from the Gulf crisis.
- 31st August  
Meeting in Amman between Mr. Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Mr. Tariq Aziz.
- 4th September  
In a speech in Vladivostok, Mr. Shevardnadze, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, revives the proposal for a general conference on the Middle East.
- 5th September  
Meeting in Moscow between Mr. Tariq Aziz and Mr. Gorbachev.
- 9th September  
President Bush and President Gorbachev meet in Helsinki.
- Euro-Arab-American naval co-ordination meeting in Bahrain.
- Mr. Tariq Aziz visits Tehran.
- 13th September  
The Security Council adopts Resolution 666.
- 14th September  
Iraqi troops enter premises belonging to the Belgian, Canadian and French Embassies in Kuwait.

Iraqi television broadcasts a message from President Bush.

- 15th September  
The President of the French Republic decides to take retaliatory measures against Iraq, including sending a brigade and air forces to Saudi Arabia.
- 16th September  
The Security Council adopts Resolution 667.
- 17th September  
European political co-operation agrees on retaliatory measures against Iran (expulsion of diplomats).
- 18th September  
WEU ministerial meeting in Paris.

### *III. The WEU Council decision of 21st August 1990*

12. Maintenance of the status quo in the Middle East is not sufficient reason for intervention by European countries in the region. All countries are entitled to decide on their internal régimes and, insofar as international peace is not thereby threatened, two countries may decide to merge without the international community having a say in the matter. However, Iraq's aggression against Kuwait involves questions of quite another kind. There is nothing to justify the claim that the people of Kuwait wanted a change of régime or, even less, the intervention of a foreign power to bring it about. Consequently, Iraq's annexation of Kuwait can in no way be assimilated to a voluntary merger of two states. Everything indicates that this was a pure and simple aggression by Iraq against Kuwait, borne out by the fact that the Iraqi Government found it impossible to form a credible Kuwaiti Government in the days following annexation.

13. It was for quite different reasons that the WEU countries reacted to the aggression in concert. They include:

14. (i) Concern to maintain peace in the highly sensitive region of the Middle East. If the conquest of one country by another were accepted without reaction by the international community, this would be an invitation to any country whatsoever in the region, particularly Iraq, to use force to solve innumerable problems. In the third world, nearly all states are of recent origin, many frontiers are contested and the absence of reaction from the international community to the Kuwait affair would mean that it was prepared to allow everyone to act as he thought fit.

15. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and its threats to the Arab countries round the Gulf

triggered the first serious international crisis since the historic changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 when the cold war and worldwide United States-Soviet and East-West opposition came to an end and thus offered hopes of peace and stability. It is the first serious trial to face the international community since the end of bipolarism. It will have lasting consequences in international relations. It must therefore be shown that the new international order is based on collective action, excludes unilateral initiatives, imposes respect for law and treaties, asserts, in all circumstances and against anyone whomsoever, the principles of non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and prevents and punishes the use of force to solve regional, frontier, ethnic, religious, economic and political disputes. The United Nations, hitherto paralysed by the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, has rediscovered the rôle for which it was created: to be the guarantor of international peace. The five resolutions adopted without delay by the Security Council on restoring Kuwait's sovereignty and independence, the embargo against Iraq and for its strict application are unprecedented in the history of the organisation. They were made possible by close co-operation between the United States, the Soviet Union and the other permanent members of the Security Council. WEU, as an international organisation, had specific responsibilities for the defence of Europe. By deciding to send naval forces to the Gulf to help to enforce the embargo against Iraq and by co-ordinating the action of these forces to back up the Security Council's decision, member countries are making a major contribution to the creation of a new international order based on the prestige and authority of the United Nations. The fact that earlier Security Council decisions, taken in the days when the world was divided into two opposing blocs, were not respected does not mean they have lost their validity. By taking vigorous action against the violations committed by Iraq, the United Nations is creating the right conditions for tackling with equal vigour, once the Iraqi affair has been settled, the other major issues in the region, i.e. the end of Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories and the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Lebanon.

16. (ii) The deliberate, declared violation of the principles and texts on which international law is based, be they treaties implying recognition of states and their frontiers, in particular Iraq's recognition of Kuwait in 1963, or those defining the law of war and in particular, in the case of Iraq, the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons, the Geneva Convention of 12th August 1949 on the protection of civilian persons in time of war and the 1961 Vienna Convention on the protection of diplomats.

17. The 1949 Geneva Convention includes the following provisions:

- in Article 4: "Persons protected by the convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying power of which they are not nationals."
- in Article 28: "The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations."
- in Article 34: "The taking of hostages is prohibited."
- in Article 35: "All protected persons who may desire to leave the territory at the outset of, or during a conflict, shall be entitled to do so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of the state. The applications of such persons to leave shall be decided in accordance with regularly established procedures and the decision shall be taken as rapidly as possible. Those persons permitted to leave may provide themselves with the necessary funds for their journey and take with them a reasonable amount of their effects and articles of personal use."

If any such person is refused permission to leave the territory, he shall be entitled to have such refusal reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the detaining power for that purpose.

Upon request, representatives of the protecting power shall, unless reasons of security prevent it, or the persons concerned object, be furnished with the reasons for refusal of any request for permission to leave the territory and be given, as expeditiously as possible, the names of all persons who have been denied permission to leave."

18. Iraq acceded to these three agreements. Yet it violated the first by threatening to use chemical weapons if attacked. It violated the second by preventing the nationals of a large number of countries leaving its territory and that of Kuwait and further by forming "human shields" to protect a number of strategic objectives on its territory. It violated the third in the case of the western countries' embassies in Kuwait.

19. (iii) The will to ensure respect for United Nations decisions and in particular those of the Security Council, since Iraq has taken no action on Resolutions 660 and 662 addressed to it on 2nd and 9th August 1990. Ensuring respect for

the orders of a worldwide international organisation contributes not only to maintaining peace but above all to organising a peaceful, lasting international order. Conversely, to leave these resolutions unapplied for lack of means of implementing them would lead to international anarchy under the supreme direction of the law of the strongest. It was precisely to avoid the embargo failing that the United Nations Security Council, as a positive answer to requests from the WEU Council of Ministers and others, adopted Resolution 665 which:

"Calls upon those member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in Resolution 661."

In the same resolution, the Security Council again underlines the need to resort as far as possible to "political and diplomatic measures" to compel Iraq to accept the United Nations decisions.

20. (iv) The violations of human rights committed by Iraq, both against its own citizens and against foreign nationals, during its war against Iran and since the end of that conflict are not the final reason for the action by third countries, but they help to deprive Saddam Hussein's régime of any right to the confidence of the international community as a whole. They also contribute to the maintenance of external pressure on Iraq for it to rectify its internal practices.

21. (v) The will to halt the expansionism which, following the invasion of Kuwait, would most probably have been targeted on other Arab countries in the region, none of which is strong enough to offer effective resistance to Iraq's military strength. The fact that Iraq has large numbers of sophisticated weapons and binary chemical weapons too and that, in recent years, it has developed the production of long-range missiles, i.e. with a range of over 1 000 km, and has long been trying to acquire nuclear weapons suggest that, if it is not stopped now, it will be far more difficult and more costly in terms of human lives to do so later. By stopping it now, this will facilitate the subsequent acceptance of the request in Assembly Recommendation 475 that all countries in the region, including Israel, renounce arms of mass destruction.

22. (vi) The fact that a majority of the Arab League condemned the Iraqi aggression and that several Arab countries, including Egypt and

Morocco, are participating directly in the deployment of forces designed to protect Saudi Arabia means action can be taken without Europe seeming to defend the West's own interests in opposition to the Arab world. In the communiqué of 21st August, there is no mention, among the reasons for or objectives of the military action co-ordinated by WEU, of the defence of any territory or of any alliance, thus distinguishing it from the attitude of the United States which is more committed to supporting Saudi Arabia and permanent co-operation with Israel. However, it asserts the wish of the WEU countries for the Arab states to assume responsibility for settling the conflict.

23. (vii) Nor does the communiqué of 21st August refer to economic reasons, but it is clear that the twelve countries concerned took the utmost account of the rôle played by the Middle East in oil production and of the size of oil reserves in the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This means that any event in the region has worldwide economic consequences and that the international community cannot allow states to juggle irresponsibly with oil output and prices. It is not a matter of opposing any increase in prices but of ensuring that such increases do not upset the international economic order unduly, the first victims of which would be the third world countries which do not produce oil. If Saddam Hussein managed to take over Saudi Arabia's oil wells and reserves, and even if he retained and exploited only Kuwaiti wells and reserves, he would be in a position of force that would allow him to extend his domination over the entire Middle East and subject the industrialised countries to all kinds of blackmail.

24. Nor will it be possible to return to the status quo ante where oil is concerned once the present international crisis has been settled. In the future, the present political and military commitment of WEU and the Community will have far greater moral and political justification if Western Europe acts within international economic and financial organisations and the United Nations to promote a fairer balance between industrialised countries, the oil-producing countries and the most needy countries of the third world. The world's principal energy source cannot continue to be exploited in the sole interest of the industrialised countries and the feudal, financial and military classes that hold sway in many of the oil-producing countries. In future, it must also be used for the benefit of the developing countries, which have incurred intolerable debts vis-à-vis international financiers, and help to fight the poverty of the human masses of the third world. The United Nations, which has assumed responsibility for solving the present international crisis, as it had never done in the past, can gradually become the

forum for decisions involving development compatible with the requirements of safeguarding the earth's environment and a new worldwide economic order.

25. It should be noted that the invasion of Kuwait took place just after a period of overproduction and falling oil prices when the rise in demand for crude oil, which had been noticeable since the end of 1985, was leading to steadier prices. This rise was not due to United States and Western European imports but to those of Eastern Europe, Asia (+10%) and, in general, developing countries (+6%). The rise in prices reached 20% and led to a parallel increase in those of natural gas and coal. The OPEC system of limits on production therefore worked and the oil income of its members rose from \$86 400 million in 1988 to \$115 000 million in 1989. Only five of the thirteen member countries, all in the Gulf, had surplus capacities at the end of 1989, in spite of the rise in their quotas in November 1989. Kuwait's then rose from 1.15 million to 1.5 million barrels per day. Moreover, for technical reasons, North Sea, United States and Soviet production could not be increased to any great extent. Saddam Hussein therefore chose a particularly appropriate time to strike at the world economy.

26. There was some hesitation about the framework in which powers determined to act to put an end to Iraqi expansion could organise their intervention. NATO was unsuitable, on the one hand because the North Atlantic Treaty makes no provision for joint action outside the area defined in the treaty, and on the other hand because the United States intends to respect undertakings to Saudi Arabia and, probably, Israel which do not concern the European members of the alliance. Statements by American authorities on 22nd and 23rd August that American forces might take the initiative of offensive operations against the Iraqi army, either in Kuwait or in Iraq itself, do not correspond either to the mandate of the European forces as defined by the governments concerned on the basis of the WEU Council discussions on 21st August or to the resolutions so far adopted by the Security Council. Of course, some degree of co-operation between American and European forces in regard to their deployment and action to impose respect for the embargo against Iraq is particularly essential since Europeans have no satisfactory observation satellite systems with immediate data transmission, and this makes them dependent on the Americans. But this technical co-operation must not lead to political dependence.

27. The European Community, for its part, and twelve-power political consultations provide no basis for military action. Thanks to Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty, only WEU had a juridical basis

that allowed the chairmanship-in-office to convene the WEU Council at the highest level to examine the situation leading to concrete action. At the request of the President of the Assembly and, apparently, certain member countries, the French chairmanship-in-office organised this meeting on 21st August.

28. The chairmanship-in-office is believed to have decided to invite the other members of the European Community plus Turkey to send observers to the meeting. Denmark, Greece and Turkey did so. Ireland refused because of its policy of neutrality. These invitations are not without importance, because they show that WEU is not only, and perhaps no longer, principally the "European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance" but that it is more than ever the instrument by which Western Europe can build its defence identity and act independently outside the NATO area. It is gratifying that the Council did not confine itself to a strictly juridical view of its composition but welcomed, in a matter that concerns Europe as a whole, all European countries wishing to attend. It should be noted that Greece decided on that occasion to send a warship to the Gulf in the framework of WEU co-ordination, and Belgian, Spanish, Italian and Netherlands units either joined the French and United Kingdom units already deployed in the Gulf or were sent there even before the meeting on 21st August. Your Rapporteur stresses the importance of the fact that the Italian chairmanship-in-office of the EEC, in agreement with the French chairmanship-in-office of WEU, the promoter of the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers, convened a summit meeting in Paris of ministers for foreign affairs of the twelve Community member countries. The same day – 21st August – WEU took politico-military decisions and the EEC tackled the political aspects of the crisis and the question of hostages. The co-ordinated WEU and EEC ministerial meetings thus give an unprecedented all-round picture of a joint policy for Western European countries.

#### *IV. The Arab countries and the crisis*

29. Iraq's aggression against Kuwait occurred at a time when the Arab world was particularly disturbed. Since the second world war, it has been riddled with political and religious movements setting states' national policies against the idea of a vast Arab cultural community and sometimes too an even vaster Moslem community, which led them to reproach the leaders of Arab states for betraying the "Arab nation" for the sake of narrow interests. Arab society's feeling of powerlessness to promote the cause of the Arab nation has frequently led to assassinations of heads of state or leaders of Arab coun-

tries. In the last ten years, a vast protest movement against the westernisation and secularisation of the Arab community has made considerable progress with the development of Islamism. This force is particularly threatening to Arab leaders since, in many countries, the absence of democracy makes it impossible for it to have a legal existence and participate constitutionally in opposition to those in power. From time to time, it gathers round charismatic leaders and there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein, who presented himself as the hero of Arabism versus the Islamic fundamentalism of Iran from 1980 to 1988, is now endeavouring to assert himself as the defender of Arabism and Islam vis-à-vis the other states of the Arab world.

30. A second factor of division and instability is to be found in the very unequal distribution of wealth, derived primarily from oil, between and within those countries. This inequality is particularly serious since it is mainly sparsely-populated countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates and Libya which have abundant oil reserves, whereas Egypt and Syria, which have very large, rapidly-growing populations, are almost without oil resources. Only Iraq and Algeria have large oil resources and fairly large populations. Thus, per capita GNP varies considerably from one country to another. The dream of a political organisation of the Arab community is therefore associated with the hope of a fairer sharing of resources between countries and their inhabitants. While the rulers of the Gulf region are not insensitive to this claim, provide both the Palestinians and the Egyptians with considerable assistance and also afforded Iraq substantial aid during the 1980-88 war, this had very little effect on the inequalities. Furthermore, the unfair way oil revenue is shared in several oil-producing countries makes their leaders oppose any form of democratic challenge to their power. This point was strongly emphasised by Saddam Hussein in his speeches aimed at Arab public opinion. At the same time, he defended Islam, threatened by the presence of non-believers close to the holy places at the request of the Saudi head of state.

31. Finally, we must not overlook the fact that the Arabs continue, in spite of the end of colonisation, to consider themselves the victims of an international order which favours the industrialised European and American countries both economically and in the sharing of political power. Efforts by western powers to maintain order, peace or simply the status quo in the Middle East, whether justified or not, are seen by a large section of Arab public opinion as aggressions against the Arab nation. Associated with these efforts are the establishment of the state of Israel in 1949, its maintenance, its military victories and, since 1967, its occupation of the whole of Palestine and a fringe of Syria and

Lebanon. In the last two years, the intifada has offered television viewers, particularly the Arabs, the daily spectacle of permanent clashes and repression of an Arab population deprived of rights. The feelings aroused by these facts explain why any challenge to the West, and in particular to the United States, considered to be Israel's main protectors, are celebrated as an exploit. Thus, after Nasser, Saddam Hussein, because of his bravado and violations of international law, is viewed as a hero by part of the Arab public which, even in countries which have unreservedly condemned the Iraqi aggression, has taken to the streets to show its enthusiasm for the Iraqi dictator.

32. These circumstances probably explain the hesitation of certain Arab leaders since 2nd August. It is fairly unlikely that these leaders wish to have Saddam Hussein lead a vast Islamic, pan-Arab movement and declare himself a revolutionary in order to try to recreate round Baghdad the unity once achieved by the Abbassides. Yet several of them do not wish to take the risk of opposing him too openly, particularly when they are not immediately threatened by the Iraqi army, because they fear the reactions of their own people.

33. Clearly Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has caused a deep rift in the Arab world which has always wanted issues between Arab countries to be settled without the intervention of external powers, always suspected of wishing to impose their domination. On the other hand, certain Arab countries, particularly those close to the Gulf, have long felt threatened by Iraq's military power and territorial claims, above all since its military victory over Iran in 1988 gave it prominence in the Gulf. However, even in coalition the Arab countries are probably not able effectively to resist Saddam Hussein's large, experienced and very well-armed army. The sovereigns of the states close to the Gulf, all monarchies, could but feel solidarity with Sheikh Jaber al Ahmed as Sabah of Kuwait, who took refuge in Saudi Arabia after the aggression on 2nd August, particularly as several of them know they are threatened by social instability in their countries, but they also had to take account of public opinion, not always unfavourable to Iraq. Strong pro-Saddam Hussein demonstrations took place at the beginning of August in Yemen, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and the Israeli-occupied territories. It is impossible to obtain an exact picture of the probably changing reactions of a public which is unable to express its views freely, be it in Iraq or in other countries which are opposed to it.

34. These were the conditions surrounding a ministerial meeting of the Arab League in Nicosia on 3rd August at which the Iraqi aggression was condemned. This meeting was followed by a meeting of Arab heads of state in

Cairo on 10th August. After difficult discussions, this Arab summit meeting adopted a resolution condemning the Iraqi aggression, calling for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces, refusing recognition of the annexation of Kuwait, subscribing to Security Council Resolutions 660, 661 and 662 and deciding to respond to Saudi Arabia's request for military assistance. It was obviously the last point more than any other that caused difficulties since it meant Arab countries deploying their forces alongside Americans in Saudi Arabia against an Arab country. Only twelve countries voted for the resolution: the six Gulf countries plus Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Djibouti, Somalia and Morocco. Tunisia did not take part in the summit meeting, Algeria and Yemen abstained, Jordan, the Sudan and Mauritania expressed reservations and Iraq, Libya and the PLO voted against. Furthermore, King Hussein of Jordan did his utmost from the start of the crisis to find a compromise between Iraq and the countries determined to apply the sanctions voted by the Security Council. His aim was to avoid a confrontation which would probably be disastrous for his country, the inevitable corridor between Israel and Iraq, and a large part of whose population seems favourable to Iraq.

*The position of the PLO and Israel in the crisis caused by Iraq*

35. Your Rapporteur will now examine in greater detail – although his remarks will still be sketchy and incomplete – the reactions of the PLO and the Palestinians in the occupied territories and Israel's attitude. The PLO and Israel were the main subject of your Rapporteur's analysis presented to the Assembly on 5th December 1989. Moreover, he is convinced that once Iraq has been made to see reason the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will return to the centre of international preoccupations and dominate the situation in the Middle East.

36. The frustration of Palestinians must not be underestimated after three years of intifada and diplomatic and political attempts which have failed to lead to negotiations between the PLO and Israel because of Israel's refusal to make the slightest concession. Pro-Saddam Hussein demonstrations in the occupied territories are due more to disappointment at the absence of results from PLO mediation than a sudden liking for the Iraqi leader. Among the Palestinians and Arabs in general, the absence of results also weakened the prestige of Egypt, which had undertaken to mediate between the PLO, the United States and Israel, and whose return to the fold of Arab League states had raised great hopes for the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Lebanese question and the crisis in the Middle East.

37. It should be added that Community Europe, while supporting the American and

Egyptian initiatives, welcoming the political evolution of the PLO and bringing pressure to bear on Israel, has taken no action of its own to solve the Palestinian problem. Finally, the Palestinians were even more disappointed by Mr. Gorbachev's perestroika which, in Gaza and the West Bank, introduced large numbers of Soviet Jews to Israel and a very sharp fall in Soviet military assistance to friendly Arab countries. Nor should it be forgotten that the United States interrupted its talks with the PLO in Tunis shortly before Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. This offers some explanation for the Palestinian people's pro-Saddam Hussein reaction, not only in the occupied territories but also in Jordan, although it does not justify the PLO's direct or indirect support of Saddam Hussein. Your Rapporteur believes this support to be detrimental to a fair solution to the Palestinian problem. Moreover, in this connection there is disagreement and even a deep split among Palestinians and within the PLO. A change of attitude is therefore not to be excluded. It is even probable in the context of the search for a political solution to the present crisis for which the PLO is starting to define mediatory proposals.

38. In any event, your Rapporteur fully endorses the statement made to his Israeli friends by Emil Habibi, the great Palestinian writer living in Jerusalem:

“The Palestinians may have made mistakes in this crisis, but they are not responsible for starting it. On the contrary, they may become its principal victims.”

39. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and its threats to use chemical weapons against Israel confirmed the many recent denunciations by Israeli leaders of the danger constituted by Saddam Hussein and his determination to ensure that, through military means, Iraq will play a dominating rôle in the region following the end of the war against Iran. Among the Israeli population, the fear of becoming the target for an attack by chemical weapons became very acute after the occupation of Kuwait and, above all, since it became apparent that the present crisis might lead to a devastating war.

40. The Israeli Government for its part is trying to derive the maximum political advantage for the future from the attitude adopted by the PLO and the divisions appearing in the Palestinian organisation and the Arab countries. So far, the Israeli Government's principal achievement has been to have fully restored the traditional relations of its alliance with the United States. Prior to the Iraqi attack in the Gulf, these relations had fallen to the lowest level in the history of the Hebrew state



because of its refusal of Mr. Baker's five points relating to the holding of elections in the occupied territories.

41. The most obvious result of the United States' change of attitude is President Bush's proposal to Congress to give Israel some of the very advanced technology military equipment (F-15 and F-16 aircraft, Patriot surface-to-air missiles, tanks, etc.) that the United States is to withdraw from Western Europe in implementation of disarmament agreements. The low profile it has so far adopted in the Gulf crisis at the request of the United States did not prevent the Israeli Government from issuing serious warnings to Jordan, caught in a vice between Israel, Iraq and internal opposition. Nor did this low profile prevent certain Israeli circles and American Jews from exercising strong pressure on President Bush, his administration and Congress, urging an immediate American military offensive against Iraq.

42. The WEU Council's communiqué illustrates the ministers' full awareness of the situation in the Arab world, particularly when it calls on the Arab countries to find a solution to the problem raised by Saddam Hussein's aggression. It is also important that the Council has instructed its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Dumas, to make the necessary contacts with the Arab League. However, one may wonder whether, in present circumstances in the Arab world, the League, or quite simply the leaders of the Arab states, will be able to reach agreement on the terms of such a settlement.

43. Nor must we be content with a settlement of the acute crisis provoked by the invasion of Kuwait and, if possible, a return to the status quo ante. If the chronic instability of the Arab world were to continue for any length of time, there would always be other states, dictators or charismatic leaders capable of rallying to their cause all the frustration with which the Arab world is fraught.

44. It is naturally for the Arabs themselves to settle their political problems. However, the international community should in future be firmer in ensuring the widest possible respect for human rights as set out in the United Nations Universal Declaration. Saddam Hussein would have been unable to start this crisis if the persecution of the Kurds and the use of chemical weapons against them had triggered the reactions they deserved.

45. It is also for the Arabs to manage their oil production and share the revenue they earn from it, but the industrialised world must not place its strength and influence with Arab countries at the service of régimes which are opposed to the introduction of liberal, democratic practices. For instance, if Iraq is successfully halted in its tracks, this must not be taken as endorsement of such régimes in the countries

threatened by Iraq. Clearly a more equitable sharing of wealth is linked with the introduction of such practices. To tackle such problems and those relating to economic assistance, the twelve EEC countries have decided to grant Arab countries which are victims of the crisis and the embargo Europe's share of the assistance to refugees promised by Mr. Perez de Cuellar on behalf of the United Nations. In tackling the political questions raised by the situation in the Middle East, it would be most desirable for a Euro-Arab conference to be held as soon as possible on the initiative of WEU, the EEC and the Arab League.

46. However, there is above all one area in which the western countries might act to promote the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East, and that is the search for a reasonable solution to the problem of the right to self-determination of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank and the closely-related problem of Lebanon. When our Assembly adopted Recommendation 475 in December 1989, it showed it was aware of this global aspect of Middle East affairs and made a few specific proposals for "fostering an international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations". Some countries seem prepared to act in this sense, as can be seen from the Franco-Soviet declaration of 26th August:

"The two parties declared they were convinced that this crisis again brought to light the urgent need for more intensive efforts to settle other crisis situations in the Middle East, and particularly the Palestinian question. They renew their support for Arab action for the settlement of the Lebanese crisis."

Saddam Hussein is quite right to underline that the international community showed it was extremely weak when it came down to applying these resolutions and he was probably encouraged by this weakness. The settlement of the Kuwait crisis should lead to the search for acceptable solutions to the other problems which, for more than forty years, have been poisoning life in the Middle East and preventing the establishment of lasting peace.

47. The international community was more than weak, it was even well-disposed and rather irresponsible towards the arms race by Iraq which is now aiming weapons purchased abroad against the interests of the countries which sold it military equipment. President Gorbachev told the Iraqis that they had been given weapons to defend themselves and not to attack other countries and he continued with criticism of the Soviet Union for the massive military assistance it had given Iraq in the past.

48. Such self-criticism also applies to Europeans and other western nations. In spite of



repeated denunciations by European parliamentary assemblies and parliaments of the various WEU and EEC member countries, our governments have not – except perhaps in part and to a limited extent by banning exports of material that might be used to produce chemical weapons – taken the necessary steps to prevent the sale of highly-sophisticated weapons and military technology and the granting of western credit and financing for the production of weapons of mass destruction since the end of the war between Iran and Iraq. Our governments failed to take effective steps, even after press campaigns covering the Atlanta bank scandal and, more recently, what would have been a very long-range howitzer. The Council of Ministers gave a most unsatisfactory reply to Assembly Recommendation 475, which made specific, firm proposals for putting an end to the arms race in the Middle East.

### *V. Conclusions*

49. At the time of writing, it is impossible for your Rapporteur to foresee how the crisis will end, how far the show of force will go, whether recourse to arms will effectively be avoided as the United Nations wishes, with great unity and firmness, whether Saddam Hussein's régime will survive and whether the cohesion shown by the United Nations will continue. However, the lessons to be learned from this matter will depend on these various elements, but it is already possible to draw certain conclusions.

50. The first concerns the vital rôle played by the Security Council, which managed to define action to be taken by the international community in face of the aggression and violations of the law committed by Iraq and to ensure that a large number of countries, including those which decided to co-ordinate their naval action in the framework of WEU, took the necessary steps to ensure that the embargo it voted could be applied effectively. This was obviously the result of the evolution of the Soviet Union since 1985 and the end of the cold war in Europe. The Soviet Union, while endeavouring to avoid any deterioration in its relations with certain Arab countries and after vain attempts to influence Iraq, voted for Resolution 665 authorising countries taking part in the naval operations to resort to force if absolutely necessary. China, which had quite recently complained about being boycotted after the 1989 repression, adopted a similar attitude. Furthermore, the United States Government was careful not to allow its forces to take action before the vote on the resolution, the text of which seems to have been carefully negotiated between Moscow and Washington. In short, the international community showed it was capable of acting firmly, with moderation and relative unanimity and, while it is not yet

sure that this action will be successful, it will certainly place the Iraqi Government in a very difficult position.

51. Moreover, it must be noted that Saddam Hussein's attempts to break the ranks of countries determined to see that the sanctions are respected have in general failed in spite of his cynical use of the promise to free the hostages of one or other country. To date, only Mr. Waldheim, representing a neutral country that plays no part either in the Security Council or in the Gulf operations, has arranged for the release of the Austrian hostages by a personal approach whose impact is necessarily limited. The western countries which, in the early days of the crisis, seemed hesitant about how to tackle the problem, endorsed the international action as soon as it seemed likely to succeed.

52. This matter has thus allowed the United Nations to improve its reputation in international public opinion and this is a major step towards organising world peace. At this new juncture, no one will be able to resort to force unilaterally to impose national interests against the wishes of other states without being sure beforehand, if not of the agreement, at least of the absence of reaction of the Security Council which will be able to play the rôle assigned to it by the United Nations Charter with far greater authority than hitherto.

53. WEU for its part has contributed to this consolidation of international order, first by basing its intervention on Security Council resolutions and then by approaching the United Nations to ask it to strengthen the measures planned for imposing the application of the embargo. Secondly, it encouraged the Arab countries to assume responsibility for the political settlement of the conflict, thus showing that Europe is not pursuing any particular interest in the matter and that its action is not intended to weaken, but to consolidate understanding among the Arab countries. Finally, since it co-ordinated member countries' national operations in the Gulf in 1987-88, the WEU Council has shown that it represented Europe in security matters from the moment armed forces were involved. The twofold holding in Paris on 21st August of the WEU ministerial meeting which defined the political, juridical and military bases for European action and the working luncheon attended by representatives of the Twelve to consider what attitude Europe should adopt towards Iraq's measures of coercion against foreign nationals was a clear indication of the complementarity of WEU and twelve-power Europe. It throws light on the long-standing discussion about their respective rôles in the preparation of a European union. The latter can but be the result of a synthesis of institutions which, as foreseen in the Single Act, would converge to achieve the same aims.

54. Similarly, while the North Atlantic Council, meeting in Brussels on 6th August, could but note agreement on the need to apply sanctions against Iraq, it was unable to make arrangements to ensure that they were applied since the region is not covered by the Washington Treaty. Conversely, it confirmed its support for Turkey in the event of it being attacked. However, in areas where United States aims and commitments to certain countries did not tally exactly with those of the European members of the Atlantic Alliance, only WEU could co-ordinate European action. On the other hand, on-the-spot technical co-operation between American forces and forces from WEU countries is still possible. It even seems necessary in certain respects as long as Europe does not have the wherewithal to process images obtained by satellites. But, according to the American authorities themselves, WEU is the instrument for inter-allied dialogue on all matters relating to threats to peace and security outside the area covered by the Atlantic Alliance.

55. For these reasons, the governments should give careful consideration to all the prospects offered by the new situation in Europe and not overlook the importance of our organisation or of the modified Brussels Treaty, since it is an essential means for Europe to play an effective part in peacekeeping in the world. While the

organisation of peace in Europe is primarily a matter for the CSCE, the latter does not, at least in the next few years, seem appropriate for co-ordinating participating countries' action to promote peace outside Europe. The utmost account will have to be taken of this WEU vocation in tackling the possible enlargement of WEU and the treaty revision made necessary by the accession of Portugal and Spain. It should also be stressed that Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the treaty, which the Assembly has often regretted was not sufficiently binding on member countries to consult each other in the event of crises outside Europe, is proving, now that it is being implemented, to be a highly adequate instrument for co-operation in which each member country, for quite understandable reasons, wishes to retain control over its own armed forces and the degree of its military involvement. The present situation in Europe seems to preclude earlier commitments being taken any further. It should be recalled that it took thirty-three years for Article VIII, paragraph 3, to lead for the first time, in 1987, to WEU military co-ordination outside the NATO area. Three years later, on 26th August 1990, the first meeting of chiefs of defence staff of the WEU countries since the signing of the Paris Agreements in 1954 was a new stage and a major political event because it places this military co-ordination at the highest level.

## APPENDIX I

## RESOLUTION 660

*adopted by the Security Council  
on 2nd August 1990*

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

ALARMED by the invasion of Kuwait on 2nd August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq,

DETERMINING that there exists a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,

ACTING under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. CONDEMNS the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
2. DEMANDS that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1st August 1990;
3. CALLS upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard and especially those of the League of Arab States;
4. DECIDES to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution.

## RESOLUTION 661

*adopted by the Security Council  
on 6th August 1990*

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Reaffirming its Resolution 660 of 2nd August 1990,

Deeply concerned that that resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues with further loss of human life and material destruction,

Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,

Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed its readiness to comply with Resolution 660,

Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of Resolution 660 and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of Resolution 660 and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
3. Decides that all states shall prevent;
  - (a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;
  - (b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products;

4. Decides that all states shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs;

5. Calls upon all states, including states non members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of the present resolution;

6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary-General;

(b) To seek from all states further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the present resolution;

7. Calls upon all states to co-operate fully with the committee in the fulfilment of its task, including supplying such information as may be sought by the committee in pursuance of the present resolution;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the secretariat for the purpose;

9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above, nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all states:

(a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies;

(b) Not to recognise any régime set up by the occupying power;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days;

11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq.

## RESOLUTION 662

*adopted by the Security Council  
on 9th August 1990*

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Recalling its Resolutions 660 and 661,

Gravely alarmed by the declaration by Iraq of a "comprehensive and eternal merger" with Kuwait,

Demanding, once again, that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1st August 1990,

Determined to bring the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,

Determined also to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait,

1. Decides that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void;
2. Calls upon all states, international organisations and specialised agencies not to recognise that annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation;
3. Further demands that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait;
4. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the occupation.

### **RESOLUTION 664**

*adopted by the Security Council  
on 19th August 1990*

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Recalling the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait and Resolutions 660, 661 and 662,

Deeply concerned for the safety and well-being of third state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,

Recalling the obligations of Iraq in this regard under international law,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue urgent consultations with the Government of Iraq following the concern and anxiety expressed by the members of the Council on 17th August 1990,

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,

1. Demands that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such nationals;
2. Further demands that Iraq take no action to jeopardise the safety, security or health of such nationals;
3. Reaffirms its decision in Resolution 662 that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq is null and void, and therefore demands that the Government of Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel and refrain from any such actions in the future;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on compliance with this resolution at the earliest possible time.

### **RESOLUTION 665**

*adopted by the Security Council  
on 25th August 1990*

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Recalling its Resolutions 660, 661, 662 and 664 and demanding their full and immediate implementation,

Having decided in Resolution 661 to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Determined to bring an end to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq which imperils the existence of a member state and to restore the legitimate authority, and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait which requires the speedy implementation of the above resolutions,

Deploping the loss of innocent life stemming from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and determined to prevent further such losses,

Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with Resolutions 660, 661, 662 and 664 and in particular at the conduct of the Government of Iraq in using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil,

1. Calls upon those member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in Resolution 661;
2. Invites member states accordingly to co-operate as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of Resolution 661 with maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, in accordance with paragraph 1 above;
3. Requests all states to provide in accordance with the Charter such assistance as may be required by the states referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;
4. Further requests the states concerned to co-ordinate their actions in pursuit of the above paragraphs of this resolution using as appropriate mechanisms of the military staff committee and after consultation with the Secretary-General to submit reports to the Security Council and its committee established under Resolution 661 to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of this resolution;
5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

### RESOLUTION 666

*adopted by the Security Council  
on 13th September 1990*

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Recalling its Resolution 661, paragraphs 3 (c) and 4 of which apply, except in humanitarian circumstances, to foodstuffs,

Recognising that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for foodstuffs to be supplied to the civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering,

Noting that in this respect the committee established under paragraph 6 of that resolution has received communications from several member states,

Emphasising that it is for the Security Council, alone or acting through the committee, to determine whether humanitarian circumstances have arisen,

Deeply concerned that Iraq has failed to comply with its obligations under Security Council Resolution 664 in respect of the safety and well-being of third state nationals, and reaffirming that Iraq retains full responsibility in this regard under international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the fourth Geneva Convention,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that in order to make the necessary determination whether or not, for the purposes of paragraph 3 (c) and paragraph 4 of Resolution 661, humanitarian circumstances have arisen, the committee shall keep the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait under constant review;
2. Expects Iraq to comply with its obligations under Security Council Resolution 664 in respect of third state nationals and reaffirm that Iraq remains fully responsible for their safety and well-being in accordance with international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the fourth Geneva Convention;
3. Requests, for the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution, that the Secretary-General seek urgently, and on a continuing basis, information from relevant United Nations and other appropriate humanitarian agencies and all other sources on the availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait, such information to be communicated by the Secretary-General to the committee regularly;
4. Requests further that in seeking and supplying such information particular attention will be paid to such categories of persons who might suffer specially, such as children under 15 years of age, expectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and the elderly;
5. Decides that if the committee, after receiving the reports from the Secretary-General, determines that circumstances have arisen in which there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering, it will report promptly to the Council its decision as to how such need should be met;
6. Directs the committee that in formulating its decisions it should bear in mind that foodstuffs should be provided through the United Nations in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their supervision in order to ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to use his good offices to facilitate the delivery and distribution of foodstuffs to Kuwait and Iraq in accordance with the provisions of this and other relevant resolutions;

8. Recalls that Resolution 661 does not apply to supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, but in this connection recommends that medical supplies should be exported under the strict supervision of the government of the exporting state or by appropriate humanitarian agencies.

### RESOLUTION 667

*adopted by the Security Council  
on 16th September 1990*

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Reaffirming its Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665 and 666,

Recalling the Vienna Conventions of 18th April 1961 on diplomatic relations and of 24th April 1963 on consular relations, to both of which Iraq is a party,

Considering that the decision of Iraq to order the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and to withdraw the immunity and privileges of these missions and their personnel is contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, the international conventions mentioned above and international law,

Deeply concerned that Iraq, notwithstanding the decisions of the Security Council and the provisions of the conventions mentioned above, has committed acts of violence against diplomatic missions and their personnel in Kuwait,

Outraged at recent violations by Iraq of diplomatic premises in Kuwait and at the abduction of personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity and foreign nationals who were present in these premises,

Considering that the above actions by Iraq constitute aggressive acts and a flagrant violation of its international obligations which strike at the root of the conduct of international relations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that Iraq is fully responsible for any use of violence against foreign nationals or against any diplomatic or consular mission in Kuwait or its personnel,

Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and for Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Further considering that the grave nature of Iraq's actions, which constitute a new escalation of its violations of international law, obliges the Council not only to express its immediate reaction but also to consult urgently to take further concrete measures to ensure Iraq's compliance with the Council's resolutions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Strongly condemns aggressive acts perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait, including the abduction of foreign nationals who were present in those premises;

2. Demands the immediate release of those foreign nationals as well as all nationals mentioned in Resolution 664;

3. Further demands that Iraq immediately and fully comply with its international obligations under Resolutions 660, 662 and 664 of the Security Council, the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations and international law;

4. Further demands that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq and take no action to hinder the diplomatic and consular missions in the performance of their functions, including access to their nationals and the protection of their person and interests;

5. Reminds all states that they are obliged to observe strictly Resolutions 661, 662, 664, 665 and 666;

6. Decides to consult urgently to take further concrete measures as soon as possible, under Chapter VII of the Charter, in response to Iraq's continued violation of the Charter, of resolutions of the Council and of international law.

## APPENDIX II

## RESOLUTION

*adopted at the Arab summit meeting,  
Cairo, 10th August 1990*

Meeting in Cairo on 10th August 1990, the Arab extraordinary summit meeting:

- after consulting the resolution of the Ministerial Council of the Arab League following the extraordinary meeting held in Cairo on 2nd and 3rd August;
- after consulting the communiqué issued on 2nd August 1990 at the nineteenth meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference;
- on the basis of the provisions of the Arab League Pact and the treaty on joint Arab defence and economic co-operation;
- on the basis of the United Nations Charter, in particular paragraph 4 of Article 2 and Articles 25 and 51;
- aware of the overwhelming historical responsibility dictated by the difficult circumstances resulting from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its dangerous consequences for the Arab nation, Arab national security and the overriding interests of the Arab nation,

DECIDES AS FOLLOWS:

1. The summit confirms the resolution of the Ministerial Council of the League of 3rd August 1990 and the communiqué of the OIC of 4th August 1990;
2. The summit reaffirms respect for Security Council Resolutions 660, 661 and 662 dated 2nd, 6th and 9th August 1990 respectively insofar as they express international legality;
3. The summit condemns the Iraqi aggression against our brother Kuwait, refuses to recognise Iraq's decision to annex Kuwait or any other consequences resulting from the invasion of Kuwaiti territory by Iraqi armed forces and insists on the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces and their return to the positions they occupied prior to 1st August 1990;
4. The summit reaffirms the sovereignty of Kuwait, its independence and territorial integrity as a member state of the Arab League, stresses the need for the return of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government which was in place prior to 1st August last and supports any measure adopted by that government to free its territory and recover its sovereignty;
5. The summit deplores Iraqi threats to Arab Gulf states, disapproves of the concentration of Iraqi troops along the frontiers of Saudi Arabia and reaffirms the wholehearted solidarity of the Arab countries with that country and the other Arab Gulf states;

The summit supports the measures adopted by Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states which are using the right to lawful defence in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the treaty of joint defence and economic co-operation between the member states of the Arab League, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and Resolution 661 of the Security Council of 6th August 1990, it being understood that these measures will be withdrawn as soon as Iraqi forces have been completely withdrawn from Kuwait and there has been a return to legal power in Kuwait;

6. The summit decides to answer positively the request from Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states concerning the deployment of Arab forces to support their own armed forces so that they may defend their territories and sovereignty against all external aggression;
7. The Arab extraordinary summit instructs the Secretary-General of the Arab League to follow the implementation of this resolution and to submit a report to the Ministerial Council of the League within fifteen days so that it may adopt the measures it considers necessary in this connection.



## APPENDIX III

## STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE

*on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait  
Brussels, 2nd August 1990*

The Community and its member states have followed with apprehension during the last weeks the increase in tension in the dispute between Iraq and some Arab countries. They have welcomed the diplomatic efforts that Arab countries and the Arab League itself were deploying and refrained from any stance and initiative in order to preserve such initiatives from any interference.

Following the breakdown of talks held in Jeddah under Arab auspices, the Community and its member states are now gravely concerned at the latest developments in the dispute and in particular at the military aggression carried out by Iraq against Kuwait, not only a hostile action to a neighbour country, but also a dangerous threat to peace and stability in the region.

The Community and its member states strongly condemn the use of force by a member state of the United Nations against the territorial integrity of another state; this constitutes a breach of the United Nations Charter and an unacceptable means to solve international difference. They therefore fully support the resolution adopted today by the Security Council.

The Community and its member states call upon all governments to condemn this unjustified use of force and to work for an early re-establishment of the conditions for the immediate resumption of peaceful negotiations. In this light they ask for an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory.

The Community and its member states maintain the matter under review and are ready to take into consideration further initiatives.

## STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE

*on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait  
Brussels, 4th August 1990*

The Community and its member states reiterate their unreserved condemnation of the brutal Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and their demand for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the territory of Kuwait, already expressed in their statement of 2nd August.

They consider groundless and unacceptable the reasons provided by the Iraqi Government to justify the military aggression against Kuwait, and they will refrain from any act which may be considered as implicit recognition of authorities imposed in Kuwait by the invaders.

In order to safeguard the interests of the legitimate Government of Kuwait they have decided to take steps to protect all assets belonging directly or indirectly to the state of Kuwait.

The Community and its member states confirm their full support for United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 and call on Iraq to comply with the provisions of that resolution. If the Iraqi authorities fail so to comply, the Community and its member states will work for, support and implement a Security Council resolution to introduce mandatory and comprehensive sanctions.

As of now, they have decided to adopt the following:

- an embargo on oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait;
- appropriate measures aimed at freezing Iraqi assets in the territory of member states;
- an embargo on sales of arms and other military equipment to Iraq;
- the suspension of any co-operation in the military sphere with Iraq;
- the suspension of technical and scientific co-operation with Iraq;
- the suspension of the application to Iraq of the system of generalised preferences.

The Community and its member states reiterate their firm conviction that disputes between states should be settled by peaceful means, and are prepared to participate in any effort to defuse the tension in the area.

They are in close contact with the governments of several Arab countries and follow with utmost attention the discussion within the Arab League and the Gulf Co-operation Council. They hope that Arab initiatives will contribute to the restoration of international legality and of the legitimate Government of Kuwait. The Community and its member states are ready to lend their full support to such initiatives and to efforts to resolve by negotiations the differences between the states concerned.

The Community and its member states are carefully monitoring the situation of EC nationals in Iraq and in Kuwait. They maintain strict co-ordination in order to guarantee their safety.

#### STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE

*on the situation in the Gulf  
(Extraordinary EPC ministerial meeting)  
Brussels, 10th August 1990*

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces has already provoked an unreserved condemnation by the Community and its member states, which have not only called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the territory of Kuwait, but also clearly stated the unacceptability of the situation created by Iraqi military aggression against Kuwait.

Accordingly they reject the announced annexation of Kuwait which is contrary to international law and therefore null and void, as stated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 662. The same applies to the announced removal of diplomatic missions from Kuwait and to any attempt by the Iraqi authorities to exert powers of government within the territory of Kuwait.

They have noted with appreciation the wide international solidarity which developed following the aggression and led to effective action by the United Nations Security Council. They welcome the rôle played by the United Nations and they will strive to maintain and further enhance such international solidarity.

The Community and its member states immediately after the Iraqi invasion adopted a set of measures against Iraq and subsequently have swiftly introduced legislation to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 661, which they consider a fundamental instrument to restore international legality.

The Community and its member states have already expressed their grave concern for the situation of foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait. No effort or initiative will be spared to ensure that EC citizens be allowed full and unconditional freedom of movement within and out of those countries. Precise requests to this end have already been addressed to the Iraqi authorities, whom they hold fully accountable for the safety of their citizens. The presidency will continue to ensure the appropriate co-ordination aimed at guaranteeing the safety of EC citizens in Iraq and Kuwait.

The Community and its member states, having also in mind the vital European interests in the stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the states of the area, are ready to take further initiatives, in the framework of the United Nations Charter, that will prove necessary to contain the conflict. They note that certain member states have already taken useful steps also to this end. They are strongly determined to engage in broad efforts to afford the necessary international solidarity with other states in the area threatened by the same aggressor in their efforts to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolution 661, and to force Iraq to restore Kuwait sovereignty in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 662.

They have decided to maintain close contact with Arab governments and to offer their assistance to Arab efforts aimed at defusing tensions and restoring international legality, within the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661 and 662. They hope that the summit of Arab heads of state and government convened today in Cairo may take concrete measures to this end. The presidency will discuss with the Arab side the possibility of co-operation aimed at achieving this common purpose.

**STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE**

*on the situation of foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait  
(Extraordinary EPC ministerial meeting)  
Paris, 21st August 1990*

The Community and its member states, deeply concerned at the situation of foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait, renew their condemnation of the Iraqi decision to detain them against their will as contrary to international law and fully support the Security Council Resolution 664 which requires Iraq to permit and facilitate their immediate departure from Iraq and Kuwait. They denounce that the Iraqi Government has reacted up to now negatively to many representations of the Community and its member states.

As members of the international community, which is founded not only on law but also on clear ethical standards, the European Community and its member states express their indignation at Iraq's publicised intention to group such foreigners in the vicinity of military bases and objectives, a measure they consider particularly heinous as well as taken in contempt of the law and of basic humanitarian principles. In this context the fact that some foreigners have been prevented from contacting their consular or diplomatic missions or have been forcibly moved to unknown destinations is a source of further deep concern and indignation. In this connection, they attach the greatest importance to the mission of two envoys of the Secretary-General of the United Nations which is now taking place. They warn the Iraqi Government that any attempt to harm or jeopardise the safety of any EC citizen will be considered as a most grave offence directed against the Community and all its member states and will provoke a united response from the entire Community. They also warn Iraqi citizens that they will be held personally responsible in accordance with international law for their involvement in illegal actions concerning the security and life of foreign citizens.

They call on all those who may still influence the decisions of the Iraqi Government to have these measures revoked and support the actions of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to this purpose. They confirm their commitment to do all in their power to ensure the protection of the foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait and reiterate that they hold the Iraqi Government fully responsible for the safety of their nationals.

The Community and its member states, in the light of their condemnation of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait as well as of their refusal to recognise the annexation of that state to Iraq, firmly reject the unlawful Iraqi demand to close the diplomatic missions in Kuwait and reiterate their resolve to keep those missions open in view also of the task of protecting their nationals.

The Community and its member states note with satisfaction that this position is shared by a great number of countries and is confirmed by Security Council Resolution 664, which requires the reversal of the illegal demand to close the diplomatic missions.

**STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE**

*on the crisis in the Gulf  
(Extraordinary EPC ministerial meeting)  
Rome, 7th September 1990*

The European Community and its member states reaffirm their full support for the implementation in all aspects of the resolutions of the Security Council relating to the crisis in the Gulf and their determination to be active in ensuring that they are respected. The European Community and its member states are convinced that a complete implementation of the embargo decided by the Security Council with regard to Iraq is the essential condition for bringing about a peaceful solution to the crisis. They are fully implementing the embargo and call on all members of the international community to do likewise.

The Community and its member states are conscious of the grave burden which the present crisis imposes on the economy of many countries. They are therefore determined to contribute to the effort being made by such countries to address the situation and faithfully implement the embargo.

Countries most immediately affected by the implementation of the embargo, and notably Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, have applied for assistance to offset those short-term effects. The Community and its member states have taken a decision on the principle of extending such short-term financial assistance to these three countries. This assistance will take place in the framework of concerted action with other industrialised countries as well as with the countries of the region. The General Affairs Council will take appropriate decisions at its forthcoming meeting on the basis of Commission proposals and the results of consultations with third countries.

In this situation, it is essential that international co-operation is intensified and that the international institutions (IMF, World Bank, GATT and other bodies like the Paris Club) play their full rôle. The newly-created EBRD should also contribute to the solution of the difficulties for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is of crucial importance that all efforts are made to prevent the affected economies turning in on themselves.

In addition to the humanitarian aid already provided, a major effort is necessary to assist in the repatriation of refugees from Iraq and Kuwait. The Community is ready to commit a substantial amount from its own budgetary resources for additional humanitarian aid. Member states will contribute to the joint effort, notably by providing transportation facilities.

The Community and its member states reiterate their readiness to continue the political dialogue and to strive for an early opening and a rapid conclusion of the trade agreement negotiations with the GCC countries.

The Community will speed up work already under way concerning the intensification of the Community's Mediterranean policy.

The European Community and its member states are moreover resolved to contribute to the bringing into being of a policy of regional co-operation aimed at influencing, in a constructive way, the solution of structural problems which afflict the Mediterranean area and the Middle East under the aspects of stability and of economic and social well-being. The forthcoming Palma meeting in the context of CSCE will be an important occasion to contribute to the much needed longer-term reflection on these problems.

#### STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE

*on the situation of foreign citizens in Iraq and Kuwait  
(Extraordinary EPC ministerial meeting)  
Rome, 7th September 1990*

The European Community and its member states reaffirm their utter condemnation of the measures taken by the Iraqi authorities against foreign citizens in Iraq and Kuwait and against embassies in Kuwait. They insist on full respect of the right to freedom of movement of foreign citizens in those countries. They regard these measures as totally unacceptable and contrary to international law and will continue to react to them with complete solidarity.

The Community and its member states deplore the fact that despite the efforts made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations through his emissaries and in person in the recent discussions in Amman, the Iraqi authorities have not complied with Resolution 664, in which the Security Council requires Iraq to permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries. They express the urgent wish that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could pursue his efforts and extend them to the situation of the diplomatic and consular representations in Kuwait by sending a mission in order to establish contact with them.

The Community and its member states look for the early resumption of discussions between the Iraqi authorities and the ICRC and urge them to co-operate fully with the ICRC's efforts to establish forms of protection and assistance for foreign citizens held in Iraq and Kuwait.

They reiterate that the Iraqi authorities are obliged to allow all foreign citizens and not only women and children, held against their will, to leave. The Community and its member states remain determined to do what is necessary to ensure their protection. They hold the Iraqi authorities fully responsible, in accordance with international law – including in their individual capacities – for the safety of foreign citizens.

They call on all those who may still influence the decisions of the Iraqi Government to have these measures revoked and support the actions of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to this purpose. They confirm their commitment to do all in their power to ensure the protection of the foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait and reiterate that they hold the Iraqi Government fully responsible for the safety of their nationals.

The Community and its member states, in the light of their condemnation of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait as well as of their refusal to recognise the annexation of that state to Iraq, firmly reject the unlawful Iraqi demand to close the diplomatic missions in Kuwait and reiterate their resolve to keep those missions open in view also of the task of protecting their nationals.

The Community and its member states note with satisfaction that this position is shared by a great number of countries and is confirmed by Security Council Resolution 664, which requires the reversal of the illegal demand to close the diplomatic missions.

## APPENDIX IV

## UNITED STATES-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT

*Moscow, 3rd August 1990*

The Soviet Union and the United States, as members of the United Nations Security Council, consider it important that the Council promptly and decisively condemn the brutal and illegal invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi military forces. The United States and the Soviet Union believe that now it is essential that the Security Council resolution be fully and immediately implemented.

By its actions, Iraq has shown its contempt for the most fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. In response to this blatant transgression of the basic norms of civilised conduct, the United States and the Soviet Union have each taken a number of actions, including the Soviet suspension of arms deliveries and the American freezing of assets. The Soviet Union and the United States reiterate their call for an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Sovereignty, national independence, legitimate authorities and territorial integrity of the state of Kuwait must be completely restored and safeguarded. The United States and the Soviet Union believe the international community must not only condemn this action, but also take practical steps in response to it.

Today, we take the unusual step of jointly calling upon the rest of the international community to join with us in an international cutoff of all arms supplies to Iraq. In addition, the Soviet Union and the United States call on regional organisations, especially the League of Arab states, all Arab governments, as well as the non-aligned movement and the Islamic conference, to take all possible steps to ensure that the United Nations Security Council resolution is implemented.

Governments that engage in blatant aggression must know that the international community cannot and will not acquiesce in nor facilitate aggression.

## JOINT STATEMENT

*issued by President Bush and President Gorbachev following their meeting  
Helsinki, 9th September 1990*

We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbours.

We reaffirm the joint statement of our foreign ministers of 3rd August 1990 and our support for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665. Today we once again call upon the Government of Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and to free all hostages now held in Iraq and Kuwait.

Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions is acceptable. Nothing short of a return to the pre-2nd August status of Kuwait can end Iraq's isolation.

We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the sanctions mandated by the United Nations, and we pledge to work, individually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the sanctions.

At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union recognise that United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 permits, in humanitarian circumstances, the importation into Iraq and Kuwait of food. The Sanctions Committee will make recommendations to the Security Council on what would constitute humanitarian circumstances.

The United States and the Soviet Union further agree that any such imports must be strictly monitored by the appropriate international agencies to ensure that food reaches only those for whom it is intended, with special priority being given to meeting the needs of children.

Our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we will be united against Iraq's aggression as long as the crisis exists. However, we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the United Nations Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay.

As soon as the objectives mandated by the United Nations Security Council resolutions mentioned above have been achieved, and we have demonstrated that aggression does not pay, the presidents direct their foreign ministers to work with countries in the region and outside it to develop regional security structures and measures to promote peace and stability. It is essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Gulf. Both sides will continue to consult each other and initiate measures to pursue these broader objectives at the proper time.

## APPENDIX V

## COMMUNIQUE BY Mr. PONTILLON

*President of the WEU Assembly  
Paris, 3rd August 1990*

Mr. Robert Pontillon, President of the Assembly of Western European Union, strongly condemns the invasion and military occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi troops. On behalf of all members of the Assembly, he calls for the evacuation and immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwaiti territory.

He requests the governments of all WEU countries to have recourse, if necessary, to paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

He calls upon the United Nations to take all necessary steps to resolve this conflict in a just manner and with due regard for the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter.

He requests the governments of the member states of the Arab League – and particularly those belonging to the Gulf Co-operation Council who are linked to Kuwait by a mutual defence treaty – to assess the importance of their responsibilities towards the community worldwide and to take whatever political and diplomatic action may be necessary to put an end to this violation of international law by Iraq.

He unreservedly supports the measures announced jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union.

## COMMUNIQUE

*issued at the close of the ministerial meeting  
of the Council of Western European Union  
Paris, 21st August 1990*

1. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU met on 21st August 1990 to discuss the situation in the Gulf caused by the Iraqi invasion and then the annexation of Kuwait. The meeting was held pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the WEU treaty, the Rome declaration of October 1984 and the platform on European security interests of October 1987, which provides for member countries to concert their policies on crises outside Europe insofar as they may affect European security interests.
2. The ministers of the WEU member states repeat their unreserved condemnation of the invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq and call on Iraq to comply immediately and unconditionally with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660 and 662. They restate their firm determination to continue to take all necessary steps to comply with the embargo of Iraq in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 and to render it effective. They call on the Security Council to take any further useful measures to this end.
3. Ministers declare that the determination their countries intend to display in upholding the law is for the sole purpose of ending aggression and its consequences. The action they have initiated is aimed at upholding respect of the principles which obtain in relations among states, for they concern the whole international community and serve as a safeguard for all its members.
4. Faced with a situation that in the first instance affects the Arab states, ministers emphasise the solidarity linking their countries to the Arab world and their resolve to support its efforts to seek a solution from within which respects the relevant Security Council resolutions in the context of their ongoing co-operation and dialogue with the Arab world.
5. Ministers express their acute concern and indignation at the restrictions on the freedom of movement of nationals of the member countries and at the inhuman treatment inflicted on some of those nationals. They warn Iraq of the grave consequences that would inevitably ensue were their safety to be placed at risk. They reiterate their support for Security Council Resolution 664 and demand that Iraq complies with it without delay.
6. They stress that WEU member countries, bearing in mind the vital European interests in the stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the states of the area, intend to contribute towards further enhancing the unprecedented international solidarity that has developed since the aggression and has led to effective action by the United Nations Security Council. The countries that are suffering from the economic consequences of this action deserve their solidarity.

7. Ministers welcome the measures being taken by member states in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 and in response to the requests for assistance from states in the Gulf region, with the aim of obliging Iraq unconditionally to withdraw its troops from Kuwaiti territory and restore Kuwait's sovereignty.

8. They have decided closely to co-ordinate their operations in the area aimed at implementing and enforcing the measures mentioned in paragraph 7, as well as any further measures the Security Council may adopt, also assuring, by common agreement, the protection of their forces. Building on the experience acquired, including the consultation mechanisms during the Gulf operations in 1987 and 1988, they have instructed an ad hoc group of foreign and defence ministry representatives to ensure the most effective co-ordination in capitals and in the region. This should cover among other things overall operational concepts and specific guidelines for co-ordination between forces in the region, including areas of operation, sharing of tasks, logistical support and exchange of intelligence. Contact points are being nominated in the ministries of defence to assist with co-operation at the practical/technical level and, as an immediate step, to prepare for a meeting of chiefs of defence staff to be held in the next few days.

9. Ministers emphasise that co-ordination within WEU should also facilitate co-operation with other countries deploying forces in the region, including those of the United States.

10. The presidency of the Council will inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the outcome of this meeting.

#### STATEMENT BY Mr. PONTILLON

*President of the WEU Assembly  
at the close of the WEU ministerial meeting  
Paris, 21st August 1990*

The WEU Assembly has constantly stressed the implications of events in the Near and Middle East for Europe's security, and in particular its Mediterranean dimension.

It looks to the Council to continue to organise member countries' consultations and reactions so as to respond immediately and vigorously to the aggression committed by Iraq against Kuwait because it is a challenge to all the principles underlying international peace based on the law of nations. There must also be a response to the very serious violations of human rights committed by Iraq on this occasion and Security Council resolutions must be made fully effective.

It considers that the seriousness of the situation created by the Iraqi aggression requires the establishment of a joint strategy by the Western European countries and its effective implementation.

It therefore urges the Council to pursue the consultations started on 21st August in order to define Europe's security interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It recalls the importance that it attaches to the deployment of all the instruments necessary for this security, including the development of European observation satellites.

It welcomes the fact that the Council considers that the threats to the maintenance of international peace require an immediate meeting of the chiefs-of-staff of member countries' armies to organise Europe's participation in the measures that will have to be taken by the international community to restore peace. The Assembly, which has advocated the formation of a committee of chiefs-of-staff of member countries, considers that such co-operation, essential until a lasting, peaceful order has been restored in the Middle East, is a decisive step towards a European security organisation.

#### PRESS COMMUNIQUE

*issued at the close of the meeting of the  
Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly  
Paris, 21st August 1990*

The Presidential Committee of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU met in Paris following the meeting of the Council of Ministers of that organisation. Representatives of all member countries and all political groups were present.

Fully informed by its talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence of France, Chairmen-in-Office of the Council, and with the Secretary-General of WEU, the Presidential Committee approved the conclusions reached by the Ministers.



In particular, the Presidential Committee expressed its indignation at the violation of international law represented by the invasion and annexation of Kuwait and Iraq's threats to Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. It considered that fundamental human rights had been seriously violated by the taking of hostages among foreign nationals. Finally, it expressed the utmost concern at Iraq's threat to member countries' economic life and that of developing countries.

It urged Iraq to apply United Nations Resolutions 660 and 662 immediately and welcomed the fact that the Council had stressed the importance of the rôle of the Arab countries in this affair.

### **MEETING OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE WEU MEMBER STATES**

*Paris, 27th August 1990*

*Information issued to the press*

1. In conformity with the decisions reached during the joint meeting of the WEU defence and foreign affairs ministers held on 21st August, the chiefs-of-staff of the armies of these countries or their representatives as well as the WEU Deputy Secretary-General, have met in Paris on 27th August.

This meeting has been the first in the history of the organisation.

2. The chiefs of staff have examined a set of military provisions, in view of achieving a close co-ordination, in the area covered by the crisis, of their activities carried out to enforce the embargo against Iraq and Kuwait, on the basis of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 661 and 665.

These measures cover the following aspects: mission definition, deployment co-ordination, action zones, information exchange, logistic and operational support, mutual protection of the vessels in the area.

3. The work carried out during this meeting aims at translating in military terms the will which was expressed, during the ministerial meeting held on 21st August, by all the member countries, to show through concrete steps their determination and solidarity in the face of the invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq.

### **AD HOC GROUP OF FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVES (PARIS)**

*31st August 1990*

1. In accordance with the decisions taken by WEU foreign and defence ministers on 21st August there have been further meetings of the co-ordinating ad hoc group representing foreign and defence ministries as well as meetings between chiefs of defence staff and naval experts. As a result, joint specific guidelines have been agreed upon for co-ordination of naval operations of WEU members in the Gulf region, aimed at securing the effective implementation of the United Nations embargo against Iraq and the occupied territory of Kuwait on the basis of Resolution 665.

These guidelines address the following areas of co-operation:

- the scale and nature of their deployments,
- areas of operations,
- execution of the mission,
- exchange of information,
- logistic and operational support,
- co-ordination structures.

Collective co-ordinating mechanisms are already in place between capitals as well as in the Gulf region to put these guidelines into practice.

2. All WEU countries will contribute to the effort, directly or indirectly. WEU countries currently plan to deploy by September more than thirty naval vessels in the area.

3. WEU countries will play a full part in co-ordinating their activities with other forces taking part in the implementation of the embargo decided by the United Nations.

4. The presidency will inform the United Nations of the implementation of the embargo through the naval presence of the forces in the region.

***Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: operations in the Gulf***

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Uyttendaele (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas, Cariglia, Chevalier, Cox (Alternate: Thompson), De Decker, Dees, Ewing (Alternate: Lord Newall), Fernandes Marques, Fiandrotti, Fillon, Fioret, Fourré, Irmer, Jung, Kittelmann, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. Maris, Mota Torres, Moya, Pecchioli (Alternate: Cannata), Perinat, Romero, Scheer, Sinesio (Alternate: Stegagnini), Speed, Steiner, Sir John Stokes, MM. Vieira Mesquita, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation******on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:  
operations in the Gulf***

1. The Assembly approves the action taken by the Council in invoking Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty as a result of Iraq's aggression against and occupation of Kuwait.

The Assembly welcomes the Council's readiness to place WEU co-ordination in the context of the implementation of United Nations Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.

The Assembly supports the Council's decision, not only to convene the meeting of the Ministerial Council, but also to constitute an ad hoc group to cover the Gulf crisis and especially to call the first meeting, under direct WEU auspices, of the chiefs of defence staffs.

The Assembly believes that the Council should remain open to the idea of further co-operation and co-ordination at different levels over all aspects of operations in the Gulf area and therefore RECOMMENDS that the necessary steps be taken to formalise the Gulf ad hoc group to consider policy and implementation on a day-to-day basis, as long as the present crisis lasts, and urges all WEU nations to provide maximum information to the operational cell being run in the French Ministry of Defence.

2. Concerned that the proliferation of vessels in the Gulf area could lead to problems in the very near future, the Assembly RECOMMENDS that further consultations take place immediately at governmental level to establish common command and control in the various Gulf zones already agreed and further RECOMMENDS that urgent measures be taken to harmonise rules of engagement at least within each zone, and ensure that recognition procedures (IFF) are properly co-ordinated between all aircraft and naval units to assure the safety of friendly forces.

3. The Assembly considers that WEU could play a useful rôle in helping to co-ordinate (perhaps in conjunction with other agencies) logistic support, reinforcement and resupply for the Gulf operations and that WEU nations' assets for sea- and airlift might be provided, in some cases where combat forces, for whatever reason, may not be available, and RECOMMENDS that the Council study the options for providing such assistance without delay.

4. Disappointed that the transatlantic presentation of WEU's contribution to support the United Nations' efforts to solve the crisis in the Gulf has yet to have an impact, the Assembly RECOMMENDS that the Council establish forthwith a liaison office in Washington to serve as a channel for North American links and as a matter of priority to convince the United States Administration that direct dialogue with WEU is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at present.

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur)**I. Introduction*

1. As a direct result of the invasion and then the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq at the beginning of August, Article VIII (paragraph 3) of the modified Brussels Treaty was invoked and an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Ministerial Council held on Tuesday 21st August 1990, under French chairmanship.

2. At the close of the meeting, the Assembly's Presidential Committee was briefed by the Chairmen-in-Office, MM. Dumas and Chevènement, respectively French Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence, and by the Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. van Eekelen. The Ministers had reached the following conclusions:

"Ministers welcome the measures being taken by member states in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 and in response to the requests for assistance from states in the Gulf region, with the aim of obliging Iraq unconditionally to withdraw its troops from Kuwaiti territory and restore Kuwait's sovereignty.

They have decided closely to co-ordinate their operations in the area aimed at implementing and enforcing the measures mentioned in paragraph 7, as well as any further measures the Security Council may adopt, also assuring, by common agreement, the protection of their forces. Building on the experience acquired, including the consultation mechanisms during the Gulf operations in 1987 and 1988, they have instructed an ad hoc group of foreign and defence ministry representatives to ensure the most effective co-ordination in capitals and in the region. This should cover among other things overall operational concepts and specific guidelines for co-ordination between forces in the region, including areas of operation, sharing of tasks, logistical support and exchange of intelligence. Contact points are being nominated in the ministries of defence to assist with co-operation at the practical/technical level and, as an immediate step, to prepare for a meeting of chiefs of defence staff to be held in the next few days.

Ministers emphasise that co-ordination within WEU should also facilitate co-

operation with other countries deploying forces in the region, including those of the United States."

3. The Presidential Committee at its subsequent meeting on the same day, and deliberating in the name of the Assembly, fully approved the conclusions reached by Ministers. The President made the following statement:

"The WEU Assembly has constantly stressed the implications of events in the Near and Middle East for Europe's security, and in particular its Mediterranean dimension.

It looks to the Council to continue to organise member countries' consultations and reactions so as to respond immediately and vigorously to the aggression committed by Iraq against Kuwait because it is a challenge to all the principles underlying international peace based on the law of nations. There must also be a response to the very serious violations of human rights committed by Iraq on this occasion and Security Council resolutions must be made fully effective.

It considers that the seriousness of the situation created by the Iraqi aggression requires the establishment of a joint strategy by the Western European countries and its effective implementation.

It therefore urges the Council to pursue the consultations started on 21st August in order to define Europe's security interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It recalls the importance that it attaches to the deployment of all the instruments necessary for this security, including the development of European observation satellites.

It welcomes the fact that the Council considers that the threats to the maintenance of international peace require an immediate meeting of the chiefs of defence staffs of member countries to organise Europe's participation in the measures that will have to be taken by the international community to restore peace. The Assembly, which has advocated the formation of a committee of chiefs of defence staffs of member countries, considers that such co-operation, essential until a lasting, peaceful order has been

restored in the Middle East, is a decisive step towards a European security organisation."

4. In addition, the Presidential Committee decided to adopt, at its meeting on 20th September, two recommendations on developments in the Middle East crisis. It asked the Political and Defence Committees respectively to address the various political and military aspects.

5. The Political Committee's report and recommendations, "European security and events in the Near and Middle East, Part II, The Kuwait Crisis" (Rapporteur: Mr. Pieralli), covers in particular the chronology of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, the WEU Council decision of 21st August 1990 and the attitudes of the Arab countries and Israel to the crisis, and are entirely complementary to this present report, as well as being essential reading for an understanding of the whole context.

6. This report of the Defence Committee aims to present the military picture, concentrating on Iraqi capabilities, the responses of other nations (especially the United States) and emphasising of course Western European Union reactions and initiatives. In addition, the appendices to the report contain the most up-to-date listing possible of:

- I. External naval forces in the Gulf area;
- II. External naval forces in transit to the Gulf;
- III. External air forces in the Gulf area;
- IV. Foreign troops stationed in Gulf states;
- V. Armed forces of countries in the Gulf region;
- VI. Iraq's air forces

## ***II. Iraq: the military forces and policy options***

7. Analysis of armed forces is always difficult and often open to speculation. However, in the case of Iraq, information given by its major arms suppliers and studies on Iraqi warfare during the eight years' war with Iran help clarify the capabilities and strategies of the Iraqi armed forces as well as the resulting policy options.

8. In quantitative terms Iraq is very strong:

### ***(i) Army***

1 000 000 troops:  
Republican Guards  
People's Liberation Army

5 500 tanks:  
2 500 Soviet T-54 and T-55  
1 000 Soviet T-62  
500 Soviet T-72  
1 500 Chinese T-59 and T-69

3 000 artillery pieces  
200 multiple rocket launchers  
66 surface-to-surface missile launchers (30 Frog 7, 36 Scud-B, T-7)  
160 armed helicopters (including c. 40 Soviet-made Hind attack helicopters)  
180 surface-to-air missile systems

### ***(ii) Air Force***<sup>1</sup>

800 aircraft including:  
16 Soviet Badger and Blinder bombers  
4 6D anti-ship bombers  
94 French Mirage F-1 (some with Exocet)  
10 French Mirage F-1 from the Kuwait Air Force  
70 MiG-21 multi-rôle fighters  
70 MiG-23 Flogger fighters  
25 MiG-25 Foxbat fighters  
18 MiG-29 Fulcrum attack fighters  
30 Su-7 ground-attack fighters  
50 Su-20 ground-attack fighters  
30 Su-25 close support fighters  
120 Chinese J-6 and J-7 fighters

### ***(iii) Navy***<sup>1</sup>

5 frigates (including the Italian-built Lupo class)  
38 patrol and coastal vessels  
8 mine warfare vessels  
6 amphibious vessels

### ***(iv) Arms deployed in Kuwait and South Iraq***

150 000 troops in Kuwait  
115 000 troops along the Southern Iraqi border  
1 500 tanks in Kuwait  
1 200 armoured vehicles in Kuwait  
700 artillery pieces in the area

9. The Iraqi army is composed of the Republican Guards and the People's Liberation Army. The Republican Guards (12 000-15 000 troops) are the elite troops of the Iraqi army. They are experienced and well-equipped with modern T-72 tanks. The Republican Guards are prepared for quick offensive action and launched the 2nd August attack on Kuwait. Within a short period three mechanised armoured divisions and four infantry divisions had invaded and taken Kuwait.

10. The second echelon is the People's Liberation Army which consists of conscripts and volunteers. The People's Liberation Army is comparatively lightly-armed, with low military skills, negligible mobility, and is not equipped to fight by night.

11. The Iraqi air force has extensive assets, although its effectiveness, in spite of being equipped with modern French Mirage F-1 and Soviet MiG-29 aircraft, is doubtful because of low training standards and poor serviceability

<sup>1</sup> Further details/characteristics will be found in the appendices.

resulting in fewer operational aircraft. During the Iran-Iraq war the air force was under-used, although on paper it was far superior to the Iranian air force. The air force gave little support to Iraqi troops on the ground and seldom engaged the Iranian air force. Some bombing raids took place on Iranian cities, usually from great heights, plus a number of precision attacks. It is debatable whether men and machines have been honed to a sharp edge on the steel of battle over the course of eight years of war or are merely exhausted. However, a strike by Iraqi air force Mirage F-1 fighters armed with Exocet (if any stocks of these missiles are left from earlier purchases) remains one of the greatest potential threats against warships in the Gulf. The range of Iraqi aircraft and their possibilities for in-flight refuelling are of course critical in this respect and affect the operational zones chosen by the various nations present in the area as well as individual ships' capabilities for self-defence. Also linked with this is the United States Navy request for rapid delivery of Goalkeeper 30 mm close-in weapons systems (CIWS) to protect their warships from missile attack. A number of Goalkeeper systems is already installed on board British and Dutch ships and trials for the United States Navy have just come to a successful conclusion in California.

12. The Iraqis have large numbers of surface-to-surface missile launchers at their disposal and in particular have deployed most of their 36 Scud-B launchers and the 800 associated missiles in Kuwait, ostensibly with chemical warheads (or so an Iraqi spokesman claimed, with chilling emphasis). It is technically possible to equip these missiles with chemical warheads but the intelligence services believe that Iraq does not yet have the technology to do so. Conversely, Iraq does have artillery with binary chemical shells, mustard gas and nerve gas, used to devastating purpose during the 8-year war with Iran, despite almost universal condemnation. In addition, Iraq has also deployed Silkworm anti-ship missiles obtained from the Chinese.

13. The Iraqi forces are presently using the same strategy as during the Iran-Iraq war. The invasion of Kuwait took place at 2 a.m. on 2nd August when three armoured divisions of the Republican Guard Force of the Iraqi army crossed the frontier, closely followed later that morning by four divisions of the Republican Guard infantry. Combat aircraft of the Iraqi air forces, which total about 800 aircraft, bombed and rocketed Kuwaiti airfields. At the same time, helicopter gunships attacked Kuwait City and landed at least a brigade of Republican Guard special forces – with light armour – who led the assault on the palace and on the main government buildings. In all, that force amounted to about 100 000 soldiers, armed with

about 1 250 tanks, with many infantry combat vehicles and with artillery.

14. The Kuwaiti army, which is barely one tenth of that figure, was in a state of alert, but was not deployed in defensive positions because the Kuwaitis did not believe that one Arab country could invade another. The troops who led the invasion were followed by further reinforcements, including some who, according to the reports received, probably belong to the People's Liberation Army.

15. On 20th August, the Republican Guard forces' divisions started to withdraw from their forward deployments and were replaced by regular army troops. The forces now in Kuwait number some 10 regular divisions – approximately 150 000 men, 1 500 tanks and 700 artillery pieces. Republican Guard units have been withdrawn to Iraq. It has been the Iraqi practice to withdraw Republican Guard units after an attack. They may now either have been withdrawn to establish a more defensive position or – and the possibility must always be borne in mind – they may have been withdrawn to reform for further aggression.

16. In Kuwait itself, the Iraqis have strengthened their coastal defences with Silkworm missiles, with a string of infantry divisions and with field artillery units. They have moved in their Frog battlefield missiles and a full range of surface-to-air missiles to Kuwait, as well as the Scud-B mentioned above.

17. With a defensive strategy, without any military aid because of East-West agreement on a blockade and without information and resupply it is not very likely that Iraq will now attack, although who can tell what might be the desperate last resort reactions if finally cornered. There is always the possibility that Iraq might try to lash out irrationally in one direction or another. It is not capable of sustaining a war over a long period and general war would probably sound the death knell for Iraq. Various United States commentators have estimated that the Iraqi air force could be destroyed within 36 hours and the bulk of Iraq's air defence within the same time-frame.

18. Similar considerations apply to the Iraqi navy. Although Iraq possesses a number of comparatively modern hulls, it is not envisaged that the force could remain effective for long, mainly because of the reduced numbers of operational ships available, with most still suffering the effects of the Iran-Iraq war.

### *III. The responses of the United States and other nations*

19. On 6th August, President Bush launched the operation "Desert Shield" to dissuade the Iraqis from attacking Saudi Arabia. The oper-

ation calls for a huge and continuing air- and sealift to deploy heavy armour and anti-tank forces and a massive build-up of sea and air assets in the Gulf region. The units moved, or moving, to date are listed at appendix.

20. As a result of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, a large number of other countries, traditional allies of the United States of America and others, have answered the call to protect the countries of the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, and to help guarantee the blockade imposed on the movement of military and economic shipping to and from Iraq.

21. In the first stages of deployment, the United States was faced with moving three army brigades, three Marine Corps expeditionary brigades and six air force tactical fighter wings, together with numerous smaller units, support materials, spare parts and supplies. The priority has been to rush combat equipment across the Atlantic followed by material first for support and subsequently for sustainment.

22. Hence the need for all types of transport by air and sea, which also relies heavily on commercial assets. Sealift involves a variety of craft, including fast sealift ships which travel at c. 30 kts, eight chartered vessels and a number of prepositioned ships with ammunition, medical equipment and supplies and fuel. On average, it takes a fast sealift ship 14 days to cover the 11 000 km to the Gulf and sealift carries some 95% of cargo and 99% of petroleum products, while airlift carries 99% of the manpower. This has meant that the United States has had to activate its Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) programme, to augment military airlift with civil aircraft.

23. Even when the "shield" is in place (and already, according to General Colin Powell, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, those United States forces deployed represent the "population of Chattanooga, Tennessee" – some 165 000 according to the gazeteer) there will be a continuing need for constant and regular support, reinforcement and sustainment. Hence Secretary of State Baker's appeal for allied help with sea- and airlift provision.

24. Throughout the western alliance the critical problem of sea- and airlift remains. Successive shifts in world markets and trading patterns mean that there are barely enough cargo hulls of the right variety available for logistic support in emergency, whether for the traditional scenario of reinforcement and resupply for Europe or in the current context.

25. Over recent years the Defence Committee has sought to draw the attention of the appropriate authorities to the conundrum of declining merchant shipping, coupled with increased "flagging out" to more and more flags of convenience (a theoretically United States-owned fleet

flies 35 flags besides its own and the United Kingdom's fleet flies 45 other flags beside the Red Ensign) and the tendency to man one's own ships largely with foreign nationals (making deployment to a potential war zone an even greater problem than it would be otherwise). The greater distances and potential dangers involved in conducting operations in the Gulf are very different from the Atlantic setting and could prove extremely costly in terms of merchant shipping.

26. Included in the numbers of United States personnel in the Gulf are thousands of United States reservists – naval, army and air force reserves, as well as National Guard and Air National Guard members, equipped for the most part with the best of modern equipment, dedicated, well-trained and highly-motivated individuals who have given up a great deal to serve their country.

27. Little did members of the Defence Committee think when they made a study-visit to the United States in the second half of July this year, at the invitation of Secretary Cheney, that many of those seen in training in New Orleans or Fort Hood, Texas, would soon find themselves in the Saudi Arabian desert. In the wake of the force reductions currently being negotiated at the CFE talks in Vienna, the rôle of reserves generally, both in North America and Europe, will be of growing importance and we have a specific lesson to be learned from what is now taking place. The whole subject of reserves is to be treated in a forthcoming report of the Defence Committee (Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker).

28. The reason for the large numbers being deployed to the Gulf area was admirably conveyed by the point made by Secretary Cheney on 6th September in Virginia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies' timely conference on "America's rôle in a changing world":

"The worst possible sin would be to deploy enough force to get into trouble but not enough to counter each eventuality."

29. That philosophy is obviously being borne very much in mind and is surely the right approach, even should the whole affair never reach the stage of all-out hostilities. Deterrence and persuasion are the names of the game.

30. As well as the American concentration of land, sea and air power, a large number of countries have promised and provided forces to bolster the various United Nations resolutions and help protect the Gulf states. Not counting the WEU nations and the United States, the following countries are taking part: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Senegal, Syria, Turkey (troops); Australia, Canada, Denmark, Greece and Norway (naval vessels). The total represents the largest multinational

force since the Korean War. Details are given in the appendices.

31. It should be stressed that the bulk of forces on land are stationed in Saudi Arabia, at the invitation of the Saudi authorities. The Saudis themselves are generally in the potential front line with those elements of the Kuwaiti forces who managed to fight their way out after Iraq's invasion. "Foreign" forces make up the second echelon, to reinforce as necessary.

32. Your Rapporteur's main concern at present, as will be elaborated below, is the command and control arrangement for these vast and disparate forces. To an extent there is little problem where small numbers are concerned, but potential sources of friction are already obvious in the United States-Saudi relationship where traditional American chains of command find it hard to accept that the national host has his own ideas on the ultimate responsibility involved in guaranteeing sovereignty. It is to be hoped that a clearcut organisation has now been installed in Saudi Arabia to replace earlier uncertainties. The Saudis rightly insist that any offensive action conducted from Saudi soil should take place only with their specific agreement.

33. The same problem is less likely to arise at sea where there are few frontiers and greater room for manoeuvre and initiative... (comparatively-speaking). It will be seen from the appendices that the United States now has the wherewithal in the area to exercise the autonomous amphibious option which considerably increases the possible courses of action available, should economic and military blockade not prove adequate to persuade Iraq to release its hold on Kuwait.

#### *IV. Western European Union reactions and initiatives*

34. It is of course coincidental that WEU finds itself involved in Gulf operations for the second time within three years, but there is definite advantage in the fact, for it does mean that the process of co-operation and co-ordination has been far less fraught with teething problems than was the case three years ago. This time round it has proved possible to advance much more quickly to a useful arrangement of mutual benefit.

35. The first step was the meeting of chiefs of defence staffs held in Paris on 27th August. Whereas the ministerial meeting a week previously had been opened to other members of the European Community (Greece and Denmark attended and Ireland eventually decided against attending, because of a traditional neutral stance) plus Turkey, as a "front line" state, and with Norway represented not at the formal

meeting but at a working lunch, it was decided to limit the chiefs of defence staffs' meeting to full WEU member states only.

36. In the event, four chiefs of defence staffs (Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg) were present together with six chiefs of naval staffs (France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). Previous proposals for such meetings had foundered on the lack of a mutually-agreed agenda, but on this occasion the brief was very clear and the chiefs of staff examined a set of operational measures aimed at achieving close co-ordination of activities in the crisis area to enforce the United Nations embargo against Iraq and Kuwait, on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 661 and 665. The measures covered the following aspects: mission definition, deployment co-ordination, zones of action, information exchange, logistic and operational support, mutual protection of vessels in the area.

37. A number of counter-proposals were made at the meeting, notably concerning a possible overall command structure for the Gulf operation. In the event, further study and deliberation were necessary before there was agreement on deployment in the Gulf. The resulting compromise reached on 31st August divided the Persian Gulf into three distinct operational zones for WEU purposes – one zone in the Gulf of Oman and others North and South of the Strait of Hormuz (but see recent developments below).

38. In the Gulf of Oman, military force will not be used to stop and control ships suspected of breaking the United Nations embargo against Iraq and Kuwait. In the area of the Strait of Hormuz such force could be used. Each WEU country will deploy its ships in the zone which best matches its view of what degree of force is acceptable to enforce the embargo.

39. Thus far it has proved impossible to define common rules of engagement which are normally the basis for military co-ordination and it may take some time before it is realised how vital the subject will be once all WEU and other nations' ships are assembled in the comparatively confined waters both within and around the Gulf area. Further consultation on air defence for WEU ships in the Gulf and reciprocal logistical support will probably prove necessary once agreement is also reached on the levels of acceptable force to be used to implement the trade and arms embargo against Iraq and Kuwait.

40. In concrete terms there are now naval points of contact in each national capital, who are consulted as necessary by the crisis management cell established in the French Ministry of Defence. The naval attachés in member countries' Paris embassies are also in regular contact



with the French naval operations centre which provides a daily situation report on who is where and doing what. Although at the time of writing the flow of information was decidedly one way, it is to be hoped that reciprocal situation reports from national capitals will soon be available in Paris. In addition, a system of operational co-ordination has been established in the Gulf area, both to facilitate WEU actions and to establish links with naval forces of other countries. After a WEU meeting on the morning of 9th September in the French embassy to co-ordinate approaches, the first meeting was held under joint United States-WEU-Arab chairmanship on 9th and 10th September in Bahrain, when it was agreed to divide the Gulf into specific patrol areas to increase the effectiveness of the blockade. Also on 10th September a meeting was held on board the French frigate *Montcalm* in the Strait of Tiran to co-ordinate WEU and United States liaison. Communication methods and procedures for challenging merchant ships were also agreed to reduce mutual interference and duplication of effort.

41. Most western navies are used to co-operating with each other – co-operation which is usually a matter of common sense – exchange of information, the sharing of logistical support as necessary (for example, the Italian support ship *Stromboli* is already programmed to take over from the French supply ship *Durance* in furnishing support to WEU nations in the Gulf zone. Similarly the Dutch are to provide a fleet auxiliary to relieve one of the British RFAs in due course), provision of fresh water, possibly an agreement on where to take “runs ashore” and when (so as not to overload local hospitality) as well as the obvious need not to interfere with manoeuvres and exercises by fixing zones of operation. These WEU co-ordination meetings are now continuing with rotating chairmanship – France chairing at the 14th September meeting on board the *Dupleix* off Hormuz and Britain scheduled to chair the next programmed meeting. Further regular meetings “on the spot” are envisaged.

42. As a result of this series of gatherings by local national commanders, WEU has declared that it will take care of “a zone of common interest where the execution of the embargo is concerned”. This zone is situated either side of the Strait of Hormuz and in practical terms it means that arrangements are being made to ensure that the task of surveillance by WEU ships is being co-ordinated as effectively as possible with logistic support (fuel, food, etc.) being provided on a shared basis. This is a quantum leap forward compared with the tentative arrangements made at the height of the 1988 minehunting operations in the Gulf.

43. As to the object of the exercise – the embargo – the main port of Aqaba, once the

lifeline for Iraq, is already virtually paralysed and Iraqi and Kuwaiti ports are reportedly at a standstill. It is probably true however that a considerable amount of military hardware, spare parts, etc. is still reaching Iraq by air. At the time of writing the United Nations is deliberating on the possibility of extending the maritime embargo to cover air movements as well...

44. With the European navies' presence in the Gulf area there is now a *de facto* WEU force as suggested by the Defence Committee in its 1988 report on “Naval aviation”, Document 1139 (Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson), and we should congratulate the Council on what has been achieved in such a short period of time.

45. The WEU member countries have deployed, or are in the process of deploying, the following assets (as at 17th September and including the news of British and French land and air forces):

#### *Belgium*

Two tripartite minehunters, *Iris* and *Myosotis* and the support ship *Zinnia*, which carries an *Alouette III* helicopter, have been sent to the Eastern Mediterranean (Crete).

#### *France*

Two naval groups are present in the Gulf area.

The first group composed of the carrier *Clemenceau*, with over 40 helicopters of the 5th Combat Helicopter Regiment embarked, the cruiser *Colbert* and the fleet tanker *Var*, is present as operation *Salamander* to respond to developments as necessary.

The second group, composed of the destroyers *Dupleix* and *Montcalm* and the frigates *Protet* and *Commandant Ducoing*, is helping impose the United Nations embargo (operation *Artimon*).

In the UAE, France has one reconnaissance squadron equipped with Milan anti-tank missiles, one section of Mistral anti-aircraft launchers and two sections of *Crotale* anti-aircraft launchers. In Saudi Arabia there is a command cell with 6 helicopters (2 *Gazelle*, 4 *Puma*) at Yenbo (300 km North of Jedda).

France has also agreed to send a transport ship to the Gulf to help transport troops of the multinational force in place.

After Iraq's violation of the French Ambassador's residence in Kuwait City on 14th September, the French Government decided to send ground forces to the Gulf area (Operation *Daguet*). These forces are: 1st Regiment of *Spahis* equipped with 48 AMX-10RC tanks and other armoured vehicles, 2nd Foreign Legion

Infantry Regiment, 2nd Company of the 6th Foreign Legion Engineering Regiment, a unit of anti-aircraft artillery from the 11th Artillery Regiment and over 30 combat aircraft (Mirage 2000 RDI, Mirage F-1-CR, Jaguar and a number of air tankers C-135F). Over 4 000 men are to be sent and the total of French troops in the Gulf area will be c. 13 000 men by the end of October.

#### *Federal Republic of Germany*

As the Federal German constitution does not allow for operational deployment outside the NATO area, the five minehunters and two supply ships that left Wilhelmshaven on 16th August will remain in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Bundeswehr has also transferred 10 Fox chemical warfare-equipped reconnaissance vehicles to the United States army for potential use in the Gulf.

The Federal Government has agreed to provide financial support for United States armed forces in the Gulf area and to help defray the cost of the United Nations embargo to countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. 1.6 billion Marks have been allocated for help with reinforcement and resupply (sea- and airlift) and for various items of equipment (light armoured vehicles, detection systems, communication equipment). 1.7 billion Marks will be available through the European Community as financial aid to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey.

#### *Italy*

The Italian navy corvettes *Minerva* and *Sfinge* set sail for the Eastern Mediterranean to replace United States ships out of Cyprus (16th August). The frigates *Libeccio* and *Orsa* are already operational in the Gulf area near Muscat. A supply ship is also on the way and a replenishment tanker *Stromboli*, (to relieve the French tanker *Durance*) and 8 Tornado fighters are also to be sent.

Italy has agreed to provide transport ships for the multinational force in the Gulf area.

#### *Luxembourg*

Not possessing vessels to send to the Gulf area or Mediterranean, Luxembourg is providing financial support to other WEU members engaged with men or material. (As was also the case in 1987/88.)

#### *Netherlands*

The Royal Netherlands navy has sent two frigates to the Gulf area, *Witte de With* and *Pieter Florisz*. These frigates are equipped with the 30mm close-in weapon system *Goalkeeper*.

A support ship is scheduled to replace a similar British vessel in the Gulf in due course.

#### *Portugal*

No armed ground forces or vessels have yet been sent to the Gulf area or to the Mediterranean, although there is the possibility of sending a frigate to the Eastern Mediterranean. Portugal has agreed to send transport ships to the Gulf area and the government has also increased the facilities for air transport of the American forces and materials through the air bases of Lages and Santa Maria in the Azores archipelago.

#### *Spain*

The Spanish Navy has sent a frigate *Santa Maria*, as well as two corvettes, *Descubierta* and *Cazadora*. Other measures are being contemplated.

#### *United Kingdom*

Additional support vessels have been sent out to the Gulf area and Eastern Mediterranean to provide supply and repair facilities to the Armilla Patrol which has been operational in the area since long before the Iran-Iraq war, and MCMVs (mine counter-measure vessels). Operation Granby is headed by the Type-22 frigate *HMS Battleaxe* and includes the Leander-class frigate *HMS Jupiter*, the two Type-42 destroyers, *HMS York* and *HMS Gloucester*, as well as a supply ship *Olna* and a fleet tanker *Orangeleaf*. Three MCMVs, *HMS Cattistock*, *Atherstone*, and *Hurworth*, have been deployed with their support ship, *HMS Herald*. The United Kingdom is also to send transport ships to the Gulf.

The British Government has decided to increase its ground forces in the Gulf area by sending 6 000 men of the 7th Armoured Brigade from the British Army of the Rhine. This additional force includes the Queen's Dragoon Guards equipped with armoured vehicles, the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards with 60 Challenger tanks, the Royal Irish Hussars with another 60 Challenger tanks, the Staffordshire Regiment with armoured vehicles, the 40th Field Regiment Royal Artillery (24 155mm guns) and one squadron from the Army Air Corps (9 Lynx and 4 Gazelle helicopters). A month will be necessary to complete the deployment of this force. A squadron of Tornado GR1 aircraft may also be made available.

#### *Command and control*

46. There remains however a specific area which must be addressed if effective co-operation and co-ordination is really to come about and your Rapporteur has already mentioned it: command and control.

47. A senior member of the WEU Defence Committee, Sir John Stokes (United Kingdom), questioning his Minister of Defence in the House of Commons, asked on 7th September:

“It may be that we shall soon be committing troops to fight and possibly die and we are naturally concerned that everything possible should be done for their security. Is there any proposal to have a force commander-in-chief, some sort of force structure and some sort of liaison between the different nations involved in the forces?”

The reply indicated that helpful discussions in WEU had taken place on making the European contribution effective, quoting the previous experience in the Gulf in the minehunting field and saying that there was a possibility of the practice being pursued further.

48. Your Rapporteur believes that it is now imperative that the thorny problem be tackled properly.

49. With a multinational armada of warships assembling in the Strait of Hormuz, the lower Gulf and in the Red Sea, to enforce United Nations-mandated sanctions against Iraq, good command and control are vital. To be effective the operations of this armada must be co-ordinated and controlled by force commanders in each of these sea areas. Otherwise there will be costly and wasteful duplication of effort and individual units will be at risk due to lack of organised defence against possible Iraqi attacks. The danger of mistaken identity and consequent combat confusion, whether at sea or in the air, will be increased. Various WEU nations which have already deployed ships to the Gulf obviously did intend that their ships would definitely take part in an integrated system of command and control. For example, as part of their contribution, the Dutch have sent an air defence frigate which would prove a much more effective asset to a composite force than can be the case as a singleton.

50. Only the United States has deployed balanced naval forces with their own integrated air support from aircraft carriers. Lacking such capability all West European warships in the potential combat areas are vulnerable to air and missile attack. Has the United States already undertaken to provide air support and cover for West European naval units deployed in the Gulf and Red Sea? Should not West European naval forces already deployed be formed into single task groups to operate in each defined area with co-ordinated defence under a senior officer with a multinational staff? What urgent action is being taken to harmonise national rules of engagement?

51. As providers of the two largest European contributions to sanctions enforcement, France

and the United Kingdom must take the initiative within Western European Union to ensure that our naval forces are deployed in the most cost-effective and secure manner.

52. The present report stresses WEU's rôle where naval forces are concerned, but should the crisis deepen and member states decide to deploy greater numbers of land and air forces, then consideration must be given to doing so in a complementary manner, again to ensure the most cost-effective and rational solution. In any case it is strongly recommended that the Defence Committee monitors the situation closely and prepares a follow-up report to the present one to keep members of the Assembly fully informed regarding the military aspects of the crisis in the Gulf.

## V. Conclusions

### (i) *Burden-sharing and the American connection*

53. Your Rapporteur believes that the European nations are making a considerable effort to support their American ally – efforts which are barely appreciated by the American public which is particularly vociferous when it comes to issues such as burden-sharing. Over the past month scarcely a newspaper in the whole of the United States (*pace* the International Herald Tribune which is read mainly in Europe) has made any reference to what the Europeans are doing about the Gulf crisis.

54. We must all ensure, both Council and Assembly, that we take every possible opportunity to “sell” WEU across the Atlantic. The message may be slowly percolating but still has a long way to go before it is properly appreciated. And we must try to ensure that Americans realise that WEU is an entity in its own right and that there is nothing to prevent them entering into direct dialogue with either us or the Council... (the United States Secretary of State proposed in the *North Atlantic Council* on 10th September that the WEU Emergency Planning Committee be activated to co-ordinate extensive air- and sealift operations). It is worth recalling the Assembly's proposal<sup>2</sup> that the links with the United States should be institutionalised by, say, opening a WEU liaison office in Washington.

55. On a public relations note, it would greatly assist if all member countries agreed to present at least their naval Gulf operations consistently as “WEU operations” and perhaps a

2. “Western European Union's information policy”, Document 1205, 8th November 1989, Rapporteur: Sir William Shelton; “Written question 285 and letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, to Mr. Pontillon, Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations”, Document 1232, 22nd May 1990.

useful start may be to institute a liaison between the armed forces PR staffs of member countries. League tables published in the press cataloguing individual nations' efforts certainly do not present the best possible picture for the Europeans, whereas the collective result is impressive. This same phenomenon is illustrated in the report from the United States Government General Accounting Office released on 6th September and referring to the cost of Gulf operations in 1987-88. Taken individually, WEU nations' contributions are certainly less than that paid by the United States (c. 40%), but as a WEU whole they total some 60% – the lion's share! It is merely a matter of the proper presentation, please...

*(ii) Observation satellites*

56. Over the course of the past two years, the WEU Assembly has been instrumental in proposing the creation of a WEU observation satellite agency. Both the Defence Committee ("Verification: a future European satellite agency", Document 1159, 3rd November 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Fourré) and the Technological and Aerospace Committee ("Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council", Document 1160, 7th November 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Malfatti) have emphasised the need for such an organisation which was also fully endorsed at the Assembly's symposium on "Observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament" in Rome on 27th and 28th March 1990.

57. It has been stressed throughout that such an organisation would be of use not only for direct verification of CFE accords but also for crisis management in other areas. The Council is

scheduled to decide whether or not the idea is to be pursued when it meets this autumn to consider the forthcoming report of the WEU Ad Hoc Sub-Group on Space. Your Rapporteur trusts that the Council will not overlook the fact that an observation satellite system to furnish raw material to the Europeans would have been a most useful factor both before and during the present crisis.

*(iii) The immediate future*

58. While a great deal of praise has come the way of WEU concerning its ability and readiness to act over the Gulf crisis, there is also the growing hint of criticism that no permanent policy and implementation group has yet been created to co-ordinate WEU actions other than in the purely naval realm in the Gulf zone. It is to be hoped that the Council will soon formalise the constitution of the ad hoc group to monitor developments on a day-to-day basis and make the necessary recommendations for modifications to guidelines governing the tactical actions of what are at present purely national commanders on the spot. The "WEU Comm" secure communications system should suffice for the moment for the group's consultations but a contingency plan to establish the group in one place, if not already in hand, must be made *now* to set up the proper machinery to be in a position to respond quickly to possible developments.

59. WEU's basis in the modified Brussels Treaty plus its flexibility compared to other institutions have proved its strength over the past month. We must make certain that we build on what has been achieved and carry through our actions to help the United Nations' efforts on the Gulf crisis reach a satisfactory and secure conclusion.

## APPENDIX I

*External naval forces in the Gulf area****Australia***

- 2 frigates: Adelaide, Darwin (United States FFG 7-class)
- 1 supply ship: Success (underway replenishment tanker Durance-class)

***Belgium***

- 2 minesweepers: Iris, Myosotis (Tripartite minehunters)
- 1 support ship: Zinnia (operated in the Persian Gulf 1987-88)

***France***

- 1 aircraft carrier: Clémenceau
- 1 cruiser: Colbert (serves as flagship of the Mediterranean squadron)
- 2 destroyers: Dupleix, Montcalm
- 2 frigates: Protet, Commandant Ducoing (Commandant Rivière-class and Type A69)
- 1 fleet tanker: Var (Durance-class; also command ship for the French Admiral in charge of the French Indian Ocean area (Alindien))

***Italy***

- 2 frigates: Orsa and Libeccio (Lupo-class; Maestrale-class)
- 2 corvettes: Minerva and Sfinge (Minerva-class)

***Soviet Union***

- 1 destroyer: Admiral Tributs (Udaloy-class)
- 1 supply ship

***United Kingdom***

- 2 guided-missile frigates: HMS Jupiter, HMS Battleaxe (Leander- and Broadsword-class (Type 22))
- 1 destroyer: HMS York (Type 42)
- 1 supply ship: Olna (Olna-class, large fleet tanker)
- 1 fleet tanker: Orangeleaf (Appleleaf-class support tanker)

***United States***

- 2 multi-purpose aircraft carriers: Independence and Saratoga (Forrestal-class)
- 1 battleship: Wisconsin (Iowa-class)
- 6 guided-missile cruisers: Antietam, Philippine sea, Ticonderoga (Ticonderoga-class), Biddle, Jouett (Belknap-class), England (Leamy-class)
- 4 guided-missile destroyers: Goldsborough, Sampson, Tattnall (Charles F. Adams-class), Scott (Kidd-class)
- 3 destroyers: Spruance, David R. Ray, John Rodgers (Spruance-class)
- 1 destroyer tender: Yellowstone (Yellowstone-class)
- 9 guided-missile frigates: Rentz, Taylor, Vandegrift (Oliver Hazard Perry-class), Barbey, Brewton, Elmer Montgomery, Reasoner, Thomas C. Hart (Knox-class), Bradley (Garcia-class)
- 1 miscellaneous command ship: La Salle (converted Raleigh-class)
- 1 oiler: Cimarron (Cimarron-class)
- 1 combat store ship: White Plains (Mars-class)
- 1 ammunition ship: Flint (Kilavea-class)
- 1 fast combat support ship: Detroit (Sacramento-class)

## APPENDIX II

*External naval forces in transit to the Gulf***Canada**

- 2 destroyers (932 soldiers on board): Terra Nova (improved Restigouche-class), Athabaskan (DDH280-class)
- 1 operational support ship: Protecteur (can carry military vehicles and bulky equipment for sealift purposes; also 4 LCVPs)

**Denmark**

- 1 frigate: Olfert Fischer (Niels Juel-class)

**Federal Republic of Germany**

- 5 minesweepers: Marburg, Koblenz, Wetzlar, Laboe, Ueberhorn (Lindau-class Type 331)
- 2 supply ships: Westerwald, Werra (Westerwald-class ammunition transport Type 760 and Rhein-class Type 401-2-3 depot ship)

(At present it is considered that the German constitution does not allow for operational deployment outside the NATO area, so these vessels are likely to remain in the Mediterranean.)

**Greece**

- 1 frigate: Limnos (Netherlands Kortenaer-class, ex-Witte de With F813)

**Italy**

- 1 replenishment tanker: Stromboli (similar ship sold to Iraq)

**Netherlands**

- 2 frigates: Witte de With and Pieter Florisz (Jacob van Heemskerck-class and Kortenaer-class, ex-Willem van der Zaan)

**Norway**

- 1 coast guard: Andenes (Nordkapp-class, one Lynx helicopter, ASW and reconnaissance)

**Spain**

- 3 frigates: Santa Maria (Santa Maria-class), Descubierta, Cazadora (F30-class, officially rated as corvettes)
- 1 supply ship: Aragon (ex-United States Paul Revere-class, ex-USS Francis Marion LPA 249 ", similar ship sold to Egypt prior to completion)

**United Kingdom**

- 1 destroyer: HMS Gloucester (Type 42)
- 3 minesweepers HMS Cattistock, HMS Atherstone, HMS Hurworth (Hunt-class; 4 of the class deployed to Persian Gulf in 1987; 2 were reported to be leased to Saudi Arabia)
- 1 support ship: HMS Herald (Improved Hecla-class, one Westland Wasp HAS 1 helicopter)

**United States**

- 1 multi-purpose aircraft carrier: John F. Kennedy
- 3 guided-missile cruisers: Mississippi (Virginia-class), San Jacinto, Thomas S. Gates (Ticonderoga-class)
- 1 destroyer: Moosbrugger (Spruance-class)
- 2 guided-missile frigates: Reid, Samuel B. Roberts (Oliver H. Perry-class)
- 1 combat store ship: Sylvania (Mars-class)
- 1 fast combat support ship: Seattle (Sacramento-class)
- 2 hospital ships: Comfort, Mercy
- 1 repair ship: Saginaw (construction tender)

- 4 amphibious assault ships: Guam, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Inchon (Iwo Jima-class; Okinawa served during 1987-88 operations in the Gulf)
- 5 amphibious transport docks: Nashville, Ogden, Shreveport, Trenton (Austin-class), Raleigh (Raleigh-class)
- 1 amphibious assault ship (multi-purpose): Nassau (Tarawa-class)
- 3 landing ships: Gunston Hall (modified Whidbey Island-class), Portland, Pensacola (Anchorage-class)
- 3 tank landing ships: La Moure County, Manitowoc, Spartanburg County (Newport-class)
- 5 vehicle cargo ships: Algol, Altair, Bellatrix, Capella, Regulus (Algol (SL7)-class, all berthed in East coast and Gulf coast ports)
- 1 maintenance aviation/support ship: Curtiss (T-AVB 3-class)

## APPENDIX III

*External air forces in the Gulf area***France***Djibouti:*

Jaguar (11)

Atlantique-2 (1) (ATL-2, maritime patrol aircraft)

*Saudi Arabia:*Transall (4) } (relaying French ground forces in Yenbo with Jedda)  
C-130 (3) }**Kuwait***Saudi Arabia:*

Mirage F-1 (15)

**United Kingdom***Bahrain:*

F-3 Tornado (12)

Rapier anti-aircraft missiles

*Cyprus:*

F-4 Phantom (6)

*Oman:*

Jaguar (12)

Nimrod (3)

VC-10 (2)

*Saudi Arabia:*

F-3 Tornado (12)

*United Arab Emirates:*

C-130 Hercules

**United States***Cyprus:*

F-111

*Saudi Arabia:*

1st tactical fighter wing: F-15 Eagle

4th tactical fighter wing: F-15 Eagle  
F-4 Phantom (total 100)

35th tactical fighter wing: F-4 Phantom

37th tactical fighter wing: F-117A Stealth fighters (22)

354th tactical fighter wing: A-10 Thunderbolt II (70)

363rd tactical fighter wing: F-16 Fighting Falcon (48), F-4 Phantom

552nd air warning squadron: E-3A Sentry AWACS (5)

105th military airlift group: C-5 Galaxy

380th bomb wing: KC-135 cargo aircraft

Patriot missiles

*Turkey (based at Incirlik on the Turkish-Iraqi border):*

39th tactical group: F-111 (40), F-16 (44)

*United Arab Emirates:*

380th bomb wing: KC-135 cargo aircraft (8)

- In addition there are about 240 aircraft on carriers (F-14A Tomcat, Corsair, Intruder, FA-18 Phantom, EA-6B electronic warfare (radar jamming) aircraft, etc.).

- 6-8 B-52 bombers are stationed at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

- The United States has also sent aircraft to the smaller Gulf states (details unknown) for more flexibility and better protection in case of attack.



## APPENDIX IV

*Foreign troops stationed in Gulf states**In Saudi Arabia*

Afghanistan:	2 000	(Mujaheddin – yet to arrive)
Bangladesh:	1 200	(yet to arrive)
Egypt:	6 000	+ anti-aircraft batteries (2 000 in position), jeeps and Milan anti-tank missiles (+ 15 000 troops and armoured vehicles yet to arrive)
France	+ 100	(2 Gazelle, 4 Puma – Yenbo, French Headquarters 300 km North of Jedda); Operation “Daguet” (4 000 men, 48 tanks, 48 combat helicopters, 30 combat aircraft, one anti-aircraft company, yet to arrive)
Gulf countries	10 000	
Kuwait:	7 000	(2 000 yet to arrive)
Morocco:	2 000	
Pakistan:	5 000	(yet to arrive)
Senegal is sending troops		
Syria:	4 000	(11 000 men and 300 tanks yet to arrive)
Turkey:	5 000	(yet to arrive)
United Kingdom:	1 700	(RAF Regiment, Royal Signals, etc.; 6 000 men, 120 Challenger tanks, 1 Tornado GR1 Squadron, one Scimitar armoured squadron, one Warrior armoured squadron, 9 Lynx helicopters, 4 Gazelle helicopters, 10 Javelin anti-aircraft systems, yet to arrive)
United States:	± 10 000:	
1st Marine Expeditionary Force	}	(M-60 tanks)
4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade		
7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade		
1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade		
101st Airborne Division	}	(equipped with Sheridan light tanks)
82nd Airborne Division		
11th Anti-aircraft Artillery Brigade		
3rd Cavalry Regiment		
3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment		
24th Mechanised Infantry Division		(equipped with 270 M-1 and M-1A1 tanks)
194th Armoured Brigade		(equipped with 160 M1 and M1A1 tanks)

*In the United Arab Emirates*

Egypt:	Armoured division	
France:	340	(technicians/instructors; reconnaissance squadron + Milan anti-tank missile; one section of Mistral anti-aircraft launchers; two sections of Crotale anti-aircraft launchers)
Syria:	1 000	
United States:	1 000	

## APPENDIX V

*Armed forces of countries in the Gulf region**Bahrain*

25 000 troops  
39 tanks  
63 aircraft  
12 helicopters  
20 ships

*Egypt*

448 000 troops  
2 500 tanks  
1 120 artillery pieces  
500 aircraft  
127 helicopters  
92 ships

*Iran*

604 000 troops  
500 tanks  
800 artillery pieces  
70 aircraft  
11 helicopters  
66 ships

*Israel*

141 000 troops  
3 794 tanks  
1 360 artillery pieces  
676 aircraft  
77 helicopters  
87 ships

*Jordan*

82 250 troops  
1 131 tanks  
247 artillery pieces  
111 aircraft  
24 helicopters  
250 patrol boats

*Oman*

25 000 troops  
39 tanks  
138 artillery pieces  
63 aircraft  
20 ships

*Qatar*

7 000 troops  
24 tanks  
19 artillery pieces  
30 aircraft  
15 ships

*Saudi Arabia*

65 700 troops  
500 tanks  
1 850 artillery pieces  
191 aircraft  
44 helicopters  
21 ships

*Syria*

404 000 troops  
4 050 tanks  
1 500 artillery pieces  
500 aircraft  
127 helicopters  
41 ships

*Turkey*

650 000 troops  
3 800 tanks  
2 187 artillery pieces  
366 aircraft  
50 helicopters  
22 ships

*United Arab Emirates*

43 000 troops  
200 tanks  
80 aircraft  
203 helicopters  
15 ships

*Yemen*

54 000 troops  
1 144 tanks  
197 aircraft  
12 helicopters

## APPENDIX VI

*Iraq's air forces**Fighters**54 Mirage F-1-C/E:*

Single-seat multi-rôle air superiority/ground attack/reconnaissance version with an inertial navigation system, nav./attack central computer. Many F-1-Cs of the French Air Force were delivered or modified to F-1-C-200-standard by installation of an 8 cm fuselage plug for a removable flight refuelling probe (like in Iraq). Mirage F-1-EQ5 and EQ-6 of the Iraqi Air force are equipped to carry Exocet anti-ship missiles and laser-guided weapons such as the AS-30L missile and Matra 400 kg laser-guided bomb. They have Thomson-CSF Agave radar.

Combat radius (F-1-C-200):

- hi-lo-hi Mach 0.75/0.88, 14 × 250 kg bombs and maximum internal fuel with reserves: 230 nm/425 km/265 miles;
- lo-lo-lo 400-550 knots (460-633 mph), 6 × 250 kg bombs, 2 external tanks with reserves: 325 nm/650 km/374 miles;
- lo-lo 1 Exocet, 2 external tanks, reserves and missile flight path: 378 nm/700 km/435 miles;
- hi-lo-hi Mach 0.8/0.9, 2 × 250 kg bombs, 3 external tanks, reserves: 750 nm/1 390 km/863 miles;
- combat air patrol endurance with 2 Super 530 missiles and underbelly tank, reserves including one attack at ceiling: 2 h. 15 min.

Total internal fuel capacity 4 300 l/1 136 US gallons; non-retractable, but removable, flight refuelling probe on starboard side of nose optional.

*245 MiG-21 'Fishbed' DF JL:*

Total capacity: 2 600 l/687 US gallons.

Combat radius:

- hi-lo-hi 4 × 250 kg bombs, internal fuel: 200 nm/370 km/230 miles;
- 2 × 250 kg bombs, drop tanks: 400 nm/740 km/460 miles.

Range (internal fuel only): 593 nm/1 100 km/683 miles; ferry range (3 external tanks): 971 nm/1 800 km/1 118 miles.

*118 MiG-23 MS 'Flogger E':*

Maximum internal fuel capacity: 5 750 l/1 519 US gallons.

Combat radius: 485-700 nm/900-1 300 km/560-805 miles.

*25 MiG-25 'Foxbat A':*

Total fuel capacity: 14 000 kg/17 410 l/4 600 US gallons.

Normal operational radius: 610 nm/1 130 km/700 miles.

Maximum combat radius, econ. power: 780 nm/1 450 km/900 miles.

*29 MiG-29 'Fulcrum B':*

Maximum range: 1 130 nm/2 100 km/1 300 miles.

*10 MiG-27 'Flogger':*

Combat radius, with underbelly fuel tank, 4 × 500 kg bombs and 2 Atoll missiles, lo-lo-lo: 210 nm/390 km/240 miles.

Maximum ferry range, 3 external tanks: 1 350 nm/2 500 km/1 550 miles.

*77 F-7 chasse TT (China) (Mikoyan MiG-21 'Fishbed'):*

Total internal fuel capacity: 2 385 l/630 US gallons.

Maximum internal/external fuel capacity: 4 185 l/1 105.6 US gallons.

*Bombers**10 Su-24 'Fencer':*

Internal fuel capacity: 13 000 l/3 434 US gallons (4 large external tanks on wing possible).

Combat radius:

- lo-lo-lo: 174 nm/322 km/200 miles;
- lo-lo-hi with 2 500 kg weapons: 515 nm/950 km/590 miles;
- hi-lo-hi 3 000 kg weapons, 2 external tanks: 700 nm/1 300 km/805 miles.

*130 Su-20/22 'Fitter C':*

Fuel capacity increased to 4 550 l/1 202 US gallons by added tankage in dorsal spine fairing.

Combat radius with 2 000 kg external stores, including fuel:

- hi-lo-hi: 370 nm/685 km/425 miles;
- lo-lo-lo: 240 nm/445 km/275 miles.

*60 Su-25 'Frogfoot':*

Combat radius: hi-lo-hi 2 000 kg air-to-surface weapons and 2 external fuel tanks: 300 nm/556 km/345 miles.

*8 Tu-22 'Blinder A':*

Combat radius maximum unrefuelled: 1 565 nm/2 900 km/1 800 miles.

*4 Tu-16 'Badger A':*

Some equipped as flight refuelling tankers, using a unique wingtip-to-wingtip transfer technique to refuel other Tu-16s, or a probe-and-drogue system to refuel Tu-22As.

Total capacity: 45 450 l/12 000 US gallons. Provision for underwing auxiliary fuel tanks and for flight refuelling.

Range with 3 790 kg bomb load: 3 200 nm/5 925 km/3 680 miles.

Maximum unrefuelled combat radius: 1 700 nm/3 150 km/1 955 miles.

*5 Xian H-6 (Tu-16 'Badger'):*

May be converted to a tanker rôle.

Combat radius: 971 nm/1 800 km/1 118 miles.

Maximum range: 2 320 nm/4 300 km/2 672 miles.

Maximum endurance: 5 h. 41 min.

*Helicopters**40 Mi-24 'Hind' A/G:*

Armed assault helicopter.

Combat radius:

- with maximum military load: 86 nm/160 km/99 miles;
- with 2 external fuel tanks: 121 nm/224 km/134 miles;
- with 4 external fuel tanks: 155 nm/ 288 km/179 miles;
- range with maximum internal fuel: 405 nm/750 km/466 miles.

*40 SA-341/42M 'Gazelle':*

Total possible usable fuel capacity: 745 l/197 US gallons.

Range at S/L with standard fuel: 383 nm/710 km/440 miles.

Military loads can include 2 pods of Brandt 68 mm or FZ-275 in rockets, 4 or 6 "Hot" wire guided missiles with APX M397 gyro-stabilised sight, 2 forward firing 7.62 mm machine guns, or one GIAT M-621 20 mm gun on starboard side.

*5 Bell 209 AHIJ/TAC:*

Range at S/L with standard fuel, no reserves: 343 nm/635 km/395 miles.

*8 AB-212 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) (Italy):*

Extensively modified version of the AB-212 intended primarily for ASW search and attack missions and for attacks on surface vessels, but suitable also for search and rescue and utility rôles.

Maximum range with auxiliary tanks: 100 knots/185 km/115 mph, cruise at S/L, 15% reserves: 360 nm/667 km/414 miles.

Maximum endurance with auxiliary tanks, no reserves: 5 hours.

Weapons: 2 Motofides 244 AS or 2 Mk 44/46 homing torpedoes, or 2 Marte Mk 2 or Sea Skua-type air-to-surface missiles.

Note

This is not an exhaustive list of Iraq's air forces but a presentation of the main characteristics of operational aircraft that can be used on air combat operations.

To better illustrate the ranges of Iraqi aircraft, the distances (in nautical miles, kilometres and miles) between some of the main geographical points in the Gulf area are given below:

- from Basra (Iraq) to Kuwait City: 73 nm/135 km/85 miles
- from Basra to Doha (Qatar): 356 nm/660 km/410 miles
- from Basra to Kamsan (Strait of Hormuz): 497 nm/920 km/570 miles
- from Kuwait City to Doha: 310 nm/575 km/358 miles
- from Kuwait City to Kamsan: 478 nm/885 km/550 miles

*European security and the Gulf crisis*

REPORT <sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the Political Committee* <sup>2</sup>  
*by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur*

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N.B. The Rapporteur visited Cairo on 19th November 1990, i.e. after the committee had adopted his report, and was able to meet in particular H.E. Dr. Esmat Abdel Meguid, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, and Dr. Moufid Shehab, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Shoura (Egyptian Senate). He therefore reserves the right to present an addendum to his report at a later date.

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1. Adopted in committee by 17 votes to 2 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Alternate for Mrs. Staels-Dompas) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Verbeek), Beix, Böhm, Brito, Candal, Caro, Coleman (Alternate: Rowe), Collart, Cuatrecasas, Eich, Fabra, Forni, Foschi (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Hitschler, Koehl, van der Linden, Lord Mackie, MM. Martinez, Martino, Müller, Natali, Pécriaux, Pieralli, de Puig, Roseta, Sarti (Alternate: Scovacricchi), Sir William Shelton, MM. Stoffelen, Thyraud, Ward, N...

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

***Draft Recommendation***  
***on European security and the Gulf crisis***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendation 489;
- (ii) Welcoming the firmness and continuity with which member countries have pursued their action to promote the application of the embargo against Iraq decided upon by the Security Council in order to obtain, without prior conditions, the release of all the hostages held by Iraq and the evacuation of all Kuwaiti territory;
- (iii) Considering that WEU's contribution to the naval deployment to ensure that the embargo is respected is of considerable importance and allows the implementation of United Nations measures to be monitored satisfactorily;
- (iv) Noting with regret that it took longer than desirable to arrange this deployment;
- (v) Condemning with indignation the many violations of international law and human rights committed by Iraq and, in particular, the threat to use chemical weapons, non-respect of the 1949 Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of civilians on the territory of a belligerent country and violations of the 1961 Vienna Convention on the protection of diplomats;
- (vi) Considering that it is still possible that the firmness, solidarity, unity and political and diplomatic initiative of the international community will compel Iraq to obey the United Nations Security Council;
- (vii) Recalling that the Iraqi aggression was also a direct attack on the still fragile new world order that efforts are still being made to establish to replace the one that prevailed throughout the East-West confrontation and which must be based on respect for international law, co-operation and peace;
- (viii) Welcoming the fact that the Twelve, at the summit meeting in Rome on 18th October, stressed that the organisation of a peaceful order in the Near and Middle East implied agreement extending well beyond the setting of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait;
- (ix) Recalling its condemnation of the measures of repression used by the Israeli police in Jerusalem on 8th October and emphasising that a settlement of the Palestinian question, in accordance with all the resolutions of the Security Council on this matter, is essential for the establishment of lasting peace in the region;
- (x) Condemning the crimes committed in Beirut following the surrender of General Aoun, but trusting that the end of the civil war in Lebanon should allow the militia to be disarmed and the armed forces of Syria and Israel to be withdrawn from Lebanon,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Make a critical analysis of the establishment of WEU's co-ordination of forces sent by member countries to ensure respect for Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and its violations of the law of nations;
2. Follow up without delay Assembly recommendations urging it to set up a European observation satellite agency;
3. Instruct the chiefs of defence staff of the WEU member countries to continue their meetings and those of subordinate bodies in order to prepare forces for possible co-ordinated operations, providing inter alia for:
  - (a) co-operation in respect of transport;
  - (b) the definition of joint procedures;
  - (c) the exchange of operational information;
  - (d) interoperability of the equipment and weapons of these national forces;
  - (e) common exercises;
4. Pursue the reactivation of WEU;

5. Ensure that the selective release of hostages does not weaken the determination of member countries to obtain the release of all hostages and the evacuation of Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
6. Use Europe's influence in the region to ensure that, after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, negotiations are started to establish a lasting and peaceful order in the Middle East, with a view in particular to:
  - (a) an agreement between all countries in the region to renounce the possession of ABC weapons, subject to effective international verification;
  - (b) an agreement between countries in the region and arms-exporting countries to limit armaments in all countries in the region and to ban the sale of arms which might take levels above the agreed limits;
7. Ask that the European Community afford assistance to countries in the region whose economy is seriously affected by the crisis.



## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. On 20th September 1990, the Political Committee adopted the draft report by Mr. Pieralli on European security and events in the Near and Middle East. The accompanying recommendation was adopted by the Presidential Committee the same day and will have to be ratified by the Assembly on 3rd December. Its ratification, however, will not allow a debate to be reopened on the substance. Moreover, it would be difficult to contemplate the Assembly holding a debate in December on a document completed before 20th September. For that reason, the Presidential Committee followed the view of the Political Committee and included in the agenda of the session a new report on the situation in the Gulf so as to allow a debate to be held on the evolution of the situation since 20th September.

2. Your Rapporteur therefore considered his task was mainly to draw information from the evolution of the crisis in the last two months without going back over the events mentioned by Mr. Pieralli, except where developments might throw new light on the start of the conflict.

3. Your Rapporteur was able to take part in the visit to WEU's co-ordinated deployment in the Gulf organised by the President of the Assembly from 26th to 30th September when he was able to hear the view of the French chief of defence staff, General Schmitt, before visiting Djibouti and British, Dutch, French and Italian naval vessels in the Gulf. He was also received on a United States ship. He was received by Emir Zayed in Abu-Dhabi and met Mr. Hassan Gouled Aptidon, President of the Republic of Djibouti. A message from His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan to Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, on 20th September was communicated to him and he had the benefit of the Political Committee's long discussion with the Secretary-General on 9th October. He is also gratified that the French Chairmanship-in-Office, i.e. the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dumas, and the Defence Minister, Mr. Chevènement, informed the committees of the Assembly on 20th August and the Presidential Committee on 22nd September of the deliberations of the ministerial meetings on 20th August and 20th September. He believes this practice is an essential contribution to exchanges between the Council and the Assembly. Finally, on 9th October, the Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. van Eekelen, briefed the Political Committee on the activities of the WEU Council. In the present report, your

Rapporteur will endeavour to draw his conclusions from these various exchanges, without forgetting that, particularly during the journey to the Gulf, greater prominence was given to military matters than political discussions.

### *II. General evolution of the situation*

4. The situation on the frontiers of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and in the Gulf too, has not changed significantly since 20th September 1990 apart from increases in the ground and air forces on Saudi territory. On 25th October, American troops numbered 210 000, large numbers of Arab forces – particularly Syrian, Egyptian, Moroccan and Saudi – have been added and the European countries which had decided, after the Iraqi moves against the diplomatic representations of Belgium, Canada, France and the Netherlands in Kuwait on 15th September, to take part in the deployment of land and air forces in Saudi Arabia, have now implemented the major part of their decision with France and the United Kingdom sending the equivalent of a brigade of ground forces with corresponding air support, Italy and the Netherlands fighter aircraft and Belgium cargo aircraft. In October, the United States decided on a very significant increase in its military deployment and France, too, decided to increase its contribution.

5. At the end of September, the naval deployment in the Gulf seemed quite sufficient for applying the embargo decided by the Security Council, with thirty-two European combat vessels and thirty American. Some units have since been relieved, but the size of this force has not been changed to any great extent. The Assembly's mission was able to note that the naval aspect of the embargo was working satisfactorily, although not without shortcomings on land and in the air. The Security Council resolution allowing the embargo to be extended to air transport raised a number of specific questions of application which do not yet seem to have been solved completely and it is not certain that the control of surface traffic between Iran and Iraq and between Jordan and Iraq is effective enough to ensure that the embargo is respected in full.

6. Indeed, on the one hand, there is every indication that the drastic reduction in Iraqi imports will not force it to capitulate. Its domestic production is enough to ensure the survival of its population. The embargo will

probably restrict its economy, however, and significantly weaken its military power by preventing it from receiving the spare parts it needs, particularly to keep its aircraft in working order. On the other hand, since, in peacetime, oil accounts for about 90% of Iraq's exports, the embargo will probably place the country in an extremely difficult situation. The closing of the pipelines to Syria and Turkey leaves only the Gulf as an outlet for Iraqi oil. The plan to build a pipeline towards the Gulf of Aqaba is a long-term project. A connection with the Iranian network might on the contrary be achieved in a matter of months, but so far there is nothing to show that Iran is prepared to give its agreement. Finally, Iraq's refinery capacity is not sufficient for its own needs and there seems to be a shortage of certain by-products needed for military purposes.

7. The embargo is therefore forcing Iraq to increase rationing which will eventually place the government in a particularly difficult position. So far, it has reacted by strengthening the dictatorship and spreading extremely strong nationalist propaganda against the countries taking part in the embargo in order to secure the support of the population. No one knows quite how far it can go in this direction, nor what is the real state of opinion in 1989-90 after ten years of almost continuous warfare. Apart from the opposition of intellectuals in exile and the resistance for several decades of the Kurds, who constitute about 15% of the population, to the brutal policy of Arab nationalism pursued by Saddam Hussein's régime, the true state of opposition in the country is very difficult to assess. Nothing, however, allows it to be thought that an internal opposition movement is ready to overthrow Saddam Hussein and set up a new régime better prepared to institute a peaceful order in the region of the Gulf.

8. It may therefore be thought that, provided new incidents do not spark off armed conflict, the embargo will take quite some time to produce decisive effects. The land, sea and air forces now in the region will have to stay as long as necessary with full logistic support. In this respect, the various logistic support and, in particular, the cargo vessels sent by European countries, whether members of WEU or not, provide a noteworthy contribution to the joint effort, particularly insofar as the armed forces of the Arab countries benefit from this support.

9. In the event of it being impossible to avoid open fighting, the superiority of the forces whose task is to ensure that the embargo is respected would certainly be overwhelming at sea and in the air, although Iraq has almost 700 fighter aircraft of which it is not known what proportion is effectively operational. The situation would be far less favourable on the ground in view of the size of the Iraqi army of

almost a million men with corresponding reserves and paramilitary forces, about 5 500 tanks, 4-5 000 pieces of artillery, and various missiles. In mid-October, it was estimated that it had 500 000 forces deployed in the region of Basra and Kuwait. Although it seems certain that Iraq would be defeated thanks in particular to American superiority in observation with its AWACs and satellite radar facilities, its data-processing means and electronic warfare equipment, a ground attack would probably be quite long and costly in human lives, which all the western countries wish to avoid. Furthermore, pending the formation of a new régime and the organisation of a peaceful order in the area, it would imply a lengthy occupation of Iraqi territory.

10. Whether or not there are hostilities, provision will have to be made for the international forces to be kept in the area for some considerable time and here Europe will have an important rôle to play. Most states in the area wish these forces to remain since they have no wish to be left alone in face of Iraq's military strength should it remain intact after the conclusion of the present conflict. Naturally, this concerns first and foremost the United States which, from the very start of the crisis, showed that it would not allow Iraq to dominate the countries of the Gulf and quickly deployed the only military force capable of beating the Iraqi army. Your Rapporteur was able to note, however, that Europe's participation in the military deployment, although modest on the ground and in the air, is of considerable importance in the eyes of the governments of the region. This is mainly due to the fact that, unlike the United States, Europe is not systematically linked with Israel in its confrontation with its neighbours and with the Palestinians.

11. There can indeed be no doubt that the Israeli-Arab conflict constitutes a back-cloth for the events in the Gulf. Certainly it is in no way the reason for Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, but, because of the omnipresence of the Palestinian diaspora, it maintains throughout the Arab populations a feeling of humiliation in face of Israeli-United States complicity in maintaining, through strength, the Israeli occupation of the whole of Palestine and part of Lebanon. Ever since 1967, Europe has unremittently stated that a return to peace means evacuating the occupied territories. It votes regularly in this sense in the United Nations. This is proof of the fact that its participation in the embargo against Iraq is not to uphold the cause of Israel but for reasons much closer to those that induced the majority of the members of the Arab League to condemn Iraq's action: respect for international law, restoration of peace based on respect for states and frontiers and determination to halt Iraqi expansionism backed by significant armed forces manipulated by an unscrupulous and

untrustworthy dictator who is threatening all the countries of the region.

12. Since 2nd August, Iraqi propaganda has been concentrated on dividing and breaking the coalition that has been formed around the Security Council resolutions. It has tried, so far in vain, to separate the Soviet Union and China from the western countries. Although without envisaging direct intervention in the conflict, except perhaps in the event of a United Nations force being formed, the Soviet Union has been very firm in condemning Iraq. It is certain that it has tried to use its influence as one of that country's main arms suppliers before 2nd August in order to make it return to a better frame of mind. It has firmly denied hints in the Soviet press in mid-October that it had proposed a compromise – shaving off a fringe of Kuwaiti territory – to obtain Iraq's withdrawal. It has clearly condemned Saddam Hussein's stubbornness and has let it be known that, while it was determined to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict, it would not be opposed to more forceful action if Iraq continued to defy the United Nations. Although not so explicit, China has voted all the United Nations resolutions condemning the invasion of Kuwait and the various violations of international law committed by Iraq. There is nothing to show here that Iraqi propaganda has had the slightest success.

13. It is also clear that promises to free the hostages, and indeed the release of hostages of one country or another, are intended to weaken the cohesion of the western countries. It cannot be said that so far these measures have had much success, but the aim is to stir up distrust and divide the countries which are determined to negotiate with Iraq only after its withdrawal from Kuwait and the release of all hostages. The Spanish, Portuguese and French hostages have been released, but this did not change the political and military attitude of the countries concerned.

14. One may wonder about Iran's firmness in view of Saddam Hussein's considerable concessions in giving up all he had gained in 1988. The evacuation of the occupied parts of Iranian territory, the release of prisoners-of-war and confirmation of the Algiers agreements on sharing the Shatt-al-Arab show the value Saddam Hussein attaches to support from Iran. Admittedly, he obtained statements against the American military presence in the area, but Iran seems to have gone no further. For instance, it has taken part in the embargo against Iraq. Your Rapporteur does not know to what extent the embargo is respected in local cross-frontier trade, but so far an Iraqi proposal which would have reduced the effects of the embargo practically to nought has not been followed up, i.e. to build a short pipeline which would have quickly

linked Iraq's network with that of Iran, thus allowing Iraq's output to be exported through terminals not covered by the blockade. Action by the Syrian President, Mr. Hafez el-Assad, among Iranian leaders seems to have played an important rôle in diverting Iran from affording Iraq any meaningful assistance. In this matter, Iraqi diplomacy has so far failed.

15. This is obviously not so for a large proportion of the Arab populations which have been far more receptive to Iraqi propaganda. In several cases, this has led the governments to break away from Arab League decisions and show extreme caution in applying United Nations resolutions. This is so for Libya, Yemen, Jordan, Sudan, Algeria and Tunisia. The Iraqi deployment includes Yemeni, Sudanese and Palestinian units. The most disturbing case for the West is obviously that of Jordan which, as Iraq's neighbour, applies the embargo in principle, but shows little rigour in implementing it. Particularly since the war between Iraq and Iran, a large part of this country's economy has relied on trade with Iraq, thanks to the growing importance of the port of Aqaba which is linked to Iraq by a motorway. This aspect of its economy fell sharply just when it had to cope with a heavy influx of refugees, particularly Indian, Pakistani, Egyptian and Sri Lankan, fleeing Kuwait and the demands of the Iraqi army. International assistance was slow and inadequate and Jordan is now grappling with a serious economic and social crisis.

16. Already in recession since 1968, Jordan's rate of inflation reached 31% in 1989 with a marked drop in the standard of living of its population leading to a serious political crisis in April 1989. Although conservative parties retained a majority in the elections in November, progress was made by the Islam opposition and the left-wing laity which has strong support among the Palestinians. The difficulty of applying democratic practices is illustrated by the fact that, of 1.5 million potential electors, only 555 000 actually took part in the vote. This result seems above all to reflect the fact that Palestinians are still not well-integrated into the Hachemite kingdom. This being so, Palestinians now form a majority of the population, the monarchy has to follow liberal practices and there is an elected parliament; hence account has to be taken of the reactions of a public that pays heed to Iraqi propaganda. Saddam Hussein is willingly seen as a hero of the Arab cause, facing up to the United States and whose violently anti-Israeli utterances correspond to the public's own feelings. Concern to ensure survival of the kingdom obviously makes King Hussein avoid committing himself too deeply in a conflict with his Iraqi neighbour and he is multiplying his efforts to achieve a compromise peace with Iraq. He can but be well aware, however, that if Iraq is allowed to retain Kuwait

and pursue its military effort, he would be one of the first victims of Iraqi expansionism which might easily take advantage of internal difficulties in Jordan to justify an invasion or to impose its protection.

17. It is more difficult to assess the impact of Iraqi propaganda in the other Arab countries, particularly in those taking part in the deployment of forces in Saudi Arabia, but the assassination in Cairo on 12th October of Mr. Rifaat-al-Maghoub, President of the Egyptian Parliament, even if it is not clearly attributable to Iraqi services, is illustrative of the heated passions now rife in the Arab world and raises the question of the possible consequences of maintaining western forces in the Gulf region for very long.

18. Another consideration not to be overlooked is the economic impact of the Gulf crisis on all the countries in the region and in particular on those which do not have the benefit of the considerable increase in the price of oil after 2nd August. Indeed, considerable fluctuations brought the price per barrel which, before the crisis, cost between \$13 and \$19, to more than \$40 by 15th October. This situation is continuing, although there is no shortage on the world market. World consumption has fallen by about 10% due to the recession amplified by the Gulf crisis, but reserves are abundant and the countries so able – Saudi Arabia and the United States in particular – have undertaken to increase their production to make up the deficit caused by the cut-off of Iraqi and Kuwaiti exports. On the other hand, the situation of non-producer countries is difficult because of the sharp drop in trade and the loss of revenue due to the return of emigrant workers from Kuwait in areas extending well beyond the shores of the Gulf. Your Rapporteur noted this in Djibouti. It is for the West and Western Europe in particular to assist these countries as necessary to ensure that the crisis does not result in unduly traumatic human consequences. This obligation will not be easy to fulfil since Europe is also in recession, due partly to the Gulf crisis, and it has also undertaken to afford substantial assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe to revive their economy. Yet it is imperative if Europe wishes to counter Saddam Hussein's attempts to break up the coalition of countries determined to act to ensure respect for Security Council resolutions.

19. Saddam Hussein's propaganda, however, profited from two events that it does not seem to have provoked directly but which might open cracks in the cohesion of the countries taking part in the embargo.

20. The first was the confrontation in Jerusalem on 8th October between Jews and Palestinians during which shooting by the Israeli police caused twenty deaths and some hundred

wounded among the Palestinians. At the origin of this affair was a religious manifestation by extremist Jews on Temple Mount overlooking the western wall surrounding the Al-Aqsa Mosque. This was a traditional manifestation on this date, and therefore in no way unforeseeable, that was received by stone-throwing Palestinians on the Mount. Nor was this unforeseeable for the Israeli authorities. Their view was that this reaction had been prepared and stones accumulated in advance in the mosque. Projectiles were also thrown at Jews worshipping in front of the wall and this provoked intervention by the police, who, threatened in turn, started firing with live bullets because they had not been issued with the plastic bullets normally used by the Israeli army in operations to maintain order. The number of victims and the fact that ambulances were struck by bullets prove that the Israeli police reacted with unusual ferocity. From the information available, it is not possible to say more about provocation by one side or the other. This incident gave new impetus to the intifada and above all heightened passion and hatred on all sides, thus making even more difficult the opening of negotiations for a Palestinian settlement in conformity with Security Council Resolution 242. After its meeting on 9th October, the Political Committee issued a communiqué condemning the Israeli police's deadly action.

21. This matter was brought before the Security Council which took several days to adopt a resolution condemning the Israeli reaction because of the attitude of the United States which was opposed to any wording condemning Israel too strongly and implying retaliatory measures. However, Security Council Resolution 672, adopted on 12th October, instructed the United Nations Secretary-General to conduct an inquiry on the spot into the circumstances of this matter and the responsibilities of all sides. The Israeli Government has refused to receive this mission on the grounds that, Jerusalem having been annexed by Israel on 28th June 1967 – which was not recognised by the member countries of WEU – events in this city were an internal Israeli matter and not a question for the Security Council.

22. Clearly this matter does not affect directly the conflict in the Gulf since it is between Israel and Palestinians whereas Israel is not taking part in the military deployment against Iraq. However, it is not without consequences for the cohesion of the participating countries since the United States is extremely reserved towards any declaration or measure which might jeopardise Israeli interests whereas Europeans are more anxious not to appear to uphold systematically the cause of this country, particularly in a case where its conduct has obviously been unduly repressive. In general, they consider that the return to peace in Palestine depends on the

application of Resolution 242 of the Security Council which calls for the evacuation of the occupied territories (without saying whether Jerusalem is counted), the constitution of a Palestinian state and respect for secure and recognised frontiers between Israel and its neighbours. The shooting on 8th October led to a recrudescence of tension between Israel and Palestinians and resulted in several murderous incidents and the closure to Palestinians of the demarcation line separating the territory of Israel and Jerusalem from the West Bank. Furthermore, the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane in New York on 4th November sparked off a violent anti-Arab reaction in Israel. These events bolster Iraqi propaganda in the Arab countries and give credit to Saddam Hussein's claim to be the champion of Moslem rights flouted by Israel. They also underline the differences between Americans and their allies on the nature of their respective relations with Israel or with Iraq.

23. The second question running against the countries in coalition against Iraq was the liquidation of the sector of Beirut held by General Aoun's Maronite forces thanks to a joint action conducted by Syrian and Lebanese armed forces on 13th October. On the one hand, it seems that Syria, which was playing an important and positive rôle in the organisation of measures against Iraq, took advantage of the good relations thus established with the West to eliminate the only force still standing in its way to domination of Lebanon. On the other hand, there are indications that, in still unclear circumstances, a large number of General Aoun's soldiers were summarily executed after having been taken prisoner. In spite of the request for protection addressed to the Lebanese Government, one of the leaders of the Maronite community, Mr. Dany Chamoun, was assassinated together with his family on 21st October by persons wearing the uniform of Samir Geagea's Lebanese forces in a sector of Beirut controlled by the Syrian army. Even if this despicable crime is believed to have been committed by a Christian militia, neither the legal government nor the Syrian occupying force did anything to prevent it. One way or another, it makes any reconciliation between the communities in Lebanon more difficult. Finally, France granted General Aoun himself asylum and he took refuge in the French Embassy, but the Lebanese Government refuses the French authorities the right to transfer him to France. On 18th October, the French Government asked the United Nations Secretary-General to inquire into the executions and extortion of which the Syrian army is believed to be guilty in Beirut.

24. Syrian action in Lebanon is not comparable to that of Iraq in Kuwait, particularly because it was carried out with the agreement and presumably at the request of the legal gov-

ernment in Lebanon. However, since certain western countries are favourably inclined towards the Christians in Lebanon, serious action and the barbaric measures that are reported to have ensued could well divert part of the opinion in these countries from an undertaking which, after all, is mainly intended to protect Arab countries, including Syria, from the Iraqi threat.

25. However this may be, the surrender of General Aoun's army should terminate the civil war in Lebanon which had been the cause or the pretext for the occupation of part of Lebanese territory by Israel and most of Lebanon by Syria. If those two countries wish to show their good faith, they should now evacuate Lebanese territory and leave the Lebanese authorities free to exercise their authority. If they fail to do so of their own accord, it will be necessary, once the Iraqi question has been negotiated, to start negotiations on Palestine, on the one hand, and Lebanon, on the other, in order to show that, contrary to what Saddam Hussein claims, the West is seeking an equitable overall settlement for the Near and Middle East as a whole in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

26. Thus, the maintenance of inactive military forces in Saudi Arabia is leading to a political evolution which, in the end, is favourable to Iraq. The annexation of Kuwait, the flight of part of its population thus reducing the resistance movements that had started, imposing Iraqi nationality on those who remain, the systematic destruction of Kuwaiti civil registers and the installation of an Iraqi population in the country strengthened Iraq's hold over Kuwait in September and October. Deprived of water, electricity and supplies, the embassies in Kuwait have had to close one after the other. Whereas there are no signs of lassitude or division in Iraqi opinion, fanaticised by government propaganda, the contrary seems to be the case in many Arab countries and the incidents in Jerusalem and Beirut suggest that the unanimity in the West in August is not completely sheltered from such factors which will inevitably be followed by others in the next few months. Whatever determination there may be to maintain the embargo until Iraq releases its hostages and evacuates Kuwait, one may wonder whether recourse to force will not be necessary to achieve this end, unless negotiations are started before these two prior conditions are fulfilled.

### *III. European military deployment in the Gulf*

27. The United Kingdom and France had maintained small naval forces in the Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea since the war between Iraq and Iran. France has port facilities in Djibouti where it maintains a well-trained

armed force for possible action in that region. Immediately after the Iraqi aggression, these two countries decided to increase their naval presence in the Gulf and France also sent a helicopter unit on the aircraft carrier *Clémenceau* which was initially disembarked in the United Arab Emirates whereas the United Kingdom sent a few units to Saudi Arabia which were integrated with the American military arrangements.

28. After the NATO Council had failed on 6th August to reach a joint decision on deploying that organisation's forces, the WEU Ministerial Council met in Paris on 20th August and decided to co-ordinate the naval forces sent by member countries to help to ensure respect for the embargo decided upon by the Security Council (Resolution 661, 6th August 1990) in order to obtain the evacuation of Kuwait by Iraq, the liberation of the hostages held by Saddam Hussein and subsequently a political settlement of the conflict under the aegis of the Arab League. On 27th August, the chiefs of staff of the member countries met in Paris to draft, on the basis of the directive adopted by the Council on the implementation of the embargo, a document on co-ordination and on 31st August a co-ordination group was formed with a permanent co-ordination unit in Paris and co-ordination activities on the spot.

29. This naval deployment now associates the WEU countries with the United States, certain Arab countries and a few European countries non-members of WEU. WEU's participation is nevertheless specific since at the meeting in Bahrain on 9th September 1990 the fleets of the member countries were given their own control sector on either side of the Strait of Hormuz, i.e. east of the sector monitored by the Americans further inside the Gulf. On 14th September, this sector was divided between the fleets of the WEU countries. Their specific rôle is to close the Gulf in the east to vessels approaching from outside which might try to break the embargo. In addition, certain countries of WEU are helping to monitor respect for the embargo in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. In all, at the end of October, thirty-five warships from WEU countries were taking part in these controls alongside thirty American vessels, without counting logistic support vessels. They fly the flags of seven of the WEU member countries. Luxembourg and Germany are not participating directly in the naval action in the region but are making a financial contribution to the joint undertaking and Germany has also sent mine-sweepers to the Mediterranean. Several other European countries have sent, have decided to send or are considering the possibility of sending vessels to contribute to the joint operations, particularly logistic support vessels. This is the case for Greece, Denmark, Norway and also Hungary, with a non-combatant land unit, and Poland, with a hospital ship.

30. Naturally, the sending of support ships and, a fortiori, a hospital ship, implies less involvement than is the case for warships, but it is nevertheless a useful contribution to the deployment against Iraq in view of the insufficient logistic means available in certain Arab countries which have sent ground forces to Saudi Arabia, and an appreciable symbolic commitment by countries determined that Security Council resolutions should be respected. Not just Western Europe, but a large part of Europe is represented, apart from the Soviet Union and neutral countries.

31. After the 15th September move by Iraqi forces against the diplomatic representations of Belgium, Canada, France and the Netherlands in Kuwait, several WEU countries also decided to send land and air forces to the region. Brigade-sized units of British and French ground forces together with corresponding air cover were or are being sent to an area some distance from the Iraqi frontier in Saudi Arabia. Air combat units were sent by France, Italy and the United Kingdom to the Gulf area, the Netherlands is negotiating with Turkey the possible stationing of a squadron of F-16 fighter aircraft on its territory and Belgium is proposing to send an air transport unit to support the deployment of its allies, but this has been delayed because of events in Rwanda. Portugal has made a transport ship and a C-130 transport aircraft available to the United Kingdom forces and Spain is considering sending a medical assistance unit.

32. Western Europe's air and land participation is therefore not negligible. Since the ministerial meeting on 18th September, it has been co-ordinated by WEU but in a less elaborate manner than the naval co-ordination. The French and British forces deployed behind the forces of Arab countries are not side-by-side and in fact their positions and deployment depend far more on bilateral agreements with Saudi Arabia on the one hand and with the United States on the other than on WEU co-ordination which in this area has not proved to be effective.

33. Moreover, the Europeans have committed less than 25 000 men compared with 210 000 for the Americans, to which may be added the forces of several Arab countries, totalling well over 50 000 men. This ratio of forces cannot allow Europeans to make their own views prevail in the overall use of the land and air forces in the region. Should Iraq launch an attack, it would first encounter the forces of the Arab countries deployed in the front line and the rôle of both Europeans and Americans would be to back them up. It is planned that the overall arrangements would then come under American command, whereas at present each unit remains under national command and their positioning



is governed by bilateral agreements between each country and Saudi Arabia. One question is what would be the attitude of the European contingents should the initiative for taking up arms be seized by Arab or American forces. Even if the European capitals do not wish to take part in such an operation, it would be difficult to envisage their forces remaining on one side. The Council has not yet provided the Assembly with sufficiently detailed information about the implications of this air and land deployment or about the directive on logistics that it prepared following the normalisation work that it has been carrying out since 15th September.

34. One may wonder whether the present military deployment in the Gulf area corresponds effectively to the political and military objectives of the participating countries. The means available to the American command are to be increased further during the next few weeks with the addition of several hundred tanks withdrawn from the NATO forces in Europe and the United States is considering a further increase of about 100 000 troops in Saudi Arabia. These means seem to be quite adequate for an offensive operation against Iraq and are more than enough for the requirements of deterrence or the defence of Gulf countries which might be threatened by the Iraqi army. Conversely, the evolution of the situation makes such an operation increasingly difficult. The more it is delayed, the more it will be hampered by the deterioration of relations between the participating countries. It seems clear that the embargo alone will not force Iraq to capitulate within a reasonable lapse of time but the maintenance of tension allows it to maintain its position. In mid-October, major cracks began to show in the determination of public opinion, both in the United States, where the budget debate revealed weaknesses in Congress's support for the government and where there were demonstrations against the presence of United States forces in Saudi Arabia on 22nd October, and in Western Europe where similar reactions have been noted as in several Arab countries. Clearly the maintenance of static deployment is leading to wear and tear in morale of which the United States Government will have to take account if this phenomenon is confirmed. Furthermore, any reduction in the present deployment without very substantial prior concessions by Iraq would be seen as a defeat for the United Nations, the West, the United States and its President, and encouragement for Iraqi expansionism and the forces of destabilisation which have long been active in the Near and Middle East. The West must therefore face squarely up to the risks it has taken in sending such a large force to Saudi Arabia.

35. A number of comments may be made, however, on the way in which WEU co-ordination is prepared on land and at sea.

First, while the American decision to send forces to support Saudi Arabia threatened by the invasion of Kuwait was immediate and followed by very speedy initial implementation, this was not so for European decisions. Agreed, France and the United Kingdom quickly reinforced their naval presence but it took eighteen days for the WEU Ministerial Council to meet in Paris and, deciding on co-ordination, for the other member countries of WEU to decide in turn to take part in the naval deployment. It then took twenty days for this co-ordination to be sufficient in the Gulf for the Bahrain meeting at last to be able to initiate the overall co-ordination of naval action in the region which is essential for ensuring that the embargo is respected.

36. Second, the move against diplomatic representations in Kuwait came on 15th September, but the military decisions which the WEU countries took on 18th September were still only partially implemented on 15th October in spite of the small numbers of forces concerned.

37. Furthermore, your Rapporteur was personally able to note that the operatives on the spot had not received identical instructions on the nature of their mission and on what they would have to do at the start of hostilities. Nor do the governments present in the same way to their parliaments the action upon which they have decided. For instance, the United Kingdom, in many ministerial statements, emphasises its forces' support for the American deployment and the solidarity of the members of NATO, whereas the communiqué issued after the WEU ministerial meeting on 20th August makes no mention of the American initiative.

38. These comments indicate that Europe has been too slow in taking its decisions, that they lack clarity, and that the implementation of co-ordination has also been slow and, moreover, incomplete. This situation is disturbing, because the Gulf is of vital importance for Europe, even more than for the United States, yet Europe has always been preceded by the United States and this is not without political consequences. Indeed, your Rapporteur was able to note that the European military presence had very special value in the eyes of the governments and probably of the Arab peoples because of the attitude adopted by the European countries in previous crises. It is regrettable that it appears to be merely an addition to the American deployment, particularly in air and land forces. Again, the weakness of Europe's participation in this deployment leaves very little possibility for a European initiative, particularly in the event of hostilities. If the United States decides to act, Europe could do little to stop it but would be carried along with the movement. If, on the contrary, it decided to take action, it would be unable to do so without American participation.

39. It is obviously too late to rectify this situation, but it is time for Europe to take steps to avoid any such recurrence in the event of a new crisis. For a long time our Assembly has been asking the Council to create a European agency for processing information obtained by satellite. Yet again the Gulf affair has just shown that Europe's delay in this matter has made it unduly dependent on the United States and it can but again ask the Council to take, at its next ministerial meeting, the decisions necessary for implementing this proposal.

40. The slowness and imperfection of military co-ordination encourage your Rapporteur to make a second proposal: to prepare such co-ordination in peacetime so that it may be implemented immediately as necessary by the governments so determined. The fact is that each of our countries has air mobile forces that can be transported very quickly over great distances. Some of them are sizeable forces with heavy arms. This is so for France's rapid action force stationed partly in France and partly in Germany with significant transport capabilities, tanks and, above all, a large number of helicopters and about 45 000 men. In other countries, the mobile forces are just a few parachute units with far lighter arms allowing them to intervene anywhere, particularly if the government instructs them to take very brief action but not to take place in a deployment such as that in Saudi Arabia. The first thing for these countries to do would be to strengthen these units in terms of numbers, transport means and fighting equipment.

41. Another difficulty is that no European country would wish to agree to its armed forces intervening in operations outside the NATO area decided by others. The difficulties of integrating forces in the NATO system are well known, and they are not confined to French forces, and on 6th August it was seen that this integration prevented NATO from acting outside the area fixed by the Treaty of Washington. The question is therefore to prepare for co-ordinated action between countries in peacetime – although it will not be possible to foresee which countries – and operations might be anywhere in the world, bearing in mind, however, that it is in the Middle East and Africa that Europe may most probably be required to intervene. Only WEU provides the possible framework for such preparations and for the prior assignment of suitable forces for such operations.

42. Once the present crisis is over, therefore, the chiefs of defence staff who met in the framework of WEU for the first time since 1954 to implement WEU co-ordination in the Gulf must continue to meet in the same framework and set up a permanent co-ordination body. Their first task would be to draft a text defining the framework of co-operation between the

mobile forces of each member country in the event of the governments deciding on joint action. To this end, they might base themselves on the text of the general instructions drawn up when France withdrew from NATO's integrated military commands so that preparations might be made for including French forces in the NATO arrangements should France decide to act alongside its allies in Europe. This text is intended to allow the immediate implementation of co-operation without impinging upon France's right to decide whether or not it will participate in hostilities in which NATO might be engaged.

43. Second, the chiefs of staff or their representatives should work out the procedures necessary for conducting possible co-ordinated operations. They will then have to consider all the hypothetical cases of hostilities in which any of them might be obliged to participate in order to plan the conditions for effective co-ordination, since, in spite of experience gained in 1987, it was necessary to improvise to a very great extent in the co-ordination in summer 1990. Finally, they will have to examine what arms, equipment and means of transport each one will have to provide for its mobile force to ensure the fullest possible interoperability of the various national units.

44. There must be no mistake, this is a very vast undertaking because, if Europe wishes to have a force that can act effectively, its strength will have to be at least some 100 000 men. Not only is this worth trying, it is essential, as long as there is no truly European army to act outside Europe. Neither NATO nor any European organisation other than WEU can provide a framework for this endeavour. Its rôle would be to allow joint action by national forces, under national or European command, in joint arrangements in the event of the governments or the WEU Council deciding to take such action.

45. It is not without serious thought nor without having consulted a number of senior experts in the military hierarchy of their countries, some of whom have had considerable experience in the problems of co-operation between national armed forces, that your Rapporteur is presenting this proposal which seems in no way unrealistic at the present juncture but which on the contrary responds fairly well to the prevailing uncertainty, since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact military machine, regarding the conditions in which Europe will have to act in future decades to ensure its security.

#### *IV. The organisation of peace in the Middle East*

46. Events in October 1990 show, should this still be necessary, how much the various theatres



of confrontation in the Near and Middle East are interlinked by extremely complex relations. Naturally, Saddam Hussein's propaganda, which associates the invasion of Kuwait with unrest in the occupied territories, the invasion of Lebanon and criticism of régimes in the Arabian peninsula, combines these very different matters in order to divide the countries determined to put an end to Iraqi expansion. This has not been without success and the West will have to prove its good faith to the Arab world. Without awaiting the end of the crisis, countries participating in the deployment of forces in Saudi Arabia must harmonise their approach to the restoration of peace not only between Iraq and its neighbours but also throughout the region. Failing this, differences over the future organisation of the region may well split up the front that has formed against Iraqi aggression, as may be feared in the case of the crises in Jerusalem and Lebanon.

47. The first question concerns Iraq, not because its frontiers prior to 2nd August are in question but because its military strength is a permanent threat to all countries in the region and one of the main reasons for the large arms build-up in the area. Admittedly, except in the event of a major military confrontation leading to revolution, no one will be able to impose drastic changes in Iraq's military policy. This is not one of the United Nations' requirements. However, Iraq signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in international conflicts, yet it has large stocks of chemical weapons, has used them, at least in repressing the Kurds, and several times has threatened to use them in the present conflict. This threat in itself is a violation of the Geneva Protocol and Iraq should be called upon to renounce the possession of chemical weapons under international control. There would be even greater justification for this if progress is made in the present Geneva negotiations on the disarmament of chemical weapons. Similarly, international control of the non-production of nuclear weapons by Iraq should be considered in the context of the non-proliferation treaty. Any withdrawal of forces now deployed in Saudi Arabia not preceded by such measures would be a victory for Iraq because it would thus become the true arbitrator in the affairs of the region.

48. The present conflict should also lead to an agreement on a general limitation of conventional weapons and a treaty denuclearising the region. This implies an agreement between all the states concerned on the maximum level of forces and armaments that each would be authorised to retain under reciprocal control. Your Rapporteur well realises the difficulty of imposing such controlled limitation measures on a state in a part of the world where mistrust is so widespread. But he considers a regional agreement on the controlled limitation of arma-

ments to be the only means of attenuating such mistrust, terminating the arms race and avoiding the present deployment of forces in Saudi Arabia causing further crises. Should there be such a withdrawal without a balance being achieved between Iraq, which is very heavily armed, and the other Middle Eastern countries, the Arab countries and Iran would believe their security to be very uncertain and peace inadequately guaranteed.

49. It is also evident that such an agreement cannot be reached without the participation of Israel and the neighbouring countries, i.e. without a general agreement on Israel's frontiers. Israel has to include in its basic security hypotheses that of a coalition between a large number of Arab countries, including Iraq and Saudi Arabia with which it has no common frontiers. This assessment of the risk is making it consider the occupied territories as part of its security zone in view of the small size of its territory, the length of its frontiers and the vulnerability of its towns. It makes no secret of the fact – and most members of the Israeli Labour Party agree with the right-wing on this point – that it will not agree to abandon the occupied territories unless its security is guaranteed. However, the continued occupation of the West Bank very largely helps to sustain international tension in the region with the result that the Arab states keep a very high level of armaments. This fact has been recognised by the international community and consequently Security Council Resolution 242 links evacuation of the occupied territories with the existence of secure and recognised frontiers for Israel. In spite of declarations by the PLO which, since 1989, has agreed that its claim to sovereignty over the whole of Palestine is now null and void, there is still real ambiguity about its true claims.

50. It is high time for this twenty-three-year-old resolution to be implemented, on the one hand, because Israel is increasing the number of Jewish settlements on the West Bank, mainly with immigrants from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thus making it increasingly difficult to consider withdrawing this population to Israeli territory, and, on the other, because prolongation of the intifada is increasing tension between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem and Israel and on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Resolution 242 can be implemented only in stages, the first of which would be to leave the Palestinians free to appoint a representative government for Gaza and the West Bank with enough authority to negotiate outstanding questions with Israel: frontiers, status of Jerusalem, progressive withdrawal of Israeli forces, the kind of guarantees it will be given and the economic organisation of Palestine as a whole. It is therefore impossible to wait for such a settlement before starting to evacuate the forces now deployed in Saudi Arabia and, conse-

quently, negotiating an agreement between countries in the region for limiting armaments. However, an agreement on the first stage seems essential to ensure that the Arab countries agree to negotiate on this point as is a western-guaranteed promise that the process started will effectively lead to implementation of Resolution 242.

51. Conversely, there is probably no justification for fearing a massive return of the Palestinian diaspora to the West Bank when it becomes independent again. This diaspora is firmly settled in a number of countries, including the Gulf countries and, to a large extent, Lebanon and Jordan, where it has resources, revenues and often a share of economic and administrative authority that would never be equalled in Palestine. Moreover, there is every indication that it will not return there, partly because the majority of the diaspora consists of people who have never lived in Palestine or even whose parents have never known the land of their ancestors. From his contacts in the Gulf countries, your Rapporteur received the twofold impression that the Palestinians there had settled permanently and that Palestinian affairs were no longer a major concern for them, whereas they found Iraqi expansionism extremely disturbing.

52. However tragic, the situation in Lebanon has more limited international repercussions. There have been no settlers in the narrow strip of territory in the south occupied by the Israeli army since 1978 and it seems clear that it is solely for security reasons that Israel is keeping forces there to protect its territory against Palestinian raids or a possible Syrian attack. Conversely, the de facto protectorate exercised by Syria over the major part of Lebanese territory, which has been occupied by its armed forces since 1976, is a violation of international law and order which should be rapidly terminated. Naturally, it is for the Lebanese people to decide on its own régime, and the present government, formed under Syrian authority, does not have the support of all the communities constituting the Lebanese nation. Nevertheless, it alone is in a position to end civil war, disarm the militia and rebuild the pact between the communities without which internal peace would be under constant threat. If Syria's action were limited to helping to restore order, it would make a major contribution to peace, but it has committed so many acts of violence and crimes and provoked or allowed so many others that it is particularly badly placed to play this rôle and, in its own words, its aim seems to be the annexation of Lebanon. The withdrawal of its armed forces is therefore a prior condition for the restoration of peace in Lebanon and, while it condemns and fights Iraqi expansionism, it cannot expect to avoid the application of principles that it is trying to impose elsewhere. This evacuation

must also be guaranteed when the conflict with Iraq is settled, and Israel must also promise to evacuate the Golan Heights, a necessary exchange for the Syrian army's leaving Lebanon.

53. The Gulf countries, be it Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or other emirates, have keenly felt the threat of invasion by Iraq, but, for the first time, this threat has led to a national reaction extending well beyond the leadership. The violence of Iraqi troops in Kuwait and the measures taken to make the Kuwaitis flee and replace them by immigrants from Iraq appear to have provoked a true national resistance movement in the country when, not so long ago, one might have wondered whether it really was a nation. The many Kuwaiti refugees were well received, particularly in Saudi Arabia, where exiled Kuwaitis saw Emir Jaber's government in exile as the only legitimate authority in the eyes of exiled Kuwaitis. For instance, it is remarkable that Kuwaiti airliners not seized by Iraq when it attacked the country have been handed over by their crews to the government in exile in Saudi Arabia whereas Iraq was unable to form a government under its protection after the invasion on 2nd August, which is probably why it annexed Kuwait so quickly afterwards.

54. There seems to have been a similar phenomenon throughout the countries in the region: faced with an external threat, the population, whatever its origin, showed solidarity and a certain national feeling emerged. Obviously not enough information is available to assess the depth of this phenomenon, but your Rapporteur has noted that the belief that authoritarian régimes have been imposed on people who did not want them is, to say the least, a simplistic view that does not correspond to reality. Representatives of governments of those countries he was able to visit assured him that they were determined to take account of this demonstration of national feeling and modify the political structures of their countries to make them more democratic and guarantee a fairer sharing of revenue derived from oil exports for the entire population. Such reforms will certainly be essential in maintaining cohesion and ensuring the survival of these states.

55. However, a better distribution of oil revenue within the emirates will obviously not be enough to maintain peace in a region where the countries with the largest populations have no oil and suffer from various degrees of underdevelopment. They have already been hit hard by the present crisis. This is the case in particular for Jordan, Egypt and Djibouti but probably also for Yemen, Turkey and Syria, not to speak of more distant countries such as Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, where the price of oil has increased considerably. Trade has slowed down in the Indian

Ocean and the Red Sea and many nationals employed in Iraq or Kuwait have had to return home penniless. It is essential to afford these countries humanitarian assistance and, after the crisis, the oil-producing countries must also increase significantly their present level of assistance to other countries in the region.

56. In fact, among the producing countries, those which were relatively densely-populated such as Iraq, Iran and Algeria could not, when the price of oil was relatively low as was the case prior to 2nd August, earn enough from their exports to feed their population and pay the interest on their external debts. The case of Iraq, whose debt was more than \$70 000 million following the war against Iran, was particularly serious but, since 1982, they all suffered a drop in the standard of living, high unemployment and a sharp reduction in investments. Conversely, more sparsely-populated countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates made large profits from their oil production and invested a large proportion in industrialised countries with the result that Kuwait's income from its foreign investments exceeded its oil revenue. The sums available to institutions for redistributing these profits, such as the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Kuwaiti Fund, and various Islamic banks and firms, dwindled from year to year. Development assistance afforded by the producing countries thus fell from 4.23% of their GNP in 1976 to 0.86% in 1988.

57. It is naturally for the Arab countries to agree on the redistribution of oil revenue among themselves, but henceforth they will no longer be able to ignore the need to do so. Still more delicate is the question of how to fix oil prices and avoid the political upheavals that have been rife in the Middle East for more than forty years. It would certainly be difficult for the West to express virtuously indignation at the use of the "oil weapon" by the Arab states in protest at its support for Israel in 1967 and 1973 when the West is itself using this weapon against Iraq in 1990, the only difference being that it is doing so in application of a Security Council resolution. The fact that states have taken over national oil resources in most countries in the region eliminates any hope of regulating prices and quantities through the machinery of supply and demand. In these circumstances, it therefore seems difficult to avoid negotiations between producer and consumer countries for regulating output and prices. Moreover, it is in no one's interest for prices to be too low, since this would restrict research, development and marketing of alternative sources of energy and prevent the introduction of any meaningful energy-saving policy.

58. It would therefore appear that, even in the event of Iraqi expansionism being defeated and

the former dynasty being restored in Kuwait within its previous frontiers, which is far from certain, there will have been far-reaching changes in the region because of the crisis. Even if contacts between western armed forces and the local populations are limited, the latter cannot fail to be unaffected by the differences in standards of living, customs and behaviour which separate them from the West and the seeds of a transformation of patriarchal Arabian societies will have been sown. If Iraqi power is not squashed, the Arab leaders make no secret of the fact that they will ask the West to keep forces in the Gulf region to protect them, thus perpetuating this contact between civilisations. No one can predict the consequences, but there is every reason to think they will be significant.

### *V. Conclusions*

59. Today's new and serious crisis in the Middle East once again has serious consequences for Europe which depends on the region for its supplies of oil, a product which is still essential for its economy. It must be noted, however, that Europe has managed to face up to this crisis better than before. The fact that all European countries have at least three months' oil reserves allowed them to handle the interruption of imports from Iraq and Kuwait without shortages, although prices rose sharply. Europe stood united in the framework of the Twelve in reacting against the Iraqi aggression, the European members of the Security Council voted in the same way, no European country accepted the invasion of Kuwait and all applied the embargo and adopted the same diplomatic measures when certain diplomatic missions in Kuwait were blockaded. The Chairman-in-Office of the Community, Mr. De Michelis, was able to speak on behalf of the Twelve in the United Nations General Assembly, underlining in particular that the common aim was not only the restoration of Kuwait but a general settlement of outstanding problems throughout the Near and Middle East. In the military area, WEU managed, more quickly than in 1987, to organise co-ordinated action with fairly clear political aims less than three weeks after the Iraqi attack.

60. Although Europe's participation in international action against Iraq is still insufficient, it is of considerable political importance because of this relative unity and the the Arab countries' confidence in Europe. It may thus voice its views when the conflict is resolved and Europe must prepare for this even if the Arab countries will have the final say in organising peace in the region. Insofar as they ask Europe to help to guarantee peace for some time to come, Europe will have a right to an opinion.

61. However, this conflict will probably not be the last one and it is essential for Europe to

learn the lessons from the difficulties it encountered in translating its relative unanimity into action allowing it to play this rôle. This matter will have shown that, in an area where NATO could not reach an adequate political consensus and the Twelve, although agreed on political aims and diplomatic action, were unable to take military action, WEU had an important rôle to play and the governments acted to better avail than ever before. This shows, first, what risks twelve-power Europe would be taking if it followed up certain proposals by the Commission of the European Community aimed at associating Europe's defence too closely with an organisation that has neither the ability nor the necessary flexibility to co-ordinate action which, at the present juncture, must remain a national responsibility. The resolution on the CSCE

adopted by the European Parliament on 9th October, which declares that "WEU should not be revitalised", pending the European union being given defence powers, is diametrically opposed to Europe's immediate interests and the long-term interests of a future European union. It is, on the contrary, WEU's activities that allow Europe to exist and act in areas within its purview.

62. This is why your Rapporteur, in an attempt to draw conclusions from the military deployment in the area of the Gulf, and particularly the naval deployment co-ordinated by WEU, proposes that preparations should be made in peacetime to make such co-ordination more rapid and effective in future while leaving each country free to participate at whatever level it thinks best in action to foster peace.

*European security and the Gulf crisis*

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AMENDMENT 1 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Soell and others*

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1. In paragraph 6 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ which might take levels above the agreed limits ” and insert “ in the region ”.

*Signed: Soell, Stoffelen, Baarveld-Schlaman*

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1. See 10th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment agreed to).

*European security and the Gulf crisis*

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AMENDMENT 2 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by MM. Martinez, Stoffelen and Scheer*

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2. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:  
“settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Lebanese problem on the basis of the application of the United Nations resolutions which have still not been respected, while strictly respecting the obligations of Article VI of the treaty governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons signed by the nuclear powers;”

*Signed: Martinez, Stoffelen, Scheer*

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1. See 10th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment amended and agreed to).

*European security and the Gulf crisis*

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**AMENDMENT 3 <sup>1</sup>**

*tabled by MM. Martinez and Stoffelen*

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3. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:  
“ Seek the association of all countries participating in the military and political effort to ensure the success of the embargo – and in particular the WEU member states – with the talks between the United States and Iraq following the United Nations Security Council resolution. ”

*Signed: Martinez, Stoffelen*

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1. See 10th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment agreed to).

*European security and the Gulf crisis*

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AMENDMENT 4 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Scheer*

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4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Signed: Scheer*

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1. See 10th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment not moved).



*European security and the Gulf crisis*

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AMENDMENT 5<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by MM. Pieralli and De Decker*

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5. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:  
“ Considering the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 678 giving Iraq until 15th January 1991 to evacuate Kuwait before any force is used against it and welcoming the fact that President Bush has decided to take advantage of this respite to open talks with Iraq and that the latter has accepted this proposal, ”

*Signed: Pieralli, De Decker*

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1. See 10th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment agreed to).

*European security and the Gulf crisis*

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AMENDMENT 6 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. De Decker and others*

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6. In the draft recommendation proper, after paragraph 2, add a new paragraph:  
“ Ask member states to earmark or set up, each according to its means, a force that can be transported over long distances to help to restore peace in response inter alia to requests from the United Nations Security Council and to provide it with weapons and equipment commensurate with the requirements of such operations; ”

*Signed: De Decker, Bassinet, Pieralli, Uyttendaele*

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1. See 10th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment agreed to).

*European security and the Gulf crisis*

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AMENDMENTS 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by MM. De Decker, Pieralli and Uyttendaele*

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7. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add:  
“, inter alia by systematic implementation of paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;”
8. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:  
“ a settlement of relations between Israel and the Palestinians on the basis of implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions; ”
9. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:  
“ full restoration of Lebanese sovereignty thanks to the disbandment of the militias and the evacuation of Lebanese territory by Israeli and Syrian armed forces; ”
10. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:  
“ ensuring regular supplies of oil for the international market; ”
11. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:  
“ establishing more effective solidarity between Arab oil-producing countries and those that lack the resources essential for their economic development; ”

*Signed: De Decker, Pieralli, Uyttendaele*

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1. See 10th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendments 7, 9 and 10 agreed to; amendment 8 withdrawn; amendment 11 negatived).

*European security and the Gulf crisis*

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AMENDMENT 12 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by MM. Pieralli and De Decker*

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12. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:  
“ Use all the means at its disposal to promote a political solution to the conflict in Kuwait and to determine the stages for the restoration of lasting peace throughout the Near and Middle East before expiry of the time-limit set by the United Nations Security Council for authorising recourse to force.”

*Signed: Pieralli, De Decker*

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1. See 10th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment agreed to).

***Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the second part of  
the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council***

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the Political Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Alternate for Mrs. Staels-Dompas) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Beix (Alternate: Lemoine), Böhm, Brito, Candal, Caro, Coleman, Collart, Cuatrecasas, Eich, Fabra, Forni, Foschi, Hitschler (Alternate: Büchner), Koehl, van der Linden, Lord Mackie, MM. Martinez (Alternate: Moya), Martino, Müller, Natali, Pécriaux, Pieralli, Mrs. Polfer, MM. de Puig, Roseta, Sarti (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Sir William Shelton, MM. Stoffelen, Thyraud, Ward (Alternate: Rowe).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***

***on the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty***

1. (a) The Assembly, having noted the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council, considers them to be administrative documents that provide no real information about the activities of the WEU Council.

(b) It nevertheless welcomes the fact that, in 1988, 1989 and 1990, it received more substantial information from the United Kingdom, Belgian and French Chairmen-in-Office and from the Secretaries-General, in particular through their letters to the President of the Assembly.

(c) It therefore approves the second part of the thirty-fourth and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council.

(d) It intends to follow up the Secretary-General's proposal to address its committees as and when required.

(e) It strongly RECOMMENDS that the Council be more precise and helpful with its communications to the Assembly, in particular its replies to recommendations and to written questions put by parliamentarians.

(f) It also RECOMMENDS that the Council inform it, whenever possible, of the conclusions drawn from reports by the Special Working Group, the Defence Representatives Group and sub-groups whose work corresponds to the agendas of Assembly sessions.

2. (a) The Assembly has noted that the Council has started to examine the terms of a revision of the treaty, made necessary by the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU.

(b) It considers that events in the Gulf, the CSCE as well as in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989 and 1990 have made an even more detailed examination of the terms of such a revision necessary.

(c) It proposes to examine in due course the questions raised by this revision.

(d) At this stage, however, in regard to Article IX of the treaty, it PROPOSES that the Council adopt the following wording:

“The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities to an assembly of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers appointed in accordance with the same criteria as representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.”

In the same way, it would be valuable if national governments made a similar report to their own parliaments.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. The present report is in answer to the second part of the annual report of the Council for 1988 (Document 1177) and the two parts of the annual report for 1989 (Documents 1200 and 1219). The first part of the report on the Council's activities in 1990 has not yet reached the Assembly. Now that the Gulf question is at the hub of governments' concerns, the reunification of Germany is practically completed and the various associations of European states are preparing meetings for the last quarter of 1990 which should be of vital importance for the future of Europe, the Assembly is expected to answer administrative reports which make little or no reference to these events. This illustrates, although perhaps unnecessarily, the futility of the task your Rapporteur has to carry out.

2. This observation is in no way intended as condemnation of the Council's activities which were significant in 1988 and 1989 and even more so in 1990. What is questioned is the conventional nature of a practice imposed by the modified Brussels Treaty but which is increasingly ill-suited to present circumstances. The Council in fact communicates with the Assembly through the quarterly meetings between the Chairmanship-in-Office and the Presidential Committee, in which two committees take part once a year, through addresses by the Chairmen-in-Office at the two part-sessions and through the Secretary-General's letters to the President of the Assembly. It is, moreover, gratifying that the French Chairmanship-in-Office, after convening extraordinary meetings of the Council on 21st August and 19th September 1990, invited the Presidential Committee, on the first occasion, and that committee and the Political and Defence Committees, on the second, to meetings at which it reported to them on the Ministers' discussions on the Gulf question.

3. The Assembly for its part has endeavoured to follow the Council's activities and to communicate, without delay, its opinions on the essential matters tackled, be it changes in Eastern Europe, at the extraordinary session of the Assembly held in Luxembourg on 22nd and 23rd March, monitoring the CFE agreements by means of observation satellites, at the symposium held in Rome on 27th and 28th March 1990, or co-ordination of member countries' efforts to ensure respect for the embargo against Iraq decreed by the United Nations Security Council, by applying the provisions of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the

Assembly for adopting recommendations, implemented on 20th September 1990. The Assembly was thus able to express its views on most of the Council's activities at the appropriate time. However, this makes the reply to the annual report of the Council something of an academic exercise since it covers events dating back to an already remote past and reported superficially in administrative terms in the report. The procedure worked out in 1955 to allow the Assembly to supervise a Council whose tasks were primarily administrative no longer really meets the requirements of a dialogue which relates to the highly political activities of a Council reactivated by the guidelines and methods it has adopted since 1984.

4. Since your Rapporteur is nevertheless convinced that the treaty must be applied as long as it has not been revised, he will offer the Assembly a reply to the documents transmitted to it.

### *II. The half-yearly reports*

5. Having read the three documents to which he is expected to reply, your Rapporteur is convinced that they remain outside the Council's political and military activities which, in the main, have been carried out by the Council of Ministers about which the Assembly – or at least its Presidential Committee – has received satisfactory information at the right time. If the half-yearly reports are to be believed, they also seem to have been carried out by the Special Working Group, the Defence Representatives Group or even meetings between the two groups. The Assembly can but welcome the number and importance of the questions tackled by these various bodies, i.e.:

- (a) implementation of the platform of The Hague (Document 1177);
- (b) the START and CFE arms limitation negotiations and those on banning chemical weapons (Documents 1177 and 1219);
- (c) co-operation in the verification of the CFE agreements (Documents 1200 and 1219);
- (d) the use of space to verify the application of future CFE agreements (Documents 1200 and 1219);
- (e) security implications of the completion of the single European market (Document 1200);

- (f) Europe's medium-term security requirements (Document 1200);
- (g) dangers to peace arising in regions outside the NATO area (Document 1200);
- (h) European co-operation in training armed forces (Documents 1200 and 1219);
- (i) operational concepts and requirements (Document 1200);
- (j) defence policy planning after a reduction in forces (Document 1200);
- (k) demographic problems (Document 1200);
- (l) the open skies project (Document 1219);
- (m) military assistance to third world countries (Document 1219);
- (n) discussions with the Soviet Union on preventing incidents (Document 1219);
- (o) military contacts with the Soviet Union (Document 1219);
- (p) study of missiles and chemical weapons in Middle East countries.

6. Many of the questions studied are in fact highly topical, particularly the last one. More than half of them have been the subject of Assembly reports. Others might also have been considered by WEU's parliamentary body if the Council had given it the necessary background information.

7. To this list should be added that of the studies that were requested of the Paris ministerial organs before they were disbanded at the end of June 1990 and whose titles are mentioned in the various half-yearly reports of the Council. Your Rapporteur counted fourteen in Documents 1177 and 1219; Document 1200 made no reference to the activities of the Paris ministerial organs. Most of them naturally relate to matters dealt with by the working groups.

8. Yet the Council has not given the Assembly the text or a summary of any of the reports prepared by the Special Working Group or the Defence Representatives Group or, a fortiori, by the Mediterranean and Space Sub-Groups, or any of the studies assigned to the Paris ministerial organs, or any of the conclusions reached. Is it to be inferred that none of this work was completed? That the Council considered them all so secret that it could communicate nothing to the Assembly? The absence of such communications obviously makes information given in annual reports purely formal

and allows few exchanges between the Council and the Assembly on matters on the Council's agenda.

9. Your Rapporteur noted with interest that the Mediterranean Sub-Group "decided to make a detailed study of problems relating to the proliferation of ballistic missiles with special reference to the disputes in the Middle East and the Gulf and to capacities for manufacturing chemical weapons" (Document 1219 on the second half of 1989). At the present juncture, it would be important for the Assembly to know what conclusions were drawn from this study. It may also wonder whether the Council followed this question with the necessary diligence and whether, when Iraq attacked Kuwait, it was prepared to act. The slowness with which WEU co-ordination started indicates that this was not the case.

10. Referring to what he believed WEU's rôle should be in the next few years, the Secretary-General, addressing the Political Committee on 9th October 1990, mentioned three essential directions for WEU's future activities:

- (i) to define Europe's security identity in the new circumstances before 1995 – the time-limit for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the Central European countries. Europe must show a united front if it wishes the United States to maintain forces in Europe. In this connection, the continued presence in Germany of forces from other countries, accompanied by the stationing of German forces in neighbouring countries, would be a positive factor;
- (ii) to define the concept of the two pillars of the alliance, i.e. which part of the American presence is important and how Europe should participate, and also how to organise consultations with the United States on all politico-military matters;
- (iii) to study the Soviet Union's security requirements in regard, for instance, to maintaining a buffer zone in Central Europe, in order to prepare for and facilitate agreement on the organisation of the continent's security.

Your Rapporteur can but endorse such a programme. The Assembly would obviously be most interested to know how it is implemented in view of the part it played in preparing the ground, with particular regard to the symposium organised by the General Affairs Committee in Florence in April 1989 and Recommendations 471, 474, 479 and 480.



### *III. Relations between the Council and the Assembly*

11. Your Rapporteur has noted all the improvements in relations between the two WEU organs thanks to the initiatives of successive Chairmen-in-Office and the Secretary-General. However, as well as the delays and shortcomings of the half-yearly reports, he also has to stress the inadequacy of replies to recommendations adopted by the Assembly. In most cases, they have been the subject of detailed studies by the rapporteurs who have often, in preparing them, consulted the most authoritative sources in their countries, other member countries and international organisations concerned. The Assembly committees have studied the reports and examined the draft recommendations with great care. The Assembly has done its utmost to organise serious debates, enhanced by addresses by ministers, or even symposia to which it has invited those most qualified to give information and express opinions. In this, it has been limited only by the budgetary constraints imposed on it by the Council. However, it can but note that the replies to these recommendations not only do not reflect a true reactivation of WEU, they are in many cases even more evasive than they were prior to 1985. In particular, your Rapporteur must recall that the Council undertook to reply to Assembly recommendations, even if they related to matters handled by other bodies than WEU. This should have applied, *inter alia*, to Recommendation 475 on European security and events in the Near and Middle East, a particularly detailed text, to which the Council's reply was extremely brief on the basis of the argument that the matter was being handled in the framework of European political co-operation.

12. The Council should also be reminded that the Assembly is a body whose responsibilities cannot validly be delegated. Giving the Presidential Committee, or other committees, information at more or less confidential meetings cannot relieve the Council of the need to communicate to the Assembly as a whole, through statutory channels and at the right time, information on the Council's work so that it may effectively exercise its tasks under Article IX of the treaty. Your Rapporteur is well aware that this may not correspond to some concepts of diplomacy, but was it not to break with such practices that the signatories of the Paris Agreements added to the Brussels Treaty what was to become Article IX of the modified treaty? The circulation since 1989 of a "Letter from the Assembly" compensates to a certain extent for this lack of information given to members of the Assembly. It is for the Council to communicate to the Assembly, at any time, such documents as it wishes to have reproduced in this way.

### *IV. Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty*

13. On the occasion of the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU, the Council adopted a political declaration according to which member states:

"... found that a number of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, did not correspond to the way in which they intend to pursue and strengthen that co-operation, on the basis of the Rome declaration on 27th October 1984 and of the platform on European security interests, adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987.

Consequently, the member states of WEU with Portugal and Spain consider that the relevant provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, and its corresponding protocols will be re-examined, as appropriate, having regard for the practice and achievements of, and the prospects for, their co-operation in security matters." (Document 117, Appendix II)

14. In the second part of its thirty-fourth annual report, the Council informed the Assembly that it was studying the revision of the treaty. Developments in Europe in 1989 and 1990 obviously called in question the bases of that study and everyone will understand that the Council will be unable to complete it as long as everything is not clear about the future of NATO, the CSCE and the European Community. Our Assembly is no better placed to give an opinion on this matter at present.

15. Several times in recent months, however, the question has been raised by persons outside the Assembly of whether the WEU Assembly should not be composed of members of the parliamentary assembly of the European Communities elected in the WEU countries. On this point, the Assembly can express its views here and now, quite apart from any other consideration.

16. In view of the nature of WEU's responsibilities, your Rapporteur believes the WEU Assembly must be composed of delegations from the parliaments of member countries.

17. He notes that the present text of Article IX of the treaty guarantees that the Assembly has a satisfactory number of members and substitutes and a breakdown of seats between member countries which has also proved satisfactory. He thinks it undesirable to call this in question.

18. As the work of both WEU and the Council of Europe has increased dramatically since 1954, members of national parliaments have some difficulties in attending all meetings.

At present, the treaty insists that the WEU delegation be identical to that of the Council of Europe. Your Rapporteur considers that the work of the Assembly would be enhanced if flexibility was permitted to national parliaments. Each parliament should be allowed to appoint a distinct delegation to WEU which could either be the same as that to the Council of Europe or only partly the same. There is probably some advantage in at least two or three members being on both delegations but the decision is best made by national parliaments.

19. However, your Rapporteur feels that, even at this early stage, he must place on record his opposition to the proposals being put forward by the Italian Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers of the European Community that the Community should take over defence and security matters from WEU. Your Rapporteur considers that the idea, whilst being flawed and premature in any case, must await the NATO review. He wonders, moreover, how the neutral (soon possibly to be more than one) nation could participate effectively in such a body in a way which would not prejudice its neutral status. He recalls that WEU is the sole body entitled by solemn treaty to deal with defence and that the modified Brussels Treaty cannot be unilaterally abrogated but remains in force until *at least* 1998 and, more probably, until 2004.

20. He considers it is neither for the governments nor for the WEU Assembly to exclude any national parliamentarian from national delegations as this is a matter solely for parliaments.

21. He therefore asks the Assembly to recommend that the Council redraft Article IX of the treaty in the treaty revision it has started as under:

“The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities to an assembly of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers appointed in accordance with the same criteria as representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.”

22. It has indeed become apparent that there is no longer any point in referring specifically to “the control of armaments” in this article since this is now a very minor Council activity and no longer of great concern to the Assembly.

23. This proposal in no way prejudices any attitude the Assembly may subsequently adopt towards the revision of other articles of the treaty. It will be able to adopt a valid attitude only when it has been able to obtain a more complete picture of the new European security order, a first idea of which might emerge from the intergovernmental meetings to be held at the end of 1990.

***Enhancing WEU's public relations***

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary  
and Public Relations by Mr. Roman, Rapporteur <sup>2</sup>***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ewing (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Müller), Sir William Shelton (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Amaral, Büchner, Bühler (Alternate: Niegel), Caccia, De Bondt (Alternate: De Decker), De Hoop Scheffer, Esteves, Fiandrotti, Mrs. Garcia Manzanares, MM. Gouteyron (Alternate: Collette), Greco, Sir Russell Johnston, Sir John Hunt, MM. Kempinaire, Kollwelter, Lopez Henares, Nuñez, Pfuhl, Lemoine, Seitlinger, Stegagnini (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Tummers, Vial-Massat.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation******on enhancing WEU's public relations***

- (i) The Assembly notes with satisfaction the increased interest shown by the media, public opinion and in parliamentary debates in the rôle of WEU as a result of its action in the Gulf region following Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.
- (ii) This open debate nevertheless shows that a large section of the public, if not ignorant of WEU, still holds preconceived and mistaken ideas about it which, in member countries and across the Atlantic too, lead to a lack of credibility in the institution that does not correspond to the increase in its activities.
- (iii) Conversely, the Assembly is gratified at being kept better informed of the Council's activities, in particular through the information letters from the Secretary-General, in spite of the fact that their contents in no way commit the Council.
- (iv) The Assembly notes with interest that, starting this year, numerous communiqués have been issued at the close of meetings of the Council of Ministers and several of its organs. It considers the Council is thus starting to keep the public better informed.
- (v) However, upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe and new threats emanating from regions outside Europe call for more systematic, coherent efforts to explain to the public the possibilities offered by the modified Brussels Treaty for establishing a new European security system; the Council must not, however, transfer the burden of these efforts to members of the Assembly.
- (vi) The hesitation shown by the Council and member governments, failing to grasp the political importance of public relations or to agree on WEU's future rôle, might increase the now prevalent uncertainty among the public about how Europe's future security should be guaranteed and organised.

**THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Include information policy in its agenda as a matter of urgency, in accordance with the suggestions made by Mr. Pontillon in Written Question 285, with a view in particular to increasing the now inadequate financial means available to WEU and its Assembly in this area;
2. Work out, with the assistance of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, a communications strategy allowing the public debate on European security to be intensified and WEU's image to be enhanced in public opinion, not only in Europe but also in North America;
3. Support and extend the Secretary-General's public relations work and urge member governments to intensify their efforts to explain to the public WEU's work in helping to establish a new security system in Europe;
4. Inform the Assembly of measures taken to attain the abovementioned goals.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Roman, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. On 27th October 1984, in the Rome declaration, the ministers of member countries: "underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase co-operation between the member states in the field of security policy and to encourage consensus."

2. Nearly six years later, on 27th June 1990, during a debate on Europe in the French Senate, Mr. Dumas, French Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said: "To develop Europe's defence and security identity, should not better use be made henceforth of Western European Union of which we shall hold the chairmanship-in-office as from 1st July this year?" Hence a decision taken in Rome six years ago was again presented in the form of an open question.

3. This question still seemed open during the first weeks following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait when the Assembly, speaking through its President, seemed to be the only WEU body vigorously condemning this action and launching a public appeal to the governments of WEU member countries to invoke paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in order to convene an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers.

4. We can but welcome the fact that the WEU Council finally assumed its responsibilities in face of the new crisis that had arisen in the Gulf, but it may be wondered whether the general public has understood the importance and novelty of the first convocation of an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the WEU Council and the first meeting since 1954 of the chiefs of defence staff of the WEU member states.

5. The public image of WEU does not yet correspond to the rôle set for the organisation in the modified Brussels Treaty, i.e. to protect the citizens of its member countries against any threat to peace in the world and to make a decisive contribution to the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe which has changed fundamentally since the removal of the Berlin wall in November 1989.

6. In these circumstances, neither the Council nor the Assembly, insofar as it speaks on behalf of the peoples of Western Europe in security matters, can relax the efforts to increase public knowledge of the rôle of the organisation and the policy and action they are pursuing in the interests of security, freedom and peace in Europe and in the world. The present report

therefore proposes to examine the problems which still face WEU in terms of its relations with public opinion.

### *II. The public relations of the Council, its ministerial organs and member governments*

#### *(i) Council of Ministers*

7. First, it is satisfying that, for the first time since 1987, a press communiqué was issued at the close of the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers held in Brussels on 23rd April 1990. In member countries, the press reacted to this meeting with considerable interest. However, the diversity of the interviews given unilaterally at the close of this meeting by many of the ministers taking part led to some confusion in the media and among the public over the position and vocation of WEU in a changing world.

8. At the beginning of August, after the Council's silence – which the President of the Assembly said was a matter for concern – about Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the public announcement of an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the WEU Council in Paris set off a vast debate in the European and United States press about the specific rôle of the organisation in the new Gulf crisis. This debate went on for several weeks and continued after the publication of the decisions taken at the ministerial meeting on 21st August 1990 and announced in a Council press communiqué.

9. In an article dated 23rd August, the French newspaper *Le Monde* wondered whether the co-ordination in the Gulf decided upon by WEU would not one day, perhaps, be seen as the foundation stone of a joint defence policy that Europe has been seeking for many years.

10. Public interest in WEU action increased further following the convocation of a second extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers in Paris on 18th September 1990. However, this welcome public debate has not yet allowed the public to obtain a more precise idea of WEU's general vocation in an environment that is evolving quickly in terms of European and international security. Some of the utterances of member governments published in the press are, in fact too divergent. It would therefore be a pity if the Council did not take advantage of WEU's positive situation to enhance its policy for keeping public opinion informed since, for a long time, the latter has been waiting for an answer to the question of how Europe's future security will be ensured and organised.

*(ii) Permanent Council*

11. It should be recalled that, further to the report presented by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on Western European Union's information policy<sup>1</sup>, Mr. Pontillon, then Chairman of that committee, addressed a series of questions to the Council on 16th January 1990 under the number written question 285<sup>2</sup> on improving its public relations effort following the WEU seminar on changes in the public perception of European defence organised in London on 6th and 7th March 1989.

12. In a letter to Mr. Pontillon dated 6th March, Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, proposed to "give a substantial answer to your question in the weeks preceding the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of your Assembly at the beginning of December 1990". However, it is satisfying to note that, since January 1990, the Permanent Council has been issuing press communiqués at the close of its meetings. Thus, the Council has followed up at least one of the Assembly's proposals, i.e. "publishing guidelines for the press at the close of meetings of the Permanent Council" (see paragraph 3(a) of written question 285 put by Mr. Pontillon).

13. Press communiqués were issued, *inter alia*, on 17th January 1990 (appointment of Mr. John Roper as Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies), 21st February 1990 (750th meeting of the Permanent Council), 14th March 1990 (the Portuguese Parliament's ratification of the protocol of accession to WEU), 29th March 1990 (Portugal's tabling of the instruments of ratification of the protocol of accession to the modified Brussels Treaty), 28th June 1990 (French Chairmanship-in-Office of the WEU Council as from 1st July 1990 and start of the WEU Institute for Security Studies), 26th September 1990 (contributions by Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal in support of WEU operations in the Gulf) and 3rd October 1990 (statement by the permanent representative of Germany that united Germany was a full member of WEU).

14. These first steps by the Permanent Council to inform the public about its activities are gratifying. Also worthy of note is the publication of information for the press relating to the first meeting in the history of WEU of chiefs of defence staff of the member states in Paris on 27th August 1990 and that of an *ad hoc* co-ordination group of representatives of the ministries for foreign affairs and defence in Paris on 31st August 1990.

15. Conversely, Chapter VIII of the second part of the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council to the Assembly "Relations with the press and information" is particularly vague, noting that "the ministerial bodies have continued to be very active in this field".

16. What is the significance of such words as:

"Continuing to work in the same direction and in the same ways, the ministerial bodies again sought to foster public relations with the press and the many institutions involved in the debate on the changing state of member countries' security policies. This continuity is largely attributable to the basically unchanged political and budgetary constraints to which an intergovernmental organisation is subject."

17. It would be interesting to ask for details and to know what "political and budgetary constraints" prevent the Council from developing a true information policy.

18. As the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council has not yet reached the Assembly, it is not yet possible to assess how far the Council will try to develop its public relations in the years ahead. Nor is it yet known what consequences the Council will draw from the results of the third European session of advanced defence studies held in London from 8th to 14th July 1990.

19. The rôle of public opinion seems to have been an important topic for certain working groups at that session. If it is true that they noted that public opinion and governments lacked credibility in WEU, it is urgent to ask the Council whether it is prepared to take steps to remedy this situation.

*(iii) Secretariat-General*

20. In April 1990, the Secretariat-General issued a leaflet in English and French entitled "Western European Union", giving brief information about the aims, background and structure of the organisation. It would be desirable to issue it in the languages of the other member countries, too, so that it might be more widely circulated.

21. The information letters from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the intergovernmental organs show that the Secretary-General and his colleagues are continuing their widespread activities, providing information on the rôle and work of WEU at meetings, conferences and seminars organised by many institutions. It would be useful to see how far it might be possible for interested members of the Assembly to be able to read the addresses made on those occasions.

1. Document 1205, 8th November 1989.

2. Document 1232, 22nd May 1990.

22. The daily press review issued by the Secretariat-General makes a very good selection of newspaper articles but also reproduces major speeches by heads of government and ministers on international political matters and, in particular, defence and security.

*(iv) Governments of member countries*

*(a) Before the Gulf crisis*

23. In Resolution 82 adopted on 7th June 1990 on the new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly, the Assembly regretted that "for some time most WEU member governments prefer to avoid public statements stressing the options offered" by the modified Brussels Treaty in regard to the future of European security.

24. Consideration of a few public statements by the ministers concerned in the first six months of this year allows one to go further and note that the future rôle of WEU was increasingly open to doubt. This is in any event how the press interpreted the remarks by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, outgoing Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, and Mr. Ordoñez, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, at the press conference given at the close of the last meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers<sup>3</sup>.

25. Where the United Kingdom Government is concerned, it should be pointed out that Mr. King, Secretary of State for Defence, gave a negative answer to Mr. Speed, who had asked him in a debate in the House of Commons on 18th and 19th June 1990 whether he believed WEU would have a rôle to play out of area. How important, therefore, was the statement by Mr. Clark, Minister of State for Defence Procurement, during the same debate, when he told Mr. Wilkinson that the "organisation may grow in stature and importance"?

26. In regard to the proposal by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, to set up multinational forces from several WEU member countries, Mr. Genscher, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, believes these ideas should be implemented in the framework of NATO<sup>4</sup>.

27. Thus, no government has made any special effort to improve the public's knowledge of specific features of Western European Union. It will be recalled, for instance, that in a debate in the Bundestag in October 1988 a member of the German Delegation to the WEU Assembly asked whether the Federal Government was prepared to publish a document on the activities of

WEU since 1984. Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, answered:

"Yes. Such a booklet is already being prepared. It will be issued fairly soon. The booklet will include fundamental texts relating to the reactivation stage in WEU and extracts from speeches expressing the Federal Government's position on the reactivation of WEU."

28. However, this booklet has not yet been published. Mr. Antretter therefore put the following question in the Bundestag on 2nd August 1990:

"How is it that, according to the minutes (11/100) of the plenary sitting of the Bundestag of 13th October 1988, the Federal Government promised, through the intermediary of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Schäfer, the early publication of an information booklet on developments in and the activities of WEU since 1984 but that this booklet has not yet been issued? When can the Federal Government be expected to honour its promise?"

29. On 14th August 1990, Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, answered as follows:

"The Federal Government proposes to publish the information booklet on WEU when WEU's future rôle in a fast-changing European security environment has been clarified. It stresses the fact that it informs the Bundestag about WEU's activities twice a year."

The public expects such clarification on the future rôle of WEU to be given as soon as possible.

*(b) After the outbreak of the new Gulf crisis*

30. Have the tone and content of public statements by government representatives on the vocation of WEU changed since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait early in August 1990?

31. In joint statements to the French National Assembly and Senate, meeting in extraordinary session on 27th August 1990, Mr. Rocard, French Prime Minister, and Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs, asserted, in connection with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, that:

"European solidarity was not lacking... It was on France's initiative that the nine countries of Western European Union met... They all spoke with a single voice to implement co-ordination of their military operations in the region... Never had Europe been so swift to show its solidarity and unity."

3. Le Monde, 25th April 1990.

4. Addressing the German Foreign Policy Association in Bonn on 28th June 1990.

32. Mr. Dumas went further:

"As to the need to organise an embryo of European defence, progress has, I agree, been made: This is now within our reach but it is, at the same time, a real question. Heaven knows we have discussed it often enough here!

A first answer, such as it is, was given by the WEU meeting in Paris on 21st August. The unprecedented decisions taken there certainly passed unnoticed in the flow of information circulated and measures adopted. They are nevertheless of considerable importance: it was indeed the first time a decision had been taken to ensure co-ordination between the various WEU countries on the spot, including countries which, although not members of WEU, were invited as observers, with regular meetings of chiefs of defence staff to ensure such co-ordination.

We must go further! Certain countries (i.e. Belgium, Spain and Greece) which had refused to follow the Americans on this occasion nevertheless agreed to join us in the framework of WEU. The crisis had revealed the need to do so. We are working at it; let us continue to do so. This is one of the essential elements of political union."

33. On 23rd August 1990, Mr. Genscher, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, described the German Government's position to the Bundestag as follows:

"The Federal Government welcomes the fact that Western European Union, as a European body for discussing and harmonising security matters, has determined its position in regard to a serious question that also affects Europe's security interests, thus asserting Europe's security identity. The WEU member countries thus show that they are determined to assume their responsibility in maintaining international juridical order."

34. In a debate on the Gulf in the House of Commons on 7th September, Mr. King, Secretary of State for Defence, took the opportunity of welcoming the discussions in WEU on the European contribution to the deployment of forces in the region concerned.

35. Without cognisance of all statements by the governments of WEU member countries, it is difficult to judge whether the Gulf crisis led the governments to give a clearer answer to the question facing public opinion about the need to organise an embryo of European defence as Mr. Dumas suggested.

36. In any event, the opinion expressed by Mr. Mitterrand, President of the French Republic, at his joint press conference with Chancellor Kohl in Munich on 18th September 1990 is noteworthy:

"Joint defence for the Community countries and a Europe capable of ensuring its own security are desirable aims for which we must strive. But it has to be achieved through prior political union. That is why the main goal is political union. There has to be a political power capable of exercising responsibilities in such a sensitive area as security. But, in the meantime, WEU is working more and more; I would even say better and better."

### *III. The WEU Institute for Security Studies*

37. As matters now stand, it is not surprising that great store is set upon the future contributions of the WEU Institute for Security Studies which has been operating in Paris since 1st July 1990. It is gratifying that its Director, Mr. John Roper, has described the new institute's vocation in the following terms:

"In the nine months from the fall of the Berlin wall to the Gulf crisis, many of our traditional approaches to European security have had to be re-examined.

Our new institute, which has been created during this period, sees as one of its primary tasks to stimulate the debate, now more necessary than ever, on the future structure of European security in the light both of the risks and of the potential.

.....

We hope, within our limits, to facilitate exchanges and promote discussion, primarily among those involved in the policy debates on security issues in the member states of WEU and throughout Europe, but also with our security partners elsewhere in the world."

38. Among its tasks:

"The institute will also contribute to the strategic debate through its own publications, and more generally create networks for exchanges between those concerned in parliaments (in particular the parliamentary Assembly of WEU), national administrations, universities, the media and industry – all those making up the European strategic community."

39. The Assembly will certainly be prepared to back the institute, particularly in its aim of promoting and stimulating debate, which corre-



sponds exactly to much of its own vocation. It is particularly in the interests of the Assembly for this debate to be as open and public as possible.

#### *IV. The WEU Assembly*

##### *(i) Debates in member parliaments*

40. There are a few encouraging signs in the Assembly's efforts to improve the impact of its work in member parliaments. For instance, on 26th April and 9th May 1990, the Belgian Chamber of Representatives considered and voted on several interpellations including one by Mr. De Decker on "the necessary evolution of Europe's security policy and of the respective rôles of NATO, WEU and the EEC".

41. During this debate, Mr. De Decker took the opportunity of informing the Chamber of the visit by the WEU Assembly's Presidential Committee to the Soviet Union in April 1990. After recalling the idea of a European Defence Community (EDC) and its failure in 1954, he said:

"Recent and coming events must lead Western European Union to define what we want as a European security policy. I advocate that... in revitalising WEU a second time – a sort of second stage since you have just organised a conference of member countries' chiefs of defence staff – we set up the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance on the basis of WEU."

42. Following the debate, the Chamber adopted the agenda as it stood, thereby negating a motion worded as follows:

"The Chamber,

.....

Deplores the fact that the ministers of defence and foreign affairs were unable to take advantage of their presidency of WEU to take initiatives or make a clear definition of Europe's security policy.

....."

43. During the debate on the defence estimates in the House of Commons on 18th and 19th June 1990, Mr. Speed, Mr. Wilkinson and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg were among those who spoke to underline the rôle of Western European Union. Mr. Hill also put seven written questions on Recommendation 479 on the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe, adopted at the Assembly's extraordinary session in Luxembourg.

44. The answers Mr. Waldegrave, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, gave to these questions on 19th June 1990 were

sent to committee members on 27th June 1990. Note should be taken of the Minister's remark in answer to Mr. Hill's question on using the modified Brussels Treaty as a juridical basis for the presence of forces of member states on the territory of other member states and convening regular meetings of chiefs of staff of member countries:

"Formal responses to recommendations in reports of the Western European Union Assembly are the responsibility of the WEU Permanent Council. We have no plans to make a separate response."

45. From time to time, certain governments try to avoid giving substantial answers to questions put by parliamentarians, claiming that the subject is the responsibility of the WEU Council. The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations should be informed accordingly as soon as possible.

46. Also in the context of Recommendation 479, on 29th June 1990 twenty-nine members of the German Delegation to the WEU Assembly (MM. Ahrens, Antretter, Bindig, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Böhm, Büchner, Bühler, Feldmann, Mrs. Fischer, MM. Hitschler, Höffkes, Mrs. Hoffmann, MM. Holtz, Irmer, Kittelmann, Klejdzinski, Lenzer, Mrs. Luuk, MM. Müller, Niegel, Pfuhl, Scheer, Schmidt, Schmitz, von Schmude, Soell, Steiner, Wulff and Zierer), representing the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP political groups, acted jointly to put nine questions (without debate) in the Bundestag on action taken by WEU to establish a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe. The Federal Government's answers, transmitted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 30th July 1990, were sent to committee members.

47. This was the third time since 1989 that the German Delegation had taken such joint action on the basis of Assembly recommendations, thus considerably enhancing the impact of the latter's work in the Bundestag. Thanks to certain almost identical questions put by Mr. Hill in the House of Commons and by the German Delegation in the Bundestag, the Assembly knows the position of these two governments on the reference date for denouncing the WEU treaty.

48. Furthermore, the Federal Government gave a clear answer to the question about the extent to which the commitments entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany under the modified Brussels Treaty would also be valid for a unified Germany:

"Under international law, the Brussels Treaty and its protocols also apply to unified Germany."

It goes without saying that these questions concern all member countries. The French Government has not yet answered the written question put by Mr. Pontillon on 29th March 1990 on the same matters.

49. At the extraordinary session of the French Senate on the situation in the Middle East held on 27th August 1990, Mr. Pontillon, President of the WEU Assembly, took the opportunity to speak in favour of making better use of WEU:

“As you can imagine, I wish to speak of the revival of the modified Brussels Treaty, the only diplomatic instrument that can offset the inadequacies of the North Atlantic Treaty and the shortcomings of the Rome Treaty in questions of security and areas outside continental Europe.

The meeting of ministers for foreign affairs and defence of Western European Union that you convened in Paris was an initiative that gave a high profile to the chairmanship-in-office that France has held since 1st July 1990.

This meeting, the first to be held at this level in response to a specific crisis, had results never yet attained in co-operation outside the NATO area.

This success is very largely due to the fact that it has been possible to give a firm political and juridical basis to European action, i.e. that of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council. There was probably no other principle on which the WEU countries could have been unanimous or which would have allowed an ad hoc group to be organised to co-ordinate this action or, finally, authorised the military co-operation that was essential both at the level of chiefs of staff and on the spot.

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the deployment of member countries' air and naval forces in the Gulf may suffer from the inadequacy of the accurate sources of information required for any action of this kind. To uphold the identity that Europe has at last given itself, not only are more consultations and harmonisation of doctrines, methods of work and forces needed, but also a minimum of independent means such as observation satellites.

This consideration should lead the WEU Council – we hope so at least – to take rapid action on Recommendation 482 adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1990, urging it to ‘decide as a matter of urgency on the establishment of a WEU satellite image-processing and interpretation agency’.

As long as Europeans do not have full military independence, it will be difficult to expect to have the political independence that is essential if their action is not to be confused with that of their American allies, whose aims are not necessarily the same as theirs.

Above all, I wish to stress that the cohesion shown by the WEU Ministers on 21st August can and must be a step towards a European union whose activities would be extended to include security and defence.

I am glad member countries of the Community which are not members of WEU were invited to and agreed to attend the meeting on 21st August and also that Greece has decided to take part in naval operations in the Gulf. We are also happy that the Turkish representative took his place at the meeting of the WEU Council.

By escaping from the rigidity of the institutions, these initiatives open the way to an enlargement of Europe to include defence and to permanent co-operation between the chiefs of staff of European countries, at least for regions not covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.

We are probably too involved in the present to be able usefully to anticipate the future. Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty contains a very wide definition of security – ‘in whatever area this threat should arise’ – and, beyond the strictly military dimension, of the very aim of the threat, defined as anything ‘which is a danger to economic stability’.

50. WEU's action was the subject of speeches by many senators during the same debate. The same interest in strengthening the organisation's rôle was apparent during the extraordinary session of the French National Assembly on the same day.

51. Reference should be made to two questions put by Mr. Seitlinger on Recommendations 474, 477 and 478 which the French Government answered on 16th and 18th June and 30th July 1990 and a question put by Mr. Fourré on 2nd April 1990 on the situation of the forty officials dismissed by WEU, which was answered on 18th June 1990.

52. In the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies on 19th July 1990, Mr. Regenwetter, Mr. Dimmer and Mr. Goerens put five written questions on Recommendations 480, 481 and 482, the answers to which are not yet known.

53. In the Italian Senate on 5th June 1990, Mr. Pieralli and others put a question on the

Italian Government's attitude towards WEU Assembly recommendations on the treatment of Kurdish minorities in Iraq, Turkey and Iran. The answers have not yet been transmitted.

54. In the Spanish Congress of Deputies, WEU was mentioned frequently in the debates on the Gulf crisis on 28th August and 11th September 1990. The Chairman of the Spanish Delegation, Mr. Martinez, stressed the importance Europe attached to the reactivation of WEU which meant "a significant step towards giving shape to a joint security policy, the essential condition for the existence of political Europe" (Proceedings, 11th September 1990).

55. Although information is not yet complete, it is already clear that initiatives by members of the Assembly in the abovementioned parliaments are on the increase.

*(ii) Efforts to develop the Assembly's public relations*

*(a) An Assembly logo*

56. Further to the decision taken by the Presidential Committee for making the younger generations in member countries aware of the idea of a European security identity, a competition was organised, open to all students of graphic art and communication in the nine WEU member countries. The aim of the competition is to produce a logo representing the Assembly's identity. The student submitting the selected entry will receive a grant of F 45 000 to finance further studies.

57. Proposals for a logo which reached the Assembly's Information Service before 31st August 1990 will be submitted to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations for consideration. The committee will propose that the Presidential Committee adopt one of them. Participation in the competition was gratifyingly encouraging. In a separate note, the committee will find all the elements it needs to be able to make its choice. It is to be hoped that the Assembly's impact in the media will thereby be enhanced and strengthened.

*(b) Relations with the media*

58. Regarding the new crisis in the Gulf, the President of the WEU Assembly was the first representative of the organisation to condemn vigorously, on behalf of the Assembly, Iraq's invasion and military occupation of Kuwait and to urge the governments of all WEU member countries to invoke, if necessary, paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty (press communiqué issued on 3rd August 1990). At the close of the WEU ministerial meeting on 21st August, the President of the Assembly and the Presidential Committee reacted publicly to the events by issuing statements to the press. On

30th September, the President of the Assembly issued a press release reporting on the mission of a delegation from the Assembly which went to the Gulf to inspect and study the WEU forces deployed there.

59. The Presidential Committee had also reacted immediately to the London declaration on a transformed Atlantic Alliance issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5th and 6th July 1990 by issuing a press release on 9th July 1990 underlining the crucial rôle that Western Europe is required to play in the context of changes in the Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe. According to the communiqué, "it is up to the Council to show how it intends to tackle the new tasks facing WEU".

60. During its visit to the United States in July 1990, the Defence Committee had in-depth talks with the most representative spokesmen of the American media. On 19th July 1990, it issued a press release underlining that the Americans insisted on the fact that it was now for Europeans to take the initiative and set up a European pillar in NATO of which WEU might form the nucleus. The committee urged the WEU Council to respond positively to this challenge and start the appropriate discussions immediately.

61. It should also be noted that Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, granted an interview to *Libération* on 6th July 1990 under the title "WEU can ensure the defence of Europe". On 11th July 1990, *Le Monde* published an article by him entitled "A defence Europe" in which he explains the rôle WEU can play now that important decisions for the future of Europe have to be taken.

62. On 5th June 1990, Mr. Charles Goerens, outgoing President of the Assembly, summed up WEU's action during his term of office at a press meeting in Luxembourg which aroused considerable interest in several of that country's newspapers.

63. It may be deduced that the press and media are always grateful to be given appropriate information and that they are only too happy to publish it.

*(c) Other communications activities*

64. It should be noted – with the thanks of all members of the Assembly – that Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, took the opportunity of the new crisis in the Arab-Persian Gulf to inform members of the Assembly rapidly by summing up how the latter had shown its presence at such a crucial time. This "Letter from the President No. 1" was circulated at the beginning of September 1990.

65. Understandably, various ways and means are available to national parliaments and international parliamentary assemblies which can be taken up only in part by the WEU Assembly in view of the budgetary and staff limits imposed on it. However, it is not without interest to obtain information on the activities of other parliaments in this area.

66. The European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD) should therefore be congratulated for organising at the Reichstag in Berlin on 31st May and 1st June 1990, at the invitation of the Bundestag, a seminar on the public relations of parliaments attended by parliamentary officials from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the WEU Assembly and the national parliaments of thirteen European countries including all members of WEU except for Luxembourg, which nevertheless answered the questionnaire sent out in preparation for the seminar.

67. According to the answers to this questionnaire, the percentage of the total budgets of the abovementioned parliaments earmarked for public relations purposes is about 1 or 2%, only the Bundestag being able to spend some 2.5% of its total budget on public relations.

68. Since the WEU Assembly has one of the smallest budgets, the real figures show enormous differences between "poor" and "rich" parliaments. While the WEU Assembly has earmarked F 450 000 for public relations in its 1990 budget, the European Parliament has a total of 12 792 000 ECU for the same period. Among the national parliaments, it is probably the Bundestag that has the most money to spend on public relations, since its 1990 budget includes the following credits:

- Public relations .....	DM 8 000 000
- Information activities .	3 660 000
- Reception of visitors at the Reichstag in Berlin	4 210 000
- Historical exhibition at the Reichstag .....	995 000
- Research .....	30 000

69. In the Bundesrat, DM 1 000 000 is earmarked for public relations out of a total budget of DM 17 000 000.

70. While the French National Assembly gave no figures for its communication budget, the Senate said its public relations expenditure represented approximately 1% of its total budget of F 1 093 million in 1988.

71. Where audiovisual means are concerned, the WEU Assembly does not yet have any of the means used elsewhere, for instance in the European Parliament, which has a well-equipped audiovisual service (cameras, editing

facilities, broadcasting van, radio and television studios, etc.) and makes available to the audiovisual press almost all its debates in plenary sitting. Technical assistance is provided for radio and television journalists who can make live or deferred recordings of their programmes. For instance, these technical facilities allowed the direct broadcasting of a debate in the European Parliament by a private American television channel when the public was able to phone in to the studio for parliamentarians to answer questions.

72. In the Council of Europe, the work of the Parliamentary Assembly is announced and, depending on its importance, covered widely by the Council of Europe's video means. A fully-equipped television studio is available for television channels at the Palais de l'Europe, the seat of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Before Assembly sessions, reports and/or summaries of reports and the order of business are made available to journalists. (They are sent to media throughout Europe: written press, radio and television and are regularly revised.) A library and press room with all necessary installations are available at the Palais. Representatives of the media can consult films, video cassettes and tapes and obtain technical assistance, etc.

73. Among the national parliaments, those of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom have had positive experience of the use of audiovisual means for public relations purposes.

74. Conversely, with the exception of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, there is little information about success in selling parliamentary publications. The Bundestag, for example, whose research service produces a large number of publications and books, is known to sell them and collect a sort of official tax (Schutzgebühr). In the light of experience in the Bundestag, which shows that in general the public is more interested in publications sold for a small sum than for those distributed free of charge, it might be useful to consider to what extent the WEU Assembly might take greater advantage from the sale of its publications for which receipts at present amount to F 35 000 per year. So far, it is mainly the Assembly's Official Proceedings that are sold with limited success.

*(d) Development of relations with non-governmental organisations*

75. In Order 76, the Assembly instructed the committee "to examine how to organise a working relationship between the Assembly and appropriate non-governmental organisations concerned with European security and defence and report on this matter."

76. The report presented by Mr. Stegagnini on "WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence"<sup>5</sup> showed the wide diversity of associations and private groups likely to be interested in the work of WEU and its Assembly. However, because of this diversity and the difficulty of drawing up fair, appropriate criteria for developing privileged relations with a number of these organisations, it is preferable not to over-institutionalise relations with existing institutions but to develop them on a more pragmatic basis. It is therefore recommended that the activities of all the organisations mentioned in Mr. Stegagnini's report be followed and that useful information be offered on the Assembly's activities.

77. Consideration might also be given to the advantages WEU might derive from encouraging the creation of a sort of "Modified Brussels Treaty Association" or "European Security Association" with the status of a non-governmental international organisation, composed of national associations in all the WEU member countries and working on a voluntary, private basis.

78. However, since the tasks of the newly-created WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris include extending the debate on security matters through the intermediary of various institutions which might have considerable impact in the media, it seems preferable to defer consideration of the usefulness of implementing such an idea until a later stage.

#### *IV. Conclusions*

79. Intensification of debates in national parliaments on European security in the light of the situation in the Middle East, growing press interest in WEU's activities during the weeks following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the greater effort being made by the WEU Assembly's steering bodies and committees – and also the WEU Council – to inform the public by means of press releases and, finally, the activation of the WEU Institute for Security Studies are all elements that can help to start more systematic and incisive action to enhance public awareness

and consolidate its consensus on Europe's security requirements.

80. The required level is far from attained, quite the reverse. Public opinion is uncertain about the factors that will guarantee the future security of the populations in view of the fundamental changes that have taken place in Europe since last autumn and the fact that Europe is now faced with new threats emanating from other regions of the world which affect European security. WEU, and particularly its Council at political level, must understand that redefining the organisation of European security does not call only for an effort of political co-ordination but also means giving the public clear, homogeneous explanations. An information policy worthy of the name cannot only be the task of a small working unit in the Secretariat-General of WEU. The Council must realise that public relations are an important part of WEU policy and acknowledge that they cannot be improved if the present inadequate financial and material resources are not increased.

81. To sum up, in order to enhance WEU's public relations policy, the appropriate measures referred to above should be borne in mind:

- (a) the importance of adopting a logo representative of the WEU Assembly as soon as possible;
- (b) the continued need for the President of the Assembly and the Presidential Committee to react immediately in response to current events because this helps to keep parliamentarians better informed and to measure up to public expectations;
- (c) the expediency of continuing to issue the "Letter from the President";
- (d) the importance of co-operating ever more closely and flexibly with non-governmental organisations;
- (e) the need to increase financial and material resources for the purposes of information policy and to consider the public as a fundamental part of WEU's general policy.

***First part of the thirty-sixth annual report  
of the Council to the Assembly of WEU***

*(1st January to 30th June 1990)*

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**ANNEX**

Communiqué issued after the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers,  
Brussels, 23rd April 1990

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***I. Introduction***

Since the end of 1989, Central Europe has undergone a period of widespread upheaval which marked the end of an era. Several points need to be made concerning the changing situation we are now witnessing.

First, a general point: the speed of the changes, underlining once more the extent of the upheaval and forcing us to rethink most of the concepts we have accepted hitherto.

Second, the developments in Germany, a perfect illustration of what has been said above: the near-complete unification of Germany, its place within Europe, firmly anchored in a western security system, are all factors which apparently betoken a peaceful future for Europe at a time when the East is proclaiming its commitment to the common values in the West.

For its part, the Soviet Union is going through a difficult period of profound change. It remains the largest military power on the European continent, but the break-up of central power, perestroika becoming bogged down, a communist party losing its leading rôle and the real risk of violent confrontation, cast great doubt over the future of Soviet power.

A fourth important point is that this situation is being aggravated by the resurgence of nationalism, illustrated inter alia by the Baltic countries' aspiration for independence and by the claims for autonomy by the different nationalities in Yugoslavia – developments which cannot be separated from the process of democratisation sweeping across Central Europe.

All these questions clearly open up considerable scope for reflection and consultation among the Council's working groups and the new Institute for Security Studies. As the last Ministerial Council on 23rd and 24th April made clear, the events of recent months have merely reinforced the need for co-operation and consultation. In the view of ministers, WEU offered undeniable assets in such a situation since it was the only organisation competent in matters of European security policy co-operation.

In their deliberations on the implications of the new European security environment, ministers agreed on the need to reach a CFE agreement quickly and discussed the various possible formulas for co-operation in order to verify such an agreement.

Turning to the prospect of the forthcoming NATO and CSCE summits, they also decided to continue to reflect on the definition of a security system appropriate to Europe's future requirements and to its extra-European dimensions, on multinational military co-operation and on the rôle of Europeans in an Atlantic Alliance which had to change given the evolution in defence doctrines and the need to maintain deterrence at lower levels of force.

For the first time since the adoption of The Hague platform, ministers decided to issue a communiqué which, by setting down the main conclusions of the ministerial discussions, testified to their willingness to define a common European security strategy with a view to strengthening the European identity and to promoting the process of European integration with a security dimension. It thus represented, in a way, an extension of the platform.

Several points should be underlined regarding the scope of this communiqué:

- "Ministers welcomed the new impetus being given to the CSCE process and the prospect of a conference of heads of state and/or of government taking place by the end of 1990.

The CSCE is the framework within which all Europeans, together with the United States and Canada, can establish new relations and develop co-operative structures capable of assuring each one of them that peace and stability will be maintained and their legitimate interests safeguarded."

- Ministers recognised the importance of the extra-European dimension, with particular reference to the developments in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
- Ministers were categorical in calling for the maintenance in Europe of United States and Canadian forces and agreed to reflect on the usefulness of co-operation between these contingents and multinational units.
- They also recognised the need to give active support to the process of democratisation in Eastern Europe by strengthening the political dialogue and co-operation with the countries concerned and by stepping up the contacts with them. In this context, they agreed on the "opportuneness of establishing contacts for two-way information with the democratically-elected governments in Central and Western Europe". They instructed the Presidency and the Secretary-General to organise these contacts.

Assembly representatives were briefed on the outcome of the ministerial meeting held on 23rd April by Mr. Mark Eyskens and Mr. Guy Coëme, the Foreign and Defence Ministers representing the Belgian Presidency.

## *II. Activities of the Permanent Council*

Among the agenda topics for meetings of the Permanent Council – whether in "enlarged", normal or "restricted" <sup>1</sup> session – were the preparation of the work programme for the WEU intergovernmental organs, the preparations for, and follow-up to, the activities of the Council of Ministers and working groups, the completion of the process of ratifying the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty, the interest shown by other countries in joining WEU, the setting-up of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, relations between the Council and the Assembly, questions concerning the staff and management of the WEU bodies and topical questions relating to European security.

### *1. Activities of the intergovernmental organs*

(i) At each Council meeting, the Secretary-General reported on the outcome of the working group meetings which had taken place since the previous Council.

(ii) The Council drew up its own work programme; it prepared for, and provided the follow-up to, the ministerial meeting, work which was essentially carried out by the "enlarged" Council which met twice during the period under review.

(iii) The Council also had an exchange of views – initiated during a restricted session – on its own rôle and on possible ways of improving its working methods.

(a) Examples of the subjects coming specifically within the purview of the Council are:

- monitoring and summarising all the work of the WEU intergovernmental organs and the Council's subsidiary bodies;
- relations with the WEU Assembly: keeping abreast of its work and following up its sessions; ensuring a regular and effective two-way flow of information;
- relations with NATO;

1. "enlarged" sessions: participation extended to the political directors and defence ministers' representatives; "restricted" sessions: participation restricted to the permanent representatives, the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General.

- institutional questions such as those concerned with enlargement or the possible review of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- relations with third countries, in particular those which had shown interest in joining WEU;
- topical and political questions concerned with European security.

(b) Desirous of devoting the major part of Council meetings to the discussion of political questions, the permanent representatives considered in a restricted session the possibility of asking their deputies to prepare for Council meetings and to deal, as far as possible, with matters of a more technical or administrative nature.

At a meeting chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General, the deputies to the permanent representatives accordingly drew up a draft mandate for a working group, the final text of which, as approved on 29th March by the Council, reads as follows:

“The Council instructs the Group of Deputies to the Permanent Representatives – which shall be known as the Council Working Group – to prepare its decisions. The Council Working Group shall also deal with all other questions entrusted to it by the Council, including those within the competence of the Institutional Working Group.

The Ordinary Council Working Group is therefore wound up.”

## *2. Accession of the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain to WEU*

(i) The Council monitored the final stages of the process of ratification of the protocol of accession of the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty.

(ii) At its meeting on 29th March, it welcomed the information transmitted by the Belgian Government to the effect that it had received the final notification of ratification of the protocol on 27th March 1990, this date thus marking the entry into force of the protocol which had been signed in London on 14th November 1988.

(iii) Consequently, Portugal and Spain participated for the first time as full members in the Ministerial Council of 23rd April in Brussels and in the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly from 5th to 8th June in Paris.

## *3. Interest shown by other countries in WEU*

The Council was kept informed of the contacts which had taken place with the authorities of Greece and Turkey – countries which had expressed their interest in joining WEU (see Assembly Document 1219, II, 4).

### *Greece*

(i) Following the visit by the Greek Ambassador to the Secretary-General on 30th May, the Council agreed to recommend to the Greek authorities that they make full use of the consultation procedure agreed between the Greek Foreign Minister and the Council Presidency and that they be invited to contact the WEU Presidency for a meeting at ministerial level.

(ii) On 18th June, the Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. A. Samaras, sent a letter to the Belgian Foreign Minister and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, requesting him to “initiate the procedure envisaged”.

### *Turkey*

(iii) Belgium has briefed the Council on the talks which took place on 11th May in Brussels between the Belgian Foreign Minister and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the Turkish Ambassador. The latter was informed of the outcome of the ministerial meeting on 23rd April and of the Council's willingness in the present situation to maintain the agreed consultation procedure without change.

The Council will continue to keep the Assembly informed on this matter.

## *4. WEU Institute for Security Studies*

(i) In the second part of the 35th annual report, the Council informed the Assembly of the ministerial decisions of 13th November 1989 concerning the setting-up of a WEU Institute for Security Studies (see Assembly Document 1219, VII).

(ii) On 17th January 1990, the Council appointed Mr. John Roper as Director of the Institute for a three-year term (until 30th June 1993).

On 7th February 1990, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Institute Director, asked the Secretary-General to appoint the Head of Administration of the Institute; on 13th June 1990, the Council took note of the nominations put forward by the Secretary-General on a proposal from the Director for the four posts of “research fellows”.

(iii) The restricted Council meeting on 18th April was devoted to an exchange of views between the permanent representatives and the Institute Director. The Director briefed the Council on his activities thus far. He offered his ideas about the future tasks of the Institute and its work programme (see VII below).



### 5. WEU Assembly

(i) The Assembly's activities and its relations with the Council were the subject of regular exchanges of view between the permanent representatives meeting in restricted session (see VIII below).

(ii) At its meeting on 29th November 1989, the Council declared itself in favour of the suggestion that a management review be carried out of the Office of the Clerk. On 11th April 1990, the Council received the report on the organisation of the Office of the Clerk – carried out by three experts appointed by the Clerk – and asked that the Presidential Committee give its opinion on it.

In letters dated 12th June to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and 25th June to the Secretary-General, the President of the Assembly noted that this report was in line with the Assembly's proposals and he called on the Council to authorise the creation of the posts requested in the draft Assembly budget for 1990.

The Council will give its opinion on this subject once it has received the opinion of the Budget and Organisation Committee.

(iii) Information of the Assembly: see point VIII below.

### 6. Questions concerning the staff and the management of the WEU organs

#### (i) Paris ministerial organs

(a) The Council monitored the procedure for winding up, with effect from 30th June 1990, the Agencies for Security Questions (excluding the ACA) and the Standing Armaments Committee, pursuant to the ministerial decision of 30th November 1989 and, in particular, gave the closest possible consideration to the question of indemnifying those staff members who were not to be taken on by the Institute. Conscious of the legal, social and humanitarian aspects of this problem, the Council considered that the provisions of the WEU Staff Rules – the subject of an agreement between the co-ordinated organisations – were sufficient. The Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General had frequent meetings with members of staff of the Paris ministerial organs, either individually or collectively.

#### (b) Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA)

The Council took note of the ACA report for 1989.

During their restricted sessions, the permanent representatives addressed the question of the agency's future. They agreed that, for the time being, its activities should be maintained.

#### (ii) Secretariat-General

##### (a) Management review of the Secretariat-General

Following the Council decision of November 1989, a management review was carried out of the Secretariat-General in January 1990 by two experts from the Management Review Staff of the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The Council decided, following several exchanges of view and having received the opinion of the Budget and Organisation Committee, to approve the proposals put forward by the Secretary-General<sup>2</sup> and, at the same time, to accept the proposals by the Foreign Office experts concerning the need for further savings<sup>3</sup>.

##### (b) WEU Legal Adviser

On 13th June 1990, the Council approved the appointment to the new post of Legal Adviser to the Secretariat-General of the Assistant Legal Adviser to the Paris ministerial organs, the activities of which were to cease on 30th June (excluding those of the Agency for the Control of Armaments).

### 7. Topical questions concerned with European security

(i) One of the reasons which led to the creation of the Council Working Group (see point VI (iii) above) was to enable the Council to discuss in greater depth questions of a political nature, the working group having laid the groundwork for those Council decisions of a more technical or administrative nature. Consequently, since the inception of the working group, there has been more substantive and varied information and exchanges of view on the Council's regular agenda item, "topical questions".

(ii) Under this item, the Council has been regularly briefed on the progress towards German unification, and on official visits by representatives of the member states which have had an impact on the course of events concerning European security.

It is also under this item that the Secretary-General has reported to the Council on his public activities and professional engagements (participation in seminars or conferences, visits received or made, etc.).

2. Three new posts: a legal adviser (A4), a committee secretary (A2), a WEUCOM operator (B3/B4), a regrading from B4 to B5.

3. Deletion of the post of Head of Administration Division on 3rd February 1991; deletion of the post of chief security guard on the date the present holder ceases his duties; deletion of one telephonist post following the voluntary departure of one of the present post-holders.

### 8. Relations with NATO

#### (i) Relations with SHAPE

(a) As each year, the permanent representatives were invited by SACEUR to visit SHAPE for an information visit, and to take part in some of the exercises forming part of the observation programme for the first six months of 1990; a report on these visits was submitted to the Council.

(b) The Secretary-General reported to the Council on his visit to Casteau, accompanied by the Deputy Secretary-General, on the occasion of SHAPEX 1990 entitled "European transition - challenges for NATO".

(ii) *Presentation by the SACEUR representative on forces of WEU member states under NATO command: implementation of Article IV of Protocol No. II*

This presentation took place during the meeting of the Permanent Council on 21st February. It was followed by a detailed exchange of views between the members of the Council and the two SHAPE representatives during which the possibilities and usefulness of setting up multinational units were discussed.

The unanimous view was that this debate proved the importance of maintaining and encouraging good relations between WEU and SHAPE.

### 9. Other questions

#### (i) Possible review of the modified Brussels Treaty

The Council agreed that this question should be addressed within the Council by the Council Working Group. An initial exchange of views was planned for the beginning of the second half of 1990.

#### (ii) Third European session of advanced defence studies

The Council was kept informed of the preparations for this session, which was being organised by the United Kingdom Delegation from 8th to 14th July at Wiston House.

The results presented to the Council together with comments would appear in the second part of this thirty-sixth report of the Council to the Assembly.

### III. Activities of the Special Working Group

1. During the first half of 1990, the Special Working Group has continued to provide the forum for in-depth study of the major politico-military issues affecting European security. The main focus of the group's work during the

period has been the impact of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the CFE negotiations in Vienna.

2. In accordance with the mandate from the November 1989 ministerial meeting, the SWG and DRG carried out a study evaluating Europe's likely security environment during the period 1991-1995. The joint conclusions of the group's work were presented to the Council of Ministers in Brussels on 23rd April 1990 along with a series of questions for ministers to discuss:

- the prospects for arms control with a view to the holding of a CSCE summit during 1990;
- how to maintain credible deterrence at reduced levels of forces;
- how to make appropriate changes in strategic doctrines, operational concepts and force structures;
- the general implications for European defence and security co-operation.

3. Ministers took note of the work done by the SWG and the DRG on the European security environment 1991-1995 and their discussions on this subject contributed to the formulation of the communiqué published at the end of the meeting.

4. The SWG has since discussed how to fulfil the task given to WEU by ministers at their April meeting (paragraph 9 of the Brussels communiqué), namely, to elaborate a common approach with regard to the 1990 summit meetings of the Atlantic Alliance and the CSCE. In this context, the group has begun to address a number of themes:

- future security architecture for Europe;
- the rôle of Europe in a changing Atlantic Alliance;
- post-CFE arms control objectives.

### IV. Activities of the Defence Representatives Group

1. The DRG held five meetings in its own right during the period under review, as well as one joint meeting with the SWG. The majority of its activities focused on two broad areas of work in preparation for the Ministerial Council in April.

2. The first of these involved a study, with the SWG (see above), of the European security environment in the period 1991-1995. As a contribution to this study, the DRG produced its own assessment of the need to maintain an undi-

minished level of security pending full implementation of a CFE agreement, and of the factors affecting the military balance post-CFE.

3. The second area of work concerned verification where the DRG proposed to ministers that member countries should co-operate in:

- preparing a programme of trial bilateral inspections (to commence in autumn 1990) whereby the nations participating could gain experience of the active and passive aspects of a CFE verification régime;
- opening a number of their national inspection teams to participation by inspectors from other member countries, thereby making best use of available resources and assisting member countries in participating fully in the verification process;
- opening their inspector training courses to nationals of other member countries, thereby ensuring a certain commonality of standards;
- indicating, if appropriate, any geographical areas on which they were interested in focusing their verification activities, while retaining the right to inspect wherever they wished, thus enabling them to target their training and to identify an informal division of labour.

4. In their communiqué, ministers welcomed these proposals, as well as the fact that a group of DRG experts had prepared a report on shared data-processing for verification which had subsequently been submitted to the HLTF by WEU countries.

5. Since the April Ministerial Council, the DRG has been concentrating on the remit in the communiqué to prepare for the Atlantic and CSCE summits by discussing the evolution of alliance strategies, the military aspects of multinational forces and the military implications of the institutionalisation of the CSCE.

6. A regular item on the DRG agenda has been the issue of military contacts with the Soviet Union and, in addition to a report on the CSCE seminar on military doctrine, the group has been briefed on visits to the Soviet Union by Belgian, French, Netherlands and United Kingdom Delegations.

#### *V. Activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group*

During the first six months of 1990, the Mediterranean Sub-Group concentrated its attention on three sets of problems affecting European security.

Firstly, developments in the Maghreb and the conflict in the Western Sahara. Members of the group considered that it was vital to encourage the development of the political dialogue and that Europe should step up initiatives to promote regional co-operation aimed at enhancing stability in the Western Mediterranean.

Secondly, political consultation within the group focused on events in Eastern Europe and their implications for the Balkans. The collapse of hitherto dominant political régimes, the re-awakening of nationalism and the resurgence of ethnic problems make any prediction about future developments in the region both difficult and uncertain. Analysis of the repercussions of the current developments will remain uppermost among the group's concerns.

Lastly, the group has embarked upon a study of the potential threat represented by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, particularly in the Western Mediterranean. The group has analysed the consequences of this proliferation in the Mediterranean basin and in the Middle East and expressed the hope that many more countries will join the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Régime).

The group finished its report on naval deployments in the Mediterranean, the conclusions of which were submitted to ministers who took due note of them on 23rd April 1990.

#### *VI. Activities of the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space*

1. During this period the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space held five plenary meetings, as well as other meetings at expert level.

2. The sub-group has continued its work pursuant to the mandate given by ministers in November 1989 to outline a detailed study on the development of a European satellite observation system with three objectives: verification of arms control agreements, crisis monitoring and the monitoring of environmental hazards.

3. In April 1990, ministers noted the progress which had been made, and called for concrete proposals to be submitted to them at their next meeting, i.e., with a view to examining the possibility of establishing a satellite observation agency. The sub-group is currently working to this remit.

#### *VII. WEU Institute for Security Studies*

##### *1. Establishment*

(See II, 4 above.)

## 2. Tasks and objectives

(i) The Director of the Institute has given the Council his initial thoughts on the Institute's tasks and work programmes.

(ii) Established under the aegis of the Council, the Institute has been given two, inter-related missions:

- *study and research for the governments of the member states of WEU* represented by the Council and in consultation with the Secretariat-General of the Organisation. The independent and objective nature of this work is laid down in a number of the main clauses of the ministerial decision of 13th November 1989;
- *stimulating the wider debate on European security issues*: the Institute will develop links with the other relevant institutes and centres of research; develop new structures for meetings and dialogue with individuals or institutes from non-WEU countries, in particular with the countries of Eastern and Central Europe; establish a data-bank on the range of research undertaken in Europe on security issues.

There are certainly no formal limits on the Institute's activities: the Institute will also contribute to the strategic debate through its own publications, and more generally create networks for exchanges between those concerned in the media, parliaments (in particular the parliamentary Assembly of WEU), national administrations, universities and industry.

(iii) The initial work programme will be concentrated around four broad areas:

- the European security identity;
- the development of European security structures;
- Western European defence issues;
- economic and North-South dimensions of European security.

(iv) The Institute team was to take up its duties officially on 1st July 1990 and a meeting was planned between the Council and the Director.

## VIII. Relations with the Assembly

(See also II, 5 above.)

### 1. Ministerial statements during Assembly sessions

(i) *Extraordinary session in Luxembourg on 22nd and 23rd March 1990*

The following ministers spoke during the session and then replied to parliamentarians' questions: the Foreign Minister representing the

Belgian Presidency, Mr. Eyskens, the German and Luxembourg Foreign Ministers, Mr. Genscher and Mr. Poos, and the Italian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vitalone.

The Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Skubiszewski and Mr. Falin, Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and member of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs, were invited by the Assembly to give an address and agreed to answer questions.

(ii) *First part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session held in Paris from 5th to 8th June 1990*

The following took the floor at the meeting and then replied to parliamentarians' questions: the Foreign and Defence Ministers representing the Belgian Presidency, Mr. Eyskens and Mr. Coëme.

The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Mr. Jeszenszky and the United States State Secretary for Defence, Mr. Atwood, were invited by the Assembly to give an address and agreed to answer parliamentarians' questions.

2. The Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, also gave an address on the opening day of the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session and answered the questions which followed.

3. Symposium on "Observation satellites - a European means of verifying disarmament", organised by the Assembly's Technological and Aerospace Committee in Rome on 27th-28th March.

The Council welcomed the initiative taken by the Assembly's Technological and Aerospace Committee in organising this symposium. Apart from the Italian and Netherlands Defence Ministers, Mr. Martinazzoli and Mr. Ter Beek, participants included the French State Secretary for Defence, Mr. Renon, senior officials from the member states, parliamentarians and leading figures from industry and the universities.

The Deputy Secretary-General, in his report to the Council on 29th March, stressed the value and usefulness of the symposium, inter alia to the work of the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space. Such alignment between the activities of the Assembly and those of the Council was particularly welcome.

### 4. Meetings between the representatives of the Council and the Assembly

(i) On 7th March, a meeting took place in Brussels between the Foreign and Defence Ministers representing the Belgian Presidency, Mr. Eyskens and Mr. Coëme, accompanied by the Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, and the Assembly's Presidential Committee headed by

Mr. Goerens. It provided an opportunity for a spontaneous exchange of views on topical political questions and the rôle of WEU in a changing European environment. The Assembly also briefed the Council on the progress of preparations for the extraordinary session in Luxembourg on 22nd and 23rd March.

(ii) The Foreign and Defence Ministers representing the Belgian Presidency, accompanied by the Secretary-General and other Council representatives, also had a meeting on 24th April in Brussels with members of the Assembly's Presidential Committee and the Political and Defence Committees to brief them on the outcome of the Ministerial Council.

#### 5. *Secretary-General's information letters to the President of the Assembly*

On 15th March and 15th May 1990 respectively, the Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, sent information letters on the activities of the intergovernmental organs to Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly.

#### 6. *Other forms of dialogue*

(i) The Council has often expressed the wish that its dialogue with the Assembly should be more constructive and frequent; given the Council's interest in discussing the reports presented at Assembly sessions, it considers it essential that the last Council meeting before each session be devoted to an examination of these reports which should therefore reach it in good time.

It has been suggested that Council representatives have more frequent informal meetings with the parliamentarians of their respective countries to discuss matters addressed by the Council and the subjects to be covered by Assembly reports.

In the same context, the Secretary-General has, on several occasions, offered to meet those Assembly committees who so wished for an exchange of views on any particular aspects of their work; if organised properly, this two-way flow of information will inevitably make WEU's action more coherent and enhance its public standing.

## ANNEX

*Communiqué issued after the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers**Brussels, 23rd April 1990*

1. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of Western European Union, meeting in Brussels on 23rd April 1990, were particularly pleased that the ratification of the Protocol of Accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty had been completed.

2. Ministers welcomed the sweeping changes which had taken place in Europe since their meeting in November 1989. The division of Europe is now being overcome. The emergence of new democracies following free elections is opening up new prospects for broader co-operation among Europeans.

They welcomed the return to democratic standards which the elections in the GDR and Hungary represent, and looked forward to those to be held shortly in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The prospect of the forthcoming attainment of German unity, founded on the unequivocal expression of the wishes of the population concerned, is an opportunity for Europe as a whole and an important step forward towards constructing a just and lasting peaceful order.

The united Germany will thus take its place alongside its fellow members of the North Atlantic Alliance and alongside its partners who have chosen to build a European union.

3. Ministers welcomed the new impetus being given to the CSCE process and the prospect of a conference of heads of state and/or of government taking place by the end of 1990.

The CSCE is the framework within which all Europeans, together with the United States and Canada, can establish new relations and develop co-operative structures capable of assuring each one of them that peace and stability will be maintained and their legitimate interests safeguarded.

4. It was with this new prospect in view that Ministers recalled the importance they attach to building a European union consistent with the Single European Act which they have signed as members of the European Community. They also reaffirmed the importance of the Atlantic Alliance and Western European Union as essential instruments for the security of the member countries and as factors for stability throughout Europe.

The continued presence of the forces of the United States and of Canada stationed in Europe provides a necessary contribution to our common security and overall stability, together with the contribution of WEU countries and their other European partners. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of The Hague platform and the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament of the Atlantic Alliance.

5. Ministers stressed the importance they attach to the concluding of a CFE agreement and to the holding of the CSCE summit before the end of the year. They regard such an agreement as an important achievement in the process of improving security and adapting military postures to the far-reaching changes – both military and political – which Europe is witnessing. They considered that the momentum of the negotiation process should be maintained so as to enhance stability, promote co-operative structures and expedite the attainment of a new peace order in Europe. Agreement on new confidence- and security-building measures in parallel with a CFE agreement would contribute greatly to that end.

6. European stability continues to be based on the collective and individual commitment of all partners in the alliance. It is also an essential matter for the Europeans themselves. For the Europeans to enhance their contribution to stability on the European continent and to the protection of their legitimate security interests, a greater degree of co-operation will be fundamental.

Ministers therefore recognised the need to continue working to strengthen the European identity and to promote the process of European integration including the security dimension. This growing identity is destined to be given concrete expression in the form of close, and even new co-operation between the member countries.

In the field of verification of the CFE treaty and “open skies”, Ministers welcomed the specific measures which had been adopted by WEU member countries particularly as regards the opening of national inspection teams to include inspectors from other WEU member countries.

On the subject of the computerised processing of verification data, Ministers welcomed the fact that a WEU group of experts had jointly defined realistic parameters for a system of interconnected data bases, and that this common WEU viewpoint had been taken into account by the Atlantic Alliance.

Ministers also noted the progress which had been made in studying the possibilities for European co-operation in the field of space-based observation systems for the purposes of arms control verification, and also for crisis and environmental monitoring. They called for concrete proposals to be submitted to them at their next meeting, inter alia with a view to examining the possibility of establishing a satellite verification agency.

7. Ministers recognised that European security has an extra-European dimension. As a consequence the European countries follow closely developments in other regions of the world, in particular the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

8. Peace, security and co-operation in Europe depend on an intensification of the dialogue at all levels. With regard to the new tasks for the organisation proposed by the incoming Presidency, Ministers agreed on the opportuneness of establishing contacts for two-way information with the democratically-elected governments in Central and Eastern Europe. They instructed the Presidency and the Secretary-General to organise these contacts. Ministers recognised that, by virtue of its activities, the parliamentary Assembly of WEU has an important rôle to play in opening up contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This has been illustrated by the recent extraordinary session of the Assembly held in Luxembourg on 22nd and 23rd March. Likewise, the WEU Institute for Security Studies, whose establishment was decided upon at the last Council, and which is to begin operation from July this year, also has an active rôle to play in pooling ideas and in drawing together the new strands of thinking being developed in both the East and the West.

9. Ministers congratulated the Belgian Presidency on the particularly active way in which they had conducted the work of WEU. They hoped that, under its impetus and that of the incoming French Presidency, there would be a continued and intensive process of reflection and concertation among the member countries, particularly with a view to the two major meetings scheduled to take place before the end of the year, namely the CSCE summit and an Atlantic summit both aimed at giving appropriate responses to the changes taking place in Europe.

WEU provides an entirely suitable forum for its members to prepare a common approach to these forthcoming meetings.

***Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:  
continuing operations in the Gulf region***

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Uyttendaele (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas (Alternate: de Puig), Cariglia (Alternate: Scovacricchi), Chevalier, Cox, De Decker, Dees (Alternate: De Hoop Scheffer), Ewing, Fernandes Marques (Alternate: Moreira), Fiandrotti, Fillon, Fioret (Alternate: Fassino), Fourré, Irmer, Jung, Kittelmann, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. Maris, Mota Torres, Moya, Pecchioli, Perinat (Alternate: Lopez Valdivielso), Romero, Scheer, Sinesio, Speed, Steiner, Sir John Stokes (Alternate: Lambie), MM. Vieira Mesquita, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*



APPENDICES

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*Rapporteur's Preface*

In preparing this report, *the Rapporteur* met or received evidence from the following:

*The Hague*

Admiral Herbert van Foreest, Chief of the Naval Staff;  
Captain J.H. Goemans, Naval Staff;  
Commander J.W. Sturman, Naval Staff.

*Paris*

Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs;  
General Maurice Schmitt, Chief of the Defence Staff;  
Mr. Régis de Bellenet, Diplomatic Counsellor, Ministry of Defence;  
Captain Gilles Combarieu, Ministry of Defence;  
Captain François Rouvillois, Naval Staff.

*London*

Mr. Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-General of Western European Union;  
The Hon. Archie Hamilton, Minister of State for the Armed Forces;  
Mr. Richard Hatfield, Head of Secretariat (Overseas Commitments), Ministry of Defence;  
Miss Oona Muirhead, Defence Commitments Staff, Ministry of Defence;  
Group Captain J.L. Uprichard, RAF, Defence Commitments Staff, Ministry of Defence;  
Mr. Stephen Gomersall, Head of Security Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;  
Mr. Michael Ryder, Security Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;  
Group Captain David Bolton, Director, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies.

*Madrid*

Mr. Narcis Serra, Minister of Defence;  
Mr. Fernando Perpina, Secretary-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs;  
Mr. Carlos Sanjuan, Chairman of the Congress Defence Committee;  
Mr. Ignacio Diez-Gonzalez, Chairman of the Senate Defence Committee.

*Lisbon*

Mr. Joaquim Fernando Nogueira, Minister of Defence;  
Mr. Joao de Deus Pinheiro, Minister for Foreign Affairs;  
Mr. Vitor Crespo, President of the Assembly of the Republic;  
Mr. Jaime Gama, Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Committee;  
General Soares Carneiro, Chief of the Defence Staff;  
General Cabral Couto, Director of the National Defence Institute;  
Vice Admiral Rodrigues Consolado, Commander-in-Chief Iberian Atlantic Area;  
Rear Admiral Sarmento Gouveia, Home Fleet Commander.

*Djibouti*

Mr. Hassan Gouled Aptidon, President of the Republic;  
Mr. Moumin Bahdon Farah, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation;  
Mr. Abdoukader Waberi Askar, President of the National Assembly;  
General Gautier, Commander, French Forces in Djibouti;  
Captain Pichon, Commander of Naval Forces in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden;  
Colonel Rousseau, Commander of Land Forces;  
Colonel Escoffier, Commander, Air Force Detachment;  
Captain Wybo, Commanding Officer, Montcalm;  
Commander Demoisson, Commanding Officer, Protet.

*Abu Dhabi, Djebel Ali, Dubai and at sea in the Gulf*

H.R.H. Sheik Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates;  
Mr. Hilal Lootah, President of the National Federal Council;  
Captain Pezard (France), Commanding Officer, FS Duplex;

Captain Buracchia (Italy), Commander, Italian Task Group;  
Commander Campregher (Italy), Commanding Officer, IS Orsa;  
Captain Mitchell (United Kingdom), Commanding Officer, RFA Diligence;  
Commander Gordon-Lennox (United Kingdom), Commanding Officer, HMS Battleaxe;  
Captain van Gurp (Netherlands), Commander, Netherlands Task Group;  
Commander van der Aa (Netherlands), Commanding Officer, HMS Witte de With;  
Commander Nieuwenhuis (Netherlands), Commanding Officer, HMS Pieter Florisz;  
Captain Orvis (United States), Commanding Officer, USS England.

*The Rapporteur and the committee* extend their thanks to those ministers, officials and senior officers who gave evidence for the preparation of this report.

The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

### *Draft Recommendation*

*on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:  
continuing operations in the Gulf region*

1. The Assembly insists that the best peaceful solution for the Gulf crisis lies in the respect of the relevant United Nations resolutions, through the application of the present sanctions against Iraq, and **RECOMMENDS** that the Council seek to ensure that this principle continues to govern the actions both of member states and other allies.

2. The Assembly recalls its Recommendation 488, adopted on 20th September 1990, viz:

“ The Assembly approves the action taken by the Council in invoking Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty as a result of Iraq’s aggression against and occupation of Kuwait.

The Assembly welcomes the Council’s readiness to place WEU co-ordination in the context of the implementation of United Nations Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.

The Assembly supports the Council’s decision, not only to convene the meeting of the Ministerial Council, but also to constitute an ad hoc group to cover the Gulf crisis and especially to call the first meeting, under direct WEU auspices, of the chiefs of defence staffs.

The Assembly believes that the Council should remain open to the idea of further co-operation and co-ordination at different levels over all aspects of operations in the Gulf area and therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the necessary steps be taken to formalise the Gulf ad hoc group to consider policy and implementation on a day-to-day basis, as long as the present crisis lasts, and urges all WEU nations to provide maximum information to the operational cell being run in the French Ministry of Defence.

Concerned that the proliferation of vessels in the Gulf area could lead to problems in the very near future, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that further consultations take place immediately at governmental level to establish common command and control in the various Gulf zones already agreed and further **RECOMMENDS** that urgent measures be taken to harmonise rules of engagement at least within each zone, and ensure that recognition procedures (IFF) are properly co-ordinated between all aircraft and naval units to assure the safety of friendly forces.

The Assembly considers that WEU could play a useful rôle in helping to co-ordinate (perhaps in conjunction with other agencies) logistic support, reinforcement and resupply for the Gulf operations and that WEU nations’ assets for sea- and airlift might be provided, in some cases where combat forces, for whatever reason, may not be available, and **RECOMMENDS** that the Council study the options for providing such assistance without delay.

Disappointed that the transatlantic presentation of WEU’s contribution to support the United Nations’ efforts to solve the crisis in the Gulf has yet to have an impact, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that the Council establish forthwith a liaison office in Washington to serve as a channel for North American links and as a matter of priority to convince the United States’ Administration that direct dialogue with WEU is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at present. The Council should make every effort to ensure that WEU is perceived as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. ”

3. The Assembly welcomes the fact that the Council, working through its special Ad Hoc Group, has already seen fit to implement at least part of the above recommendation and that WEU co-operation both at home and in the Gulf area has improved as a direct result. The Assembly believes that the arrangements for the naval application of the United Nations embargo are now well established and congratulates the Council on the measures taken.

4. The Assembly now considers that much more should be done to co-ordinate land and air operations and that all WEU nations should make appropriate contributions, and therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council discuss further national contributions to defensive land and air forces in the Gulf region and in particular should call for support in the areas of logistics and medical help (the idea of a hospital ship with a multinational WEU medical team on board deserves special consideration).

5. In the knowledge that France, Italy and the United Kingdom are the only WEU nations with combat aircraft in the Gulf region and concerned about the provision of adequate air cover for naval forces in particular, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that the members of the Council take the decisions necessary to co-ordinate air cover and extend efficient air defence protection to all WEU nations’ forces.

6. Concerned that due consideration in the WEU Council has apparently not been given to the rôle of forces, especially naval forces, should tension mount in the Gulf region and conflict break out, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that the necessary political consultations should now take place to enable the

appropriate decisions on the rôle of naval forces in particular to be implemented without delay in the event of hostilities.

7. Convinced that the present situation admirably illustrates the case for creating a European centre for the prevention of crises and recalling in this context two earlier recommendations: 465 (Document 1159, Rapporteur: Mr. Fourré), on defining the conditions for setting up a European observation satellite agency in WEU, and 481 (Document 1223, Rapporteur: Lord Newall), on creating a European verification centre under WEU auspices, the Assembly RECOMMENDS that the Council at its forthcoming ministerial meeting take the decision to set up such a centre to be used *inter alia* for crisis management and verification and equip it with the necessary technical means (including access to observation satellites) to enable it to function effectively.

8. The Assembly, believing that, even if the present crisis may prove unique as a model for European action, certain options for the future are worth studying immediately, both in the WEU Assembly and in national parliaments, RECOMMENDS that the Council emphasise WEU as the forum for out-of-area co-ordination, in keeping with the modified Brussels Treaty, and examine for the longer term the idea of creating a WEU naval on-call force for external operations, together with a possible pooling of appropriate national air mobile assets into a European rapid action force.

9. Considering that special efforts are required to ensure that the public is kept fully informed regarding the rationale for the WEU presence in the Gulf region, the Assembly RECOMMENDS that the Council should co-ordinate, through the Secretary-General's office, the presentation of WEU's rôle to the media and to the public and that links between national public relations organisations in member states' ministries of defence should be formalised and encouraged in a similar aim.

10. Noting that defence budget cuts in the majority of member countries are forcing an unco-ordinated reappraisal of defence priorities, the Assembly RECOMMENDS that the Council institute consultation within WEU on the optimum future structure of European forces, preferably before further cuts in national defence budgets are made.

### *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur)*

#### *I. Introduction*

1. Since the Defence Committee's report on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: operations in the Gulf<sup>1</sup> was adopted on 20th September 1990 first by the committee itself and, later the same day, by the Presidential Committee acting under emergency procedure in the name of the Assembly, the situation in the area has continued to evolve and the co-operation between WEU member nations has been further defined.

2. Given the uncertain duration and outcome of events, the Assembly's Presidential Committee has decided to devote the bulk of the next plenary session of the Assembly (to be held in Paris in the first week of December) to debate on the Gulf issues, and has asked the Political and Defence Committees to draft recommendations for consideration.

3. The Political Committee is therefore preparing a report entitled European security and the Gulf crisis (Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker) as a follow-up to its original report and recommendation concerning the Gulf crisis: European security and events in the Near and Middle East, Part II, The Kuwait crisis<sup>2</sup> (Rapporteur: Mr. Pieralli). Mr. Pieralli's report set out in particular to cover the chronology of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, the WEU Council decision of 21st August 1990 and the attitudes of the Arab countries and Israel to the crisis. The two reports of the Political Committee are complementary to the two reports of the Defence Committee and are essential reading for an understanding of the whole context.

4. Document 1243 attracted a tremendous amount of interest and publicity, both in the international specialised press and also more generally in the media. It also provoked various reactions not only from WEU member governments but, in addition, from other interested parties. The Turkish authorities in particular have confirmed that it is not planned to send land forces to the Gulf region (Appendix IV) and have pointed out that no foreign military aircraft are stationed at the Incirlik air base; temporary transfers there are only for training purposes (Appendix III). Your Rapporteur is happy to set the record straight and would welcome further precisions or observations from whatever source.

1. Document 1243, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

2. Document 1242.

#### *II. Developments from mid-September to date*

5. This present report is an updated version of Document 1243 and takes account of developments since the middle of September, as well as aiming to identify certain elements of the present crisis which have implications for the wider debate on the future organisation of European security.

*(i) Second extraordinary meeting  
of the WEU Council of Ministers,  
Tuesday, 18th September 1990*

6. France, as Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, called the second extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in Paris on Tuesday, 18th September. At the close of the meeting the following communiqué was issued:

"The foreign affairs and defence ministers of the member countries of Western European Union, at their extraordinary meeting in Paris,

- unreservedly condemn the new breaches of international law by the Iraqi authorities and the assault on personnel arising from the violation of diplomatic premises in Kuwait city, and following Iraq's intolerable act of aggression against another Arab country; they recall that the authors of these violations will carry a personal responsibility,
- express their resolve to apply and ensure the strict implementation of the embargo decided on by the United Nations Security Council in all its forms - the only way of reaching a political and peaceful solution to the crisis,
- decide to exchange information on all violations of which they may be aware, and jointly to identify any shortcomings in their embargo measures in order to rectify them as soon as possible,
- welcome the fact that, since their meeting on 21st August last, all the member states have made an effective contribution to the common effort, and that the co-ordination is proceeding effectively with other countries' forces deployed in the region,

- decide, as far as they are concerned, to take all further measures necessary, as soon as possible, for the full and effective enforcement of the embargo, with particular attention to air traffic, and call upon the Security Council rapidly to adopt the appropriate decisions to this end; these decisions should apply if necessary to any countries not complying with the embargo,
- endorse the decision by some member states to reinforce their air and ground forces in the region or to assist partners in deploying such forces and support the decisions taken or envisaged by the member states with a view to further deployments should the situation so demand,
- decide to strengthen the WEU co-ordination and to extend the co-ordination at present operating in the maritime field to ground and air forces and, within this framework, to identify the forms that these new deployments will take, to seek to ensure that they are complementary, to harmonise the missions of member states' forces and to pool their logistic support capabilities as required,
- intend to strengthen co-ordination with other countries having forces in the region, in particular the Arab states and the United States of America,
- are resolved to continue providing humanitarian aid to those countries particularly affected by the crisis,
- underline the solidarity linking their countries to the Arab world."

*(ii) Meeting of Defence and Political Committees  
followed by Presidential Committee meeting,  
Thursday, 20th September 1990*

7. At the start of the meetings held by the Defence, Political and Presidential Committees in Paris on Thursday, 20th September, Mr. Roland Dumas, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, was present in the Palais d'Iéna to brief the committees on the 18th September ministerial meeting and to answer members' questions. This gesture was greatly appreciated by all those present as a welcome initiative to ensure that the closest possible links exist between the Council and the Assembly during these difficult times. The session with Mr. Dumas was followed, during the Defence Committee's own meeting, by a comprehensive briefing on WEU operations in the Red Sea and Gulf areas by the naval specialists responsible for organising the WEU operational cell in the French Ministry of Defence.

8. It was therefore a fully-informed debate which followed in the Defence Committee and which resulted in the adoption of the following set of recommendations:

"1. The Assembly approves the action taken by the Council in invoking Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty as a result of Iraq's aggression against and occupation of Kuwait.

The Assembly welcomes the Council's readiness to place WEU co-ordination in the context of the implementation of United Nations Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.

The Assembly supports the Council's decision, not only to convene the meeting of the Ministerial Council, but also to constitute an ad hoc group to cover the Gulf crisis and especially to call the first meeting, under direct WEU auspices, of the chiefs of defence staffs.

The Assembly believes that the Council should remain open to the idea of further co-operation and co-ordination at different levels over all aspects of operations in the Gulf area and therefore RECOMMENDS that the necessary steps be taken to formalise the Gulf ad hoc group to consider policy and implementation on a day-to-day basis, as long as the present crisis lasts, and urges all WEU nations to provide maximum information to the operational cell being run in the French Ministry of Defence.

2. Concerned that the proliferation of vessels in the Gulf area could lead to problems in the very near future, the Assembly RECOMMENDS that further consultations take place immediately at governmental level to establish common command and control in the various Gulf zones already agreed and further RECOMMENDS that urgent measures be taken to harmonise rules of engagement at least within each zone, and ensure that recognition procedures (IFF) are properly co-ordinated between all aircraft and naval units to assure the safety of friendly forces.

3. The Assembly considers that WEU could play a useful rôle in helping to co-ordinate (perhaps in conjunction with other agencies) logistic support, reinforcement and resupply for the Gulf operations and that WEU nations' assets for sea- and airlift might be provided, in some cases where combat forces, for whatever reason, may not be available, and RECOMMENDS that the Council study the options for providing such assistance without delay.

4. Disappointed that the transatlantic presentation of WEU's contribution to support the United Nations' efforts to solve the crisis in the Gulf has yet to have an impact, the Assembly RECOMMENDS that the Council establish forthwith a liaison office in Washington to serve as a channel for North American links and as a matter of priority to convince the United States' administration that direct dialogue with WEU is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at present."

9. These recommendations were further considered on the same day by the Presidential Committee which added the sentence "The Council should make every effort to ensure that WEU is perceived as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance." at the end of paragraph 4, accepted them unanimously and in the name of the Assembly forwarded them immediately to the Council for action.

*(iii) Assembly delegation to examine the WEU naval deployment in the Gulf*

10. From 25th to 30th September 1990, the President of the Assembly, Senator Robert Pontillon, led a delegation composed of the Chairman of the Defence Committee, the Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur of the Political Committee and the Rapporteur of the Defence Committee to examine the WEU naval deployment in the Gulf area. The military liaison for the visit was assured by the Assembly's Defence Counsellor and the link with the French Ministry of Defence through the good offices of Mr. Chévènement's advisor on strategy, who also accompanied the team.

11. On the eve of the delegation's departure, a meeting took place with the French Chief of the Defence Staff. As well as providing a very competent briefing on WEU forces in the region, General Schmitt's staff outlined the way ahead as envisaged by the Rue St. Dominique. One of the key elements where land and air units were concerned (bearing in mind the decision of the WEU Council of Ministers on Tuesday, 18th September, to extend naval co-operation to land and air components) would be to try and ensure tight arrangements between French and British forces in Saudi Arabia...

12. The Assembly's delegation visited Djibouti to hear how the United Nations embargo was being applied both in the area of the Straits of Tiran, where WEU forces, in the shape of French and Spanish vessels, are co-operating with a Greek frigate, the fruit of the original augmented WEU ministerial meeting of 21st August, as well as United States vessels, and in the Bab El-Mandab waterway where French forces (naval and maritime patrol aircraft) are

applying United Nations sanctions. The captain of the French frigate Montcalm gave a full account of the meetings held on board, under WEU auspices, to resolve certain problems, especially of communication. As will be highlighted further on in the report, the fact that most United States forces present in the Red Sea area come from the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean or from the Atlantic means that there have been comparatively few difficulties in establishing a reasonable level of co-operation from the outset. A great number<sup>3</sup> of merchant ships have been challenged in these waters where the maritime sea lines of communication are particularly dense. The position of the Kingdom of Jordan is germane in this respect and your Rapporteur is grateful that recent communications to the Assembly from King Hussein have clarified that country's position in relation to the embargo.

13. From Djibouti the Assembly's delegation travelled to the Gulf states and on the way was able to observe for itself the extent of maritime traffic and the obvious need for a considerable number of hulls to "cover the ground" in ensuring that the application of the embargo is as watertight as possible.

14. In the Gulf states the delegation was briefed on board all WEU ships in the immediate area of Abu Dhabi, Djebel Ali and Dubai (Dupleix (France), Orsa (Italy), HMS Battleaxe and RFA Diligence (United Kingdom) and Witte de With (Netherlands)) and sent messages to Belgian and Spanish ships in the Gulf of Oman. In addition, at the invitation of the United States authorities, an American air-defence cruiser, the USS England, was also visited.

15. Your Rapporteur and his colleagues are particularly grateful to all those ministers, ministries, ambassadors and attachés who contrived to authorise and make the necessary arrangements for such visits, often at comparatively short notice and in defiance of a certain number of logistic problems. The welcome extended by task group commanders and captains of individual ships was exemplary and all questions asked were answered with great frankness.

16. As a result of these contacts, the delegation was able to assess the quantitative and qualitative level of the European navies which provide a significant presence in the Gulf region (over 50% of the combatants actually on patrol in the area to apply the United Nations embargo fly the ensign of a WEU member state: the vast majority of United States vessels present have either an amphibious or an air defence rôle). A remarkable degree of operational co-ordination between the navies is in evidence as a result of

3. See Appendix I.



the application of well-tryed methodology, although initial problems resulting from the fact that the bulk of United States ships have come from their Pacific-based Seventh Fleet where different codes, communication procedures, etc., etc., apply have had to be solved with a certain amount of pragmatism.

17. Certain practical difficulties which militated against the most effective solutions for co-operation, for example in planning the roster for filling the five WEU zones at the entrance to the Gulf (four north-west of the Strait of Hormuz, one south-east), were highlighted during the visit. The commonsense solutions (for the particular example, the harmonisation of operating areas between identical meridians for all nations present) are rarely far away, fortunately, and even if difficult for individual ships to solve through co-operation on the spot, via the monthly WEU nations' meetings, are usually tackled at the regular meetings between naval points of contact held under French chairmanship in Paris.

#### *The problem of identification*

18. A major problem area brought to members' attention in the previous report of the Defence Committee was confirmed by the naval specialists in the ships visited: that of identification of aircraft. Bearing in mind the front-line nature of readiness ("live" ammunition in ready-use lockers, frequent alerts and calls to action stations, the similarity of aircraft types likely to be encountered in the area, let alone the major airline routes bordering the possible conflict zone) there is a real danger of accidental interception and destruction of friendly aircraft (blue on blue). A great deal of work has been done on identification, friend or foe (IFF) systems but a great deal still remains to be done before there is complete compatibility even between equipment of allied nations. The discovery that United States forces were using a fourth channel in their IFF procedures caused some consternation before there was general realisation of what was involved. While the general picture generated by United States/Saudi AWACS aircraft is vital for the correct interpretation of the situation, the fact that no one has tactical command (apart from that between ships of the same nationality) means that a co-ordinated and directed response to any particular air threat is currently highly unlikely.

#### *Replacement and resupply*

19. As the modern equivalent of the "phoney war" continues in the Gulf region and as crews become weary and nerves stretch it will be of increasing importance to ensure that procedures are adhered to and alert states maintained. The regular rotation of ships and crews will in itself

of course provide part of the solution. By all accounts this aspect is well in hand as is the planning for continued logistic support throughout the area. It is in this domain that further contributions by those present will be vital over the months to come or where those nations politically reluctant to commit combatants might possibly be persuaded to play a part.

20. Likewise, there may be a need for ships for escort duty for supply and replenishment ships transiting the eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea areas especially given the potential ranges of some Iraqi missiles. In the Mediterranean one would like to envisage that NATO would be empowered to act (there is no problem of "area" here), but the controversy at the time of writing concerning a possible visit by the NATO on-call force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) to Alexandria in Egypt does not presage better things to come...

#### *Rules of engagement*

21. In spite of the fact that, as a result of agreement following the WEU chiefs of defence staffs' meeting at the end of August, common directives were issued to local commanders, no formal attempt has been made by the governments concerned to co-operate in the formulation and updating of rules of engagement for their vessels. A certain amount of comparing of notes in an informal way by those present in the Gulf area is believed to have taken place, especially by those programmed to operate in the same or adjacent WEU sectors, but this cannot replace the formal consultation which your Rapporteur believes essential. With the evolution of the situation, it is probably time also to update the chiefs of defence staffs' directives.

#### *Crisis management/observation satellites*

22. One implication of such a move on rules of engagement concerns the gathering of the intelligence on which the modification of the rules is based. The Assembly has highlighted the need for European observation satellites time and time again and, as well as adopting Recommendation 465 (Document 1159, Rapporteur: Mr. Fourré) on defining the conditions for setting up a European satellite agency in WEU, has also suggested the creation of a European verification centre<sup>4</sup>, primarily for the implementation of the imminent Vienna CFE agreement, but also more generally for the management of crises and the prevention of risks. How very useful it would have been for the management of the present crisis to have had such a centre up and running! We must convince the Council that, at their ministerial meeting in

4. Recommendation 481 (Document 1223 - Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union, Rapporteur: Lord Newall).

Paris on 10th December 1990, they should take a positive decision to set up the centre, to be used *inter alia* for crisis management and verification. It must be given the necessary technical means (including access to observation satellites) to enable it to function effectively.

#### *Command and control*

23. While there has been some movement affecting the co-operation between WEU forces as a result of the Assembly's recommendations and after the delegation's visit to the Gulf area, there is very little to report in the domain of command and control. The level of practical co-operation is very good indeed and perhaps sufficient for the current situation, but your Rapporteur must draw both the committee's and the Assembly's attention yet again to the critical question: what happens if hostilities break out? This concern has been voiced by virtually all those who have been called to give evidence to the Assembly's committees over the past few weeks. All are generally agreed that something must be done to produce a unified command structure but our governments seemingly continue to fight shy of the necessary deliberations.

24. Opinions between the WEU member countries are obviously divided, but a number of governments now believe that the necessary arrangements should be made. The same governments also consider that Western Europe is missing an ideal opportunity to demonstrate its resolve to assert itself further in terms of security and defence, with obvious implications for the future. The Assembly's recommendation in September was to "establish common command and control in the various Gulf zones already agreed...". That recommendation stands and needs urgent implementation at the highest political levels if the danger of uncoordinated action and maybe tragic loss of life is to be avoided should the shooting start...

### *III. Iraq: the military forces and policy options*

25. Analysis of armed forces is always difficult and often open to speculation. However, in the case of Iraq, information given by its major arms suppliers and studies on Iraqi warfare during the eight years' war with Iran help clarify the capabilities and strategies of the Iraqi armed forces as well as the resulting policy options.

26. In quantitative terms Iraq is very strong:

#### *(i) Army*

1 000 000 troops: Republican Guards  
People's Liberation Army  
5 500 tanks: 2 500 Soviet T-54 and T-55  
1 000 Soviet T-62  
500 Soviet T-72  
1 500 Chinese T-59 and T-69

3 000 artillery pieces  
200 multiple rocket launchers  
66 surface-to-surface missile launchers  
(30 Frog 7, 36 Scud-B, T-7)  
160 armed helicopters (including c. 40 Soviet-made Hind attack helicopters)  
180 surface-to-air missile systems

#### *(ii) Air force*

800 aircraft including:  
16 Soviet Badger and Blinder bombers  
4 Ch.H-6D anti-ship bombers  
94 French Mirage F-1 (some with Exocet)  
10 French Mirage F-1 from the Kuwait Air Force  
70 MiG-21 multi-rôle fighters  
70 MiG-23 Flogger fighters  
25 MiG-25 Foxbat fighters  
18 MiG-29 Fulcrum attack fighters  
30 Su-7 ground-attack fighters  
50 Su-20 ground-attack fighters  
30 Su-25 close support fighters  
120 Chinese J-6 and J-7 fighters

#### *(iii) Navy*

5 frigates (including the Italian-built Lupo class)  
38 patrol and coastal vessels  
8 mine warfare vessels  
6 amphibious vessels

#### *(iv) Arms deployed in Kuwait and South Iraq*

470 000 troops in Kuwait  
115 000 troops along the southern Iraqi border  
3 700 tanks in Kuwait  
1 200 armoured vehicles in Kuwait  
700 artillery pieces in the area

27. The Iraqi army is composed of the Republican Guards and the People's Liberation Army. The Republican Guards (12 000-15 000 troops) are the élite troops of the Iraqi army. They are experienced and well-equipped with modern T-72 tanks. The Republican Guards are prepared for quick offensive action and launched the 2nd August attack on Kuwait. Within a short period three mechanised armoured divisions and four infantry divisions had invaded and taken Kuwait.

28. The second échelon is the People's Liberation Army which consists of conscripts and volunteers. The People's Liberation Army is comparatively lightly-armed, with low military skills, negligible mobility, and is not equipped to fight by night.

29. The Iraqi air force has extensive assets, although its effectiveness, in spite of being equipped with modern French Mirage F-1 and Soviet MiG-29 aircraft, is doubtful because of low training standards and poor serviceability

resulting in fewer operational aircraft. During the Iran-Iraq war the air force was under-used, although on paper it was far superior to the Iranian air force. The air force gave little support to Iraqi troops on the ground and seldom engaged the Iranian air force. Some bombing raids took place on Iranian cities, usually from great heights, plus a number of precision attacks. It is debateable whether men and machines have been honed to a sharp edge on the steel of battle over the course of eight years of war or are merely exhausted. However, a strike by Iraqi air force Mirage F-1 fighters armed with Exocet (and it is estimated that at least 100 Exocet missiles remain from earlier purchases, plus whatever was captured in the assault on Kuwait) remains one of the greatest potential threats against warships in the Gulf. The range of Iraqi aircraft and their possibilities for in-flight refuelling are of course critical in this respect and affect the operational zones chosen by the various nations present in the area as well as individual ships' capabilities for self-defence. Also linked with this is the United States Navy request for rapid delivery of Goalkeeper 30 mm close-in weapons systems (CIWS) to protect their warships from missile attack. A number of Goalkeeper systems is already installed on board British and Dutch ships and trials for the United States Navy were successfully concluded in California in the summer.

30. The Iraqis have large numbers of surface-to-surface missile launchers at their disposal and in particular have deployed most of their 36 Scud-B launchers and the 800 associated missiles in Kuwait, ostensibly with chemical warheads (or so an Iraqi spokesman claimed, with chilling emphasis). It is technically possible to equip these missiles with chemical warheads but the intelligence services believe that Iraq does not yet have the technology to do so. Conversely, Iraq does have artillery with binary chemical shells, mustard gas and nerve gas, used to devastating purpose during the 8-year war with Iran, despite almost universal condemnation. In addition, Iraq has also deployed Silkworm anti-ship missiles obtained from the Chinese.

31. The Iraqi forces are presently using the same strategy as during the Iran-Iraq war. The invasion of Kuwait took place at 2 a.m. on 2nd August when three armoured divisions of the Republican Guard Force of the Iraqi army crossed the frontier, closely followed later that morning by four divisions of the Republican Guard infantry. Combat aircraft of the Iraqi air forces, which total about 800 aircraft, bombed and rocketed Kuwaiti airfields. At the same time, helicopter gun ships attacked Kuwait City and landed at least a brigade of Republican Guard special forces – with light armour – who led the assault on the palace and on the main government buildings. In all, that force

amounted to about 100 000 soldiers, armed with about 1 250 tanks, with many infantry combat vehicles and with artillery.

32. The Kuwaiti army, which is barely one-tenth of that figure, was in a state of alert, but was not deployed in defensive positions because the Kuwaitis did not believe that one Arab country could invade another. The troops who led the invasion were followed by further reinforcements, including some who, according to the reports received, probably belong to the People's Liberation Army.

33. On 20th August, the Republican Guard divisions started to withdraw from their forward deployments and were replaced by regular army troops. Two months later on 20th October the forces now in Kuwait number approximately 470 000 men, 3 700 tanks and 700 artillery pieces. Republican Guard units have been withdrawn to Iraq. It has been the Iraqi practice to withdraw Republican Guard units after an attack. They may now either have been withdrawn to establish a more defensive position or – and the possibility must always be borne in mind – they may have been withdrawn to reform for further aggression.

34. In Kuwait itself, the Iraqis have strengthened their coastal defences with Silkworm missiles, with a string of infantry divisions and with field artillery units. They have moved in their Frog battlefield missiles and a full range of surface-to-air missiles to Kuwait, as well as the Scud-B mentioned above.

35. With a defensive strategy, without any military aid because of East-West agreement on a blockade and without information and resupply, it is not very likely that Iraq will now attack, although who can tell what might be the desperate last resort reactions if finally cornered. There is always the possibility that Iraq might try to lash out irrationally in one direction or another. It is not capable of sustaining a war over a long period and general war would probably sound the death knell for Iraq. Various United States commentators have estimated that the Iraqi air force could be destroyed within 36 hours and the bulk of Iraq's air defence within the same time-frame. Of course, even without war, air forces must keep flying to maintain readiness which implies that the Iraqis are using spares on a regular basis. Items such as tyres and lubricants should therefore soon be in short supply and difficult to replace (which is why Iraq is reported to be reducing the usual number of exercises and manoeuvres in an effort for economy). It is therefore highly likely that the embargo itself would suffice to diminish the air threat.

36. Similar considerations apply to the Iraqi navy. Although Iraq possesses a number of comparatively modern hulls, it is not envisaged that

the force could remain effective for long, mainly because of the reduced numbers of operational ships available, with most still suffering the effects of the Iran-Iraq war.

#### ***IV. The responses of the United States of America and other nations***

37. On 6th August, President Bush launched the operation Desert Shield to dissuade the Iraqis from attacking Saudi Arabia. The operation calls for a huge and continuing air- and sealift to deploy heavy armour and anti-tank forces and a massive build-up of sea and air assets in the Gulf region. The units moved, or moving, to date are listed at appendix.

38. As a result of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, a large number of other countries, traditional allies of the United States of America and others, have answered the call to protect the countries of the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, and to help guarantee the blockade imposed on the movement of military and economic shipping to and from Iraq.

39. In the first stages of deployment, the United States was faced with moving three army brigades, three Marine Corps expeditionary brigades and six air force tactical fighter wings, together with numerous smaller units, support materials, spare parts and supplies. The priority has been to rush combat equipment across the Atlantic followed by material first for support and subsequently for sustainment.

40. Hence the need for all types of transport by air and sea, which also relies heavily on commercial assets. Sealift involves a variety of craft, including fast sealift ships which travel at c. 30 kts, chartered vessels and a number of prepositioned ships with ammunition, medical equipment and supplies and fuel. On average, it takes a fast sealift ship 14 days to cover the 11 000 km to the Gulf and sealift carries some 95% of cargo and 99% of petroleum products, while airlift carries 99% of the manpower. This has meant that the United States has had to activate its Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) programme, to augment military airlift with civil aircraft.

41. Even when the "shield" is in place (recent reports indicate that United States manpower is now some 210 000 strong) there will be a continuing need for constant and regular support, reinforcement and sustainment. Hence Secretary of State Baker's appeal for allied help with sea- and airlift provision. An added complication is the necessity now to replace certain of the original elements, rapidly deployed at the start of the crisis, with more robust forces.

42. Throughout the western alliance the critical problem of sea- and airlift remains. Successive shifts in world markets and trading pat-

terns mean that there are barely enough cargo hulls of the right variety available for logistic support in emergency, whether for the traditional scenario of reinforcement and resupply for Europe or in the current context. For example, where the British forces coming to Saudi Arabia from Germany are concerned, some 33 hulls have proved necessary.

43. Over recent years the Defence Committee has sought to draw the attention of the appropriate authorities to the conundrum of declining merchant shipping, coupled with increased "flagging out" to more and more flags of convenience (a theoretically United States-owned fleet flies 35 flags besides its own and the United Kingdom's fleet flies 45 other flags beside the Red Ensign) and the tendency to man one's own ships largely with foreign nationals (making deployment to a potential war zone an even greater problem than it would be otherwise). The greater distances and potential dangers involved in conducting operations in the Gulf are very different from the Atlantic setting and could prove extremely costly in terms of merchant shipping.

44. Included in the numbers of United States personnel in the Gulf are thousands of United States reservists – naval, army and air force reserves, as well as National Guard and Air National Guard members, equipped for the most part with the best of modern equipment, dedicated, well-trained and highly-motivated individuals who have given up a great deal to serve their country.

45. Little did members of the Defence Committee think when they made a study visit to the United States in the second half of July this year, at the invitation of Secretary Cheney, that many of those seen in training in New Orleans or Fort Hood, Texas, would soon find themselves in the Saudi Arabian desert. In the wake of the force reductions currently being negotiated at the CFE talks in Vienna, the rôle of reserves generally, both in North America and Europe, will be of growing importance and we have a specific lesson to be learned from what is now taking place. The whole subject of reserves is to be treated in a forthcoming report of the Defence Committee (Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker).

46. The reason for the large numbers being deployed to the Gulf area was admirably conveyed by the point made by Secretary Cheney on 6th September in Virginia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies' timely conference on America's rôle in a changing world:

"The worst possible sin would be to deploy enough force to get into trouble but not enough to counter each eventuality."

47. That philosophy is obviously being borne very much in mind and is surely the right approach, even should the whole affair never reach the stage of all-out hostilities. Deterrence and persuasion are the names of the game. Mr. Cheney is recently reported as saying that there should be a *doubling* of United States forces in the area in order to ensure success in any armed confrontation with Iraq.

48. As well as the American concentration of land, sea and air power, a large number of countries have promised and provided forces to bolster the various United Nations resolutions and help protect the Gulf states. Not counting the WEU nations and the United States, the following countries are taking part: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Senegal, Syria (troops); Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Greece and Norway (naval vessels). The total represents the largest multinational force since the Korean war. Details are given in the appendices.

49. It should be stressed that the bulk of forces on land are stationed in Saudi Arabia, at the invitation of the Saudi authorities. The Saudis themselves are generally in the potential front line with those elements of the Kuwaiti forces who managed to fight their way out after Iraq's invasion. "Foreign" forces make up the second *échelon*, to reinforce as necessary.

#### ***V. Western European Union reactions and initiatives***

50. It is of course coincidental that WEU finds itself involved in Gulf operations for the second time within three years, but there is definite advantage in the fact, for it does mean that the process of co-operation and co-ordination has been far less fraught with teething problems than was the case three years ago. This time round it has proved possible to advance much more quickly to a useful arrangement of mutual benefit.

51. The first step was the meeting of chiefs of defence staffs held in Paris on 27th August. Whereas the ministerial meeting a week previously had been opened to other members of the European Community (Greece and Denmark attended and Ireland eventually decided against attending, because of a traditional neutral stance) plus Turkey, as a front line state, and with Norway represented not at the formal meeting but at a working lunch, it was decided to limit the chiefs of defence staffs' meeting to full WEU member states only.

52. In the event, four chiefs of defence staffs (Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg) were present together with six chiefs of naval staffs (France, Italy, Netherlands,

Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). Previous proposals for such meetings had foundered on the lack of a mutually-agreed agenda, but on this occasion the brief was very clear and the chiefs of staff examined a set of operational measures aimed at achieving close co-ordination of activities in the crisis area to enforce the United Nations embargo against Iraq and Kuwait, on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 661 and 665. The measures covered the following aspects: mission definition, deployment co-ordination, zones of action, information exchange, logistic and operational support, mutual protection of vessels in the area.

53. In concrete terms there are now naval and logistic points of contact in each national capital, who are consulted as necessary by the crisis management cells established in the French Ministry of Defence. The naval attachés in member countries' Paris embassies are also in regular contact with the French naval operations centre which provides a daily situation report on who is where and doing what. A number of member states are in the process of appointing special liaison officers to Paris to ensure that dedicated links with national capitals are immediate. In addition, a system of operational co-ordination has been established in the Gulf area, both to facilitate WEU actions and to establish links with naval forces of other countries. After a WEU meeting on the morning of 9th September in the French embassy to co-ordinate approaches, the first meeting was held under joint United States-WEU-Arab chairmanship on 9th and 10th September in Bahrain, when it was agreed to divide the Gulf into specific patrol areas to increase the effectiveness of the blockade. Also on 10th September a meeting was held on board the French frigate *Montcalm* in the Strait of Tiran to co-ordinate WEU and United States liaison. Communication methods and procedures for challenging merchant ships were also agreed to reduce mutual interference and duplication of effort.

54. Most western navies are used to co-operating with each other – co-operation which is usually a matter of common sense – exchange of information, the sharing of logistical support as necessary (for example, the Italian support ship *Stromboli* took over from the French supply ship *Durance* in furnishing support to WEU nations in the Gulf zone. Similarly the Dutch are to provide a fleet auxiliary to relieve one of the British RFAs in due course), provision of fresh water, possibly an agreement on where to take "runs ashore" and when (so as not to overload local hospitality) as well as the obvious need not to interfere with manoeuvres and exercises by fixing zones of operation. These WEU co-ordination meetings are now continuing with rotating chairmanship – France

chairing at the September meeting on board the *Dupleix* off Hormuz and Britain chairing the October meeting on board the RFA Fort Grange. Italy will chair the November WEU meeting. The pattern of such meetings is well established: WEU caucus normally to begin with, "all comers" (United States, Australia, Canada, etc.) subsequently. The WEU chairing nation then usually takes care of the co-ordinating rôle for the following month. Further regular meetings on the spot are envisaged.

55. The WEU member countries have deployed, or are in the process of deploying, the following assets:

#### *Belgium*

Two tripartite minehunters, *Iris* and *Myosotis*, and the support ship *Zinnia*, which carries an *Alouette III* helicopter, have been sent to Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman. The frigate *Wandelaar* is now helping French units to apply the embargo in the Bab El-Mandab Straits and four C-130 transport aircraft have been offered "for WEU purposes" once opérations in Rwanda are complete.

#### *France*

Now that the Clémenceau group has returned to Toulon, France has the following ships taking part in Operation Artimon to help apply the embargo:

- (a) Straits of Tiran: Commandant Ducuing (frigate);
- (b) Straits of Bab El-Mandab: Doudart de Lagree (frigate) and La Rieuse (patrol craft);
- (c) Gulf: Montcalm, La Motte Piquet (frigates), Marne (support ship).

In the Red Sea the frigate Commandant Bory is escorting transport ships bringing reinforcements to Yanbu for Operation Daguet.

Other naval vessels in the general area are the frigates *Du Chayla* and *Protet* and the support vessels *Durance* and *Var*.

The normal levels of forces in Djibouti have been augmented with Mirage F-1-C interceptors for air defence and a second Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft.

In Abu Dhabi, France has one squadron of Mirage F-1 aircraft, a reconnaissance squadron equipped with Milan anti-tank missiles, one section of Mistral anti-aircraft launchers and two sections of Crotale anti-aircraft launchers.

French ground forces in Saudi Arabia (Operation Daguet) are: 1st Regiment of Spahis equipped with 48 AMX-10RC tanks and other armoured vehicles, 2nd Foreign Legion Infantry

Regiment, 2nd Company of the 6th Foreign Legion Engineering Regiment, a unit of anti-aircraft artillery from the 11th Artillery Regiment and over 30 combat aircraft (Mirage 2000 RDI, Mirage F-1-CR, Jaguar and a number of air tankers C-135F).

#### *Germany*

As the Federal German constitution does not allow for operational deployment outside the NATO area, the five minehunters and two supply ships that left Wilhelmshaven on 16th August will remain in the Eastern Mediterranean, based in Crete. The Bundeswehr has transferred 60 Fox chemical warfare-equipped reconnaissance vehicles to the United States Army for use in the Gulf.

The German Government has agreed to provide financial support for United States armed forces in the Gulf area and to help defray the cost of the United Nations embargo to countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. DM 1.6 billion have been allocated for help with reinforcement and resupply (sea- and airlift) and for various items of equipment (light armoured vehicles, detection systems, communication equipment). DM 1.7 billion will be available through the European Community as financial aid to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey.

#### *Italy*

The Italian Navy corvettes *Minerva* and *Sfinge* sailed to the Eastern Mediterranean to replace United States ships (16th August). The frigates *Libeccio* and *Orsa* are operational in the Gulf area. A supply ship is also on the way and a replenishment tanker *Stromboli* relieved the French tanker *Durance*. Eight Tornado fighters for air defence of Italian naval forces are now stationed in Abu Dhabi.

Italy has agreed to provide transport ships for the multinational force in the Gulf area.

#### *Luxembourg*

Not possessing vessels to send to the Gulf area or Mediterranean, Luxembourg is providing financial support to other WEU members engaged with men or material (as was also the case in 1987/88). Some \$2 million have been pledged so far.

#### *Netherlands*

The two Royal Netherlands Navy frigates in the Gulf, *Witte de With* and *Pieter Florisz*, will be replaced by the *Jacob van Heemskerck* and *Philips van Almonde* at the end of the year. The support ship *Zuiderkruis* will be replacing a British fleet auxiliary.

## Portugal

Portugal has agreed to send transport ships to the Gulf area and the government has also increased the facilities for air transport of the American forces and materials through the air bases of Lages and Santa Maria in the Azores archipelago. A C-130 aircraft has been ferrying refugees from Jordan to Egypt and a medical team is deployed in the area.

## Spain

The Spanish Navy has a frigate Santa Maria on patrol in the WEU Gulf areas, as well as two corvettes, Descubierta and Cazadora, in the Red Sea. These ships are all to be relieved in the coming months and Spain has declared its readiness to consider logistic and medical support if requested by the WEU.

## United Kingdom

Operation Granby includes the frigates HMS Battleaxe, HMS Brazen and HMS London, the Leander-class frigate HMS Jupiter, the two Type-42 destroyers, HMS York and HMS Gloucester, as well as a supply ship Olna and a fleet tanker Orangeleaf. Three MCMVs, HMS Cattistock, Atherstone, and Hurworth, have been deployed with their support ship, HMS Herald. The heavy repair ship RFA Diligence has arrived in Jebel Ali from the Falklands and the destroyer Cardiff is en route from the United Kingdom, as is RFA Argus (normally equipped for helicopter operations, but now rigged as a medical receiving station with teams of medical specialists on board).

Ground forces in Saudi Arabia will comprise 6 000 men of the 7th Armoured Brigade from the British Army of the Rhine. This force includes the Queen's Dragoon Guards equipped with armoured vehicles, the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards with 60 Challenger tanks, the Royal Irish Hussars with another 60 Challenger tanks, the Staffordshire Regiment with armoured vehicles, the 40th Field Regiment Royal Artillery (24 155 mm guns) and one squadron from the Army Air Corps (9 Lynx and 4 Gazelle helicopters). The force will be complete by mid-November and will also include the 39th Engineer Regiment, 22nd Field Hospital, 16th Field Ambulance unit and Royal Signals satellite link detachments.

The Royal Air Force has two squadrons of Tornado F3 ADV in Dhahran, a squadron of Tornado GRI IDS in Tabuk (Saudi Arabia) and another in Bahrain, where there is also a Jaguar squadron and two Rapier detachments. Four Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft are based in Sib (Oman).

## VI. Outstanding issues

### (i) National contributions

56. While there are obviously various political considerations in member nations which may preclude one or other country from sending combat forces to the Gulf region, there are nevertheless a series of imperatives as to why all member states should review their positions in an effort to see whether more might be contributed. After all, the reason for the WEU alliance to react to the crisis as it has is a common denominator. This is the first time in the history of the United Nations that one member has attacked and tried to annex another and all our countries are affected in a very similar way when it comes to such a threat to a large percentage of our oil supplies. Hence the need for solidarity between us.

57. Even if a particular country wishes not to become involved to any great extent militarily, there are ample opportunities to work together with others, especially, for example, in the areas of logistics and medical help. This wider forum is now being addressed but it would be of great help if more offers were made spontaneously instead of having to be coaxed forth.

58. One current idea which would appear to lend itself to the WEU concept is the provision of a hospital ship for the Gulf region – with each nation contributing whatever medical resources possible: both personnel and equipment would be needed.

59. The formula used by the Belgian Government, by which WEU was offered four C-130 transport aircraft, is ideal in the given situation.

### (ii) Air cover and air operations generally

60. France, Italy and the United Kingdom are the only WEU nations with combat aircraft in the Gulf region. At present all these aircraft have purely national missions – providing air cover as necessary for their own national forces. This means that some forces are well protected whereas others have to rely entirely on allies for that protection. Your Rapporteur feels that consideration must be given urgently to a reappraisal of the possibilities for increased co-operation with the institution maybe of specific WEU zones of operation in the air just as there are at sea.

61. In this context it is hoped that a sector may be found for the Dutch F-16s which would prove an invaluable asset to co-operate with the French and Italians.

62. Another way in which countries with limited possibilities might act nevertheless is in the realm of providing replacement aircraft to allow in-depth maintenance of both men and



machines as the crisis continues. For example, the United Kingdom's Nimrod aircraft based in Oman are flying twice as many hours as normal: bringing in another country's P3 MPA aircraft for a spell would allow much-needed rest and maintenance... If some forces are already stretched now, what would happen if conflict came?

*(iii) Forward planning*

63. Obviously planning ahead is a function of an individual nation's willingness to participate but if conflict should break out it would benefit all concerned to have made various contingency plans. An outstanding question concerns the rôle of naval forces in time of tension and once hostilities have broken out. There would be a myriad of jobs to be done: escort duty for the tankers still delivering essential oils and fuels, escorts also for high-value targets bringing reinforcements and resupplying those already in place, perhaps also escorting amphibious shipping on its way north-westwards (depending on what happens in relation to the military option). Mine-hunting and -sweeping would be another consideration. As well as the United States, Belgium and Britain have specialist ships in the area: have any plans been made for co-operation between these ships or allocation of zones decided now that the risk of mines has been emphasised in recent briefings? (See Appendix V for Iraqi capabilities in mine warfare.)

64. Our governments must obviously consult formally where co-operation is concerned – but that consideration of possible war missions and decisions such as whether to stay and fight or cut and run should be prepared well in advance: they would come too late if left until the day when conflict begins.

*(iv) Publicity*

65. In Document 1243, emphasis was placed on links with the United States in presenting WEU Gulf actions, but there is a wider public which deserves better and more frequent information. As defence budgets in national capitals decline as cuts begin to take effect, it becomes increasingly important to present actions as a question of priorities.

66. It might well be that the Council could ask the Secretary-General to co-ordinate the presentation of WEU's rôle to the media and to the public in member countries, ensuring a tight liaison between the national public relations organisations which exist in all defence ministries and maybe formalising such links for the future.

67. Not least of the considerations as already stressed in Document 1243 is that of convincing Americans (especially those in Congress) that

the Europeans are bearing their share of the burden and now is the ideal time to illustrate the European rôle in the most graphic way possible.

*VII. Lessons for the future*

68. The present Gulf crisis, unique in its genre, may not prove the ideal model for shaping European forces for the future, but there are a number of lessons to be drawn from it which are already obvious.

69. In these days of never-ending debates on future defence and security structures, at a time when defence cuts are starting to hit both in terms of personnel and equipment, there has to be a general consensus within the WEU Council that WEU is proving its worth as the best present forum for out-of-area co-ordination. The modified Brussels Treaty with its many facets, not least of which is the famous Article VIII, has provided a basis for concerted European action which should now be formalised with reinforced decision-making and even operational powers for the future.

70. In addition to the main requirements for European forces over the coming decades: mobile, flexible, rapidly-deployable, it will be essential to seek as much co-operation as possible between all our countries in WEU. Whether it be procurement policies, joint operations or multinational units, we must keep open minds as to the modalities, but amongst those we should now start considering is the idea of creating a WEU naval on-call force for external operations (a WEU/Armilla patrol for perpetuating a European presence in the Gulf area, without keeping vast armies on land, might be a natural progression from present arrangements).

71. In addition, a possible pooling of appropriate national air-mobile assets into a multinational European rapid action force for operations beyond the Atlantic area should be studied as a matter of urgency in the WEU Council's Defence Representatives Group. The Defence Committee itself will be investigating the subject and making recommendations in a forthcoming report, to be entitled "Arms control: force reductions and the rôle of multinational units" (Rapporteur: Mr. Uyttendaele).

*VIII. Conclusion*

72. The above considerations are of course relevant for the longer term. For the immediate future, it is essential that the watchword remains as stated in the final paragraph of Document 1243:

"We must make certain that we build on what has been achieved and carry through our actions to help the United Nations' efforts on the Gulf crisis reach a satisfactory and secure conclusion."



APPENDIX I

*Naval actions linked to the application of the embargo since  
the adoption of United Nations Resolution 665  
(period covered: 26th August-1st November 1990)*

	Numbers of merchant ships			
	Challenged	Boarded	Diverted	Warning shots
1. <i>Strait of Tiran</i>				
WEU units (France, Spain) .....	592	43	0	0
Other units (Greece, United States) .....	919	269	4	2
2. <i>Strait of Bab El-Mandab</i>				
WEU units (Belgium, France) .....	1 654	11	0	1
Other units (United States) .....	8	1	0	0
3. <i>Strait of Hormuz</i>				
WEU units (France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom) .....	3 916	18	1	1
Others units (Australia, Canada, United States) .....	2 180	68	11	6
TOTALS (as at 1st November 1990) .....	9 269	410	16	10

## APPENDIX II

*Updated position of present or future forces  
in the region of the Gulf<sup>1</sup>**19th September**Argentina*

Argentina undertook to send a task force to the Gulf composed of two of its most modern ships armed with Exocet missiles, a battalion of about 450 paratroopers, a Hercules C-130 and a Boeing 707 of the Argentinian air force. This task force is reported to be financed by Kuwait.

*20th September**France*

The Ministry of Defence chartered nine ships to transport troops, equipment and rations for Operation Daguet, i.e. car ferries, cargo ships, container ships and roll-on, roll-off cargo ships with a gross registered tonnage of 60 000 tons.

Four convoys are planned: Angéla, Alice, Arlette and Amélie. The first convoy consisted of a car ferry and two accompanying cargo ships.

*Japan*

Three ships for transporting equipment were made available to the multinational force deployed in the region of the Gulf.

*Iraq*

Iraq is now believed to have 360 000 troops in Kuwait, supported by 2 800 tanks, 1 800 light armoured vehicles and 1 450 pieces of artillery.

*21st September**Spain*

Spanish ships were deployed in their zones of operation. The corvettes Cazadora and Descubierta were in the Red Sea in the Strait of Tiran and the frigate Santa Maria in the Gulf of Oman.

*25th September**Bangladesh*

It was announced that 5 000 troops will be sent to join the 2 000 already in Saudi Arabia.

*Egypt*

It was decided to send 15 000 troops and 300 tanks to join the 5 000 troops in the special light brigades already present since the beginning of the Gulf crisis. It is expected to reach a total of about 35 000 troops in the near future.

*Czechoslovakia*

President Havel proposed sending 200 troops equipped for chemical warfare if Saudi Arabia so requested.

*26th September**WEU*

At the meeting of the Permanent Council of WEU on 26th September, the representatives of Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal informed the Council of their decision to contribute to the joint effort. Belgium decided to send a frigate and four Hercules C-130 aircraft, Luxembourg offered to contribute about \$2 million to cover the cost of transport and Portugal offered to help with air transport (a Hercules C-130 is transporting refugees between Amman and Cairo), a transport ship and medical supplies (a medical team is already in the area).

*28th September**Iraq*

Iraqi forces in and around Kuwait were believed to number 430 000 troops plus 3 500 tanks, 2 500 armoured transport vehicles and 1 700 pieces of artillery.

*Italy*

Italy decided to send eight Tornados from the air base at Gioia del Colle (Bari) to Abu Dhabi to protect Italian naval units in the Gulf. These aircraft will be refuelled in flight by Royal Air Force VC-10s.

*Netherlands*

The squadron of F-16 fighters planned to strengthen the air embargo decided upon by the United Nations Security Council will not be deployed in Turkey.

1. See also Appendices I (External naval forces in the Gulf area) and II (External naval forces in transit to the Gulf) in Document 1243.

29th September

*Canada*

To ensure the air protection of its ships in the Gulf region, Canada decides to send a squadron of eighteen CF-18 fighters and 450 men belonging to the 409th Tactical Fighter Squadron.

*Egypt*

In addition to forces already present (some 20 000), 1 500 troops, tanks, armoured vehicles and air defence systems are to be deployed with the Arab multinational force in Hafar al Batin (Saudi Arabia).

*Netherlands*

Ships are to leave to relieve ships already in the Gulf, i.e. the frigates Jacob van Heemskerck and Philips van Almonde (Kortenaer-class) and the fast combat support ship Zuijderkruis. These ships are to be based at Mina Jebel Ali, south of Dubai.

*Taiwan*

An initial contribution of \$100 million was proposed to assist American forces in the Gulf.

1st October

*Argentina*

In spite of opposition from some political fractions and public opinion, the Argentinian task force left the naval base of Punta Alta (800 km south of Buenos Aires) for Oman. The task force is composed of the destroyer Almirante Brown and the corvette Spiro carrying Exocet missiles and an Alouette helicopter. It left on 26th September.

*Romania*

Though not officially confirmed, this country is believed to have proposed to accommodate American troops on their way to and from the Gulf in tourist resorts along the Black Sea. This offer is also reported to be extended to British and Canadian troops.

*Eastern European countries*

Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania were reported to have offered to send medical supplies to help the multinational forces in the Gulf. Bulgaria is even reported to have proposed sending 400 troops, but this has not been confirmed.

3rd October

*United States*

United States naval forces are:

- *in the Gulf*: an aircraft carrier, the USS Independence, a combat ship, three cruisers, one destroyer, three frigates, three amphibious craft, one auxiliary vessel, command vessels (La Salle, Blue Ridge), plus two hospital ships (Comfort, Mercy) and two air force logistical support ships (Curtiss, Wright);
- *in Bahrain*: 1 heavy cargo ship Super Servant III, four mine hunters Avenger, Adroit, Impervious, Leader;
- *in the north of the Gulf of Oman / Arabian Sea*: thirteen amphibious craft, five auxiliary vessels, two frigates and one destroyer;
- *in the Red Sea*: one aircraft carrier USS Kennedy, three cruisers, three frigates, two auxiliary vessels;
- *in the Eastern Mediterranean*: one aircraft carrier USS Saratoga and its combat group, one cruiser (Belknap) and four amphibious craft.

6th October

According to the IISS Military Balance 1990-1991, on 1st June 1990 the Iraqi army consisted of:

*(i) Army*

- 955 000 troops;
- 7 army corps;
- 7 armoured divisions;
- 40 infantry divisions;
- 6 divisions of the Republican Guard.

*Equipment:*

- 5 500 heavy tanks (T-72, 62, 55, 54);
- 100 light tanks;
- 2 500 reconnaissance vehicles;
- 7 500 infantry/transport armoured vehicles;
- 3 000 towed artillery;
- 500 self-propelled artillery;
- 200 rocket launchers;
- 86 surface-to-surface missile launchers (50 Frog-7, 36 Scud-B - Abbas, Hussein);
- 4 000 anti-aircraft defence guns;
- 600 surface-to-air missile launchers;
- 489 helicopters (various types), including 159 armed.

*(ii) Navy*

- 5 000 men (based in Basrah and Umm Qasr);
- 5 frigates;

- 38 patrol and coastal combatants;
- 8 mine warfare vessels.

(iii) *Air force*

- 40 000 men;
- 2 Tu-22 Blinder and Tu-16 Badger squadrons;
- 22 fighter-bomber squadrons of MiG-19s, -23s; Mirages; Sukhoi-7s, -20s, -24s and -25s;
- 17 fighter aircraft squadrons of MiG-19s, -21s, -25s, -29s and Mirage F-1s;
- 1 reconnaissance squadron of MiG-21s, 25s;
- 2 transport squadrons of An-2s, -12s, -24s, -26s and Il-76s.

*7th October*

*United Kingdom*

RAF Jaguar aircraft are redeployed to Bahrain from Oman.

*16th October*

*United Kingdom*

First contingent of the United Kingdom's 7th Armoured Brigade arrives in Saudi Arabia.

*Japan*

In Japan, against mounting opposition, the government introduces a bill to parliament to allow forces to be sent abroad. (Such moves have since been condemned by China.)

*18th October*

*Spain*

In Spain it is announced that the frigate Numancia is to sail for the Gulf from Ferrol as a replacement and that the corvettes will be relieved in the Red Sea on 9th November by the Diana and Cristina.

*20th October*

Iraqi deployment in Kuwait: about 470 000 troops.

In the front line (Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian frontier): 24 divisions with:

- 3 700 tanks (two-thirds of the Iraqi total);
- 2 300 infantry combat vehicles;
- 2 200 pieces of artillery including 2 battalions of Frog-7 surface-to-surface missiles (USSR, range 70 km, accuracy 400 m).

In reserve: 4 reinforcement divisions.

Behind the lines:

- 3 divisions of the Republican Guard (crack units);
- 5 infantry divisions.

These forces are protected by the Iraqi air force. In Kuwait, the Iraqis have also laid mine-fields and buried most of their armoured vehicles. Facing the French Daguet force and Arab troops in Saudi Arabia, Iraq has deployed the 16th Infantry Division of 13 000 troops with:

- 3 infantry regiments;
- 1 tank regiment;
- 1 surface-to-surface artillery regiment;
- 1 engineering battalion;
- 1 anti-tank weapons battalion;
- 1 reconnaissance battalion;
- 1 surface-to-air weapons battalion.

Along the Turkish-Iraqi frontier, Iraq now has 250 000 troops with armoured vehicles, heavy artillery (and missiles?). The Iraqi deployment has been reinforced with 2 infantry divisions and 1 armoured division from the frontier with Iran. The deployment along the frontier with Syria has also been reinforced with 3 infantry divisions.

*21st October*

*Iraq*

Iraq is reportedly trying to make the c. 150 Hawk missiles captured in Kuwait operational.

*25th October*

*United States*

United States Defence Secretary Cheney suggests that a further 100 000 troops (besides the 240 000 already in or on their way to Saudi Arabia) would be necessary to mount an offensive action against Iraq.

*31st October*

*France*

2 squadrons of AMX-10RC tanks (270 men) of the 1st Foreign Cavalry Regiment (based in Orange) left France for the Yanbu garrison in Saudi Arabia. Units of the 1st Regiment of Spahis will join them later, thus completing the Daguet force.

Consideration is also being given to sending 155 mm towed artillery.

*Portugal*

A Portuguese transport ship was reported loading material at the Marchwood military port in the United Kingdom.

## APPENDIX III

*Allied air power in the Gulf area<sup>2</sup>*

Currently deployed in the area are:

- 271 air superiority fighters;
- 595 dedicated and multi-rôle offensive strike aircraft;
- 64 electronic warfare and reconnaissance aircraft;
- hundreds of attack, assault and scout helicopters;
- transport and tanker aircraft;
- support aircraft.

*(a) United States*

## 1. Air superiority fighters (132 aircraft):

- 48 F-15C/D (from the 27th and 71st TFS, 1st TFW, Langley AFB) based at Dhahran since the beginning of the crisis;
- 24 F-15C/D (60th TFS, 33rd TFW, Englin AFB, Florida) reported to be deployed;
- 60 F-14A (based on USS Saratoga, Independence and John F. Kennedy).

## 2. Dedicated offensive aircraft (260 + 26 B-52G):

- 22 F-117A Stealth fighters (37th TFW, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada) at bases on the Arabian Peninsula;
- 50 A-6E (aircraft carriers);
- 20 A-6E (with USMC-MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force));
- 38 F-111F (48th TFW, Lakenheath, United Kingdom) at an undisclosed base in Saudi Arabia;
- 24 A-7E (USS John F. Kennedy);
- 60 AV-8B (with the USMC-MEF);
- 48 A-10A (354th TFW, Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina) reported to be at Al Jabayl in Saudi Arabia;
- 26 B-52G (Loring AFB, Maine, Castle AFB, California) reported to have been deployed to Diego Garcia.

## 3. Multi-rôle combat aircraft (180):

- 24 F-15E (336th TFS, 4th TFW, Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina) based at Thumrait, Oman;
- 44 F-16C/D (17th, 33rd TFS, 363rd TFW, Shaw AFB, Georgia) based at Al Dhafra, Sharjah, UAE;

- 24 F-16C/D (614th TFS, 401st TFW, Torrejon AB, Spain) deployed at Doha, Qatar;
- 40 F/A-18 (aircraft carriers);
- 48 F/A-18 (USMC-MEF).

## 4. EW and reconnaissance aircraft (54):

- 12 F-4G Wild Weasels (35th TFW, George AFB, California) at an unknown location;
- 12 EF-111A (336th TFW, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho);
- 18 EA-6B (aircraft carriers and USMC-MEF);
- 12 RF-4C (106th TRS, Birmingham, Alabama ANG).

## 5. Airborne command, transport and tanker aircraft include:

- C-130 Hercules aircraft;
- E-2C AWACS aircraft (United States Navy);
- E-3A AWACS aircraft;
- KC-13S tankers;
- KC-10;
- KC-130 (United States Navy and USMC);
- MC-130 special operations aircraft;
- MH-53 special operations aircraft.

The USAF 507th Tactical Air Control Wing (Shaw AFB) provides forward air control, communications and mobile radars for ground-controlled interception support.

## 6. Maritime patrol aircraft and anti-submarine aircraft include:

- 30 USN carrier-borne S-3A/B Viking;
- P-3C (United States Navy).

USMC units reported to have been deployed:

- 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (Fleet Marine Force Atlantic);
- 3rd MAF (FMF Pacific).

## 7. Helicopter assets include attack helicopters:

- AH-64A Apache;
- Bell AH-1W Super Cobra.

## 8. United States Army aviation units include elements of the:

- 101st Aviation Brigade;
- United States Army Europe's 12th Combat Aviation Brigade;
- 3rd Armoured Division,

2. See also Appendices III (External air forces in the Gulf area) and VI (Iraq's air forces) in Document 1243.

plus the regular units deployed with the:

- 82nd Airborne Division;
- 101st Airborne Division;
- 24th Mechanised Infantry Division;
- 1st Cavalry Division (with an additional brigade from the 2nd Armoured Division) now deploying.

*(b) United Kingdom*

1. Air superiority fighters (18):
  - 18 Tornado F3 with latest version of Foxhunter AI24 radar (23, 25 Squadron, RAF Leeming) at Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia.
2. Dedicated offensive aircraft (36):
  - 24 Tornado IDS (RAF, Germany) in Bahrain;
  - 12 Jaguar GR-1A (RAF Cottishall wing) in Muharraq, Bahrain (4 with tactical reconnaissance pods).
3. EW and reconnaissance aircraft (6):
  - 6 TR-1A (17th Reconnaissance Wing, RAF Alconbury) at undisclosed location.
4. Airborne command, transport and tanker aircraft include:
  - C-130 Hercules;
  - VC-10 tankers.
5. Maritime patrol aircraft and anti-submarine aircraft:
  - 3 Nimrod MR2 (RAF Kinloss Wing) at Seeb, Oman.

*(c) Saudi Arabia (RSAF)*

1. Air superiority fighters (84):
  - 60 F-15C/D (from 5, 6 and 13 Squadrons) based at Taif, Khamis Mushayt, Dhahran AFBs;
  - 24 Tornado ADV (29 Squadron) based at Dhahran AFB.
2. Dedicated offensive aircraft (30):
  - 30 Tornado IDS (7 Squadron).

3. Multi-rôle combat aircraft (75):
  - 45 F-5E (3, 10, 15 and 17 Squadrons) at Taif, Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk AFBs;
  - 30 Hawks (with Kuwait AF).
4. Airborne command:
  - E-3A AWACS (with USAF).

*(d) France*

1. Air superiority fighters (4):
  - 4 plus Mirage 2000 deployed at Hufuf (East of Dhahran).
2. Dedicated offensive aircraft (8):
  - 8 Jaguar A/E at Hufuf.
3. EW and reconnaissance aircraft (4):
  - 4 Mirage F1-CR (ER 33, Strasbourg) at Hufuf.
4. Tanker aircraft:
  - KC-135.
5. Helicopter assets:
  - 5th Combat Helicopter Regiment (48 helicopters).

*(e) Others*

*Canada*

Air superiority fighters (18) to be deployed:

- 18 CF-18 (409 Squadron, 1 Canadian Air Division from Baden-Sollingen, Germany) to be deployed to provide air cover for Canadian ships in the Gulf.

*Italy*

Dedicated aircraft for air defence (8):

- 8 Tornado IDS in Abu Dhabi.

*Kuwait*

1. Air superiority fighters (15):
  - 15 Mirage F-1 CK/BK which escaped to Saudi Arabia in August;
2. Multi-rôle combat aircraft (30):
  - 30 Hawks (with RSAF).

## APPENDIX IV

*Allied ground forces in the Gulf area*<sup>3</sup>*(a) Arab-Muslim forces**(i) Saudi Arabia*

75 000 regulars (Army and National Guard) and 550 tanks.

1. The army comprises:
  - 2 armoured brigades:
    - the King Fahd Brigade Group equipped with M-60A3 tanks and M-113 APCs, and
    - the Khalid Bin Waleed Brigade Group equipped with AMX-30 tanks and AMX-10 APCs;
  - 4 mechanised brigades;
  - 1 infantry brigade;
  - 1 airborne brigade;
  - 3 Royal Guard battalions.
2. The National Guard comprises:
  - 2 mechanised brigades equipped with V-150 Commando APCs;
  - 2 infantry brigades.

*(ii) Other members of the GCC (Bahrain, Oman, UAE, Qatar)*

- 55 000 ground troops (altogether);
- 300 AMX-30, M-60, OF-40 and Chieftain tanks.

A 10 000-strong force including Saudi elements is deployed at Hafi-Al Batin (North East Saudi Arabia). This force includes elements of the Kuwaiti Army including a depleted armoured battalion equipped with Chieftain tanks.

*(iii) Egypt and Syria*

Each committed a division to the multinational force in Saudi Arabia.

*Egypt:*

- 3rd Mechanised Division (15 000 men and 300 M-60 MBTs);
- special forces;
- chemical defence units.

*Syria:*

- 4 000 troops;
- one armoured division (15 000 men and 270 tanks) is pledged.

*(iv) Others**Morocco:*

- 1 700 troops (one airborne brigade).

*Pakistan:*

- 5 000 troops (one infantry brigade group).

500 Afghan Mujaheddin

*(b) Western forces**(i) United States*

All United States forces in the Gulf are commanded by General Schwartzkopf. United States Army units are subordinate to Lieutenant General John Yeosock (3rd Army Headquarters). Marine Corps Units come under Lt. General Walter Boomer (I Marine Expeditionary Force).

*3rd Army*

The most powerful units are:

1. 1st Cavalry Division (Fort Hood, Texas) with 2 active army brigades and a brigade from the 2nd Armoured Division (Fort Hood).

The 1st Cavalry Division has:

- 6 armoured battalions;
- 4 mechanised battalions with 350 M-1 tanks and 220 M-2 Bradley IFVs.

The Division's artillery component has:

- 72 155 mm M-109 SP howitzers;
- 12 8 inch (203 mm) M-110 SP (self-propelled) howitzers;
- 1 battery of 9 MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket Systems).

The Combat Aviation Brigade of the Division has:

- 130 AH-64A Apache attack helicopters;
- OH-58 scout helicopters;
- UH-60 assault helicopters.

2. 24th Infantry Division (mechanised; Fort Stewart, Georgia) with 2 active brigades and the 197th Infantry Brigade (mechanised; Georgia) attached.

The 24th Infantry Division has:

- 5 armoured battalions;
- 5 mechanised battalions with 290 tanks and 275 Bradleys.

3. See also Appendix IV (Foreign troops stationed in Gulf states) in Document 1243.

The Division's artillery component and Combat Aviation Brigade are the same as the 1st Cavalry Division.

3. 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment – the only unit equipped with 120 mm armed M-1A1 MBTs (Fort Bliss, Texas):

- 5 000 personnel
- 130 M-1A1;
- 110 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicles;
- 24 M-109.

Helicopters (80):

- OH-58;
- AH-64A;
- UH-60.

4. 101st Airborne Division (air assault; Fort Campbell, Kentucky) and 82nd Airborne Division (Fort Bragg, North Carolina):

- light infantry formations;
- anti-armour capability with more than 150 TOW missile launchers.

Each division has:

- 3 infantry brigades;
- 9 105 mm howitzer batteries.

The 82nd includes the 3rd Battalion 73rd Armour equipped with M551 light tanks. The mobility of the 101st is provided by the 101st Aviation Brigade equipped with helicopters:

- OH-58 scout;
- AH-64A attack;
- UH-60 assault;
- CH-47 transport.

5. Support units:

- III Corps Artillery (Fort Sill, Oklahoma): M-109 and M-110 SP howitzers;
- 11th Air Defence Artillery Brigade (Fort Bliss, Texas): Patriot launchers;
- 12th Combat Aviation Brigade and 227th Aviation Regiment from United States Army Europe: OH-58D, AH-64A, UH-60 helicopters;
- 7th Medical Command (Germany);
- 1st Corps Support Command (Fort Bragg, North Carolina);
- 13th Corps Support Command (Fort Hood, Texas).

#### *Note*

1. The 350 M-1 tanks deployed in combat-ready units in Saudi Arabia are to be exchanged for more advanced M-1A1 tanks from prepositioned stores in Western Europe. The M-1A1 has an integrated NBC weapon protection system, a 120 mm smoothbore gun (compared to the M-1's 105 mm), improved survivability and improved suspension and track systems.

2. The air defence of the 3rd Army is provided by (hardware):

- 35 Patriot launchers;
- 75 Vulcan close-in weapon systems (CISW).

#### *I Marine Expeditionary Force*

This comprises:

- 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii);
- 4th MEB (Norfolk, Virginia);
- 7th MEB (Twenty-nine Palms, California).

Each MEB includes:

- 17 000 marines;
- one ground combat element;
- one air combat element;
- one service support element.

1st MEB and 7th MEB are deployed in Saudi Arabia. 4th MEB remains embarked (with the USS Independence Battle Group).

Available in the Eastern Mediterranean:

- Marine Amphibious Ready Group 3-90 comprising the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (22 000 men) embarked on four amphibious ships.

MEF land systems hardware:

(a) *vehicles*:

- 140 M-60A1 tanks;
- 170 LAV;
- 300 amphibious assault vehicles.

(b) *artillery*:

- 4 105 mm towed howitzers;
- 90 155 mm towed howitzers;
- 6 155 mm SP howitzers;
- 6 8 inch (203 mm) SP howitzers.

(c) *air defence*:

- 15 Hawk launchers.

#### *Note*

1. As the 140 M-60A1 of the 1st and 3rd Tank Battalions are the only MBTs integral to I MEF, the United Kingdom's 7th Armoured Brigade will be attached to it.

2. In addition, units of the United States Seal (sea-air-land) and Green Beret special forces teams are reported to be in the area.

#### *(ii) United Kingdom*

The 7th Armoured Brigade comprises:

- one armoured reconnaissance squadron;
- 2 armoured regiments each with 57 Challenger 1MK3 MBTs;



- one armoured infantry battalion equipped with Warrior IFVs;
- one artillery regiment with 24 M-109 SP howitzers (155 mm) and 36 Javelin surface-to-air missile launchers.

In addition, units of the Special Air Service and Special Boat Squadron are reported to be in the area.

*(iii) France*

The French ground component consists of a composite force drawn from 3 divisions of the FAR. The 5 000-man force is deployed at Hafar-al-Batin (300 km north of Hufuf).

It consists of:

- HQ element from the 6th Light Armoured Division;
- 1st Spahis Regiment (AMX-10RC armoured reconnaissance vehicles);
- 5th Combat Helicopter Regiment (48 helicopters including "HOT" and

- 20 mm cannon-armed Gazelle and Puma support helicopters);
- 2 Foreign Legion Infantry Regiments (VAB wheeled APCs, Milan AT (anti-tank) missiles);
- 11th Marine Artillery Regiment (155 mm towed howitzers, 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, one SAM battery);
- one light reconnaissance squadron from the 11th Parachute Hussar Regiment (deployed in the UAE).

*(iv) Others*

*Bangladesh*

2 000 troops (infantry and engineers).

*Czechoslovakia*

200-man chemical defence unit (?).

*Poland*

Pledged to send a field hospital and a hospital ship.

## APPENDIX V

*Iraqi mine capability**(a) Some available types*

1. Supplied by the USSR:
  - AMD/KMD-series - bottom influence mines;
  - Krabs-type;
  - M08 (as in 1908);
  - MKB-series.
2. Supplied by Italy:
  - MISAR-Manta - bottom influence mine - operates at depths of up to 100 m and has a 140 kg warhead. Plastic-cased it is difficult to detect.
3. Iraqi-manufactured (based on Soviet designs):
  - Al Muthena - moored contact mine (AM-35- and AM-45-series with 35 kg and 45 kg warheads). Manufactured with anchor and cable and also as a drifting mine;
  - Sigeel - bottom-moored contact mine with a 400 kg warhead;
  - Sumer - acoustic/magnetic bottom mine;
  - Alkaakaa-16 - floating/submersible mine designed to destroy offshore

structures. It is a  $3.4 \times 3.4 \times 3$  m, 16 t mine with a 13 t warhead and detonation by timer or remote control.

*(b) Minelaying capability*

1. By air:
 

Several helicopters:


  - Super Frelon (Aérospatiale, France);
  - MI-8/MI-17 (USSR).

Several aircraft:

  - Tu-16 Badger (USSR);
  - Tu-22 Blinder (USSR).
2. By sea:
  - 3 Polnochny landing craft (USSR);
  - 1 T-43-class ocean minesweeper (USSR);
  - 3 Yevgenya-class inshore minesweepers (USSR);
  - 3 Nestin-class minesweepers (Yugoslavia).

Other ships available including some air cushion vehicles type SR-N6 (United Kingdom-built) captured during the invasion of Kuwait.

APPENDIX VI  
The Gulf area



Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 1990

- Ⓐ Strait of Tiran
- Ⓑ Strait of Bab el-Mandab
- Ⓒ Strait of Hormuz

Legend

- Air base
- Naval base
- Missile base
- Major Saudi oil belt

*Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:  
continuing operations in the Gulf region*

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AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Lambie*

---

1. Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper.
2. Leave out paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Signed: Lambie*

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1. See 10th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendments negatived).

***Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:  
continuing operations in the Gulf region***

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**AMENDMENT 3 <sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others***

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3. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after “ Brussels Treaty ”.

*Signed: Stoffelen, Martinez, Soell*

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1. See 10th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment negatived).

*Consequences` of the invasion of Kuwait:  
continuing operations in the Gulf region*

---

AMENDMENT 4 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Martinez and others*

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4. In paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after “ European forces ”.

*Signed: Martinez, Stoffelen, Soell*

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1. See 10th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment negatived).

*Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:  
continuing operations in the Gulf region*

**ADDENDUM**

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee  
by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur*

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

- I. Updated data on C<sup>3</sup>I in the Gulf region
- II. Chronology of the latest events
- III. Update on military technology and weaponry in the Gulf

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- I. Naval actions linked to the application of the embargo since the adoption of United Nations Resolution 665
- II. Naval forces in the Gulf region
- III. United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (29th November 1990)

***I. Updated data on C<sup>3</sup>I in the Gulf region***

***30th September***

According to the Director for C<sup>3</sup>I on the joint staff of the United States forces in the Gulf, Lieutenant General James Cassidy, to ensure adequate satellite communications for United States troops in Saudi Arabia, the Defence Department has rented capacity on satellites operated by the Intelsat (civilian-run, Washington-based) organisation.

Military commanders in Saudi Arabia are relying heavily on GPS receivers. The Global Positioning System consists of 14 satellites which continually broadcast accurate navigational information to users below.

***15th October***

Allied forces in Saudi Arabia have established a management panel which will reserve radio frequencies for each of the numerous communications systems to speed up communications and avoid accidental jamming.

The panel includes representatives from Saudi Arabia and all countries sending forces to the region.

***1st November***

Britain's Gulf operation "Granby" is being directed from the bunker known as the Primary War HQ at RAF High Wycombe in Buckinghamshire.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine is the Joint Military Commander of all British forces in Operation Granby. He is responsible to the Secretary of State for Defence and oversees the operation from the United Kingdom.

***6th November***

The United States and Saudi Arabia reached agreement on the operational command and control of troops if military action is needed against Iraq.

The agreement was reached during talks in Djeddah (Saudi Arabia) between United States Secretary of State James Baker, King Fahd and senior Saudi ministers.

Under the agreement, United States and Saudi forces will operate under a joint command in defence of the Kingdom. For military action beyond Saudi borders, United States troops would operate under American commanders after the operation was approved "at the highest political level" of both governments.

*10th November*

The Headquarters of RAF Strike Command (High Wycombe, United Kingdom) has been augmented by 200 army and navy personnel to become the joint HQ for Operation Granby.

*14th November*

When a second British armoured brigade arrives in Saudi Arabia, a divisional headquarters will have to be set up in the area for command and control.

Lieutenant General Sir Peter de la Billière will remain overall Commander of the British ground forces. But another senior officer will be appointed under him, operating from the divisional headquarters.

*17th November*

Air Vice Marshal William Wratten will succeed AVM Sandy Wilson as Air Commander British Forces Middle East. He will assume the post of Deputy to Lieutenant General Sir Peter de la Billière, British Forces Commander Middle East.

*19th November*

According to John Davis, Chief Scientist in the United States Navy's Space and Electronic Warfare Branch, forces in the United States "Desert Shield" operation are rapidly exhausting the capacity in the "Fleet Satellite Communications" satellites. There is an increased need for military communications as the satellites are being used by all United States units in the Gulf region (army, navy, air force and marines).

Options under study by the Defence Communications Agency include the use of the NATO 4 satellite slated for launch in December, movement of a United States Defence Satellite Communications System 3 satellite to a perch over the Persian Gulf or leasing of additional communications capacity from civilian satellites.

As another option, the United States might push for activation of an already orbiting NATO satellite.

The Defence Department is relying heavily on support from industry to meet the increased demand for communications caused by the accelerated troop build-up in Saudi Arabia, according to Defence Department officials.

## *II. Chronology of the latest events*

*9th October*

### *Egypt*

The Commander of the Egyptian forces in Saudi Arabia, Major General Mohammed Ali Bilal, said that "Egyptian forces will not join any attack on Iraq".

*27th October*

### *France*

It is planned to relieve French forces based in Saudi Arabia in January/February 1991.

Operation Daguet has been strengthened with the arrival of 500 additional troops, 22 anti-tank helicopters (HOT missiles) and 24 AMX-10-RCs (reconnaissance).

*29th October*

### *France*

Three French soldiers on a reconnaissance mission were captured, with their equipment, by Iraqi troops in circumstances that are not yet clear.

The three soldiers, one officer and two non-commissioned officers, belong to the 13th Regiment of Parachute Dragoons – an intelligence unit – and have been "returned" to the French Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad with their equipment.

*31st October*

### *United States*

The number of United States servicemen killed accidentally since Operation Desert Shield began in August has reached 48.

The United States forces started a large-scale beach assault exercise. The 10-day exercise code-named "Sea Soldier II" involves elements of the:

- 4th Marine Expeditionary Force;
- Amphibious Task Group II,

with 26 aircraft, 75 helicopters and 17 ships.

*2nd November*

### *Spain*

According to military and diplomatic sources, there is no question of sending troops from the Spanish army to the Gulf unless hostilities break out. Even then, however, such a



deployment would be improbable for logistic and internal political reasons.

The army headquarters has drawn up plans for possible military intervention and taken measures should the government decide to extend Spain's participation beyond the deployment of three naval units in the Gulf.

*3rd November*

#### *France*

The army headquarters is preparing to send 155 mm towed artillery belonging to the 11th Marine Artillery Regiment (St. Aubin) to strengthen Operation Daguet.

The French army in Saudi Arabia has moved 20 to 30 km further south.

*5th November*

#### *Syria*

The first contingent of the 9th Armoured Division arrived in Yanbu (Saudi Arabia). This contingent of 2 500 to 3 000 soldiers with 100 T-62 tanks and several armoured anti-aircraft vehicles (with 4 ZSU-23-B tracked, radar-guided anti-aircraft guns (USSR)) under the command of Major General Ali Mabib will be deployed near the Saudi-Kuwaiti border.

Syria already has 3 000 ground troops in Saudi Arabia and 1 000 more in the United Arab Emirates.

#### *United Kingdom*

The cost of the British deployment in the Persian Gulf is expected to exceed £600 million (\$1.17 billion) by the end of the financial year (31st March 1991).

#### *United States*

The United States army is reviewing ways to deploy more modern M2 and M3 Bradley IFVs to United States troops in Saudi Arabia. There are 615 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles fielded to the Middle East, all of them older M2 and M3 or M2A1 or M3A1 versions, and none more survivable than the M2A2 and M3A2 version.

*6th November*

#### *Western European Union*

WEU co-ordination meeting on board the Italian ship Stromboli in the Gulf.

#### *United States*

The Defence Department has decided to call up major combat units from the reserves

totalling thousands of men to join the United States forces in the Gulf in the next few months.

More than 34 000 reservists have already been mobilised to perform military support rôles in the United States and in the Gulf region.

These include physicians, port handlers, cargo plane pilots and water purification specialists. Congress extended combat reservists' 180-day call-up limit to 360 days, allowing sufficient time to train them.

*7th November*

#### *Japan*

Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu abandoned a plan to send Japanese troops to the Gulf and called on a fresh plan to aid the international effort in the Gulf region by sending an "all-civilian force" (medical personnel and others).

*8th November*

#### *Netherlands*

The Netherlands said it had rejected a British request to send more troops to the Gulf. Britain asked it to contribute a decontamination company and an engineer support unit.

It would consider the request "only if there is a United Nations resolution supporting such an action".

#### *United Nations*

Medicines provided to Iraq under an exemption from the United Nations embargo could be used for chemical and biological warfare, the Chairman of the United Nations Sanctions Committee, Marjatta Rasi, Finnish Ambassador, said.

The Chairman also said that she was concerned about the large amount of medicines being shipped to Iraq, although she had no evidence that drugs were being misused.

#### *United States*

More than 2 000 American soldiers have been airlifted to hospitals in Germany since the military build-up in the Gulf began in August.

Most had suffered heat-stroke and minor injuries. Officers said that the number reporting sick dropped as the weather cooled down.

*9th November*

#### *Egypt*

President Mubarak announces that another armoured division of 4 000 troops and 400 tanks will be sent to Saudi Arabia towards the end of November.

*Spain*

The three Spanish naval units, the frigate Numancia and the corvettes Diana and Infanta Cristina, sent to replace the units already in the Gulf, arrived in Port Saïd (Egypt) on 7th November.

*United States*

The Department of Defence announces that 824 reserve marines including 600 combat troops have already been recalled for active service.

10th November

*Greece*

Military hospitals in main Greek cities and on the island of Crete have been placed on alert to deal with possible casualties in the event of a war in the Gulf.

*Iraq*

According to United States sources, Iraq has now 2 200 APCs and IFVs in Kuwait and contiguous areas to the north and west. Tanks now number 3 500 and artillery pieces 2 200.

General Hussein Rachid, deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Presidential Guard, is appointed as the new Army Chief-of-Staff.

He commanded the Iraqi forces who drove Iranian forces out of the southern peninsula of Fao in April 1988, the battle which marked the start of a large-scale Iranian withdrawal.

*Portugal*

The naval support ship Sao Miguel will carry food and equipment to the United Kingdom forces in Saudi Arabia.

*Senegal*

The Senegalese military contingent of 500 troops in Saudi Arabia is under the command of Colonel Mouhamadou Keita.

*United Kingdom*

British forces are training for a possible offensive operation to force an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

The 8 000-strong 7th Armoured Brigade Group has been augmented by a squadron of 15 RAF Puma support helicopters transported to the Gulf by USAF C-5 Galaxies.

A detachment of C-130 Hercules transports is expected to be deployed later in November. The Chinook helicopters of the 7th squadron (Odiham, United Kingdom) have been painted in desert colours.

The United Kingdom army and air force contributions consist of:

- 7th Armoured Brigade Group and a Puma squadron (attached to I Marine Expeditionary Force in Saudi Arabia);
- a reinforced squadron of Tornado F3 air defence fighters and an RAF regiment ground defence squadron (in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia);
- a reinforced squadron of Tornado GR1 strike aircraft (in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia),

in Bahrain (Muhanag):

- a reinforced squadron of Tornado GR1;
- a reinforced squadron of Jaguar fighters;
- a detachment of VC-10 air tankers;
- RAF Regiment Rapier squadron and ground defence squadron;
- 22nd Engineer Regiment;
- 33rd Field Hospital,

in Oman (Seeb):

- a Nimrod maritime reconnaissance/ASW squadron;
- VC-10 air tankers.

Royal Navy forces:

- 7 Royal Navy destroyers and frigates;
- 4 mine counter-measures vessels (MCMV);
- 9 Royal Fleet Auxiliary Ships.

Britain's 3 MCMVs in the Gulf, Atherstone, Hurworth and Cattistock, have begun searching for mines following a request from the United States navy.

*United States*

Two United States military bases at Gournia and Souda on the north-western part of Crete have been stocked with pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, while United States army units trained to deal with chemical warfare conditions have been transferred to Crete ready to move into the Gulf if needed.

11th November

*United States*

President Bush has ordered up to 200 000 reinforcements be sent to the Gulf.

According to Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, half of all United States land forces in Europe are being sent to the Gulf. About 200 000 United States army troops are stationed in Europe.

Once the additional forces are in place, the United States will have about 430 000 sol-

diers, airmen and sailors in the Gulf region (more than in Europe during the cold war).

The all-United States force will be joined by up to 100 000 allied and Arab troops making a total of 530 000 men (Iraq has 430 000 men in Kuwait, almost 50% of total Iraqi forces).

The military now has more than 100 cargo ships dedicated to the supply-line feeding and provisioning the forces in the Middle East. A new major deployment will add to the strains on that supply-line.

According to three senior United States marine corps generals, stockpiles should be increased before any American offensive is launched against Iraq. They also cautioned that war in the Gulf would be costly.

40 000 more Marines are to join the 45 000 already deployed in Saudi Arabia and on ships in the region.

The marines notified about 800 combat reservists that they will be called to active duty – some should be sent to Camp Lejeune (North Carolina) or Camp Pendleton (California).

*12th November*

#### *Western European Union*

WEU/United States/other navies co-ordination meeting on board the USS Blue Ridge in the Gulf. (Next meeting programmed for December on board the Dutch ship *Zuiderkruis*.)

#### *United Kingdom*

Tom King, the Defence Secretary, confirmed that the government was considering sending more combat troops to Saudi Arabia.

The options presented include an airborne brigade but it is considered more likely that armour will be sent to boost Britain's military presence, already totalling 16 000 men and women (soldiers, sailors, airmen).

Since the arrival of the 7th Armoured Brigade, 15 Puma helicopters have been sent for casualty evacuation and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Ship *Argus* has set sail as an additional hospital facility.

#### *United States*

Elements of the new deployment are:

- a full army corps from Europe with 2 armoured divisions and one armoured cavalry regiment.

A corps comprises 110 000 men, 1 000 tanks and several hundred APCs.

The Army VII Corps is being sent from Germany.

- 1st and 3rd Armoured Divisions;
- 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Armoured Division;
- 2nd Armoured Cavalry Regiment;
- 2nd Command and Supply Corps.

It will deploy with:

- air assault helicopters;
- hundreds of artillery pieces;
- broad range of support troops and equipment;
- one additional mechanised division: the 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley (Kansas, United States) with 400 tanks, APCs and 16 500 soldiers;
- 3 brigades (48th and 256th Mechanised Infantry, 155th Armoured Brigade) of Army National Guard combat troops, each one with 3 000 men and hundreds of tanks and armoured vehicles. These brigades will be sent to Fort Irwin (California) for training and evaluation before decision to dispatch them to the Gulf. This deployment will essentially be a test of the military's increasing reliance on the National Guard and reserves;
- 3 aircraft carrier groups (USS *Ranger* (Forrestal-class), USS *America* (Kitty Hawk-class), USS *Roosevelt* (Nimitz-class)), with (each) 1 aircraft carrier and 7 escort and support ships. One aircraft carrier has a crew of 5 500 men and carries 80 jets (F-14 fighters, F-18 fighter-bombers, A-6 bombers). Escort: one guided-missile cruiser, several destroyers, frigates to provide air and submarine defence for the battle group;
- battleship *Missouri* with its escort (to complement the battleship *Wisconsin*). These battleships have a crew of 1 500 sailors. They are equipped with cruise missiles, 9 16-inch (410 mm) guns, several weapons for attacking shore targets;
- Amphibious Group III (San Diego, California);
- 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force from Camp Lejeune (North Carolina) and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade from Camp Pendleton (California), totalling 60 000 men;
- Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron I (Norfolk, Virginia).

More than half of the total 197 000-man strength of the United States Marine Corps will be present in the Gulf (46 000 already in the region, plus 60 000 to arrive).

More land systems hardware deployed:

- 221 M1 (army);
- 165 M2 Bradley IFVs;
- 115 M3 Bradley IFVs;
- 400 M113 APCs;
- 5 LAVs (USMC-MEF);
- 75 155 mm SP (self-propelled) howitzers;
- 10 Patriot air defence missile launchers;
- 55 Vulcan CIWS (close-in-weapon system);
- 40 Army Apache helicopters.

*13th November*

#### *Western European Union*

WEU naval points of contact co-ordination meeting, Paris.

#### *Egypt*

President Mubarak of Egypt has said his country would not enter Iraq if western troops attacked according to an interview published in "Mayo", the newspaper of the ruling National Democratic Party.

Egypt has been calling for a peaceful solution, but only on condition that Iraq withdraws and the Kuwaiti Government is restored to power.

#### *France*

An agreement is to be concluded with Saudi Arabia on the missions assigned to the Mirages and Jaguars stationed in Hufuf since October.

The 16 French Mirages and 8 Jaguars, accompanied by 2 C-135 in-flight refuelling aircraft, carry out training and reconnaissance missions. Once the agreement has been signed, they will be able to conduct combat patrols lasting 3 to 5 hours to monitor a specific area of Saudi air space.

#### *United Kingdom*

There will be a substantial addition to ground forces, maybe a further tank regiment and a further armoured infantry battalion, totalling about 1 500 men, 57 Challenger tanks and 48 Warrior IFVs.

Other additions might include self-propelled artillery and Royal Engineers. There may well be more combat aircraft.

*14th November*

#### *Spain*

The Numancia, Diana and Infanta Cristina units reach their destination in the Gulf region.

The frigate Numancia is to control the access to the Strait of Hormuz (Oman Sea). The corvettes Diana and Infanta Cristina (Descubierta-class) control the access to the Strait of Tiran (in the north of the Red Sea).

#### *United Kingdom*

The 7th Armoured Brigade was declared operational after completing their final work-up exercise.

Significant modifications have been made to their equipment for desert fighting, including fitting engine sand filters to the Challenger tanks. The brigade benefited greatly from the experience of the United States troops who arrived in August.

*15th November*

#### *Niger*

The intervention battalion of 481 soldiers (Operation Zoumouchi) leaves to join the multinational forces in Saudi Arabia. The battalion of 21 officers, 110 non-commissioned officers and 350 privates is comprised essentially of volunteers. This is the first time Niger has sent troops abroad.

#### *Pakistan*

Pakistan is committed to send an additional 3 000 troops to Saudi Arabia, bringing its strength there up to an infantry brigade with support units. The second contingent is ready but has not yet departed.

*16th November*

#### *Argentina*

Argentina is currently negotiating the assignment of two air force transport planes and ground troops with Saudi Arabia.

#### *Bulgaria*

Bulgaria is reported to be training a volunteer unit of medics with a chemical protection subdivision for deployment in the Gulf.

#### *United Kingdom*

British tank units in Germany have been put on notice to be ready to leave for Saudi Arabia. The reinforcements will join the 7th Armoured Brigade in north-east Saudi Arabia.

Reports suggested that the 4th Armoured Brigade, or elements of it, would be sent.

If a full brigade is sent it will include:

- one regiment of 60 Challenger tanks;
- one infantry battalion of 650 men

equipped with Warrior and other armoured vehicles;

- probably an artillery regiment with 155 mm howitzers.

Such a brigade would consist of at least 6 000 men.

The 4th Armoured Brigade had already been selected as the replacement unit for the 7th Armoured Brigade after six months.

#### *United States*

The United States and Saudi Arabia started a major military exercise with 1 100 aircraft, 16 ships and more than 1 000 Marines.

The six-day amphibious exercise called "Operation Imminent Thunder" began in Eastern Saudi Arabia. Royal Saudi air force, navy and marine units of the Kingdom were also taking part in the exercise. The previous amphibious training was the 10-day operation "Sea Soldier II" that ended on 8th November. The exact location of these exercises has not been revealed (according to non-official sources "Sea Soldier II" was carried out in Oman).

The first of several hundred late-model M1A1 Abrams tanks rolled off an American cargo vessel at a Saudi port. Nearly 200 tanks arrived on the Cape Ducato after a three-week voyage from the German port of Bremerhaven.

Defence Secretary Dick Cheney has authorised the activation of 72 500 more military reservists. The Defence Department's new ceiling of 125 000 reservists who can be on active duty at one time represents more than three times the number of reservists sent to participate in the Vietnam war.

The army was given authority to activate 55 000 more reservists while the USMC can call up 12 000 and the air force 5 500. The navy's authority to activate 3 700 more personnel for a total of 10 000 remains unchanged.

The required 90 days stint for the 35 562 reservists already taking part in Operation Desert Shield was extended by up to 90 more days. The first unit becomes eligible for extension on 22nd November.

*17th November*

#### *Iran*

The country announced the biggest exercise the navy has staged since the war with Iraq. It is to be held in the Gulf in December and will involve 50 ships.

#### *Kuwait*

Hawk missiles captured by Iraq during its invasion of Kuwait may not be operable because

technicians disarmed most of them, according to Kuwait's Defence Minister (in exile), Sheik Nawaf-al-Ahmed al-Sabah.

#### *Saudi Arabia*

The Kingdom has accepted Czechoslovakia's offer to send NBC defence experts to the Gulf region. An official invitation was issued to 179 volunteer soldiers.

#### *United Kingdom*

The Royal Navy is "ready" for war in the Gulf, according to the Senior Naval Officer Middle East, Commodore Paul Haddacks.

All Royal Navy ships in the region are in "defence watches" one stage below "action stations".

Damage control and casualty evacuation exercises had been conducted in the Gulf. The naval gunfire support and air defence readiness had also been tested.

*20th November*

#### *Western European Union*

WEU military points of contact meeting, Paris.

#### *Iraq*

Iraq said that it was sending 250 000 more troops to bolster its armies in occupied Kuwait. The Iraqi press agency said 150 000 of the reinforcements were reservists and that some of the extra troops would come from seven divisions that would immediately be mobilised and sent to Kuwait.

About 425 000 troops with 3 700 tanks are already deployed in the region.

The Iraqi army is continuing to strengthen its positions in Kuwait. The Iraqi obstacle belt north of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border consists of minefields, anti-tank ditches, concrete dragons' teeth and small sand hills ("berms"). Some of the anti-tank ditches are filled with oil, which could be set alight to create a smoke-screen.

The obstacle belt is covered by a first echelon of 11 to 12 infantry divisions with dug-in tanks. Behind is a second echelon of three to four mechanised or armoured divisions in prepared defensive positions.

The third echelon, a tactical reserve of two to three mechanised or armoured divisions, has been moved to positions west of Kuwait City.

The Strategic Reserve held in positions astride the Iraqi border with northern Kuwait comprises five Republican Guard armoured

divisions equipped with Soviet-made T-72 tanks.

Iraqi units are well-dispersed, with equipment dug in and camouflaged according to intelligence sources.

#### *Netherlands*

In Rotterdam, the United States army began loading hundreds of jeeps, trucks and armoured vehicles on board the first of more than 20 ships sailing for the Gulf. These trainloads of equipment arrived from a United States army base in Möhringen (Germany) and were being loaded onto the United States navy cargo ship, Algol.

24th November

#### *Australia*

The HMAS Brisbane guided-missile destroyer and the HMAS Sydney guided-missile frigate have left for the Gulf to replace the frigates Adelaide and Darwin.

The tanker Weshalia will later replace the supply ship Success.

#### *France*

According to the Defence Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, the French deployment to the Gulf will have cost about 250 million dollars by the end of the year 1990.

#### *Iraq*

The Iraqi authorities announce the formation of a People's Army Command (paramilitary militia) in occupied Kuwait.

#### *Kuwait*

Kuwaiti military units are under training by teams from the United States special forces.

Kuwait has reformed two armoured brigades in Saudi Arabia but only one has tanks. This brigade, named the "Martyrs' Brigade", is equipped with United Kingdom-built Chieftain tanks. There is little ammunition and few spare parts.

A delivery of Yugoslav M-84 tanks (a T-72 derivative) is expected. Kuwait has 200 of these tanks on order.

#### *Niger*

The intervention battalion of "Operation Zoumounchi" is in Saudi Arabia under the command of Colonel Amadou Seyui, a French-trained officer.

#### *Philippines*

President Aquino refused a request by a special envoy of the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh

Jaber Ahmed Al-Sabah, to send troops to the Gulf, but she promised to send a medical team.

#### *Switzerland*

Citing a 1972 law prohibiting arms exports to "areas of armed conflict", Switzerland has banned weapon sales to all Gulf states.

#### *United States*

United States forces in Saudi Arabia are facing a problem of shortage of spare parts, particularly aircraft, according to a briefing paper for the Defence Secretary Dick Cheney.

According to the Defence Department, multinational naval forces have intercepted 3 592 ships since the beginning of the naval blockade in August. There have been 412 boardings and 16 ships have been diverted.

The exercise "Operation Imminent Thunder" has ended. It was a combined training exercise involving an amphibious landing on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia (160 km south of the Kuwaiti border).

It was a joint Saudi-American exercise, with Royal Saudi air force, navy and marine units and American forces from:

- 1st and 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade;
- United States navy units:
  - La Salle (miscellaneous command ship, converted Raleigh-class);
  - Midway (multi-purpose aircraft carrier, with aircraft from Carrier Air Wing V);
  - Wisconsin (battleship, Iowa-class);
  - Bunker Hill, Mobile Bay, Worden (guided-missile cruisers, Ticonderoga-class and Leamy-class);
  - O'Brien, Fife, MacDonough, Curtis Wilbur (destroyers, Spurance-class; guided-missile destroyers Arleigh Burke-class and Coontz-class);
  - Nicholas (guided-missile frigate, Oliver Hazard Perry-class);
  - Nassau, Guam (amphibious assault ships, Tarawa-class and Iwo Jima-class);
  - Trenton (amphibious transport dock, Austin-class);
  - Pensacola, Gunston Hall (dock landing ships, Anchorage-class and Whidbey Island-class);
- United States air force units:
  - 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (F-15s);
  - 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-117s);
  - 552 AWACS Wing;
  - 23rd Tactical Fighter Wing (A-10s);
  - 354th Tactical Fighter Wing (A-10s).

25th November

*Iraq*

To strengthen military arrangements in Kuwait and southern Iraq, the Command Council of the Revolution – the highest authority – orders the call-up before 15th December of 60 000 farmers, hitherto in reserve and exempted from mobilisation.

26th November

*Iraq*

According to American defence and intelligence analysts, Iraqi commanders are working to develop low-tech defences against the technological superiority of the multinational forces in Saudi Arabia.

The experts also said that the passage of time is degrading Iraqi military capability and some advanced weapons, due to the loss of foreign experts and access to spare parts.

*Pakistan*

Pakistan is planning to boost its commitment to the multinational force in Saudi Arabia by sending troops to the United Arab Emirates.

Pakistan already has 5 000 soldiers in Saudi Arabia.

*United Kingdom*

An additional 14 000 troops will be sent to Saudi Arabia. The move places almost half of the BAOR (British Army of the Rhine) in Saudi Arabia. Equipped with tanks, artillery and helicopters, a total force of 25 000 ground troops will operate alongside the United States 1st MEF in north-east Saudi Arabia.

With air and naval forces, the total strength of the United Kingdom deployment will exceed 30 000.

27th November

*France*

France is giving the Kuwaiti Government (in exile) spare parts to make 15 French-built Mirage jet fighters operational. Exocet and HOT missiles are not included in these deliveries according to official sources.

*United Kingdom*

The 14 000 extra British troops being dispatched to Saudi Arabia and the heavy armour accompanying them will not be fully operational until several weeks into the New Year (1991) because of logistical and training problems.

This disclosure was made at the first joint press conference held by the British- and Saudi-based commanders of the British force.

28th November

*Persian Gulf*

American and Spanish warships in the Red Sea fired warning shots across the bows of an Iraqi freighter which ignored requests to stop.

The French destroyer Dupleix joined the efforts to stop the freighter Khawla Bint al Zawrah in an operation which naval officers say typifies the close co-ordination achieved between the navies patrolling the region.

The ship was not carrying any cargo which violated the United Nations embargo and was allowed to proceed.

29th November

*Brazil*

This country, which has not yet sent any troops to the Gulf, is considering taking part in the military deployment on a defensive basis. (This has not yet been officially confirmed.)

*France*

Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, again expressed France's position towards the question of recourse to force, considering it would in no way be automatic once the expiration of the time limit set for Iraq has elapsed.

Speaking about the command question, Senator Robert Pontillon, President of the Assembly of Western European Union, says he sees no difficulty in French troops fighting under American command.

*Iraq*

The tour of inspection of Iraq from 18th to 22nd November by experts from the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) revealed no diversion of fissile material for military purposes.

Iraq reaffirms its intention to resist by every means any military action designed to make it withdraw its armed forces from Kuwait. Before the adoption of Resolution 678, President Saddam Hussein asserted that the Iraqis would fight in a manner that would honour Arabs and Moslems and that his country would not bow to international pressure. The Deputy Minister for Military Industry, Amer Rachid Labidi, affirmed in an interview granted to the Tunisian weekly Maghreb that Iraq had technology capable of surprising the enemy and that it had a full, integrated deterrent force to counter an attack.

*Saudi Arabia*

Pending the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of the resolution authorising possible recourse to force against Iraq, the Saudi army is placed in a state of maximum alert in case of Iraqi provocation along the frontier between occupied Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

*United Kingdom*

British troops in Saudi Arabia were placed on alert in case there should be Iraqi provocation following the adoption of Resolution 678 by the United Nations Security Council.

*United Nations Security Council*

The Security Council adopts Resolution 678 authorising recourse to force to rid Kuwait of the Iraqi military presence if Iraqi troops are not withdrawn before 15th January 1991.

This resolution calls for total, unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and "authorises member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait... to use *all* necessary means to uphold and implement the Security Council Resolution 600" (adopted on 2nd August 1990 and calling for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the Emirate of Kuwait).

The vote was taken at 10.30 p.m. GMT. Twelve countries voted for the resolution (France, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union (permanent members of the Security Council), Canada, Colombia, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Romania and Zaïre. Two countries (Cuba and Yemen) voted against and China (a permanent member) abstained.

Except for the Ivory Coast and Yemen, which were represented by an ambassador, the ministers for foreign affairs voted in person.

*United States*

The Senate Armed Forces Committee started hearings to allow a better definition of the reasons for and aims of the United States' commitment in the Gulf and the attitude of Congress to President Bush's policy in the crisis.

President Bush calls Resolution 678 a very powerful declaration and says he hopes we are closer to peace.

The United States has also decided to settle part of its debt to the United Nations and hands a cheque for \$186 million to the Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar.

The United States deployment is continued in Saudi Arabia, having to be operational before 15th January. The troops who arrived in August will then need to be relieved, while the new arrivals will not yet be combat-

ready or accustomed to the Saudi theatre of operations.

It should be noted that the American contingent is not wholly composed of fighting units, more than half the forces present being for logistic, mechanical, medical and administrative support.

*30th November*

*United States*

President George Bush called for talks with Iraq after the vote of United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, approving the use of force to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

Joseph Wilson, American Chargé d'Affairs in Baghdad, had delivered the invitation to talks to the No. 2 official in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. In return he was given a series of questions that President Hussein wanted answered about the nature of the discussions.

*1st December*

*Iraq*

President Saddam Hussein accepted the proposal from President George Bush for the United States Secretary of State and Iraqi Foreign Minister to travel to each other's capitals to discuss a peaceful solution to the crisis.

*2nd December*

*Iraq*

President Hussein estimated in a television interview to the French second channel, Antenne 2, that the chances of finding a peaceful solution to the crisis were "50-50" and said it would largely depend on whether United States Secretary of State James Baker was ready to engage in a "real dialogue".

He called for guarantees from Washington that the United States would "not resort to force before 25th March" (because of the Iraqi decision to release all the western hostages over a three-month period starting on 25th December - March is also a period of Islamic religious holidays).

*United States*

After an exchange of notes between the United States and Iraq on how the two nations will conduct discussions on the Gulf crisis, Secretary of State James Baker said during a television interview that if Saddam Hussein complied with United Nations resolutions and withdrew from Kuwait he would avoid an American military attack.



He also said that the administration is willing to hold discussions with Iraq to avoid war, but that it is not willing to negotiate the fundamental demands of the United Nations.

### ***III. Updated data on military technology and weaponry in the Gulf***

*5th October*

#### *United States*

Responding to the United States troop deployment in the Persian Gulf, the House has added unrequested money for fast sealift and prepositioned equipment as well as requested funding for the C-17 transport, the Advanced Tactical Fighter and the Milstar communications satellite.

Citing the threat from Iraqi missiles, the House provided money for the creation of a new Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence Programme, which would be independent of the Strategic Defence Initiative.

The ballistic missile threat from Iraq is generating intense demand for the United States Patriot anti-aircraft and anti-tactical missile (ATM) system.

According to the IISS, Iraq has 30 Soviet-made Frog-7 surface-to-surface missiles, 36 Soviet-made Scud-Bs and Iraqi-modified ballistic missiles called the "Sijil", the "Abbas" and the "Hussein". In addition, Iraq claims to possess a new missile called "Al Hijara" ("the stone").

Patriot is seen as the only existing system for ATM area defence with proven capabilities. The system consists of a fire unit with ground-based phased array radar, a command and control station and eight missile launchers, each with four missiles – 32 missiles in all.

*17th November*

#### *France*

A French official report submitted to the French Parliamentary Defence Committee warned that the Gulf crisis may result in both France and the United Kingdom permanently losing markets in the Gulf area to United States suppliers.

French intelligence has reported that some of the more sophisticated equipment in the Iraqi armed forces, such as French-built advanced radar systems, is suffering from a lack of spare parts and poor maintenance.

A French industrial source (non-identified) asserted that some French-made computerised systems employed by the Iraqis were ren-

dered useless early in the Gulf crisis by implanted computer viruses.

*19th November*

#### *United States*

With official government approval, non-lethal weapons could be deployed on a large scale early next year in the Gulf and used to defeat Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

Briefings for Defence Secretary Dick Cheney and Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser, are planned for early December.

United States Government facilities are testing non-lethal military systems that could render Iraqi equipment useless and immobilise enemy troops without killing them. The weapons could be used by United States special forces in the area.

Deployment of such systems in the Gulf will require Administration approval and Congressional funding. Such action would be unlikely until Congress returns in January.

Among the available technologies are:

- low-energy laser rifles to temporarily blind troops and disable optical and infrared systems;
- infrasound waves to temporarily disorientate and incapacitate humans for crowd control and psychological operations;
- chemical agents that would change molecular or base metals or alloys on critical aircraft, ships and trucks.

Operation Desert Shield, which involves hundreds of aircraft and dozens of ships from the United States and other nations, is facing the problem of HERO (Hazard of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance).

HERO is created by the electronic emissions and the electric energy generated by radar, radio and microwaves. It is known that during the Libyan air strike in April 1986, HERO caused an American fighter bomber to crash and caused the accidental bombing of friendly embassies and residences.

The wrong touch or rub can result in a discharge of static electricity causing a weapon to launch or explode.

Lightning can knock an aircraft out of the air or set off a bomb or rocket. Heat generated by electromagnetic radiation can ignite volatile chemicals.

HERO could burn out, short, or scramble any smart electronic or electric component such as the electroexplosive device (EED). This device is used as a fire trigger. Its functions are to launch

a missile or rocket and detonate its warhead, fire guns, drop bombs and fuel tanks, eject pilots and control aerial refuelling. Operation Desert Shield could not operate without it.

Electronic safety devices designed to protect against accidental launch or detonation offer little protection against HERO because of their electronic nature.

A three-year classified study of HERO called the "Joint Electromagnetic Interference Study" is being conducted by the Pentagon under the supervision of United States air force Colonel Charles Quisenberg.

*26th November*

*United States*

The United States army is studying ways to field an Israeli antiradar drone for use against Iraqi air defence radars in the Gulf.

The army is considering the "HARPY" drone because forces in the region lack the capability to disable enemy radar for extended periods over a large battlefield area, according to United States military sources (non-identified).

"HARPY" is a ground-launched, propeller-driven drone capable of loitering over the battlefield for three to four hours as it hunts for enemy radars. Its extended loitering capability allows it to continuously monitor enemy radars for rapid suppression.

Its long flight range enables safe deployment in the near area of an army corps.

The "HARPY" is produced by Tel Aviv-based Israel Aircraft Industries. United States army and industrial sources also warn that if it satisfies military needs, deployment of the "HARPY" system could create a political problem for the multinational coalition that includes forces from Syria and Egypt.

APPENDIX I

*Naval actions linked to the application of the embargo since the adoption of  
United Nations Resolution 665*

*(at 3rd December 1990)*

Number of merchant ships				
Country	Challenged	Boarded	Diverted	Warning shots
Belgium .....	859	3	0	0
France .....	3 663	63	1	2
Germany .....	—	—	—	—
Italy .....	1 280	6	0	0
Netherlands .....	448	1	0	0
Portugal .....	—	—	—	—
Spain .....	1 211	46	0	1
United Kingdom .....	1 812	15	1	0
<b>TOTAL WEU .....</b>	<b>9 273</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
Argentina .....	x <sup>1</sup>	x	x	x
Australia .....	x	5	0	0
Canada .....	x	6	0	0
Denmark .....	0	0	0	0
Greece .....	73	44	1	1
Norway .....	0	0	0	0
United States .....	3 948	316	17	9
<b>TOTAL ALLIES .....</b>	<b>4 021</b>	<b>371</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>OVERALL TOTAL .....</b>	<b>13 294</b>	<b>505</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>

1. No data available.

APPENDIX II

*Naval forces in the Gulf region*  
*(at 3rd December 1990)*

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	WEU									ARG	AUST	CAN	DK	GR	NOR	USA
	BEL	FR	GER	GB	IT	NL	POR	SP	TOTAL WEU							
Battleships .....																2
Aircraft carriers .....																1
Cruisers .....																7
Destroyers .....		3		2					5	1		1				6
Frigates .....	1	2		2	3	2		3	13	1	2	1	1	1		4
Corvettes .....		1							1							
Minehunters .....	2		5 <sup>1</sup>	3					10							
Auxiliaries .....	1	2	2 <sup>1</sup>	6	1	1	1		14		1	1			1	10
Amphibious .....				2					2							14
TOTAL .....	4	8	7	15	4	3	1	3	45	2	3	3	1	1	1	44

1. Based in Crete.

## APPENDIX III

***United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990)***

*Adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd meeting,  
on 29th November 1990*

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling and reaffirming* its Resolutions 660 (1990) of 2nd August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6th August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9th August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18th August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25th August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13th September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16th September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24th September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25th September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29th October 1990 and 677 (1990) of 28th November 1990,

*Noting that*, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its obligation to implement Resolution 660 (1990) and the above-mentioned subsequent relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Security Council,

*Mindful* of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security,

*Determined* to secure full compliance with its decisions,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. *Demands* that Iraq comply fully with Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;
2. *Authorises* member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15th January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;
3. *Requests* all states to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;
4. *Requests* the states concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present resolution;
5. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

***Konversiya – conversion in Soviet military industry***

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Stegagnini (Alternate : Lagorce) (Chairman); MM. Garrett (Alternate : Lambie), N... (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaenssens (Alternate : Uyttendaele), Atkinson (Alternate : Sir Dudley Smith), Böhm (Alternate : Müller), Caccia (Alternate : Scovacricchi), Conceição, De Bondt, Dimmer, Eich, Mrs. Francese, MM. Le Grand, Lenzer, Lopez Valdivielso, Malfatti, Moreira, Palacios, Parry, Pedregosa (Alternate : Lopez Henares), Schmidt, Tummers, Valleix, Verbeek (Alternate : Maris), Ward (Alternate : Ewing), Worms.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

### ***Rapporteur's Preface***

In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews with the following experts:

*Moscow, 24th-27th September 1990*

1. *USSR State Planning Committee*

Yuri A. Glybin, Deputy Vice-Chairman, Head of the Department of the Defence Complex.

2. *USSR Supreme Soviet*

Leonid Sharin, Acting Chairman of the Committee on Defence and State Security.

Stanislav P. Golovin, Member of the Congress of the USSR, Secretary of the Committee on Defence and State Security.

3. *Institute of World Economy and International Relations*

Professor Evgeny V. Bougrov, Head of Section.

4. *Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR*

Konstantin P. Ovtchinnikov, Deputy Director, Department of International Economic Relations.

Alexandre A. Zhitnikov, Counsellor, Department of International Economic Organisations.

Yuri V. Maltsev, Expert, Directorate of International Scientific and Technological Co-operation.

5. *P. O. Sukhoi Design Bureau*

Mikhail P. Simonov, General Designer.

*Birmingham, 17th October 1990*

*University of Birmingham, Centre for Russian and East European Studies*

Philip Hanson, Professor of Soviet economics.

Julian Cooper, Lecturer in Soviet technology and industry, Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies.

*Paris, 19th October 1990, OECD*

Hans J. Blommestein, Head non-OECD economies unit, Economics and Statistics Department.

*Paris, 25th October 1990*

The American University of Paris

Georgy Skorov, Professor of Economics, Institute of USA and Canada, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

***Draft Recommendation***

***on konversiya – conversion in Soviet military industry***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the far-reaching changes taking place in the USSR, in particular since the Reykjavik agreement;
- (ii) Convinced that the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency in defence being introduced by the Soviet Union will have immediate repercussions on military production;
- (iii) Aware that the INF Treaty and the imminent agreement on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) will reduce even further the quantitative demand for military equipment;
- (iv) Considering that, through conversion, the Soviet Union is making a sincere effort to use for civilian purposes the human and material resources thus being released;
- (v) Aware that the Soviet authorities consider conversion to be an important means of improving the living standards of the population;
- (vi) Recalling that the preamble to the Brussels Treaty refers to economic, social and cultural ties as means for fortifying and preserving the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty;
- (vii) Recognising that it is too early to assess the full significance of economic and political reforms now taking place in the Soviet Union;
- (viii) Convinced that in the post cold war era strong social, economic and cultural ties between Western European nations and the Soviet Union will greatly contribute to reinforcing peace and security in the whole of Europe;
- (ix) Recognising that, in a first phase of the Soviet Union's transition to market economy, direct exchanges between companies, experts and politicians will be crucial;
- (x) Aware that, notwithstanding existing uncertainties, both the Federal Republic of Germany and France have recently concluded bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union on partnership and co-operation,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Urge member governments to promote the extension of existing and the establishment of new exchange programmes so as to enable both Soviet and Western European experts to learn more about each other's social, economic and cultural systems;
2. Urge those member governments which have not yet done so to conclude formal bilateral agreements on good neighbourliness, partnership and co-operation, based on the new pattern of international relations in Europe and modelled on two such agreements as recently concluded by WEU member states;
3. Appoint a special committee of experts from national administrations with the task of studying conversion problems and exchanging experience and advice with their opposite numbers in the Soviet Union.



## *Explanatory Memorandum*

(submitted by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur)

### *I. Introduction*

1. Since 1985, when President Mikhail Gorbachev first acceded to the highest political functions, Soviet authorities have increasingly expressed their concern over the lamentable state of the national economy. They were also worried about the share of gross national product appropriated by the military. A growing number of them took the view that the defence industry, with its traditional high standards as regards skill, productivity and quality control, could make a major contribution to improving the living conditions of the Soviet citizen and to the Soviet economy in general.

2. In fact, this serious concern over the arms race and its consequences for the state budget was one of the incentives that led to the conclusion of the INF Treaty in 1987. In December 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev made a new breakthrough when, in an address before the United Nations General Assembly, he announced drastic reductions in the manpower and equipment of the Soviet armed forces. There will be still more reductions to come once a CFE agreement has been concluded as a result of the Vienna negotiations.

3. Both earlier events were bound to have repercussions on the Soviet defence industry to such a degree that, from the very first reductions in defence orders, the state was involved in conversion, an effort to use for civilian purposes the capacity thus made available.

4. This conversion activity fits wonderfully into the concept that the signatories of the Brussels Treaty had in mind when they referred to improving the social, economic and cultural conditions of their populations as a means of ensuring lasting peace. It can be considered a first indication that the cold war armaments culture is changing into a disarmament culture in the conviction that improved social, economic and cultural conditions of a population are a more valuable contribution to peaceful and stable international relations than too many arms and poor living conditions.

5. N. Gybenko, Minister of Culture of the USSR, gave a striking example of how far this new attitude has already penetrated Soviet life when he said:

“If the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is proposing a conversion programme, it would be fine if the arma-

ments industries care for the protection culture...They should return to culture their architectural masterpiece built by Stassov...I mean the building of the warehouse of the army supply corps which is now being used as a garage by the Ministry of Defence<sup>1</sup>.

6. The Technological and Aerospace Committee is particularly interested in the Soviet conversion effort for several reasons, some of which go beyond its interest in technological developments.

7. In the first place, it is of course interesting to see how the Soviet defence industry – until now always pampered with orders and priority treatment – will find ways to respond to a new challenge under different circumstances. Second, the degree to which the conversion idea is implemented will be a measure of the sincerity of the Soviet Union's ambition to replace military by civilian production. A third reason is to determine what western countries, in particular the member states of Western European Union, can do and, in some cases, are doing to respond to Soviet efforts to involve foreign countries in its conversion effort.

8. In this report, therefore, an attempt will be made to describe the state of conversion, the many connected issues at present and possible future developments. It should be said that the entire economic, social and political situation is in too great a state of flux to allow an observer to make final statements. Certainly, experts and politicians in the Soviet Union agree that the overall situation in the country is seriously complicated and calls for commensurate decisions, but there is still much discussion about the best way towards improvement. There can be no question, however, that the West can and should help. At the moment, financial aid would not be the right thing. This was confirmed only when the European summit meeting in Rome on 27th and 28th October 1990 took note of the fact that the European Commission deemed it too early to present operational proposals for EEC support and in particular financial aid for the Soviet economic reform programme. This report will try to formulate some proposals for adequate participation and co-operation in the Soviet efforts to improve the living conditions of the population.

1. Alexei Kireev, *Temps Nouveaux*, 10-1990.

## II. Defence spending in the Soviet Union

9. Lenin's new economic policy and the beginnings of the first five-year plan (1928-1932), when the mainly agricultural Soviet society was dependent on the capitalist countries for capital and know-how, met with a certain response in the West. Machinery could be imported, and engineers and other technicians from western countries went to work in the Soviet Union. But this situation changed rapidly when the world-wide depression took substance. The Soviet Union had less resources to buy machinery and equipment because of the declining price of its chief export product, cereals. The economies of western countries were too much in trouble to allow them to help others and Japan and Germany showed increasing hostility towards the Soviet system. This all contributed to an increasing isolation of the Soviet Union on the world scene.

10. At the same time it was Stalin's declared objective to make his country self-sufficient both militarily and industrially, the heavy

industry being basic to war production. From the beginning of the first five-year plan in 1928, military spending has therefore been one of the highest priorities of the Soviet Government. This policy has certainly been pursued at the expense of the production of consumer goods and of the living standard of Soviet citizens in general.

11. Not only for western observers, but also for Soviet experts it is extremely difficult to assess to what extent military expenses have laid a claim on the Soviet state budget, and this issue is still subject to discussion. For many years, the Soviets have been extremely elusive on this subject, but their attitude is changing now, also because of intense pressure from within the country.

12. The first meaningful Soviet figures were made public by President Gorbachev, who, in the Congress of People's Deputies on 30th May 1989, stated that the defence budget for 1989 was 77.3 billion roubles. Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov announced more details to the Congress in June 1989, as illustrated in the following table<sup>2</sup>:

*Official Soviet military expenditure, 1989-90*

(Billions of current roubles)

	1989	Percentage share	1990	Percentage share	Percentage change 1989-90*
Personnel, O&M .....	20.2	26.1	19.3	27.3	- 4.5
Pensions .....	2.3	3.0	2.4	3.4	+ 4.4
Procurement .....	32.6	42.2	31.0	43.7	- 4.9
Construction .....	4.6	6.0	3.7	5.2	- 19.6
R&D .....	15.3	19.8	13.2	18.6	- 13.7
Others .....	2.3	3.0	1.3	1.8	- 43.5
Total** .....	77.3	100.0	71.0	100.0	- 8.2
Military space .....	3.9				

\* (-) reduction ; (+) increase

\*\* Items may not add up to totals due to rounding off.

13. Even if this sign of more openness was acclaimed, observers from both the Soviet Union and western countries expressed criticism. They said that it was not made clear if the budget was expressed in constant or current prices and what kind of budgetary index had been used. It is still open to doubt if the production of both nuclear weapons and fissionable material has been included. The figure for military research may not reflect the full truth, as part of this research may have been included in the budget of the Academy of Sciences and other

administrations. No specific mention has been made of the substantial military aid given to foreign countries. A major problem in particular is the arbitrary method used to determine the price of weapon systems, which is believed to be at an artificially low level, thus distorting the procurement budget. Moreover, the Soviet Union does not use constant prices, as western countries do to measure real trends.

2. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1990, page 163.

14. Recent NATO estimates of Soviet military expenditure vary from 130 to 140 billion roubles for the year 1987. This

leads together with the percentage breakdown by resource category to the following table:

*NATO estimates of Soviet military expenditure, 1987*<sup>3</sup>

(Billions of current roubles)				
Item	Low estimate	Percentage share	High estimate	Percentage share
Personnel (including pensions) .	10.4	8	11.2	8
O&M .....	39.0	30	42.0	30
Procurement .....	52.0	40	56.0	40
Construction .....	2.6	2	2.8	2
R&D .....	26.0	20	28.0	20
Total .....	130.0	100.0	140.0	100.0

15. Julian Cooper, Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies of Birmingham University, gives a slightly lower figure of 120 billion roubles for 1989.

16. In its Yearbook 1990, SIPRI estimates Soviet military expenditure for 1988 at 90-100 billion roubles, but it has recognised since that its estimates missed solid ground and has announced a revision of the methods and basic figures used.

17. Altogether, at the moment it is almost impossible to make a reliable comparison with western defence budgets. However, most observers agree that the percentage breakdown given by the Soviets when they presented their defence budget in different chapters in 1989 reflects the truth. This reveals that two-thirds is put on equipment and one-third on operational costs, just the reverse of the United States budget. But here again, the situation is obscure if one takes into account that the armed forces can fulfil a number of basic needs by their own means as is the case for all clothing and some food. Moreover, building companies of the armed forces are building apartments for both military and civilians while they are also involved in building roads and railroads. Army personnel and transport means are also playing an indispensable rôle in the yearly harvesting of crops.

18. The share of gross domestic product spent on the military is another question which is still subject to debate.

19. Based on official data, the military share of national output was about 8-9% in 1989, but this is thought to be unrealistic given the size and strength of the Soviet armed forces.

20. Most western experts estimate the Soviet military burden at around 12%, or roughly double that of the United States<sup>4</sup>.

21. Another Soviet economist, Alexei Kireev, estimates the military expenditure at 104-121 billion roubles and at 12-14% of the GNP. Others, such as V. Seljunin and V. Chanin, go as far as estimating the defence share of the GNP at between 20 and 30%<sup>5</sup>.

22. It should be mentioned here that it is difficult to determine the exact volume of the Soviet GDP, due to the inadequacy of Soviet statistics. For the sake of consistency, however, it is assumed here that the Soviet GDP can be estimated at around 900 billion roubles<sup>6</sup>.

23. On 15th October 1990, the Soviet delegation to the United Nations for the first time presented a detailed report on the military budget of the USSR for 1989, with a breakdown of the amounts earmarked for army, navy, air force, foreign military aid and the resources for procurement of aircraft, missiles, nuclear warheads, ships and other equipment<sup>7</sup>, but at the time of writing this report no further details were available.

### *III. The structure of defence industry in the Soviet Union*

24. Under the supervision of the Commission for Military Industrial Questions (VPK, Kommissija po voenno-promyshlennym voprosam)

3. Source: Wilkinson, C., Soviet defence expenditure: past trends and prospects, NATO Review, No. 2 (April 1989), pages 16-22. This article also gives a brief outline of the method used by NATO experts to estimate expenditure in each of the main expenditure categories.

4. NATO experts, using current prices, estimate the Soviet defence burden at 15 to 17% of GDP in the mid-1980s (Wilkinson, see note 3).

5. Hans-Henning Schröder, Teil I, pages 34-36 (see selected bibliography).

6. A discussion of this question, referring to further literature, can be found in SIPRI Yearbook 1990, page 166, footnote 44.

7. Le Monde, 17th October 1990.

of the USSR Council of Ministers, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Igor S. Belousov, eight different ministries (Ministerstva Oborony Otrasei Promyshlennosti (MOOP), also called the defence complex) are responsible for the development and production of practically all weaponry and other military equipment. These ministries are the following:

- Minradioprom (Ministry of the Radio Industry)
- Minpromsvyazi (Ministry of the Communications Equipment Industry)
- Minelektronprom (Ministry of the Electronics Industry)
- Minobchtemash (Ministry of General Machine-building)
- Minaviaprom (Ministry of the Aviation Industry)
- Minsudprom (Ministry of the Ship-building Industry)
- Minoboronprom (Ministry of the Defence Industry)
- Minmash (Ministry of Machine-building)

25. Until last year, there was a ninth ministry, Minsredmash (Ministry of Medium Machine-building), mainly concerned with nuclear warheads and nuclear energy, but this was abolished in July 1989.

26. At the same time, the machine and equipment complex of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers for Machine-building, a civilian industry branch, is strongly connected with the military sector. It provides the military sector with all those goods which it does not produce itself, such as tools, machinery, means of transportation and electric equipment. It also produces equipment for purely military use such as armoured cars, automobile chassis, caterpillar tracks, artillery equipment, etc.

27. According to Soviet figures, the machine-building industry turned out 28% of the total industrial production in 1986, which can be split up as follows:

	%
Output of machine-building industries in 1986	28
Machine and equipment complex	
- specialised capacities (excluding specifically military products, but including dual-use products)	11
- specifically military products	2
- civilian products alien to the complex (mining materials, repairs, metal constructions, etc.)	2
Defence complex	
- military products	9
- civilian products	4

28. Altogether, the total production for military and space purposes in the Soviet Union can be estimated at roughly 10-11% of the total industrial production, or between 89 and 96 billion roubles<sup>8</sup>.

29. In many respects, the defence complex has long been a privileged branch of the Soviet industry. It had primary access to raw materials, energy and all the other resources it needed, including financial resources. The best scientists, engineers and workers were employed in the defence industry, and often they got better payment and social amenities than elsewhere.

30. As it was a particularly closed producer-consumer circuit without any interference from without, the central planning and administrative command system, a main pillar of the traditional Soviet economic system, worked almost to perfection in the defence complex.

#### *IV. Major reasons for conversion in the defence industry*

31. The 1987 INF Treaty was a first and important breakthrough in Soviet foreign policy. It can be considered as the first result of deep reflection within the Soviet leadership over the share of defence spending in the national budget and its consequences for the economy and for the living standards of the population.

32. Only four enterprises<sup>9</sup> were concerned with the consequences of cancelling the intermediate-range missile programme. Nevertheless a media campaign promoted the idea that defence production capacity could be made available for civilian purposes.

33. Seen from a historical perspective, it was only the overture for much larger operations. Gradually, a nationwide debate started over the poor performance of the economy. The population complained that after three years of restructuring since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, with increasing shortages and rising consumer prices, no improvement in living conditions could be perceived. Since the introduction of the first tentative economic reforms, including measures like a state quality control in the industry, people were also afraid of losing their job or having their wages cut.

34. These phenomena were accompanied by a growing surplus in purchasing power. According to earlier official figures, between 1986 and

8. Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est, March 1988, page 11; Julian Cooper, RUSI Journal, autumn 1990, page 51.

9. These were: the Votkinsk machine-building works in the Udmurt Autonomous Republic, the Barrikady works in Volagrad, the Petropavlovsk heavy machine-building works in Kazakhstan and the M. I. Kalinin machine-building works in Sverdlovsk.

1988 the income of the population increased by 16.7% while sales of consumer goods increased by 13% only, mainly through inefficiency and shortages. Altogether this led to a surplus in purchasing power of 35 billion roubles in 1987 and of 45 billion roubles in 1988<sup>10</sup>.

35. These figures were, however, seriously criticised and the latest Soviet statistics and official statements are much more alarming indeed. Goskomstat, the USSR State Committee for Statistics, has put the difference between goods and services offered and salaries paid, or the "non satisfied demand" as it is called in the Soviet Union, at 165 billion roubles in 1989, an increase of 16% as compared with 142 billion roubles in 1988. During the same period, wages increased by 12.9%<sup>11</sup>.

36. The Soviet Government had already been alarmed by the desperate state of the mechanical industry, which, in the USSR, comprises the industries for building machines, equipment, electrotechnics, electronics and informatics. There was an urgent need to modernise this branch of industry where wastage and obsolescence had reduced output and the ability to meet the needs of new technologies in production and application. The five-year plan for 1986-90 therefore included the modernisation of this branch as one of its priorities, but the first results of this effort were rather disappointing<sup>12</sup>.

37. When, in the later 1970s, the symptoms of a growing national economic crisis became ever more apparent, western observers already noticed a slower rise in Soviet defence expenditure. But it took until the XIXth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (28th June-1st July 1988) for the Soviet leadership to seize the opportunity to announce new priorities in the distribution of the country's resources.

38. General Secretary Gorbachev made it clear that the seriousness of the country's stagnation had been underestimated. State expenditure had grown more rapidly than income. The budget deficit put the market under pressure, undermined the stability of the rouble and the overall circulation of money and stimulated inflation<sup>13</sup>. He denounced the shortfall in the production of foodstuffs and also the lack of living accommodation and consumer goods.

39. In the short term he wished to create a modern and performing consumer goods industry. This should be brought about not only through the existing light industry, but also through the defence industry, which should considerably increase its contribution to the production and delivery of consumer goods.

40. This redistribution of resources, in which the defence industry should also be involved, was designated the "social reorientation of the economy".

41. Inevitably, this would have consequences for the defence structure. The conference decided that the entire defence structure should be oriented towards qualitative parameters as regards technical equipment and military science as well as the size of the armed forces. The new strategic concept required the armed forces to comply with quality rather than quantity and their strictly defensive character was emphasised. In practice, this was meant to lead to a reduction in the armed forces and the so-called doctrine of reasonable sufficiency in defence.

42. At the end of the same year, a new and decisive step was taken by General Secretary Gorbachev. In his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8th December 1988, he said:

"Today I am able to inform you of the fact that the Soviet Union has decided to reduce its armed forces. Over the next two years their strength will be reduced by 500 000 men, and substantial cuts will be made unilaterally, regardless of the talks on the mandate of the Vienna meeting."

43. All in all, the Soviet Union was to reduce its armed forces in the western part of the country and on the territory of its allies by 10 000 tanks, 8 500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft.

44. He then called the world's attention to an urgent problem, the change from an arms economy to a disarmament economy. The military industry should be converted and he said that the Soviet Union was prepared:

- to draft and present its own internal conversion plan as part of its economic reform effort;
- to prepare plans for the conversion of two or three defence plants as an experiment during 1989;
- to make public its experience in re-employing defence personnel and using defence facilities and equipment in civilian production.

10. Hans-Henning Schröder, Teil I, pages 11 and 15.

11. *Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est*, No. 349, April 1990, pages 10-11.

12. *Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est*, No. 327, March 1988, pages 3-21.

13. While officially the 1989 budget deficit for the USSR was said to be 36.3 billion roubles, Soviet economists put this figure considerably higher and they estimated the deficit for the 1990 budget at around 100 billion roubles. (Hans-Henning Schröder, Teil I, pages 24-29). As for its relative magnitude, the budget deficit is officially estimated at the moment to be more than 10% of the gross domestic product (*International Herald Tribune*, 20th-21st October 1990.)

45. These announcements were followed by a resolution adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 21st March 1989, according to which in 1991 the defence budget should be reduced by 14.2%, while expenditure for arms and military equipment should be reduced by 19.5% as compared with 1988.

46. In the accomplishment of these plans, SIPRI has observed positive developments, especially as regards the reduction of total defence expenditure, but it says that the achievement of the 19.5% reduction in arms and military equipment remains to be seen, since this would leave a reduction of the order of 11.5% in 1991 if the actual reduction rate for 1989-90 is taken into consideration <sup>14</sup>.

### *V. Different methods of conversion*

47. When speaking of conversion in the defence industry, it should be noticed that there does not exist a clear definition of this term which is being accepted by all experts.

48. In general terms, everybody agrees that it is the conversion of industrial capacity in research, development, production and marketing from the military to the civilian sector.

49. In a recent Soviet handbook for political economy, conversion is defined as follows:

“...the change of proportion in the distribution of financial, human and material resources between the civilian and the military sphere, the diversion from the production of armaments and other forms of military activity to peaceful lines.” <sup>15</sup>

50. Another Soviet economist, Alexei Kireev, has defined conversion as follows:

“the organised transition, during the process of real disarmament, of military production and other types of military activities to civilian production; the corresponding change in proportion of the distribution of financial, human, material and intellectual resources between the civilian and military sector.”

51. At the same time, Kireev excludes as alien to conversion a number of civilian activities of the defence complex and the military, even if they are being extended as a consequence of the disarmament process <sup>16</sup>.

52. In this report, the abovementioned definition as specified by Kireev is considered to be useful as a guideline, but in a broad interpre-

tation so as to be able to include activities which might be considered marginal to the proper conversion effort. It should be noticed here that the replacement of military production capacity by civilian production capacity – often called “real conversion” – in specific enterprises may vary from 5 to 100%. Other parallel activities are worth mentioning. One of these is that enterprises may increase their traditionally existing output of civilian products irrespective of changes in the volume of their military production.

53. A different development, almost contrary to the idea of conversion, is the policy of placing civilian enterprises under the authority of the defence complex in order to improve their efficiency and output. The leading idea here has been to use existing human and material defence complex resources for the improvement and extension of civilian production, which is not alien to conversion.

54. Even if the two last mentioned activities cannot be said to be part of the proper conversion effort, they will be dealt with in this report since they may help to clarify the rôle of the defence complex in the Soviet industry.

55. Before going on, however, it may be interesting to give one more quotation from the abovementioned 1988 Soviet textbook:

“In socialist countries, conversion benefits from the lack of social strata and groups, which are interested in the arms race, from the collective property of production means, from production management and the development of the social sphere on the basis of economic plans. It goes without saying that these social-economic prerequisites and levers do not automatically exclude practical problems in the process of conversion. Without structural changes of production, without changes in investment policy, without retraining and re-employment of cadres, it will not work.” <sup>17</sup>

56. Only two years later, belief in socialist economy and its benefits largely disappeared, but the author was right in saying that conversion would meet a number of practical problems. The aim of this report will be to address some of them.

### *VI. Existing civilian production of the Soviet defence industry*

57. However much upheaval the idea of conversion has caused in western media and public

14. SIPRI Yearbook 1990, pages 167-171.

15. Hans-Henning Schröder, Teil II, page 48.

16. Alexei Kireev, La conversion en URSS, in *Vie Internationale*, May 1990.

17. Political Economy. Textbook for higher education establishments, edited by V.A. Medvedev, Moscow 1988, as quoted in Hans-Henning Schröder, Teil II, page 48.

opinion, it is not an unfamiliar process inside the Soviet Union. For many years, the Soviet defence industry has been turning out civilian products. A number of consumer goods such as television sets, video and audio equipment, refrigerators and sewing machines have even been produced exclusively or almost exclusively by the defence industry. As early as 1971, General Secretary Brezhnev stated that civilian products constituted 40% of the total output of the defence industry. This percentage remained at about the same level until 1988. Soviet authorities claim that in the conversion framework this percentage will climb to 50% in 1990, 53% in 1991 and ultimately to at least 60% in 1995, the last year of the thirteenth five-year plan.

58. Last year, the Soviet monthly *Vestnik Statistiki* published for the first time figures on civilian production in the defence industry, giving an idea of the quantities involved (see Appendices I and II). They should, of course, be considered with some caution, since, in Soviet statistics, which are part of a central planning and control system, "each figure... is the product of an average between the requirements of authorities and reality, or rather expresses the maximum of travesty of reality which is compatible with probability"<sup>18</sup>. It should also be noted that these figures cannot reflect the impact of the conversion effort, since they refer to 1987 and 1988, while the first larger-scale decisions were taken only in the course of 1988. The only consumer goods showing a significant increase in production were fairly new products such as colour television sets and video recorders.

59. A recent study by Julian Cooper on the output of civilian products of the Soviet defence industry over the years 1965-85 mentions – on top of the products in Tables I and II at appendix – such divergent products as crude steel, metal-cutting machine tools, tractors, irrigators, railway freight wagons, tramcars, passenger cars, personal computers, cameras and furniture<sup>19</sup>.

60. Very recently, an important redistribution of civilian production capacity has enlarged the civilian production of the Soviet defence complex. As mentioned above during the 1980s (paragraph 36), the Soviet Government had become aware of the desperate state of the civilian machine-building industry, which, due to obsolescence, inefficiency and a number of other reasons, was by no means able to satisfy the existing demand for its products.

61. A modernisation programme was set up for the 1986-90 five-year plan, but the apparently disappointing early results of this programme led to more radical decisions. It was thought that the defence complex, with its highly-qualified workforce, priority access to financial and material resources and greater efficiency, could help to quicken the pace of modernisation and expand output. In 1987, the decision was taken to dissolve the civilian Ministry of Machine-building for the Light and Food Industries and to transfer many of its enterprises to the defence complex. This led to the acquisition by the defence complex of around 230 mostly very backward civilian enterprises employing more than 300 000 workers with a total annual output of about 5 billion roubles, the modernisation of which required and indeed got a lot of attention.

62. This process was taken further when in 1989 the medical equipment industry was transferred to the defence complex, and in particular put under the responsibility of the Ministry of General Machine-building.

### *VII. Conversion in the defence complex, the first stage*

63. In early 1989, when the first consequences of reduced and cancelled orders became known in the defence industry, a rather chaotic process started, often amidst a sudden decline in productivity and many connected problems such as idle and alarmed work forces and declining profits. Overnight, prospering enterprises had to scramble for work and desperately accept any order and instruction from authorities even if such orders were totally alien to their specific know-how or their existing assembly lines.

64. Five of the then nine defence industry ministries – aviation, defence, general machine-building, radio industry and shipbuilding – were in particular asked to start the production of food-processing equipment. The following paragraphs will give an overall picture of this first stage of conversion as far as new production and demands are concerned<sup>20</sup>.

#### *(i) Minaviaprom (Ministry of the Aviation Industry)*

65. The Ministry of the Aviation Industry is first responsible for the production of military aircraft and helicopters, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles and other armaments. It is also responsible for the production of civilian aircraft and helicopters. At the same time, for many years it has been involved in the production of the following mass consumer goods:

18. Alain Besançon as quoted in *Est et Ouest*, August-September 1989, page 12.

19. Julian D. Cooper, *The scales of output of civilian products by enterprises of the Soviet defence industry*, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, August 1988.

20. For a more detailed account, see Hans-Hanning Schröder, Teil III.

refrigerators, freezers, tape recorders, washing machines, vacuum cleaners, furniture, radios and watches. The conversion programme has had an immediate effect on firms under this ministry and some examples should be mentioned here.

66. The engineering factory Kujbyshev had to face a reduction in military orders of 8.2% in 1989 and of 22.4% in 1990. Instead of weapons, it was instructed to produce light machines and production machines for the food industry to a value of 2.18 million roubles.

67. The aircraft factory Znamja Truda, which produces MiG-29s, faced important reductions in aircraft manufacturing. Instead it had to prepare the production of kitchen machines, vegetable choppers, chandeliers and toys.

68. The P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau said it was confronted with a reduction in credits of up to 50% while officially the reduction rate had been fixed at 10%. It was further instructed to design automated salt and sugar packing-machines and vegetable-washing machines for the food-processing industry.

69. Among other products which the ministry was ordered to turn out were pasta production machines, mowers and small tractors.

*(ii) Miniboronprom (Ministry of the Defence Industry)*

70. It produces all equipment and weapon systems for the army, from tanks to guns and hand weapons. In addition, it has always produced a large spectrum of capital goods and consumer goods, such as tractors, diesel engines, motorcars and cameras. Furthermore, as the leading agency, it is responsible for the overall production of cameras, cinecameras and projectors, hunting and sporting weapons, binoculars and camera lenses. A 1988 conversion order to manufacture production lines for hypodermic needles ended in a fiasco.

71. In factories taken over from the Ministry of Machine-building for the Light and Food Industries, it was to produce installations for making sugar lumps, bottling units for mineral water and fruit juices and tin-manufacturing machines. The Votkinsk factory, former manufacturer of SS-20 missiles, is now turning out installations for milk pasteurisation and tank lorries for juice and milk. It is now also believed to be producing programme-controlled machine tools and installations for the production of baby food, besides washing machines and prams.

*(iii) Minobchtchemach  
(Ministry of General Machine-building)*

72. This ministry is responsible for solid and liquid propulsion rockets, cruise missiles and the accompanying fire control systems and for

all Soviet space launch systems. In the civilian sector, it produces the usual range of products such as television sets, washing machines, refrigerators, tramcars, tractors and even crude steel and metal-cutting machine tools. In 1989 it was charged with the lead responsibility for the medical equipment industry. At almost the same time, in the framework of conversion it was instructed to develop, among other things, milk-processing machines. It was also required to co-ordinate the production of small-size bakeries, but while, according to the planning, thirty should have been produced in 1988 and 600 in 1989, only two had been finished by February 1989.

*(iv) Minradioprom (Ministry of the Radio Industry)*

73. The firms under Minradioprom produce radio and communications equipment, specialised computers, fire control systems and lasers for the armed forces.

74. In the civilian sector it is the prime producer in computing techniques, air traffic control systems, entertainment electronics and installations for computer-aided design in the industry. The conversion brought no surprises for this branch of the defence complex, since it was instructed to increase civilian production in its own familiar area of interest.

*(v) Minsudprom (Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry)*

75. This ministry is responsible for developing and building all naval vessels and corresponding weapons systems including radar installations and sonar equipment. It is also charged with the co-ordination of civilian shipbuilding all over the country. On top of that, its factories have for a long time been turning out such civilian goods as refrigerators, washing machines, tape recorders, furniture, radios and irrigators.

76. Since 1988, Minsudprom has taken over a number of enterprises belonging to the former Ministry of Machine-building for the Light and Food Industries and it is now producing turn-key factories for canned food and equipment for the catering industries. Moreover, as regards conversion it was ordered to produce additional equipment for the food industry and the agro-industrial industry.

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77. The Ministries of the Communications Equipment and of the Electronics Industry were less severely hit by demands to produce alien consumer goods. They were mainly instructed to increase the production of these civilian goods which were familiar to them.



**(vi) *Minpromsvyazi***  
**(Ministry of the Communications Equipment Industry)**

78. In the defence sector, this ministry is responsible for the production of communications equipment, components for radar installations, computers and equipment for electronic warfare. At the same time it is the leading agency for the entire civilian production of television sets, tape recorders and radio receivers.

**(vii) *Minelektronprom***  
**(Ministry of the Electronics Industry)**

79. Its establishments produce electronic components and computers for military use. Similar products are being turned out for civilian use.

80. Pocket calculators and electric furnaces belong to its range of civilian products. It is also responsible for the delivery of complete furnishings for computer instruction classrooms, but in 1988 it only completed one-sixth of the planned number. In recent years it has never been able to satisfy the ever-increasing demands for electronic components and television tubes, in which it has a monopoly position in the Soviet Union.

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81. Of the two remaining defence complex ministries the Ministry of Machine-building has not taken a high profile in the conversion effort, while the Ministry of Medium Machine-building was abolished in 1989.

**(viii) *Minmash* (Ministry of Machine-building)**

82. For the military, Minmash is responsible for the production of munitions, switches and solid propellents. In civilian production, it was the leading agency for the overall production of samovars, primus stoves, syphons and sewing machines. It further produced such goods as motorcycles, scooters, bicycles, mopeds and refrigerators. In the enterprises it took over from the Ministry of Machine-building for the Light and Food Industries, it is responsible for producing installations for the textile industry. It has been suggested that in conversion activities it could produce paints, colours, glass cleaners, furniture, spare parts for motorcars, hunting munitions, linoleum and disposable syringes, but little is known about the results of these suggestions.

**(ix) *Minsredmash* (Ministry of Medium Machine-building)**  
**(abolished in 1989)**

83. Responsible for the development of nuclear warheads, high energy lasers and nuclear

energy questions, this ministry has always had an extremely limited share in the production of consumer goods. Following conversion, it started to turn out fertilisers, gold and isotopes for medical use and chemical products such as acids, tar and fluoroplast. After taking over a number of firms from the Ministry of Machine-building for the Light and Food Industries, it started the production of dairy installations. A further conversion exercise envisaged the production of oil presses, installations for the production of fruit extract and food concentrate.

84. In July 1989, however, the decision was taken to integrate Minsredmash in other ministries due to its popularity having been reduced to zero after the Chernobyl disaster and to an increasing sensitiveness of the population as regards nuclear energy.

***VIII. Conversion in the aerospace industry:  
 industrialists versus state planning***

85. The aerospace industry is beyond doubt one of the spearheads of Soviet industry with a technological level up to world standards, indeed among the very best. No wonder the industrialists are very upset about the way conversion has been forced upon them by the government. They are very worried about orders they have been given to produce food-processing machines, sawing machines, bread-cutting machines and other civilian items which they deem beneath their dignity and know-how. Practically all of them have stepped into the development of civilian aerospace products, reasoning that they do not want to lose their high-tech capabilities and that they wish to be able to compete on the world market.

86. One of these industrialists is Mikhail P. Simonov, general designer of the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau, one of the prime enterprises for the development of fighter-bombers and air superiority fighters, who gave his forthright opinion that it makes little sense to ask a sophisticated defence industry to shift to the production of civilian goods which are completely alien to its original expertise. This will easily result in squandering expertise. If the Soviet Union wishes to develop its economy, it will have to further develop its specific capabilities, one of which is certainly the aeronautical industry.

87. In the first wave of conversion orders, the Sukhoi Design Bureau was ordered to develop fully-automated salt and sugar packing-machines. These machines have indeed been developed and are being produced now in two different factories. Furthermore, a tomato-washing machine has been developed, some four of which have been produced.

88. For the production of civilian goods, Mr. Simonov prefers to develop Sukhoi's aerospace

capabilities. In accordance with this line of thought, several different new programmes are now under development. With a view to marketing and penetration on the western markets, he considers co-operation with western partners to be essential.

89. The best known of these programmes is the SSBJ supersonic business jet, which is being developed in a joint venture on a 50-50 basis together with Gulfstream. In this co-operation, Sukhoi is responsible for the airframe design, chassis, hydraulics and the aerodynamic characteristics, while Gulfstream is responsible for the avionics, cabin design, coating and certification.

90. Meanwhile, the Soviet Lyulka Design Bureau and Rolls Royce have – in a co-operative effort – agreed on a basic engine configuration for the SSBJ, and they are still engaged in a feasibility study which should be completed by March 1991.

91. At the moment an 8 to 19-passenger version with a maximum range of 7 500 km is under development. Sukhoi still has further plans for a 50-passenger version with a 9 200 km range.

92. A quite different and very recent development is a programme for a so-called ground-effect vehicle, which can best be described as a jet-engined aircraft with a very large wing surface and the hull and floats in trimaran-like construction. It can land on and take off from water. The specific design enables this vehicle to glide over the water surface at a cruising height of 1.5 m, thus having a very low fuel consumption. A relatively small 60-seater, of which the research and development cost is estimated at \$1.5 billion, is now being designed in a joint venture with Aeromarine Aircraft in Singapore. The basic design could be developed into a 600-ton vehicle with 600 seats. It is thought that there is a vast market for this vehicle in South-East Asia and the Pacific with its innumerable islands and rather limited possibilities for landing strips.

93. Other projects are the Su-80M, a small 19-seat and 3 500 km autonomy transport aircraft of 16 m length and 23 m wingspan for rugged conditions which has aroused interest in Indonesia (IPTN) and the Su-84, a 4-passenger aircraft.

94. A small aerobatic aircraft, the Su-26M, which made its first appearance for western observers at the world aerobatic championships in Hungary in 1984, is now being offered on the world market and six have already been sold to the United States. Meanwhile, Sukhoi has signed an agreement with Piper for the development of a new range of single-engined aircraft which will benefit from the experience with composite materials in the Su-26M.

95. In order to face the different consequences of conversion, Sukhoi and several other Soviet aerospace defence industries with expertise in engines, electronics, airframe design and production have combined forces in the recently established Aero Conversion Association with a view to developing new programmes for civilian products in their specific areas of interest.

96. Other Soviet aerospace industrialists follow the same line of thought. The helicopter firms Mil and Kamov are proposing co-operative ventures with western companies for different new and existing models. Rolls Royce and Kamov signed an agreement for the supply of five Rolls Royce/Turbomeca RTM 322 turboshaft engines in 1993 as powerplants for the 14-seat Kamov Ka-62R helicopter now under development. After expected certification to western standards it will be offered for sale outside the Soviet Union with the RTM 322<sup>21</sup>. Yakovlev is offering its new Yak 42M three-engined, 156-seat passenger transport for export and proposes co-operative ventures especially for the power plants of the Yak 48, a twin-engined, 6 to 10-seat business jet now under development. Ilyushin, Tupolev and Antonov will also try to penetrate the world market with their new models.

97. Western industrialists have not ventured any fundamental objections to business relationships with Soviet counterparts, but they still see a number of practical obstacles, such as the current quite chaotic political and economic situation in the country, the shortage of hard currency and the lack of legislation concerning commerce with the West.

98. At the moment, many western firms wishing to do business are trying to establish offset and counter-trade arrangements. On the other hand, they expect that the Soviet Union will not linger in creating a legal framework in order to improve the opportunities for international business relations since it is a matter of urgency for its economic development.

99. Mr. Henri Martre, of GIFAS, the French aerospace industry association, recently made it clear that the first priority for GIFAS is to sell its products on the Soviet market. Second, it will certainly try to develop co-operation with Soviet industry because innovation in the aerospace industry is too expensive to act independently. Aerospatiale has projects for co-operation in supersonic transport and helicopters. In the first domain, together with TS AGI and Tupolev, it is engaged in studies of the environment and pollution. With Kamov and Mil it is discussing research projects on the de-icing of rotor-blades, a helicopter for lifting heavy loads and the Eurofar. SNECMA sees opportunities for

21. Aerospace World No. 10, 1990.

technological exchange: titanium metallurgy against electronic control and high temperature control<sup>22</sup>.

100. It should be noticed here that the approach of the Soviet aerospace industry towards conversion, which is to develop its own existing and specific capabilities into the civilian area, is now also being pursued by the other branches of the defence complex. This led to an intensive lobby seeking to modify the draft state conversion programme which seems to have met with some success.

### ***IX. The state conversion programme***

101. Since it became clear that in 1988-89 a number of mishaps had discredited the first conversion efforts, a more structured and deliberate approach was chosen for the years to come. The Military-Industrial Commission – the co-ordinating authority of the defence complex – and the defence industry department of Gosplan – the State Planning Committee – worked out a state programme for the conversion of the defence industry for the years 1991-95 in consultation with the Ministry of Defence<sup>23</sup>. This has already been examined and approved by the Committee on Defence and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet and approved for implementation by the Presidential Council after inclusion of some amendments, among which should be mentioned measures to enhance the programme's emphasis on civil aviation, shipbuilding, communications and space research. It is not yet completely clear how far it has survived the compromising over the economic reform after its inclusion in the Ryzhkov programme.

102. The draft state conversion programme indicates that the civilian production effort of the defence industry should be aimed at three main target areas:

#### ***(i) Improvement of the population's living standard and conditions***

103. This requires a sharp increase in the production of non-food consumer goods, building up the production of equipment which can provide the population with food, clothing and housing, an upgraded health service and a normal living environment.

22. Air et Cosmos, No. 1299, 29th September 1990.

23. V.I. Smyslov, On the basic directions of the draft state programme for the conversion of defence industry in the USSR, report for the United Nations conference on conversion, Moscow, 13th-17th August 1990; Julian Cooper, unpublished paper on Soviet conversion, Oxford Analytica, October 1990.

#### ***(ii) Stimulation of scientific and technological progress in key branches of industry and the national economy as a whole***

104. In this area, the effort is directed at expanding the development and production of all items constituting the basic infrastructure of a modern society, such as information and communication technology and electronics. At the same time and aimed at the same objective, the programme requires a major effort in such areas as civilian aviation and shipbuilding and relevant civilian space technology.

#### ***(iii) Development of new materials and technologies***

105. It is being recognised that advanced materials and technologies, which until recently were exclusively reserved for the armed forces, can be employed even more usefully to improve the technological level of civilian facilities.

106. Until 1995, some 420 production factories and 200 research institutes and design bureaux will be involved in the conversion programme. Of these, six defence complex firms producing military goods are being totally converted. They will terminate their military production in order to convert to civilian production.

107. Partial conversion plays an important part in the state programme: 242 of the defence complex enterprises mentioned above will reduce their military work by 20% or less.

108. Apart from the abovementioned, over 100 firms of other branches of industry are covered by conversion, of which 34 are being totally converted.

109. According to the state conversion programme, the share of Defence Ministry civilian production in the overall civilian production of the Soviet Union will increase from 43% in 1988 to 50% in 1990 and to over 60% in 1995. Over these seven years, the total volume of civilian production is expected to more than double. The value of the total quantity of civilian goods to be produced by the defence complex in the period 1991-95 is estimated to be 110 billion roubles.

110. It is envisaged that over the years 1991-95, a total sum of 40 billion roubles will be invested in the civilian activities of the defence complex, including the 9 billion roubles which have been earmarked by Prime Minister Ryzhkov for re-equipment of the military-related production capacity for civilian purposes.

111. Yuri A. Glybin called the three main target areas first objectives and he said that industries wishing to produce items specified in the programme will obtain state support in their efforts, including financial means.

112. He stressed that this is a task programme, indicating objectives, tasks, priorities and availabilities. He was well aware that the programme now developed may not be the ideal one and will need adaptation and changes, but being the first one it will allow an organised start to be made.

113. Parallel to the state conversion programme, a USSR law on conversion has been drafted, which has now been submitted for approval to the Supreme Soviet, with adoption expected to take place in early 1991. This law envisages settling a number of problems caused by conversion. It determines the rights and obligations of the personnel of converted enterprises, but also of their administration, establishes privileges, advantages and financial incentives for these enterprises and a large portion is devoted to social issues.

#### *X. Internal criticism against the state conversion programme*

114. The conversion effort, as it is being organised by the state, has met with quite some criticism. This criticism was not only voiced by industry, as referred to in chapter VIII, which saw its privileged position endangered and was also afraid of losing its technological edge.

115. There was also severe criticism from radical Soviet economists, who advanced different but no less valuable arguments and who propose an alternative conversion strategy which meets growing support. The leading economist in this criticism is Yuri A. Yaremenko, Director of the Institute for the Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technical Progress of the USSR Academy of Sciences, with Alexei Kireev of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union's Communist Party as one other well-known protagonist.

116. They venture that the approach of the state conversion programme is founded on administrative methods incompatible with the market reform envisaged now. Their second argument says that the planned conversion is not sufficiently orientated to the modernisation of the civil industrial base of the economy. Lastly, they say that the programme provides an extension of the defence complex at the expense of the civilian industry rather than the other way round.

117. The main argument is that the Soviet Union is losing a unique chance to bring about the demilitarisation in depth of its economy, which could break through the wall of secrecy which is at the moment dividing its economy in two parts – a civilian and a military one – which are completely separated. They observe that,

instead, the defence complex continues to consolidate its monopoly in the production of numerous consumer goods, which alienates the Soviet economy even further from the development of sound competition principles<sup>24</sup>.

118. A large part of the proposals of these radical economists, especially the idea to cut back the defence industry, has been included in the Shatalin 500-day programme for economic reform.

#### *XI. From military to civilian research and development*

119. According to official Soviet figures on defence expenditure in 1989, the Soviet Union spent 15.3 billion roubles or 19.8% of total defence spending and 1.8% of the GNP on research and development. Western observers put these figures at a higher level and assess Soviet defence research and development expenditure at between 20 and 28 billion roubles, the same 20% of total defence spending but between 2.5 and 3.5% of its estimate of GNP.

120. Whatever figures one considers, the proportion of Soviet spending in this area is exceptionally high if compared with western spending. The United States, at the peak of defence spending under the Reagan administration, spent 0.8% of GNP on military research and development and the Federal Republic of Germany 0.11<sup>25</sup>.

121. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the reduction of 13.7% in defence research and development in 1990 could result in considerable progress for similar activities in the civilian sector. It is planned that, during the 1991-95 period, state budget funding of defence complex civilian research and development will amount to 36 billion roubles.

122. According to the state conversion programme, research and technological personnel who can no longer be employed in the armaments industry will be employed in the priority spheres of civilian production identified in the programme. Their knowledge and capabilities can be fully used in the civilian industry since the government has announced that the traditionally strict security régime in the defence industry has been relaxed and many institutes and enterprises have been declassified in order to overcome what President Gorbachev has denounced as the internal Cocom between the military and civilian sector. It was mentioned in paragraph 117, however, that Soviet critics still have serious doubts about this relaxation of the security régime.

24. Alexei Kireev, *La reconversion marque le pas*, Temps Nouveaux, 10-90.

25. SIPRI Yearbook 1990, page 175.

123. It is planned to increase appropriations for civilian research by 41.1% in 1991 as compared with 1988. This increased growth rate of appropriations for civilian research as compared with military will completely change the balance. In 1995 the share of civilian projects in nation-wide research and development should according to plan amount to 45.8% while in 1988 it was only 28.5%.

124. Priority growth of appropriations in the years 1990-95 is planned in the following areas:

- information and communication technology, (growth by 3.7 times);
- civil aviation, civilian space exploration and state research programmes in basic technologies such as high-energy physics and high-temperature super-conductivity (growth by 1.5 to 1.6 times).

125. According to the state conversion programme, the research capabilities which have been released and will no longer be used for defence purposes will be employed in two different ways:

- to create technological progress in traditional spheres of civilian application. Here there are such items as highly-productive microchip equipment for the textile and knitted goods industry, new equipment for the food industry guaranteeing a greater range of goods, personal computers, audio and video equipment, fibre-optics communication means, modernisation of civilian aircraft, new ships and modern medical equipment;
- to create fundamentally new kinds of machinery, resource-saving technologies and promising dual-purpose materials.

126. This will include the development of new and composite materials, ecologically-safe means of self-contained power engineering, a space-based satellite communication system and automated means for monitoring the ecological situation in cities and regions <sup>26</sup>.

127. It should be observed here that a programme which looks flawless in theory may be less easy to enforce in practice.

128. At a round-table conference organised by the scientific department of Pravda on 9th June 1990, directors of companies and institutes in the defence industry complained about reductions in credits for research and development, dismantlement and the dissolution of qualified teams.

129. In this framework, O. Patkulín, Deputy Director of the Institute for Light Alloys, stated that, for its own survival, the institute had had to sacrifice its fundamental research in a period of growing demand for new materials for engines. E. Shalin, Director-General of the National Institute for Aeronautical Materials, denounced a catastrophic reduction of credits for fundamental research and thought that the government should establish large-scale research and development programmes <sup>27</sup>.

130. A number of Soviet authorities venture that this grumbling should rather be dismissed as being typical of people who have nostalgia for the good old days when they were spoilt and who are now in trouble since they have to adapt to the new situation. Others, however, argue that indeed a lot of indiscriminate cutting of research and development budgets is taking place which may cause the loss of great numbers of capable scientists and engineers, which in turn will affect the high technology base of Soviet industry <sup>28</sup>.

## *XII. Consequences of conversion for individual enterprises*

131. When conversion was started in practice during 1989, a number of serious problems apparently had been neglected in the rush of sudden changes. It soon became clear that in these early stages the conversion effort was rather arbitrary. For some enterprises, military orders were either cancelled or severely cut and at the same time replaced by instructions to increase the existing civilian production. Other enterprises had their military orders reduced and were instructed to build new assembly lines for civilian products for introducing an entirely new production process simultaneously with the decrease in military production. Production goals for civilian output were set far too high, not taking into account the many problems which had to be surmounted by the enterprises concerned.

132. Little attention was paid to the inventory of specific facilities in order to measure convertibility. Specific existing capabilities of manpower and assembly lines were too often neglected and it seems that little attention was paid to the surrounding infrastructure and to the rôle of such enterprises in the social-economic structure of the town or region where they were situated.

133. The management of many defence complex enterprises often had no experience in working for customers other than the state.

27. Air and Cosmos, 30th June 1990.

28. Alexei Kireev, La conversion en URSS, Vie Internationale, May 1990, pages 102-103.

26. V.I. Smyslov, see note 23.

Accountancy for the sake of economy had not been a subject of interest for them since they had been used to priority treatment where financial resources were concerned.

134. Not surprisingly, many defence enterprises faced serious financial problems. Their defence production, usually reasonably profitable, was reduced and replaced by civilian production with lower profit margins or even losses. At the same time they had to invest considerably in retraining of personnel, new assembly lines, tools and other equipment. The inevitable decline in productivity with simultaneously climbing operational and investment costs was due to bring many enterprises to the brink of bankruptcy. It all happened while the defence industry was trying to cope with the first major economic reforms, which came into force in January 1989, and which introduced the principle of self-financing, thus stressing the need to be profitable.

135. At the same time the customary and preferential supply lines of resources of the defence complex industries were being cut off while Gosplan told the enterprises concerned to be resourceful. This required a complete change in mentality and a very large degree of adaptability. Civilian production factories, which have always been in a less privileged position, have long since learned how to cope with shortages. They try to find partners in order to swap resources and so to meet their production quotas.

136. It has been suggested that defence factories operate in the same way and pool the resources and equipment which are being made available in the framework of conversion. There can be no wonder when Soviet experts, such as Evgeny Bougrov, suggest that in a number of enterprises a change of management would be helpful.

137. Finally, when all questions mentioned above have been resolved, the enterprise still faces two more: fixing the price of its new civilian products and selling them to customers of whose need and whereabouts it knows nothing. Many Soviet economists consider the prices of new civilian products turned out by the defence complex to be too high. This may partly be the consequence of better materials used, higher production costs and lack of familiarity with the market, but customers will be reluctant to pay a higher price which is hardly justified and which has little relation to the price of similar products already on the market.

138. Marketing and selling the new civilian output of the defence complex is also a question which until now obtained little attention from the state. It was thought in the beginning that in a market with shortages in almost every single product one could imagine, there would be no

problem in finding customers. In practice, however, there have been problems in finding customers, also because, understandably, defence industry enterprises had no knowledge at all of the market for the sometimes rather exotic or at least alien products which they were ordered to turn out such as sugar lumps or packing machines.

139. Yuri Glybin of Gosplan left no doubt that lessons have been learned from the first conversion activities. In the framework of both the state conversion programme and the USSR law on conversion, provision is being made to furnish financial means where needed if certain prerequisites have been met. For instance, a converting enterprise qualifies for financial support if it is a major defence complex facility with at least 20% of its defence production cut and if it converts to civilian production of items mentioned in the priority list of the state conversion programme. Financial support will include specific means for retraining personnel and retooling. Moreover, under penalty of a fine, the state will have to announce cuts in defence orders between 18 and 24 months ahead and discuss possible conversion activities with the establishment concerned.

### *XIII. Social consequences of conversion*

140. It goes without saying that conversion as envisaged by the Soviet Union will have serious consequences for the approximately 500 000 defence industry employees who, according to Soviet estimates, will be directly affected. According to Vladimir Volkov, Chairman of the Sverdlovsk City Soviet Commission for Industry and Conversion, nearly 30 000 researchers and highly-qualified workers had to leave defence-related jobs in this city alone in the last two years<sup>29</sup>.

141. To name only a few problems: retraining programmes will have to be organised, new jobs created and regions where the defence industry predominates may have to be partly or totally restructured. In this respect, it should be observed that, due to the structure of Soviet society, a reduction in the financial means of an enterprise may have consequences, not only for payment and provisions for its employees, but also for the social infrastructure of the town and region where it is located since the social funds of these enterprises are used to finance housing projects and social services for its employees.

142. Moreover, as Mikhail Simonov said, re-employment in the civilian sector of people who have been working for a long time in the privileged and well-respected defence sector in many cases causes a psychological shock which should not be underestimated and requires adequate therapy.

29. Moscow News, No. 2, 1990, page 10.

143. For many years salaries and social advantages had been better in the Soviet defence industry than in the civilian industry, but the prevailing opinion now is that this situation is no longer so.

144. The Soviet economist A. Izjumov stated recently that, in the last 10 to 20 years, the differences in salaries and social privileges between the defence and civilian industries have largely disappeared. On the other hand, in a 1989 interview, the Soviet Minister for Shipbuilding declared that it was no secret that in the defence industry higher hourly wages were paid than in the civilian sector <sup>30</sup>.

145. Apparently, the truth is between the two, because the Supreme Soviet, through Mr. Leonid Sharin, has stated that, during a transitional period of two years, workers in converted defence industry establishments should keep their original wage levels irrespective of changes. At the same time, Gosplan made it known this summer that in order to maintain the current rate of payment for a period of re-training of some categories of specialists, over 570 million roubles will be allocated to the wage fund in 1989-90 <sup>31</sup>.

146. In order to comprehensively seal the right to social protection for Soviet citizens working in enterprises affected by conversion or released as a result of it, a draft USSR law on conversion has been submitted for approval to the Supreme Soviet, which is expecting to adopt it in early 1991.

147. According to this draft law, the personnel of converted enterprises who will lose their jobs due to the reduction of military contracts must have a right to corresponding allowances, compensation and preferential pensions. The state should make provisions to help these people acquire a new job.

#### *XIV. Arms trade in the Soviet Union*

148. In a discussion of conversion in the Soviet defence industry, the arms trade cannot be ignored.

149. The Soviet Union, with its well-developed defence industry, has long been listed among the leaders in the arms trade. Major reasons were, on the one hand, the moral and material support given to countries which were fighting for their freedom and national independence as it was officially stated, and, on the other hand, to earn badly-needed foreign currency. According to SIPRI, in 1989, the Soviet Union was the leader

in conventional arms exports, with total sales of \$11.6 billion, followed by the United States with total sales of \$10.7 billion.

150. Of the total \$11.6 billion sales, a value of \$8.5 billion was exported to developing countries and \$3.1 billion to developed countries, these being the Warsaw Pact member states, Yugoslavia and Finland.

151. The full list of export destinations shows that the Soviet Union has been rather indiscriminate in this respect <sup>32</sup>.

152. It was therefore rather interesting to hear the opinion of Valentin Sharin, acting Chairman of the Committee on Defence and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on this subject. Mr. Sharin recognised that, in order to earn hard currency and to get rid of existing stockpiles, the Soviet Union will continue to sell arms on the world market. In a way, the Soviets have even become more audacious than before; recently, they submitted an official offer to the Swiss Government to sell MiG 29s. Another reason for these continuing sales, he added, was to make sure that the defence industry would not have to face the additional problem of losing the export market.

153. Mr. Sharin made it clear, however, that there is a tendency among members of the Supreme Soviet to stop indiscriminate arms trade. These deputies think that in the Soviet Union legislation should be introduced to scrutinise arms sales in order to prevent sales which could destabilise relations in a specific region or sales to hotbeds of conflict.

154. At the same time international agreements should be concluded to make sure that such vacuums in arms supply will not be filled by malevolent or less scrupulous arms-producing countries.

155. In this framework Mr. Sharin recalled that in the Soviet Union there is wide popular support for conversion, not as a goal in itself, but rather as one of the means to bring about a general restructuring of the entire society.

#### *XV. Can and should conversion still be centrally planned?*

156. Understandably, Gosplan, now preparing the thirteenth five-year plan since this state planning system was established in 1928, is still quite confident of its capabilities to provide a perfect and balanced state conversion programme for the goals to be achieved in the 1991-95 period. In theory, the programme is indeed well-contrived, and there is reason to argue that without state planning the defence

30. Hans-Henning Schröder, Teil III, pages 34-37.

31. V.I. Smyslov, see note 23.

32. SIPRI Yearbook 1990, pages 219-316, provides a fairly complete picture of trade in major conventional weapons.



industry would be at a complete loss since it has been pampered by the state for so many years. At the moment, however, a number of symptoms are casting doubts on this confidence in the implementation of a traditional state planning programme.

157. There is no longer any doubt that an increasingly anarchistic situation is reigning as regards the implementation of a centrally imposed plan. A clear sign of the desperate situation appeared when President Mikhail Gorbachev issued a decree on 27th September 1990 which among other things gave a one-month deadline to companies in the sectors of pharmaceuticals, raw materials, building materials, spare parts and the food industry to restore their production in compliance with the plan. Enterprises were furthermore called to observe the contractual obligations which they had taken until the end of 1991<sup>33</sup>.

158. Moreover, there is a strong tendency in the various Soviet republics to be more autonomous, also as regards decisions in social-economic questions. Differences of opinion over the road to be followed towards better economic performance have come to light in violent debates which more than once were decided to the detriment of the central authorities.

159. Meanwhile, the struggle of republics at different administrative levels over the extent of their autonomous rights is raging unabated. Mr. Silaev, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, has stated that the Russian Federation has massive imports in mind, for which purpose it will establish a Russian foreign currency bank, using the gold and diamond reserve in Iakoutia.

160. Iakoutia, which would like to keep its treasures for itself, declared on 27th September 1990 that it was no longer an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation, but a sovereign Socialist Soviet Republic<sup>34</sup>.

161. According to President Gorbachev's economic reform plan, which was approved on 19th October 1990, the central government will retain control over mineral resources and other raw materials for at least two years from now.

162. The quest for autonomy, in some cases even for far-reaching sovereignty and independence, is at the moment assuming such proportions that it can no longer simply be dismissed as irrelevant, premature and wishful thinking. Apparently, President Gorbachev considers it to be a real threat, judging by a recent address in which he denounced the disintegration of Lebanon, once one of the most flourishing countries of the world but now being abandoned by

its inhabitants, after which he went on to say that, for his own country, there was a need to build a union of sovereign states and to struggle against separatism<sup>35</sup>.

163. On 1st November 1990, the Russian Republic started putting into effect its own more radical reform plan. Moreover, the parliament of the Russian Republic approved a law declaring that the republic had full control of all its resources. This law stipulates that all agreements with foreign companies involving the republic's most important resources need the agreement of the republic's government to be valid.

164. It may be too early for a final opinion, but it may well be that the state conversion programme with its central planning system will soon be overtaken by the centrifugal effects of the recently adopted economic reform plan.

### *XVI. Results of conversion*

165. It should be observed that the first results of the conversion effort have been frankly disappointing. Apparently, the many problems had been underestimated.

166. A reduction of 20% in the production of more or less sophisticated pieces of military equipment does not mean that the same production facility or assembly line can, from that moment on, use the same 20% of the production capacity to turn out civilian products. If there is no intention of going back to manual production, research and development of new production equipment has to be undertaken, often followed by large-scale investment in machinery, tools and the retraining of workers. This all takes time and money, much more than was thought initially.

167. Production goals were set far too high in relation to specific possibilities. Specialisation, production volumes and technological level of defence facilities were taken into account marginally when orders for civilian production were issued. The result of this rash action and lack of experience was that, in 1989, only 23 of the 120 planned civilian articles were accomplished in mass production while only 15% of these products were in conformity with world quality standards. In 1988-89, the Ministry of the Aviation Industry produced 21% less civilian products in the framework of conversion than planned, saying that some of the products on order were too difficult to produce<sup>36</sup>.

168. Too often it was thought that with the existing shortages sales and marketing of civilian goods produced by the defence industry would

33. Le Monde, 29th September 1990.

34. Le Monde, 29th September 1990.

35. Address at the plenary session of the Central Committee, 8th October 1990, Le Monde, 10th October 1990.

36. Alexei Kireev, in Temps Nouveaux, October 1990.



not be a problem, while in fact the lack of experience in this field led to unsold stocks.

169. It appeared that the technological gap between the civilian and military sectors of the economy is so large that it is impossible to apply high technology in enterprises which produce for the civilian market. For instance, without large-scale restructuring and re-equipment, the Ministry for Agricultural Machines would be incapable of using titanium and aluminium alloys, certain plastics and other materials which need special processing. There are serious doubts about whether it will be possible to introduce rapidly, in existing civilian production facilities, many of the new technologies which have been developed and applied in the defence industry for military purposes.

170. Another reason for conversion not meeting its goals is – not surprisingly – that top generals and a number of weapon producers are lobbying against it<sup>37</sup>. According to Vsevolod Avduyevsky, it is also essential for at least those branches of the defence complex which are producing for the civilian market to lift the restrictions connected with military production. He thinks that civil production needs freedom, also to prevent such firms reverting to military production without anyone knowing<sup>38</sup>.

171. Fortunately, there have also been positive developments. In particular the aerospace industry has come up with many new and interesting initiatives, inspired by its own existing high capabilities. It is determined to penetrate world markets. Since it really has something to offer, western companies are interested in co-operation and a number of joint ventures and co-operative agreements have already been concluded. Mention has already been made of co-operative agreements between different defence complex enterprises in order to join forces and operate in civilian markets where they have specific capabilities.

172. In Sverdlovsk, a traditional defence industry centre, regional authorities have established a company called "Uralkonversia" in order to attract foreign co-operation in a number of different activities, such as metallurgy, electric energy and laser technology.

173. In 1989, the production of consumer durables increased by 9.3%, partly due to the efforts of the defence industry. It has, however, been observed that this increased production was less the result of conversion than of the fact that the defence industry has used its existing reserves and facilities<sup>39</sup>.

174. Concluding, it should be said that until now the conversion of the Soviet defence industry has not yet produced the results expected, mainly because many problems had not been foreseen or had been underestimated. On the other hand, the efforts being made are sincere to all appearances, the more so because the Soviet authorities have no other choice. The potential of conversion is important and experts estimate that it could provide 2 to 5% additional civilian production in 1995. Moreover, spin-off could bring about a general improvement of civilian production capabilities as defence secrecy will be lifted from a growing number of technologies, developed in the defence complex industries. There is reason for optimism, but large investments and western co-operation are essential. Moreover, economic reform in the Soviet Union is a condition *sine qua non*.

### *XVII. Economic reform in the Soviet Union*

175. Even if it has been an important step to divert financial means from the military to the civilian sector in the framework of conversion, Soviet authorities agree that it is not a cure for all ills and in fact they are all convinced that the only real solution for their ailing economy will be a rapid introduction of the market economy. President Gorbachev during the last months has repeatedly indicated that the Soviet Union was in danger of becoming ungovernable and slipping into economic collapse. He was particularly concerned at the declining respect for the law<sup>40</sup>.

176. For a number of months, the political authorities in the Soviet Union have been haggling about different possible ways to reform the economy, a subject which at the same time is closely linked with the question of how to arrive at a new treaty to hold the Soviet republics together.

177. In a preliminary decision on 24th September 1990, the Supreme Soviet granted President Gorbachev special powers which will allow him to rule by decree during the transitional period to a market economy.

178. On 4th October 1990, President Gorbachev in a decree made the first specific move towards the development of the market economy, when he authorised enterprises to negotiate directly and at their own discretion a part of their wholesale prices<sup>41</sup>.

179. Until now, these prices had been fixed centrally for the whole territory of the Soviet Union. When, as a consequence of the first recent economic reforms, enterprises were granted some autonomy in management, this resulted in several of them stopping the production of items which did not bring any profit, or even caused losses.

37. Alexandre N. Yakovlev, *International Herald Tribune*, 27th September 1990.

38. Vsevolod Avduyevsky, Chairman of the Soviet national committee to promote conversion, *Moscow News*, No. 39, 7th-14th October 1990.

39. *Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est*, June 1990.

40. *The Times*, 31st August 1990.

41. *Le Monde*, 6th October 1990.

180. The new decree on price liberalisation was urgent since enterprises, expecting a price reform at some moment, no longer signed new contracts at official prices and tried to break existing contracts.

181. There were some important snags in this decree which still need clarification in order to be able to measure their effect. In the first place it was stated that within ten days councils of ministers of the Russian Federation and the republics would have to publish a list of wholesale prices remaining under state control. Secondly, the governments would have to indicate the limits of profit margins above which all earnings on a fifty-fifty basis would have to be transferred to the budgets of the union and the republics.

182. On 19th October, the Supreme Soviet finally approved in principle President Gorbachev's plan to move towards a free market economy which is a compromise between the forced-march 500-day approach of the economist Stanislav Shatalin and the more gradualist approach advocated by Prime Minister Nicolai Ryzhkov.

183. Both programmes envisaged financial stabilisation, the de-control of prices and production, privatisation or denationalisation of state enterprises, greater independence for republics, an opening to direct foreign investment, the creation of a modern banking system and capital markets and external convertibility of the rouble.

184. The approved Gorbachev plan, entitled "Basic directions for the stabilisation of the economy and the switch over to the market", begins with a declaration of the superiority of the free market system over the old system of central planning, stating "The choice has been made: there is no alternative to a transition to the market".

185. Essentially, the transition will take place in four stages. The first stage will mainly be concerned with basic legislation and with measures to stabilise the money supply, check inflation and reduce the budget deficit.

186. It is planned to cut the 1991 budget deficit by around 25%, mainly by reducing KGB and defence expenditure, selling state assets and slashing capital investment. Shortly, the state bank will be transformed into a federal reserve system, with each republic having its own central bank. The commercial rouble for import and export transactions will most probably be devaluated by 60 to 75% before the end of 1990.

187. A start will be made with denationalisation, privatisation and the introduction of land reform.

188. In the second stage, there will be liberalisation of the retail price of a large

number of consumer goods. The third stage should see the development of a market infrastructure both for consumer goods as well as for production means. Privatisation should be gathering pace. In the fourth stage, the market and financial system should stabilise and the consumer market should improve.

189. President Gorbachev has said that the basis of the new market economy should be created within a period of 18 to 24 months, but the reform actions of his programme are expressed in rather vague and general terms.

190. In the beginning, central direction will be exerted to avoid a drastic slump in production and economic breakdown in the coming winter. For at least two years from now, the central government will retain control over mineral resources and raw materials.

191. Privatisation will take place over a long period: by the end of 1991 only 7% of small enterprises should be privatised. Private property of production means has not been rejected, but during a rather long period it will be confined to organisations of very limited size. There is no explicit mention of private ownership of land, on which subject the communist party wants a referendum.

192. The Gorbachev programme is equally vague about its relation to a general movement towards more autonomy in the Soviet republics and Abel G. Aganbegyan, an economist who has been involved in preparing the compromise, has conceded that the programme dictates only the basic direction of reform, leaving much to be worked out in negotiations.

193. Some well-known Soviet economists, amongst whom are Stanislav Shatalin, Grigori Javlinski and Nicolaj Petrakov, have strongly criticised the compromise economic reform plan as now adopted. In particular, they were aiming at the government's price policy according to which state-controlled prices are to be raised under control, while at the same time compensatory subsidies will be paid to the lowest income categories. Meanwhile, the decentralisation of economic policy and privatisation of state property are being delayed. The combination of these measures, the abovementioned critics say, will lead to hyperinflation and further destabilise the rouble.

194. In western countries too, there are strong fears that President Gorbachev's economic reform plan is the result of too much – possibly inevitable – political compromising.

195. On 24th October, however, the parliaments of both the Russian Republic and the Ukraine insisted in resolutions that their approval was needed before Soviet legislation could take effect on their territory. The resolution of the Russian Parliament covers nearly all federal legislation as well as presidential

"decrees and other decisions" <sup>42</sup>. This could have as a consequence that the central government will have difficulties in enforcing its economic reform programme, which is less radical than the Shatalin reform programme, adopted earlier by the Russian Republic. In particular, the right to raise taxes and the exploitation of natural resources are matters where the federal government and the republics disagree. Meanwhile, on 1st November 1990, the Russian Republic started to put into practice the original radical 500-day plan for economic reform, thus consciously adopting a collision course with President Gorbachev's economic reform plan.

### *XVIII. Conclusions*

196. Since 1985, when General Secretary Gorbachev started to open the Soviet Union's windows to the world, to ease the tight reins of central control and to convince the Soviet population that radical political and economic reforms were inevitable, East-West relations have changed profoundly.

197. In security policy, the perception of the Soviet Union as a military threat is disappearing very rapidly. Even up to the point that the United States Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, after his visit to the Soviet Union in October 1990, said that if things continued as they had in the last eighteen months "it will be possible to say that we do not consider the Soviets as adversaries" <sup>43</sup>.

198. Apart from arms reductions in the framework of international agreements, the Soviet Union is making important unilateral reductions in the manpower and equipment of its armed forces. Conversion in the Soviet defence industry is no longer a fairy tale, it is reality. It has a great potential insofar as it can help to build a better performing civilian industry which could improve the living standards of the population. Care should be taken, however, lest it lead to a reinforcement and extension of the defence complex industries. On the contrary, the more the civilian production branches of the defence complex are freed from the bodice of state protection, state influence and secrecy, the better they would be able to integrate into the civilian market and employ their capabilities to promote its progress and development.

199. At the moment, more important than anything else and also crucial for the success of conversion, is a rapid transition of the Soviet Union to a market economy.

200. Can Western European countries help? The answer to this question is not easy. Of course, to sit idle and see what happens is never

satisfactory. But there is no way to set up a new Marshall plan as the United States did after World War II to help Western Europe recover. The Soviet Union lacks the indispensable economic, legal and organisational infrastructure of the market economy of post-war Western Europe that helped to make the Marshall plan a success. The prevailing opinion is that pouring financial aid into the Soviet economy would be money down the drain until a thoroughgoing reform is instituted and internal economic and political relations have been clarified more than is the case at present.

201. Most useful would be to provide know-how in the organisation and running of a modern market economy. International organisations like OECD, IMF and the World Bank at the moment provide specialist knowledge. They discuss existing problems with Soviet experts, exchange experience and provide policy recommendations on the basis of extensive study; Soviets see an advantage in this multinational approach since the advice is objective and not biased towards the interests of a specific western nation.

202. Furthermore, it is important to help to create new generations of entrepreneurs, familiar with the theory and practice of the market economy through extensive training programmes in business administration and practical knowledge of the market economy. Western nations could support and stimulate such training programmes by sponsoring fellowship funds and establishing exchange programmes.

203. Exchange programmes should also be aimed at administrative experts and politicians in order to make them familiar with the rôle of government, administration and democratic control in a market economy. Such activities can be embedded in bilateral political agreements such as the treaties which have been concluded recently by Germany and France.

204. A third means of assistance is direct contacts between western and Soviet companies in whatever way is most appropriate. In this area, there is little to do for western governments. The potential of the Soviet market is enormous, but twenty to thirty years may well before there is an infrastructure and economic environment in any way comparable to western standards. In certain areas, Soviet industry has technologies and know-how to offer. Western companies are willing to co-operate in many different ways, but most of them are reluctant to invest large amounts of money in such co-operative projects at this highly unstable juncture.

205. There is no conclusion other than that the Soviet Union has first responsibility. But in the name of history, Western European nations are obliged to help the Soviet Union appropriately to implement the transition to a market economy.

42. International Herald Tribune, 25th October 1990.

43. International Herald Tribune, 20th-21st October 1990.

## APPENDIX

TABLE I

*Production of MOOP ministries (in thousands of units)*

Ministry	1987	1988	Variation (%)
<b>Ministry for the Radio Industry (Minradioprom)</b>			
Television sets .....	1 274	1 644	29
of which colour .....	521	887	70
Tape recorders .....	1 276	1 480	16
Refrigerators .....	396	384	- 3
Washing machines .....	329	330	0
Vacuum cleaners .....	792	840	6
Radio receivers .....	1 518	1 548	2
Watches .....	2 178	2 200	1
<b>Ministry for the Aircraft Industry (Minaviaprom)</b>			
Refrigerators .....	844	869	3
Tape recorders .....	311	398	28
Washing machines .....	1 180	1 239	5
Vacuum cleaners .....	1 336	1 376	3
Radio receivers .....	53	44.5	- 16
Watches .....	4 000	4 000	0
<b>Ministry for Electronics Industry (Minelektronprom)</b>			
Television sets .....	376	365	- 3
of which colour .....	117	90.2	- 23
Tape recorders .....	1 023	1 084	6
Video tape recorders .....	45	72.9	62
Radio receivers .....	9.3	7	- 25
Watches .....	6 529	6 790	4
Electric batteries .....	1 098	1 241	13
<b>Ministry for General Mechanical Construction (Minobchtchemach)</b>			
Colour television sets .....	534	636	19
Refrigerators .....	2 163	2 250	4
Washing machines .....	383	379	- 1
Vacuum cleaners .....	765	926	21
Tape recorders .....	220	231	5
Radio receivers .....	158	155	- 2
<b>Ministry for Communications (Minpromsvyazi)</b>			
Television sets .....	6 914	6 983	1
of which colour .....	3 458	4 080	18
Tape recorders .....	1 133	1 235	9
Radio receivers .....	5 781	5 608	- 3
<b>Ministry for the Defence Industry (Minoboronprom)</b>			
Refrigerators .....	525	562	7
Motor bikes and scooters .....	596	601	1
Sewing machines .....	1 476	1 550	5
Washing machines .....	331	401	14
Vacuum cleaners .....	523	580	11
Tape recorders .....	22.1	24.7	12

Ministry	1987	1988	Variation (%)
Ministry for Mechanical Construction (Minmach)			
Refrigerators .....	1 773	1 879	6
Bicycles .....	2 413	2 461	2
Tape recorders .....	520	577	11
Washing machines .....	1 132	1 139	0.6
Electric batteries .....	82 600	95 000	15
Radio receivers .....	106	115	9
Watches .....	2 900	3 000	2
Ministry for the Naval Industry (Minsudprom)			
Refrigerators .....	115	145	26
Washing machines .....	715	751	5
Tape recorders .....	383	376	- 2
Radio receivers .....	547	549	0.4

TABLE II

*Production of consumer goods by military industry  
as compared to total national output  
(in millions of units)*

Products	1987 production			1988 production		
	National	VPK	(%)	National	VPK	(%)
Vacuum cleaners .....	4.4	3.4	75	4.8	3.7	77
Batteries .....	(*)	83.7	(?)	97.3	96.2	99
Bicycles .....	5.5	2.4	43	5.6	2.5	45
Sewing machines .....	1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	100
Washing machines .....	5.8	4.1	78	6.1	4.2	69
Video tape recorders .....	0.045	0.045	100	0.073	0.073	100
Tape recorders .....	5.0	4.8	97	5.5	5.4	98
Watches .....	70.6	15.6	22	73.5	15.9	22
Motor bikes and scooters .....	1.0	0.6	60	1.0	0.6	60
Radio receivers .....	8.2	8.2	100	8.0	8.0	100
Television sets .....	9.1	8.6	94	9.6	9.0	94
of which colour .....	4.6	4.6	100	5.7	5.7	100

(\*) Figure not available.  
Source: Vestnik Statistiki No. 5, 1989.

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***Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty***

**PART II**

***WEU and the European Community***

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the Political Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur***

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**submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur**

***Draft Recommendation***

***on WEU and the European Community***

1. The Assembly is the only parliamentary assembly empowered to deal with the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty and regrets that, in spite of this, the Council did not inform it of important proposals made by a member country to associate Western European Union with the European Community.
2. It notes that the Commission of the European Communities is considering the inclusion in the Rome Treaty of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, thus separating it from the other provisions of the treaty although they are its essential complement, particularly in regard to relations between member countries and NATO.
3. It also notes that a resolution adopted by the European Parliament proposes that the reactivation of WEU be terminated so that it may be integrated into the Community, although some member states of the EEC are still opposed to developing a European concept of defence.
4. The Assembly considers that, if implemented, these various measures would weaken the Atlantic Alliance and Europe's ability to play a major rôle in international affairs.
5. It therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council pursue the reactivation of WEU so as to allow Europe to play a more effective part in NATO and to provide it with the wherewithal to act more effectively each time the security of Europe is threatened.
6. It also **RECOMMENDS** that the Council take no decision calling in question the modified Brussels Treaty without consulting it beforehand.

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1. Adopted in committee by 17 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Alternate for Mrs. Staels-Dompas) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Verbeek), Beix, Böhm, Brito, Candal, Caro, Coleman (Alternate: Rowe), Collart, Cuatrecasas, Eich, Fabra, Forni, Foschi (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Hitschler, Koehl, van der Linden, Lord Mackie, MM. Martinez, Martino, Müller, Natali, Pécriaux, Pieralli, de Puig, Roseta, Sarti (Alternate: Scovacricchi), Sir William Shelton, MM. Stoffelen, Thyraud, Ward, N...

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

### *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur)*

1. On 28th April 1990, the European Council decided to hold an intergovernmental conference on political union in Rome on 14th December, in parallel with the intergovernmental conference on economic and monetary union. This conference has been prepared by several meetings of ministers for foreign affairs and at the meetings between heads of state or of government held in Dublin on 25th and 26th June and in Asolo on 6th and 7th October.

2. In October, there were several calls for WEU to be merged with the European Community. In particular, Mr. De Michelis, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, said several times that he intended to make proposals in this sense and, according to press reports, he did so in Asolo. However, no official text of his proposals has been circulated.

3. Conversely, on 21st October, the Commission of the European Communities issued an opinion on the proposed revision of the treaty establishing the European Economic Community concerning political union which reads as follows:

"The term 'common policy' has been chosen deliberately. In these matters it would be unrealistic to speak of political union when it is quite clear that, traditionally, member states have special relations with certain parts of the world and geopolitical positions which are firmly anchored in their history. More importantly, the Twelve do not yet share the same assessment of their responsibilities or of their general and specific commitments in various parts of the world.

The same considerations have led the Commission to recommend a specific approach to security matters. The treaty should include a reference to this subject and might incorporate the undertaking contained in Article 5 of the 1948 Brussels Treaty on the WEU which specifies that, in the event of an armed attack against one of the contracting parties, the others are obliged to provide aid and assistance.

More than that, the new treaty should, in general terms, point the way towards a common security policy, including defence.

It is also in the common interest to bring defence equipment production and trade fully under the discipline of the common market, which would involve inter alia the removal of Article 223."

4. Finally, on 9th October, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, on a report by Mr. Romeros, paragraph 42 of which reads as follows:

"The pursuit of a common foreign policy is inextricably linked with the pursuit of a security and defence policy; the Treaty of Rome should not hamper the granting of full powers in security and defence matters to the European union; the Western European Union should not be 'revitalised' in the process but should, rather, be integrated into the European union."

5. Your Rapporteur has also heard that Italy has made a proposal in the WEU Council in the same sense, but neither the text nor the gist of this proposal has been communicated to the Assembly.

6. Having been informed of these various steps, the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly, meeting in Paris on 31st October 1990, instructed the Political Committee to present a report on the subject at the Assembly's forthcoming session to be held from 3rd to 6th December. This is the report in question.

7. WEU is based on a treaty of alliance, the modified Brussels Treaty, which includes a number of binding obligations. To admit countries which have not subscribed to these obligations would weaken the institution, deprive the founding treaty of its significance and, finally, destroy the only existing European defence structure.

8. The signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty are bound to come to the assistance of any of them that are the subject of an attack in Europe by all the means at their disposal. It is the only text by which the deterrent forces of the United Kingdom and France are placed at the service of Western Europe as a whole.

9. This provision, which is contained in Article V of the treaty, cannot be separated from the treaty as a whole, which lays down the conditions allowing the treaty provisions to be implemented, particularly in regard to relations between member countries and NATO (Article IV), consultations between them in the event of a threat to international peace and economic stability in the world (Article VIII), the balance of forces and armaments in Europe (Protocol No. II), parliamentary supervision of these activities (Article IX) and, finally, the integration of security co-operation in the process of uniting Europe (Article I). Article V cannot be



separated from the treaty as a whole nor can a similar article be inserted into a treaty with a different aim.

10. Article 223, paragraph 1, of the Rome Treaty excludes defence from the Community's responsibilities:

"The provisions of this treaty shall not preclude the application of the following rules:

- (a) No member state shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security.
- (b) Any member state may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not, however, adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes."

Article 30, paragraph 6, of the Single European Act recognises that NATO and WEU ensure Europe's security:

- "(a) The high contracting parties consider that closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters. They are ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security.
- (b) The high contracting parties are determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security. They shall work to that end both at national level and, where appropriate, within the framework of the competent institutions and bodies.
- (c) Nothing in this title shall impede closer co-operation in the field of security between certain of the high contracting parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance."

It would be absurd to abolish these institutions in favour of a Community that has no powers in such matters.

11. Neither the United Kingdom nor France is prepared to hand over powers to decide on the use of their systems of defence and deterrence to an authority that is outside their control. It is

not by institutional stratagems that it will be possible to change the permanent, carefully thought-out political guidelines of those two countries which, moreover, have accepted considerable sacrifices in order to have nuclear forces and which have always refused to include them in an arms limitation process in view of the disproportion between their forces and those of the Soviet Union and the United States.

12. There is not a consensus in Europe on the possible use of forces outside the NATO system. The modified Brussels Treaty has the advantage of allowing its members to take such action if they consider it necessary, without endangering the cohesion of the organisation. Its members may also associate non-member countries of WEU with their action. No Community procedure offers such flexibility. Where defence is concerned, there have to be specific decisions by sovereign states and only their implementation can be the subject of co-ordination. As was seen during the recent affair of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, WEU allowed co-ordination of member countries' military efforts well beyond anything that could have been done by the Community because it was based on the sum total of individual decisions by participating states.

13. Ireland's accession to a joint Western European defence system is hardly probable. Nor if Austria joined the Community would it be likely to wish to take part in the action of WEU.

14. Since WEU is the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, it might in the near future be required to allow Europeans to consult each other on the importance and nature of their participation in a new collective security system in Europe: only in WEU can Europe draw up a European disarmament programme.

15. The limits imposed on NATO's activities by the North Atlantic Treaty mean that WEU is the only body able to examine any action designed to maintain peace and ensure Europe's security vis-à-vis any challenge outside the NATO area.

16. The transfer of defence responsibilities to the European Community would inevitably reduce its ability to promote the economic development of Eastern Europe and prevent any enlargement of the Community to include not only countries that were hitherto members of the Warsaw Pact but also neutral countries such as Austria. The Soviet Union has made no secret of the fact that its favourable attitude towards co-operation between the USSR and its allies and neutral countries and the Community was linked with the fact that the Community was not a military bloc.

17. Conversely, if the Community, European political co-operation and WEU were to be grouped, each one remaining attached to the

juridical text by which it was set up, under the aegis of a European council consisting, according to circumstances, of the ministers for foreign affairs of Community member countries or of the ministers for foreign affairs and defence of WEU member countries, with proper parliamentary scrutiny and oversight, it would allow a step to be taken towards applying the decisions of the 1972 Paris summit meeting without endangering existing structures, in accordance with Article 223 of the Rome Treaty and the Single Act.

18. WEU co-ordination of the deployment of member countries' naval forces to ensure respect for the embargo against Iraq shows the operational nature of WEU, which can bring together

member countries' ministers of defence or chiefs of defence staff. It would be deplorable for Europe to deprive itself of these means of action. An institution whose responsibilities do not extend to the area covered by the modified Brussels Treaty would be unable to carry out this rôle.

19. Parliamentary supervision of activities that remain in national hands will be far more meaningful if carried out by an assembly emanating from national parliaments, as is the case of the WEU Assembly, than if exercised by a European Parliament elected by direct suffrage but with no means of influencing national governments in an area where state sovereignty is in no way limited.

## INFORMATION LETTER

*from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,  
on the activities of the ministerial organs*

*(September – November 1990)*

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Dear President,

As I write this twelfth information letter to you and your colleagues, the Gulf crisis has moved into its fourth month, Europe is on the eve of a series of summit meetings and intergovernmental conferences which will sketch out plans for its new architecture, notably in the field of security and – finally – the hopes of the new democracies in the East and the uncertainties of the countries on the periphery of the Europe of the Nine and Twelve are calling urgently for decisive and concerted choices from our member states. These are the three problems I should like to raise with you, since they will be the focus of your Assembly's debates during the second part of its thirty-sixth ordinary session at the beginning of December.

The Gulf conflict has entered into a new phase. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly been warned in the clearest possible terms of the inevitable consequences of his murderous persistence in brutally occupying Kuwait. The procession of eminent statesmen to Baghdad to secure the release of as many "human shield" hostages as possible, with Saddam Hussein responding by allowing some to go in the hope of dissuading the coalition of nations from taking action against him, or even dividing those nations, must not mask the essential point: the necessary determination of the United Nations to put an end to the plunder of Kuwait by persuasion, by the strict application of sanctions and, if necessary, by force. The further military deployments which have just been agreed are designed solely to give the United Nations a choice of various options. Saddam Hussein's obstinacy and cynicism are conferring growing legitimacy on the possibility of armed intervention. The events of the past few weeks have shown up the limits of conducting a dialogue with a man whose desire to play for time in no way detracts from the pleasure he derives from humiliating others. Nevertheless, the "logic of war", illustrated by the strengthening of the deployments by the coalition for the liberation of Kuwait, is aimed at convincing Saddam Hussein of the realities of the risk he is facing and persuading him to take action to remove that risk for once and for all.

There is a high level of consensus among the members of the Security Council and the international community as to the resolutions adopted so far and the sanctions put in place in response to Iraqi aggression, combined with a willingness to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis, but one uncertainty remains: what would become of this consensus if the international community were constrained to use force in the near future?

WEU countries are concerned to ensure the cohesion vital to the success of the joint enterprise to which they are making a unique contribution. Because of their autonomy of decision in practice there will have to be consultation at the highest level – at least ministerial – should greater commitment become inevitable under United Nations auspices and hence within the WEU framework.

Our member states now have a framework for common action as a result of the guidelines agreed in the three areas of operation: naval, air/land and logistic. The decisions required in a state of war could be taken only in the context of a WEU ministerial meeting, which would itself be one of the elements in the European and international concertation process. In any event, such a situation would be a litmus test for WEU solidarity.

The limits of European commitment in the Gulf – only two countries have deployed forces from all three armed services – should, however, cause us to reflect on whether it would be appropriate in the future to envisage simple, yet effective, mechanisms for speeding up WEU's political and military capacity to react to crises outside Europe. In the final analysis, does not WEU's credibility depend on the operational rôle it could be given? The co-ordination mechanism now operating to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned already goes far beyond the ad hoc measures adopted in 1987/88. There remains the problem of military commitment on the ground, which is fairly thin at the moment in Saudi Arabia, although it could be substantially strengthened when the time comes.

The appeal launched early in October by Mr. De Decker, Vice-Chairman of the Assembly's Political Committee, for consideration to be given to establishing a "European rapid deployment force", an idea recently relaunched by some hundred German and French parliamentarians when they advocated "multinational combat forces" and the establishment of "joint intervention forces to protect

Europe's legitimate security interests", clearly states the problem and will no doubt lead to the subject being placed on the agenda of the competent WEU bodies so that its implications for force planning may be studied. The Gulf crisis is a persuasive argument as to the importance of not prejudging the mandate for future conventional arms control negotiations, particularly as regards our naval and aero-naval forces and the possibility of deployments outside Europe.

This crisis must also make us realise that although the Soviet threat is currently receding this must not be used as a pretext for dismantling NATO's defence planning achievements over the past forty years. The "volatile crescent" along the southern flank of our continent spans the area from Central Asia to the Greater Maghreb. The Middle East is, in a way, the epicentre in which many threats to Europe's peace and prosperity are building up; it is our duty to defend and safeguard that peace and to extend and share that prosperity.

We have little cause for smug optimism as regards developments in our own continent. What the peoples of Central Europe have achieved in the spring and autumn of this year is considerable. The process of democracy has taken root, but economic conditions are creating obvious impatience among the people. Great hopes are vested in Western Europe and we must therefore be neither inward-looking nor fragmented in our efforts to respond. A potentially explosive situation is brewing in the Balkans and the Soviet Union. Despite his immeasurable power, President Gorbachev cannot derive from it the authority he needs, and is impotent in the face of the relentless disintegration of the Soviet Union. The same causes, the same effects: 1990 echoes 1917, with the reappearance of the spectre of famine and worsening shortages in Moscow and the main urban centres. In this potentially explosive situation, stabilisation through the creation or extension of a market economy is a priority for our own medium-term security policy. Emergency food and economic aid should be immediate and unconditional, but investment programmes will have to be linked with the development of democratic institutions. So great is the risk of political and ethnic unrest growing and spreading, leading to migration on a scale that might well exceed current forecasts, that there must be a mobilisation of minds and energy within our member states. It is the responsibility of elected representatives to encourage private initiatives to back up the programmes drawn up by states, the Community and the international institutions. Such steps might, for example, take the form of twinning or solidarity agreements. The coming months will provide the opportunity to flesh out the concept of co-operation and security in Europe, which will be the focus of debate for the heads of state and government of WEU member countries together with their opposite numbers from elsewhere in our continent at the CSCE summit in Paris.

In May 1989, in a conversation with Professor Hans Maier, Chancellor Kohl said that "today's Europe of the Community is just a limbless torso". There is virtually unanimous recognition that Europe is our destiny. Events have put Europeans on the spot. They may have had some excuse for being taken by surprise last year, but with the timetable for the year-end – the CFE agreement, CSCE summit, WEU ministerial meeting and intergovernmental conferences on European union – they should be able to define the fundamental principles of European security irrespective of any debate on possible and desirable institutional arrangements, a debate into which I shall not enter for the time being.

If a European security identity is truly to exist in the minds of our peoples, the geographical and cultural contours of the European space to be defended if and when necessary must be specified, together with what is meant by European citizenship.

Basic questions as to the goals of European union can no longer be evaded. The new thresholds that our states must cross together imply an acceptance of tighter disciplines and transfers of sovereignty at times yet to be determined. It is essential that the pace of future progress towards European union should not be uneven because some are wholehearted and others hesitant. The interests of Europe require that at each of the stages envisaged all the partners should have a firm and vigilant resolve to create the synergy that enables them to move forward as one. In defining the European enterprise, there is a need for clarity as regards declared applications for membership and the accumulation of priorities with which the institutions – WEU, the Community, NATO and the Council of Europe – will be confronted, each in its own sphere. Quite apart from the economic rationale, the politico-strategic considerations that will determine the rôle that Europe decides to play on the world scene in the 21st century must already be central to our thinking.

Thought should be given to the organisation of relations with third countries that are members neither of WEU nor of the Community, and the arrangements adapted to each individual state. On the strategic level, the firmest of these links should be with the pivotal states on the northern and southern flanks. The eastern periphery of Europe and the borders of the Mediterranean call for special attention, since in the final analysis our own stability depends in part on theirs. Finally, neutral states in the heart of the European continent and in Scandinavia are addressing the issue of their neutrality and calling it into question.

WEU's parliamentary Assembly has an important rôle to play in clarifying these matters, since the success of European integration depends to a great extent on the consensus of public opinion. In the last resort, we shall have to give a convincing reply when a future European conscript asks: what Europe am I supposed to be fighting for?

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Since last September, WEU's Permanent Council has met on five occasions (on 26th September, on 17th and 31st October and on 14th November).

The meeting on 3rd October was a formal session to commemorate the Day of German Unity. I think it would be useful to bring to the attention of WEU parliamentarians the text of the speeches made by the German Ambassador, the French Ambassador speaking on behalf of the Presidency of the Council and the representatives of Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. The Council also took note of the declaration by the German Government. All these documents are set out in Annex I to this letter.

At the four other Council meetings, the prevailing themes of discussions were the exchange of information on the Gulf situation and follow-up on the extraordinary ministerial meetings held on 21st August and 18th September.

Another major theme was WEU's relations with third countries. The Council embarked on detailed discussion of the attitude member states should adopt towards applicant countries over the next few months, the presence of observers at future WEU ministerial meetings (Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Turkey had been invited to send observers to the extraordinary ministerial meeting of 21st August) and two-way information contacts with the democratically-elected governments of Central and Eastern Europe. The debate on the prospects for a European security identity continued, in preparation for the events scheduled for the end of the year. The Council devoted particularly close attention to the progress with the Vienna negotiations for the conclusion of a CFE agreement. WEU's rôle in the new European security architecture will be the focus of debate for the Enlarged Council with a view to preparing for the Ministerial Council.

For their part, the Council's working groups have also tackled these questions during their meetings. The *Special Working Group* and the *Defence Representatives Group* have held three joint meetings (on 3rd September, 10th October and 8th November).

In dealing with topical questions, delegates have exchanged information and comment on developments in the Gulf crisis, the co-ordination measures adopted by WEU countries and the diplomatic initiatives designed to strengthen the application of the embargo. The Special Working Group has decided to retain on its agenda the problem created by the existence of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which may well represent an even greater threat in the region by the end of the century.

On the basis of an informal document submitted by the WEU Institute and a Secretariat working document, the delegations to these meetings considered the problems that would have to be solved before the conclusion of the CFE agreement negotiations: air forces and ground-based aeronaval forces; circumvention and verification at a time when the withdrawal of modern Soviet equipment to the east of the Urals is accelerating; the question of parity, taking into account the decisions as to sub-regional apportionment; personnel strength; and the definition of sufficiency, whose implications are as much political as they are military. The Special Working Group prepared for the NATO High-Level Task Force seminar held in Rome on 11th September, devoted to the steps to be taken between the Paris CSCE summit and the Helsinki review conference scheduled for 1992. In the declaration adopted at the London summit, WEU states undertook, together with their allies, to work for fresh negotiations with the same mandate, the aim being to limit the strength of armed forces in Europe. Since the "bloc-to-bloc" criterion no longer applies, in the situation that has existed in Europe since 3rd October and with the German Government's declared intentions as to the organisation of the defence of the unified Germany, the western approach must be adapted to changing circumstances. Steps should be taken here and now to define a European position on the global political concept and on general objectives for the continuance of the conventional arms control negotiations that will follow the Helsinki review conference in 1992. The stress should also be on the gradual development of confidence-building measures which should, despite Soviet hesitancy, be promoted in a pragmatic spirit.

As part of the preparations for the Paris summit, delegations discussed the security institutions that might be established under CSCE. The plan to set up a conflict prevention centre, based on the principles set out in paragraph 22 of the London declaration, was the subject of broad-ranging discussion. If a centre of this kind is to be genuinely capable of reducing the risk of confrontation, it must have the benefit of direct means of communication among states to increase the flow of available infor-

mation and thus prevent misunderstanding and miscalculation. The centre's essential function, then, should be to clarify unusual military activity and implement confidence-building measures. Thereafter, political conciliation at the time when conflict is imminent can be envisaged only if the centre has proved its worth in the priority field of achieving transparency.

The problems of European security co-operation will continue to be debated in the light of developments in the Atlantic Alliance, with due regard for NATO's current strategic review.

The *Defence Representatives Group* met on 9th October to continue its discussion on the problems of verification of the future CFE agreement and to review experience with bilateral trial inspections conducted by member states. A report on co-operation on verification is being finalised and will be submitted to the Enlarged Council meeting planned for 29th November. The group embarked on preparations for a meeting of chiefs-of-staff to be held in the first half of 1991, the agenda for which should focus on the lessons to be learned from developments in the Gulf crisis, but also cover: the evaluation of out-of-Europe risks and the advisability of having joint intervention facilities; a review of NATO strategy; and Soviet military capabilities by the year 1995.

On 27th September a meeting of *verification experts* was held in London to compare national experiences with setting up bodies responsible for the implementation of verification missions, training and inspectors' equipment and training.

The *ad hoc Sub-Group on Space* met on 24th and 28th September and on 7th November to finalise the report requested by ministers at their April meeting and to draft a ministerial decision to be referred to the Enlarged Council on 29th November. Several meetings of experts were also held on technical aspects of the planned space co-operation projects.

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Relations between the public, the administration and the armed forces provided the theme of the *39th seminar for WEU government officials organised by the Public Administration Committee* at the Paris offices of WEU on 8th-12th October. Mr. Michel Franc, Conseiller d'Etat, Director of the Institut International d'Administration Publique, had drawn up the programme for the meetings which were chaired by Colonel Marc Giacomini, Chef de la Division Etudes, Planification, Evaluation at the Service d'Information et de Relations Publiques des Armées (SIRPA), Ministry of Defence. Two working groups discussed the problems of the evaluation of public attitudes to the armed forces and communication in times of crisis. Participants also pooled their views on ways of stimulating a defence awareness.

In a democracy, there must be an active policy on the dialogue between the armed forces and public opinion, which presupposes a balance between the right of the public to be informed and the duty of the armed forces to inform on the one hand and, on the other, the genuine need for information. This may vary from one situation to another, as illustrated by the current commitment of military resources in different forms by WEU member states to the Gulf region. In the opinion of those present, the quality of national assessments conducted up to this time would have been enhanced had they been comparable. An exchange of information and research documents would be a first step towards a security "Eurobarometer".

Communication in times of crisis calls for continuing adjustments to a shifting situation and for the mobilisation of highly-skilled staff trained in the use of very diversified techniques. The message to be conveyed to the public is an active factor as a crisis develops, because of the impact it makes on human minds. Communication is of course centralised at the highest level of national authority, and a key factor is interministerial co-ordination. Transparency and a positive attitude towards journalists are essential since, by definition, in times of crisis the only restrictions that may be placed on the media are those imposed by mutual consent.

Stimulating a European defence awareness is an imperative over the coming decade. The success of this enterprise depends on whether European peoples believe that they belong to societies worth defending and recognise the essential aim of WEU member states in their defence effort: to ensure that Europe retains control over its own destiny and can therefore protect its vital interests and its nationals throughout the world. No field of state activity can be indifferent to the need to strengthen defence awareness. National identities and European identity must reinforce each other in this respect. The geostrategic developments of the past few months are leading to a reappraisal of security policy aims and methods and to a review and adaptation of public information literature. The restructuring of the armed forces should be a good opportunity to adapt the deployment of units more closely to their human and economic environment, both nationally and at the European level.

In conclusion, the participants at the seminar stressed that the European defence identity must no longer just be a matter of words. With growing contact and interchange among the armed forces of WEU countries, there would be every benefit in continuing that effort through the formation of multinational units, more exchanges of personnel, greater equipment compatibility and enhanced interoperability.

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In accordance with the ministerial mandate requesting the WEU Council Presidency and the Secretary-General to establish two-way information contacts with the democratically-elected governments of Central and Eastern Europe, I visited Hungary on 22nd and 23rd October last, together with Mr. Philippe Guelluy, Chef du Service des Affaires Stratégiques et des Pactes at the Quay d'Orsay. We went on to meet representatives of the Hungarian Government: the Secretary of State for Defence, Lt. Gen. Antal Annus, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Geza Jeszensky, as well as the Deputy Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament, Mr. Dornbach, and the Chairmen of the Foreign and Defence Committees, Mr. Horn and Mr. Balogh.

Hungarian policy on security and the future of the Warsaw Pact, the European security architecture and the CSCE summit were the main topics of discussion. The Hungarian ministers informed us that the Warsaw Pact summit was being postponed, giving grounds for thinking that it might be dissolved before several of its European members withdrew. In the opinion of those we met, CSCE should be a sort of model for a future European security system, offering a range of two-way guarantees to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The idea was put forward of a seminar to bring together the officials responsible for politico-military affairs in the foreign and defence ministries of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the WEU countries, in order to develop informal contacts under the auspices of the WEU Institute. At the same time, the intensification of contact between WEU's parliamentary Assembly and the Hungarian Parliament might well help to promote the political dialogue.

On 5th and 6th November, Mr. Guelluy and I visited Czechoslovakia, where we were received by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Jiri Dienstbier, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Zdenko Pirek, and the Deputy Defence Minister, Mr. Rasek. We also met several senior officials in their entourage. The Czech authorities were closely monitoring developments in the Soviet Union, whose future was still in the balance. Nationality tensions were, in their view, secondary to the urgency of the measures that had to be taken to prevent economic collapse, with all its disastrous consequences. They saw European and Atlantic institutions as being a key factor in the stability and progress of Europe as a whole. Democratisation could only benefit from closer links among all the peoples in the continent. Russia should not be left isolated from the development of pan-European structures. The future of European integration and the Warsaw Pact were also discussed.

The main topics of our discussions with Mr. Ivan Simko and Mr. Ladislav Lis, Chairman of the Federal Assembly Committees on Armed Forces and Security, were the reorganisation of the armed forces and the future of the Warsaw Pact. They expressed a wish for the establishment of contact without delay between the Czech Committees on the Armed Forces and Security and the corresponding committees in WEU's parliamentary Assembly.

At the end of each of these preliminary missions to the democratic governments of Central Europe, Mr. Guelluy and I briefed the heads of mission of WEU member states in Budapest and Prague on our discussions with the Hungarian and Czech authorities.

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Turning to the relations between your Assembly and the Permanent Council, I should first like to stress how constructive the dialogue was on 9th October between the members of the Political Committee and myself on developments in the Gulf crisis and the security situation in Europe. If the Assembly committees think it would be helpful, I am at their disposal to come and share my thoughts with their members and make my contribution to the debate on the necessary acceleration of the process of European integration in the fields of defence and security. As we move into the 1990s, this is the level at which substantial progress should be made, just as the period following the Treaty of Rome saw economic advances, while the 1970s was the decade of political progress.

The information booklet published by the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly, containing the information report on WEU presented by Mr. Tummers to the second part of the 35th ordinary session in December 1989, should be revised regarding certain points now that the Agencies for Security Questions have been wound up and the WEU Institute for Security Questions set up on 1st July 1990.

First of all, may I point out that the commonly-used term, "ministerial organs", has the advantage of succinctly distinguishing, within WEU, between the field of activity for which the Ministerial Council, the Permanent Council and its working groups are responsible and the field for which your parliamentary Assembly is responsible.

WEU has two seats. The Secretariat-General has been in London, at 9, Grosvenor Place, since 1957 and it is where the Permanent Council and, since its reactivation, its working groups meet. In Paris, the WEU building at 43, avenue du Président-Wilson has, since 1962, been the seat of the Council's subsidiary organs. Today it houses the ACA and the WEU Institute for Security Studies – as well as accommodating the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. The ACA, a subsidiary organ of the Council whose creation was decided in the Paris Agreements and included in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, has had no seat laid down by treaty. Operational considerations prevailed in this case, namely that it was deemed useful and necessary for the ACA to be close to NATO.

At 1st January 1991, the Secretariat-General will have 53 posts, two of them hors grade, at 1st January 1991, the ACA will have one post and the WEU Institute for Security Studies will have 23 posts, one of which is hors grade.

The Institute comes under the authority of the Permanent Council, although this does not affect the "intellectual independence" it was granted by ministers in the decision by which it was set up. The ACA staff member who acts as Deputy Director is responsible to the Permanent Council and comes under my administrative control.

The staff employed by WEU are international civil servants whose contract of employment with the organisation is based on the current staff rules. Some of them have been sent by their national authorities. Since March 1984, contracts of employment offered to new WEU staff have been for a fixed period. The Council and I have naturally taken care to arrange for a fair apportionment of posts among nationals of the various WEU member states.

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On 13th and 14th September, I paid an official visit to Portugal, accompanied by Mr. E. Deste-fanis, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs. This visit, which was extremely well-organised by the Portuguese authorities, gave me an opportunity for very constructive discussions at the highest level.

I had the honour of being received by the President of the Republic, Mr. Mario Soares, who granted me a hearing of over 40 minutes.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Anibal Cavaco Silva, also received me for a long discussion which bore on the situation in the Gulf and WEU's future within the context of the move towards European union.

With the Foreign Minister, Professor Juan de Deus Pinheiro, and the national Defence Minister, Dr. Fernando Nogueira, I had fruitful exchanges of views on the Portuguese contribution to be made to the embargo in the Gulf as part of WEU co-ordination, as well as on progress with the Vienna negotiations and preparations for the CSCE summit. We spoke of the possible extension of this process to the Mediterranean. Finally, we mentioned developments in thinking on the future European security architecture and the need to strengthen co-operation on security among WEU member states.

I also met Professor Crespo, President of the Assembly of the Republic, and several members of the Portuguese Delegation to the WEU parliamentary Assembly.

During the visit, I paid a visit to the IEPG Secretariat and made a speech on WEU and European security to the National Defence Institute.

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In the field of public relations and information regarding WEU's current and future rôle and missions, my colleagues and I have taken part in the following events:

- From 3rd to 5th September, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, attended the second workshop in Vienna on the verification of arms reduction arranged under the auspices of the Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt. He gave a paper in the plenary session on the rôle of WEU in verification.
- On 5th-8th September, at Hot Springs, Virginia, I attended the 32nd annual conference of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) on America's rôle in a changing world.



- On 17th September, I spoke at Bad Godesberg at a conference arranged by the German Society for Foreign Affairs.
- On 17th September, Mr. E. Destefanis received a group of United States journalists at the Secretariat and addressed them on WEU and its rôle in the emergence of new security structures in Europe.
- On 21st and 22nd September, I took part in the second seminar in Copenhagen organised by the European Movement on the subject "Towards a larger Europe".
- On 24th September, Ambassador Holthoff attended the international symposium of the Spanish Atlantic Association in Madrid on the future of the alliance. He took the floor during the debate on NATO, WEU and CSCE.
- On 4th October, I gave a speech to the British association "Families for Defence" on the future of European security.
- On 5th October, I gave the inaugural tutorial in the Master's course on international politics at the Centre for the Study of International Relations (CERI), Université Libre de Bruxelles, on the security dimension of European integration.
- On 11th October, I attended the NATO Central Region Air Command seminar in Ramstein.
- On 12th October, I spoke in The Hague on WEU's contribution to the security of Western Europe as part of a conference organised by the Royal Society for Military Science on West European security after 1992.
- On 14th October, at the Secretariat, my colleagues and I welcomed General Milani, SACEUR representative to the WEU Council, for a working meeting on the situation in the Gulf and progress with the review of Atlantic Alliance strategy.
- On 15th October, I made a speech on WEU at Greenwich to the officers on the Joint Service Defence College course and the teaching staff<sup>1</sup>.
- On 16th October, under the programme of co-operation between ASEAN and the European Community, Ambassador Holthoff addressed the European Political Co-operation (EPC) Secretariat on European security policy in the light of the situation in Eastern Europe and the Gulf crisis.
- On 18th-21st October, I attended a seminar in Alanya organised by the Turkish Atlantic Treaty Association on the impact of changing East and West relations on NATO and Turkey's collective security and defence, where I spoke to the seminar on the new rôle of WEU.
- On 29th October, Mr. E. Destefanis gave a talk on WEU and the security of Europe to diplomats enrolled on the MA/post-graduate diploma in diplomatic studies at the Diplomatic Academy of London.
- On 7th November, I made a speech to the French Atlantic Treaty Association on European security.
- Also on 7th November, I gave a talk on WEU and European security in a study session arranged by the NATO Defence College.
- On 9th November, I spoke on the same topics in The Hague during a conference organised by the Peace Policy Foundation, entitled "Extending Europe in four dimensions".
- On 13th November, I gave a talk to the Eurodisput Association in Utrecht on international organisations in the field of European security.
- On 15th November, I attended the annual conference of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels.
- Finally, on 16th November, I went to Brunssum to pay an information visit to the Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT).

Over the past two and a half months, I have continued to have regular contact with the press, radio and television both in London and during my visits to WEU member countries. Through these meetings I was able to clarify the direction in which WEU is working in the changing context of European affairs and to explain the co-ordinating rôle that our organisation has so effectively assumed since the Gulf crisis broke out.

1. The text is attached to this letter as Annex II.

## ANNEX I

This annex contains:

- the texts of the declarations made at the Council meeting on 3rd October 1990, celebrating the Day of Common Unity;
- the text of the letter from the Federal German Chancellor to heads of state and government, marking this day;
- the press release issued after the Council meeting the same day.

***Opening address by the Secretary-General, Dr. W. van Eekelen***

With this extraordinary meeting of our Council, we are marking the Day of German Unity. Today, the aspirations of the German people to achieve unity and freedom based on self-determination have been realised. Today not only heralds the end of the artificial and often cruel division of Germany, it also terminates the division of our continent. Therefore at midnight we witnessed the closing of the post-war period and today we begin a new chapter in European history. As a European I feel moved and privileged to chair our Council meeting today.

The peaceful and democratic way in which these historic changes have taken place deserves respect and admiration. Respect and admiration for the present German Government for its vision and vigour but also for all its predecessors. So does the spirit in which the two-plus-four negotiations were conducted, where all sides endeavoured to place greater emphasis on joint success than on seeking individual advantage. These are promising contributions indeed towards the building of a just and lasting order of peace in Europe.

German unification contributes towards the achievement of the fundamental aims of WEU, as laid down in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty. Let me remind you that member states declared in that preamble that they were resolved ...“ to fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty ... and to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe ”.

Germany's friends and allies wholeheartedly share the joy of the German people.

***Statement by the German Representative, H.E. Mr. H. von Richthofen***

Germany is united today.

United in peace and freedom through free self-determination and in agreement with our partners and our neighbours. We have joined together to form a single state, the Federal Republic of Germany, with complete sovereignty over her internal and external affairs.

Forty-five years after the end of the second world war which originated from German soil and caused untold suffering in Europe and throughout the world, the painful division of Germany has come to an end.

This is indeed a day of joy and it is my privilege today to express my deep gratitude to our partners and friends who gave their support and helped us on our way to unity.

In the difficult years of the cold war, you, our partners in WEU and NATO have stood by our side and shared our concern for German unification. I am happy today to be able to inform you that the united Germany is a full member of Western European Union.

It is my country's wish to serve the cause of global peace and to advance the unification of Europe through its regained national unity. This is the mandate of our constitution given to us in 1949, and this remains our supreme goal for the future.

We know that upon unification we will have to assume greater responsibility within the community of nations. Our foreign policy will remain directed towards global partnership, close co-operation and peaceful reconciliation of interests.

Only peace will emanate from German soil.

The inviolability of borders and the respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in Europe is the precondition for peace. For this reason, we have confirmed the final character of all borders of the united Germany including the border with the Republic of Poland.

We will take into account the protection of confidence and the interests of all states concerned when we start discussing the contractual obligations of the former German Democratic Republic.

With the same determination with which we worked for German unity we will foster European unification in order to complete the single European market by 1992, in order to achieve economic and monetary union, in order to advance towards political union.

The CSCE process is essential in building a new structure of security and co-operation for the unification of the whole of Europe. We are firmly committed to this intensification and institutionalisation.

For more than forty years the members of the North Atlantic Alliance have, in their community based on the shared values of freedom and democracy, preserved peace and freedom on our continent. We will continue to be a full member of NATO and we will strive to develop and to adapt the alliance to the continuing progress in East-West relations while maintaining its rôle as the basic pillar of new security structures in Europe.

Disarmament and arms control remain key elements of our security policy.

We have affirmed our renunciation as a united Germany of the production, possession and control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Germany remains committed to the non-proliferation treaty. Within the process of conventional arms reduction in Europe, we have declared our willingness to reduce the armed forces of the united Germany to 370 000 men. We trust that the other participating countries will join in our effort to consolidate security and stability in Europe in the follow-on negotiations.

The united Germany is committed to play a full part in ensuring that the United Nations fulfils its mission of building a peaceful world. As German unity with complete sovereignty has been achieved, the Federal Republic of Germany is prepared to participate in United Nations measures aimed at preserving and restoring peace through the deployment of her forces.

Today and in future, Germany stands shoulder to shoulder with all those who are committed to peace, respect for human rights and freedom.

Now that the burden of division has been lifted from us, we Germans are prepared to redouble our efforts towards shaping a common peaceful future in trustful co-operation with all countries and people.

Mr. Secretary-General, your Excellencies, dear colleagues, I would like to make the following official statement:

“Today, on 3rd October 1990, the German people’s wish to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany has been fulfilled.

As the German Representative to the Permanent Council of Western European Union, I am happy to be able to inform the Council that henceforth the united Germany will be a full member of Western European Union.

Questions regarding the territory of what was until now the German Democratic Republic and Berlin are settled in the treaty of 12th September 1990 on the final settlement with respect to Germany. I refer to Article 6 of this treaty which states, and I quote ‘The right of the united Germany to belong to alliances with all the rights and responsibilities arising therefrom shall not be affected by the present treaty’.

The overall obligation to provide assistance in case of an armed attack referred to in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and all other provisions of the set of treaties shall apply with immediate effect on the whole territory of the united Germany.”

***Statement by the French Permanent Representative,  
H.E. Mr. L. de la Barre de Nanteuil, on behalf of the Presidency of the Council***

On behalf of all delegations, I should like to thank the German Ambassador for his statement.

I am delighted that, as chance and the calendar would have it, it has fallen to a Frenchman to reply and express the WEU Council’s pleasure at seeing Germany recover its full and complete sovereignty, thus bringing an anomalous situation to an end.

I should like to highlight three characteristic aspects of today’s event.

In the first place, this event can obviously not be divorced from the changes that have been taking place in all the countries of Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. For the first time in

history, all the peoples of Europe are seeking to espouse the same values: peace, liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and a state founded on the rule of law. It is for this reason that German unification should be but one stage in the general process of unification of our continent.

Secondly, the agreement that has made German unification possible has been achieved in a climate in which the protagonists of the last world conflict no longer harbour any wish to impose discriminatory conditions on one of their number. All the provisions of the treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany have been freely accepted by all its signatories. The reaffirmation of the binding nature of the frontiers has been preceded in particular by declarations from both German Parliaments. Germany's renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons only confirms its past undertakings. Lastly, Germany retains the right to decide on its membership of alliances, with all the rights and responsibilities arising therefrom.

It is for this reason that we have convened here today and have heard the German Permanent Representative declare that the united Germany is a full member of Western European Union. I propose that the Council take note of this declaration and make it public in the form of a press release, to be issued after our meeting.

Thirdly, I should like to say how greatly I, as a Frenchman, rejoice at the culmination of the process of German unification and share in the German people's joy. Our two peoples have been in conflict on three occasions, but neither of us believes that history must inevitably repeat itself. Looking far beyond the reconciliation decided upon in 1963 when the Elysée Treaty was signed, their aim is to build up the closest possible understanding and co-operation. Today, I should like solemnly to declare that my country will abide faithfully by the policy line it has set itself. France will preserve its special relationship with a democratic, peaceful and united Germany, and will work to further the building of the community of Europe.

France is convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence. It will redouble its efforts to forge an increasingly coherent European defence identity that more effectively embodies the commitments of solidarity into which we have entered under the modified Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty.

***Statement by the Belgian Permanent Representative, H.E. Mr. J-P. van Bellinghen***

Mr. Secretary-General, dear colleagues, I have been attending this Permanent Council throughout the seven years I have been in London, and it is truly the first time that we have witnessed such a major event. A major event which goes to the very heart of our treaty and to the heart of our pre-occupations; an event which marks the culmination of one of our objectives. Our feeling is therefore one of profound joy.

As our Chairman has said, this achievement is undoubtedly due to the changed international climate but equally to the will of the German people, its courage, patience and, quite simply, the social, political, democratic and economic success of the Federal Republic of Germany. At midnight last night I was in a house two doors away from my own, in the Embassy of what was the German Democratic Republic. There were only young people there speaking German, clustered around their Trabants, one of which was wrapped in the red, black and gold colours of Germany. Hearing them speak, I said to myself: the event taking place is not a reminder of the past but the expression of a guarantee for the future. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

***Statement by the United Kingdom Permanent Representative, Mr. J. Greenstock***

Mr. Secretary-General, the United Kingdom welcomes the fact that Germany is being unified in the best possible way, democratically, in peace and freedom and as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, the EC and WEU. The United Kingdom is glad to have played a full part in the two-plus-four negotiations, which resolved the external aspects of German unification and paved the way for full German sovereignty. This was the culmination of our rôle as one of the four powers in the post-war period, helping to reconstruct and defend a free democratic Germany. We are particularly proud of our rôle in defending Berlin. At the request of the German Government, we are contributing a British military presence in Berlin while Soviet forces remain on German soil. German unification takes place in a Europe that is rapidly changing for the better. A united Germany will have an important rôle to play in this new Europe and in the wider world. We will be working with Germany as a friend, ally and partner, as we have done with the Federal Republic up to now. We pay tribute to the people of Eastern Germany, who demanded and won freedom and democracy, and to the people of West Germany, who have helped them to achieve it on this historic day. Thank you.

***Statement by the Spanish Permanent Representative, H.E. Mr. F. de la Morena***

Mr. Secretary-General, German Ambassador, dear colleagues, I would like to join my colleagues who have preceded me in congratulating the German Ambassador on this momentous day of the unification of Germany. It is certainly an historic day on which to rejoice, and as Europeans, we are sure that this day will be remembered by future generations. It is impossible to think of Europe without Germany, in the same way as it is impossible to think of Germany outside the context of Europe. That is why this event is so important for all of us and not only for the German people. I do not think this is a moment for a long speech, but I would simply like to extend our warmest congratulations and very best wishes for a splendid future for Germany, which will also be a splendid future for Europe. Thank you very much.

***Statement by the Portuguese Permanent Representative, H.E. Mr. A. Vaz-Pereira***

I would like to join my colleagues in congratulating the German Representative on this historic occasion, so important not only for the German people but also for all of us and for all of Europe. Last night, we saw the end of a period of 40 years that represented not only the division of Europe but the confrontation between two worlds and the division of the whole of Europe into opposite camps. So, at this particular moment, I do believe that we should rejoice in what has happened and especially we should rejoice at what is coming. All the best for the German people and all the best for all of us. Thank you.

***Statement by the Netherlands Permanent Representative, H.E. Mr. J.-B. Hoekman***

Mr. Secretary-General, first of all I would like to join previous speakers where they have expressed their feelings of joy on this day.

As Her Majesty Queen Beatrix recently said in her speech from the throne opening the parliamentary year, Europe's division is nearing its end.

The Netherlands Government has always welcomed the prospect of German unification; the partition of Germany reflected an unnatural state of affairs, and the lack of freedom in the GDR a painful injustice to the people.

Taking into consideration the period of 40 years of democracy in the FRG and the need for freedom in the GDR, there is every reason to trust that a unified Germany will be a pillar of democracy in Europe, all the more because Germany will continue to be a member of NATO, the EC and WEU. The new Germany will be able to contribute to the new Europe.

The unification of Germany symbolises the process of peaceful change, the healing of a once bitterly-divided Europe. The Netherlands rejoice with our German friends that the unity which they have long sought has finally become a reality on this day, 3rd October.

Today, Secretary-General, we are celebrating without afterthought Germany's most remarkable achievement and the coming of age of a post-war Europe.

(In German) I should like to offer my German colleague warmest congratulations on the unification of Germany and the restoration of German sovereignty.

***Statement by the Luxembourg Representative, Mr. J.-J. Welfring***

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should like in turn to associate myself fully with the words that you, the Presidency and the other delegations have spoken on this great occasion, and simply to cite two sentences from the official statement on German unity published by the Luxembourg Government this morning:

"The people of Luxembourg welcome the unification of Germany, in the certainty that the fresh momentum imparted to the current progress towards European union will further strengthen the solidarity binding our peoples.

They wish the German people happiness and prosperity in their newly-found unity and freedom."

***Statement by the Italian Permanent Representative, H.E. Mr. B. Biancheri***

The feelings of the members of WEU have been expressed by the French Presidency, by yourself, Mr. Secretary-General and by other delegations very well and very eloquently. I will simply say (to the German Ambassador) that the Italian people and the Italian Government do rejoice with you. They rejoice fully, entirely and sincerely. We rejoice because the German land, the German heritage, the German people are now one; we as Europeans, as members of this union, therefore feel stronger and more secure. We are sure that with the same determination and the same vision, unified Germany will now work together with its partners for the construction of Europe.

***Reply by the German Permanent Representative, H.E. Mr. H. von Richthofen***

Mr. Secretary-General, dear colleagues, may I thank you all for your congratulations, your best wishes and your very kind words. It is a great happiness for us to know that you rejoice over this historic day with us. May I also again express my gratitude for all the support you have given us both in difficult times and in good ones. May I also thank you for the understanding and encouragement you have given us for the future. This will not be an easy process, but we know that assisted by our friends and partners, we will be able to succeed. Thank you very much.

***Message of the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany sent on 3rd October 1990 to heads of states and government<sup>2</sup>***

The German nation has reunited in peace and freedom today.

Forty-five years after the end of the second world war, which originated from German soil and caused untold suffering in Europe and throughout the world, the painful separation of the German people has come to an end.

In exercising our right to free self-determination, in harmony with our neighbours and on the basis of the treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany, we Germans have today united to form a single state – the Federal Republic of Germany – with complete sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.

On behalf of the German people I would like to thank all those who stood up for our right of self-determination and smoothed our path towards unity. Conscious of the continuity of German history, we particularly appreciate this contribution.

I. Our country wants to serve the cause of global peace and advance the unification of Europe through its regained national unity. That is the mandate of our constitution, the Basic Law, which has stood the test of time and which will also apply to the united Germany.

At the same time, we stand by our moral and legal obligations resulting from German history. We know that upon unification we will also assume greater responsibility within the community of nations as a whole. Our foreign policy will therefore remain directed towards global partnership, close co-operation and a peaceful reconciliation of interests.

In future, German soil will be a source of peace only. We are aware that the inviolability of the borders and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in Europe is a basic precondition for peace. That is why we have confirmed the final character of the united Germany's borders, including the border with the Republic of Poland. At no time in the future will we make territorial claims on any other country. Now that German unity has been established, we shall discuss with the contracting parties concerned the international treaties of the German Democratic Republic with a view to regulating or confirming their continued application, adjustment or expiry, taking into account protection of confidence, the interests of the states concerned and the contractual obligations of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the principles of a free, democratic basic order governed by the rule of law, and respecting the competence of the European Community.

II. The unification of Germany is inextricably linked with that of Europe. We will resolutely continue to strive for European unification with the same determination with which we worked towards German unity.

Important steps lie immediately before us. Together with our partners in the European Community, we want to complete the single European market by 1992. We are steadily moving towards

2. Unofficial translation.

economic and monetary union. The united Germany will play an active part in the development of political union.

The European Community will be ready to co-operate closely with the other countries in Europe. In particular, we intend to contribute to the development of closer ties between the European Community and the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe which have won their freedom and set out on the path towards political, economic and social reform.

We are convinced that the countries of Europe can best safeguard and strengthen their independence and their citizens' human rights and fundamental freedoms if they work together.

For this reason, an important forum for our co-operation is and remains the Council of Europe.

We are committed to the process of security and co-operation in Europe as a source of hope for the European nations and as a stepping-stone towards their future unity. We are therefore strongly in favour of this process being intensified and institutionalised.

III. The community of free western democracies based on shared values and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation have preserved peace and freedom on our continent during difficult decades. For this reason, the united Germany will continue to be a member of this alliance.

Together with our allies, we also want to further develop this successful alliance in line with the progress made in East-West relations and the changing demands of our time, as well as to preserve its rôle as the basic pillar of new, overarching security structures in Europe.

We advocate a joint declaration by the members of the two alliances in Europe, reaffirming their intention to refrain from the threat or use of force and establishing a new partnership in the development of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

Disarmament and arms control remain key elements of our security policy.

In the context of German unification we have reaffirmed our renunciation of the manufacture, possession and control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The united Germany remains committed to the non-proliferation treaty.

Our willingness to reduce the united Germany's armed forces to 370 000 is contribution to the success of the negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. We assume that in the follow-on negotiations the other participating countries, too, will play their part in consolidating security and stability in Europe, not least through measures to reduce force levels.

On the global level, too, we shall seek disarmament agreements that will increase stability and security. The principle of basing the level of forces only on self-defence requirements must apply throughout the world.

An agreement on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union, negotiations on reducing American and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons and, not least, a global ban on chemical weapons are still urgently required.

IV. The countries of Africa, Asia and America can continue to count on the solidarity of the united Germany. We will not invest in German unity at their expense.

On the contrary, the end of the conflict in Europe will free intellectual and material resources to tackle the fundamental tasks for peace which are now facing us: the struggle against poverty and under-development and the preservation of our natural environment.

Terrorism and drug abuse are challenges to all states throughout the world, which call for joint action. We will shoulder our share of the responsibility.

V. The elimination of the East-West conflict has also opened up new avenues for fully implementing the high goals of the United Nations Charter. At the same time, the events of the last few weeks have demonstrated the extent to which world peace is still endangered by disregard for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The Federal Republic of Germany wishes to play a part in ensuring that the United Nations fulfils its indispensable rôle in the process of building a peaceful world and meeting the global challenges we face.

As German unity with complete sovereignty has been achieved, the Federal Republic of Germany is prepared to participate in United Nations measures aimed at preserving and restoring peace through the development of its forces, too. We will create the necessary internal conditions for this.

VI. At the beginning of the last decade of this century, we see new opportunities for a world which solves its problems through reconciliation and understanding, and remains committed to the principles

of international law. Our country stands shoulder-to-shoulder with all those who are committed to peace, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as individual well-being.

Now that the burden of division has been lifted from us, we are prepared to redouble our efforts towards shaping a common peaceful future in trust and co-operation with all with all countries and peoples who share these worthy objectives.

*Press release*

The Council of Western European Union (WEU) rejoices at the culmination today of the process of German unification, following the signature in Moscow of the treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany on 12th September. Today, the aspirations of the German people to complete the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination become reality. The Council welcomes the peaceful, democratic nature of these historic changes, which contribute further towards building a just and lasting order of peace in Europe.

Together with the recent changes in Europe, German unification marks the end of the division of our continent and contributes towards the achievement of the fundamental aims of WEU: European unity and integration.

The Council of WEU welcomes the statement made today by the German Permanent Representative that the united Germany is a full member of Western European Union.

On this historic day, the Council shares the joy of the German people.



## ANNEX II

*Joint Service Defence College, Greenwich,  
15th October 1990*

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*Western European Union and European security, by  
Dr. W.F. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of Western European Union*

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Commandant, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour and privilege for me to be with you at the Joint Service Defence College for a free-wheeling discussion on the problems of European security in the new geostrategic situation of our continent.

Allow me to take as a starting-point the following quotation from the message sent by the chiefs-of-staff at the college's inauguration in 1947: "In peace, they told your predecessors, the bow is unbent, the spur of great events no longer presses". Indeed, we have had the alliance, NATO and a status quo with a few major crises which have ensured 35 years of peace in Europe. Now, history has come back as if to make up for lost time. It has come back East and South. To meet the challenges of an increasingly multipolar and complex world, we need a common purpose reconciling patriotism and a vision of our long-term interests and ambitions. Only through the building of a European union with its own foreign and security policies can we find such a purpose and ensure that the successor generation will inherit a safer world.

As chance would have it, I became Secretary-General of WEU in the spring of 1989, scarcely three weeks before the general elections in Poland. On 4th June, Solidarity's triumph heralded the return of democracy in the centre of Europe. On 16th June, the official funeral of Imre Nagy was also that of his executioners and marked the end of the Kadar era. Then on 9th November, the totalitarian dyke finally burst with the breaching of the Berlin wall.

On 3rd October, the Permanent Council of WEU met in London to celebrate the culmination of the process of German unification. This breath-taking acceleration in the pace of events has given added urgency and significance to the problems associated with constructing the security dimension of Europe. Europe at peace has turned its back on its divisions but must be on its guard against any return to the bloody aberrations of the past. At the same time, it must equip itself to play a rôle on the international stage commensurate with its resources and wealth.

The forthcoming signing of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe, the CSCE summit followed by the ministerial meetings of WEU and NATO, the intergovernmental conferences on political, economic and monetary union will all be positive steps, we hope, along the road to European union, and towards a new order of peace in our continent without which Europe cannot become the responsible power which the world needs.

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Not long ago, concern was expressed over Western Europe's will to force itself into a more effective force on the continent as well as on the world political scene. Today, a rather contradictory concern is being voiced – often from the same quarters – about Western Europe's slackness in getting its act together. This is particularly true in the context of the Gulf crisis which is there to remind us that the end of the cold war is not the end of all conflict and threat to our security and to our vulnerable prosperity. From North Africa to Central Asia, from Egypt to the tip of the Arabian Peninsula, challenges are emerging of an unprecedented magnitude in the demographic, social, economic, cultural and religious fields. If Europe is to play a significant rôle in establishing some balance in those regions, it will have to devise a common foreign policy and set intervention mechanisms and possibly common forces in order to tackle contingencies. It will also have to propose a framework for dialogue. The Italian-Spanish proposal for a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean is a significant step forward in that direction.

The same goes for recent calls for a Euro-Arab dialogue which is indeed necessary if we want to address the long-term problems and achieve stability at the south-eastern periphery of our continent.

Europe as a whole is at a crossroads. For the first time in its long and tumultuous history a genuine prospect of continental unity based on a comprehensive co-operative framework lies ahead. Security issues are at the core of the debate on future pan-European architectures. The definition of concrete steps towards union has just been clearly put on governments' agendas after having been argued by numerous political scientists and essayists last year. When it comes to a common foreign policy or a common defence, the key issue to be addressed is that of transfer of sovereignty to which states are prepared to consent.

Four main challenges have to be faced which call for new European security structures at a continental level:

- the emergence of a new political order in Europe and the need to manage the transition towards new forms of pan-European co-operation;
- the political evolution and economic reconstruction in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union;
- the future of disarmament negotiations and the new European strategic equation, with all its effects on transatlantic relations;
- the development of co-operation on security, in particular to give Europe the capacity to look outward to other theatres.

The WEU states must bring bold solutions to those problems, which will help them to perform their rôle on the world stage to the full and will expunge the traces of Yalta and the cold war from our continent. In this final decade of the 20th century, Europe must make every effort to channel the expression of resurgent nationalism through democratic institutions, reinforced by appropriate regulating mechanisms at both regional and pan-European level, to ensure that any disputes that arise among nations and ethnic groups in Europe are never again settled by resorting to force. Hopefully, the CSCE will soon be in a position to play a constructive rôle in that respect.

It is by advancing along this path, a path strewn with many obstacles, that a new strategic balance can be achieved, providing that Western Europe displays cohesion, realism and determination in adapting its institutions to the new realities. Adaptation should mean rationalisation and democratic accountability rather than bureaucratisation in an even more complex web of organisations if the hearts and minds of the Europeans are to be won over.

Three factors continue to determine the political context in which new European security structures will have to be established:

- (i) the transformation of the Soviet Union,
- (ii) the rooting of democratic systems in Eastern Europe,
- (iii) German unity, and its impact on those bodies responsible for European security: WEU and NATO.

Faced with the grave crisis in the Soviet Union, European countries must direct their efforts towards implementing a global Ostpolitik. It is a central factor in the formulation of a European foreign policy, including its security dimension, that European governments must give the Soviet leadership the political and material support which may help it to move forward in the direction of democracy and a market economy. At the same time, it must make due allowances for the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests and apprehensions.

It is vital for the European Community to establish itself as a dynamic instigator of initiatives promoting the unity of the continent and the reconstruction of its eastern part. The Community has already taken over the co-ordination of economic assistance to Eastern European countries. Germany clearly has a rôle to play as prime mover in this context, in view of its experience with the economic restructuring of the GDR. The countries of Eastern Europe will be spared profound social and economic difficulties if adequate intervention and association mechanisms can be established under the Community's auspices, paving the way for ultimate economic integration, with each country adapting to a market economy at its own pace. This should not be a one-way process. The Community must encourage Eastern European countries to come together and harmonise their own economic policies.

The new Germany is clearly under a European roof, just as Chancellor Adenauer had advocated. In assuming the obligations into which the Federal Republic has just entered, Germany acts as a prominent member of the Atlantic Alliance, the European Community and WEU. No artificial strategic vacuum has been created in the centre of Europe that would have been destabilising. Western European countries are united in recognising that Germany is firmly anchored in the western security community. As Thomas Mann put it, unity has led more to a European Germany than it will lead to a German Europe.

Our common sense tells us to refute those negative ideas floating around about Germany's future. German unity must foreshadow the unity of the continent, based on institutional arrangements drawn up by Western Europe in the light of changed conditions. The very diversity of those arrangements bears witness to the dynamic nature of the process of European integration and may serve as a basis for the formulation of the pan-European structures of the future.

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The current situation is a source of hope, but it also entails obvious risks. It would be inadvisable to weaken or hastily dismantle Western European defences. The governments of Western Europe must, then, resist the temptation to make disorderly unilateral reductions beyond the levels envisaged for the CFE treaty. On the other hand, they must improve and develop their bilateral and multilateral co-operation in every possible field. It is with these constraints and objectives in mind that recent proposals on the adjustment and strengthening of European security structures should be analysed.

The reactivated WEU is in a position to make a vital contribution in the fields of arms control, the restructuring of forces and the creation of military co-operation arrangements at a more operational level. Allow me therefore to recall the reasons why WEU is still so necessary in today's fast-changing world.

According to the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, WEU is the only European organisation competent to deal with European co-operation on security. It has undeniable advantages arising from its threefold vocation:

- as an organisation within which the European members of the alliance can meet and discuss their concerns in matters of security and the adaptation of this alliance to a radically-altered European context, with the foreign and defence ministers coming together to create the momentum for this process of ongoing consultation;
- as the only specifically European organisation whose members are committed by treaty to afford mutual support if their frontiers come under attack, a commitment which goes beyond the provisions of Article V of the Washington Treaty;
- as an organisation representing those governments resolved to give European union a defence and security dimension.

Political consultations on European security concentrate on those issues which have an impact on the continental strategic balance. The first one is indeed the residual military power of the Soviet Union.

While we should welcome the Soviets' intention to shift the emphasis to the defensive in their military doctrine, it should also be borne in mind that this intervention has hitherto had little practical effect at grassroots level. It has not incited the Soviets to slow down the modernisation of their weapons. In 1995-96, the Soviet army may well possess a modern military potential, with fewer but more professional troops. The risk of a surprise attack will no doubt have disappeared, or at least the intention to attack by surprise, but the capacity to conduct offensive operations may remain. Europe and its allies must remain capable of forestalling any such contingencies.

Since the Soviet Union will inevitably continue to be the leading military power on the European continent as well as a major nuclear power, NATO and SHAPE will have to continue to embody and preserve the transatlantic political and military link on which deterrence is founded, until such time as pan-European security structures offering all European countries firm guarantees have been created and consolidated. This may well happen by successive enlargements of the alliance, or alternatively the CSCE may take NATO as its model in planning future institutionalisation under its first basket. But these prospects are still remote, and Western Europe must be ready, at least over the current decade, to devote adequate resources to its defence on the continent and outside Europe. Public opinion should continuously be warned against the illusion that peace or disarmament "dividends" can be reaped in the short-term even though such a dream has been shattered by the events in the Gulf.

The denuclearisation of Europe is another dangerous myth. On this level as in the field of space, the Soviet Union will continue to be a major power. In view of the strategic nuclear arsenals that exist, Europeans will for a long time to come have to accept the inherent irrationality of the deterrent nature of nuclear weapons, which forces the potential adversary to disperse its offensive resources. The course of events is uncertain and seems more like an obstacle race. Even if there is striking progress towards the control of all other categories of weapons, those European states having nuclear weapons will, in all probability, keep them as long as they can, since nuclear weapons are the weapon of last resort and the ultimate form of deterrence.

However that may be, the more modern weapons will continue to be indispensable to European security as they give armed forces the flexibility of action they need to face up to the multiplicity of potential risks with which they may have to contend. One need merely point out that in the space of two weeks, from 18th July to 2nd August, the western world went from a state of near-euphoria to a state of crisis, with prospects of armed intervention in the Gulf and aggravated economic slowdown.

The outcome of the CFE negotiations will narrowly avert the risk of structural disarmament. Growing European co-operation on arms matters would no doubt satisfy both finance ministers and taxpayers. In the final analysis, much will depend on the necessary rationalisation of the European arms industry, currently suffering from over-capacity. Defence budgets will, moreover, be burdened by the restructuring of forces as a result of the implementation of the future CFE treaty. Finally, the destruction and re-allocation of equipment limited by this treaty will inevitably have substantial financial repercussions as well.

An idea that might contribute something new to methods of co-operation among Europeans and with Europe's North American allies has been put forward: multinational units. Many experts regard this concept as feasible in military terms and as right in political terms, strengthening Europe's defence identity and making common efforts in this field more acceptable to public opinion. It is being debated at NATO in the context of the ongoing strategy review. Multinational units might well also be considered as a good formula for the development of co-operation between national rapid deployment forces.

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Although the risk of military confrontation has almost disappeared, the East-West dimension of security will be no less important in the immediate future. But demographic and religious factors, combined with growing poverty and the first results of more general ecological phenomena, are making the North-South divide a particular concern. In view of geostrategic factors and Europe's dependence on imports of raw materials and sea lines of communication, Europeans will have to consult about how to meet those challenges which, while not always directly military, will have a growing impact on worldwide security in the broad sense, and on prosperity. The current crisis in the Gulf is a good example of the need for European states to have navies that can guarantee security of supplies as well as air and land intervention forces that can protect their nationals and interests wherever it may be necessary. The deployment of these forces will require, as now in the Gulf, operational co-ordination mechanisms.

Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty provides for very detailed consultation on "out-of-Europe" questions. Experience has shown how useful WEU, with its competence vis-à-vis external dangers, can be to Europe and to the alliance. WEU provides a framework for concerted action in the event of direct threat when one or more member states' prosperity and security interests in the broad sense are at stake in another continent. The success of political consultation and the co-ordination of naval action in the Gulf in 1987-88, in reaction to threats against the freedom of navigation, militates in favour of almost permanent consultation on "out-of-Europe" matters within WEU.

Drawing on this experience, WEU foreign and defence ministers met in extraordinary session on 21st August, at the behest of the French Presidency, to co-ordinate their actions in response to the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait. This was followed by a meeting of WEU chiefs of defence staff on 27th August, the first in the history of the organisation, which translated into military terms the will expressed by member countries at the Ministerial Council to take concrete steps to show their determination and solidarity in the face of Iraqi actions. A second ministerial meeting followed on 18th September to assess progress made and initiate land/air co-ordination.

The resulting guidelines for the co-ordination of naval operations of WEU members in the Gulf region, aimed at ensuring the effective implementation of the United Nations embargo against Iraq on the basis of Security Council resolutions, endorsed the establishment of co-ordination mechanisms at three levels:

- an ad hoc working group of officials from foreign and defence ministries;
- naval contact points in capitals;
- unit commanders in the Gulf area.

The competence of the ad hoc working group goes beyond the 1987/88 arrangements since it addresses the following areas of co-operation:

- the scale and nature of WEU deployments;
- areas of operations;

- execution of missions;
- exchange of information;
- logistic and operational support, and
- the functioning of co-ordination structures.

All WEU member countries have contributed to the naval effort in the Gulf area. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom have sent over 30 warships – a number roughly equal to that of the United States fleet. Germany dispatched naval units to the eastern Mediterranean to free United States vessels. Luxembourg has given financial assistance and Portugal has made available naval and air transport capabilities.

An increasing number of WEU countries are also contributing ground and air forces, while others have made available facilities such as air bases or air transport. In addition, economic aid is being provided to those countries in the region most affected by the implementation of the embargo.

The recent United Nations decisions on an air embargo as well as the continuing build-up of ground forces call for new forms of co-ordination among WEU countries. For obvious reasons, I cannot comment further on what they entail, but I can assure you that they are gradually being put into effect.

Since the United States has the largest forces in the area, WEU has been keen to ensure that its activities are co-ordinated with them, as well as with the other allies and the Arab countries taking part in the implementation of the United Nations embargo. In this context the WEU co-chairmanship together with the United States and the Arab states of the naval planning conference held in Bahrain on 8th/9th September is an indication of its essential rôle in the Gulf.

The WEU reaction to the current Gulf crisis has sent a clear signal that the nine member countries are prepared to shoulder their full responsibilities in order to defend their legitimate security interests.

While it is too early to make an assessment of the impact of the Gulf crisis, it is clear that WEU's competence in out-of-area crises enables its member countries to make a more co-ordinated and hence more valuable contribution to the international effort in the Gulf than would have been the case if they had responded on an individual basis. Indeed, some countries made clear that they would only respond if the operations were co-ordinated under WEU auspices. Until the European Community assumes responsibility for security and defence matters, WEU will remain the only forum in which West Europeans can co-ordinate their security response to threats such as those posed by a Saddam Hussein.

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Western European leaders are therefore rightly putting forward more and more proposals for a confederation of the whole of Europe, drawing on what has already been achieved by European institutions and the CSCE, the essential foundation for democracy and self-determination. It is the priority of Western European countries, and foremost among them the nations that have come together within Western European Union, to reinforce exchanges at every level between the two parts of Europe, but it is also a priority to move towards the objective stated in the Single European Act: European union.

The stronger and more united the Europe of the Community, the better placed it will be to exert a positive influence over current developments in the eastern part of our continent. The European union must be built up in the economic and monetary areas, but also through growing harmonisation of foreign and security policies so that Europe can speak with a single voice on the international scene.

The consolidation of all existing European co-operation structures existing in the security field – IEPG, Eurogroup and WEU – into a single “European security community”, is advocated. Thus a European defence pillar would come into being, which could formulate a common defence strategy and a coherent armaments policy. At the same time, European political co-operation would be strengthened to give the Community the foreign policy dimension it lacks.

WEU will play a vital rôle in the definition of a European security identity until such time as the Twelve agree on how security matters are to be handled within the Community. At the suggestion of the Italian Presidency, the problem of the Community's rôle in matters of security has now been placed on the agenda of the intergovernmental conference on political union. WEU may have only a transitional rôle to play, but the obstacles to the immediate creation of a European security community are related mainly to the variable geometry of the composition of existing institutions and the divergences in thinking and strategic commitments which that variable geometry expresses. In the first place, then, a coherent European security identity should be formulated, to which European states would subscribe,

rather than resorting to unconditional expansion out of an artificial concern for geographical symmetry. A policy on possible enlargement still needs to be defined once the democratisation process is firmly rooted.

The WEU Assembly and, since last April, the WEU Council are both engaged in a policy of extended contacts with the new democracies of Central Europe. I shall be in Budapest on 22nd October to have talks with the Foreign Minister and the First Deputy Defence Minister. Fact-finding missions to Prague and Warsaw are being prepared for the end of the year.

The common European home dear to President Gorbachev will be constructed out of elements that have already been tried and tested in the West. The uncertainties of their situation have forced the Soviet leaders to be slightly more modest about it. They are not in a position to propose a model for a pan-European structure, whether on the political, economic or social level. We have WEU, the European Community, EFTA, the Council of Europe, OECD and NATO, all of which have chalked up remarkable successes whilst at the same time promoting prosperity and security.

The Community is the focal point for European construction. WEU is Europe's nucleus in the field of security. Will the Twelve be able to make the fullest use of the power of attraction exerted by the European institutions and reinforce those institutions, while forging new links with Eastern Europe as economic co-operation gradually develops and as the process of democracy is strengthened? Until the events broke out in the Gulf, Community member states seemed divided on the advisability of developing common foreign and security policies. The Gulf crisis seems to be precipitating a change of thinking at the highest level.

In the run-up to the summit meeting of the 34 states participating in the CSCE, the first objective of Europeans should be to seek a formula that would unreservedly integrate the Soviet Union into the European security system without allowing it to assume a dominating rôle. The CSCE process must develop according to the principle that contributions are complementary and that none should be subsidiary. Each existing organisation should be able, in the first phase, to find its place in a pan-European structure, with its own terms of reference and its own methods. On the basis of common principles, concentric circles, partially overlapping but with different radii, are de facto already coexisting: the European institutions, the Atlantic Alliance and the CSCE.

As regards the first security circle, the European institutions, WEU has a clear-cut mission of a conceptual nature: to define a European security identity. This definition should be such as to win acceptance from non-member countries, if we hope that it will found a new European security balance predicated on concepts of deterrence, sufficiency and transparency. The intergovernmental conference in December next should open up new prospects for WEU. It would be more logical for the security of Europe ultimately to be the responsibility of a European union; Europe would then be better-equipped to confront the challenges of development aid, energy and the environment among others. But this historic step towards a union of free, pluralist democracies in our continent calls for careful preparations, to which WEU will make a decisive contribution. Further integration in the security field can only happen on the basis of shared principles, a shared strategy and common tactical concepts and doctrines for arms co-operation and procurement. WEU is the only available framework for such harmonisation.

As for the second circle, that of the Atlantic Alliance, the renewal of NATO will be based on the principles which have made it cohesive and have preserved peace and security for the past 40 years. NATO is still indispensable for at least three reasons: the need for ongoing consultation with North America on international politico-military problems coupled with a significant American military deployment in Europe; the prerequisites of arms control and verification of agreements; and the prospect of an increase in the responsibilities of the CSCE in the field of European security. NATO will continue to embody the necessary North American presence in Europe, which will continue to serve as a counterweight to residual Soviet power and contribute to guaranteeing the full, complete independence of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.

It is mainly at the level of these two circles that the work of discussing and thinking about the formulation of a pan-European architecture based on the institutionalisation of the CSCE should take place.

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The 1989 revolution and events in the Gulf have forced a change in the pace of construction of European union. Should it be deepened or broadened? Could we be thinking about narrowing the gap between the two processes so that they converge as nearly as possible? Might an enlargement of EFTA and the Council of Europe be an acceptable interim solution in view of the progressive integration of

new partners in both Eastern and Northern Europe? In the final analysis, the future of peace and security in Europe depends on the political will of the WEU member states and the Community to develop their co-operation and harmonise more closely their policies within the three existing circles of European institutions.

The Gulf crisis shows that, for want of a foreign and security policy, there is a genuine risk of the Community being a spectator on the sidelines of history, a mere commentator on world events. Europe owes it to itself to take prompt action to remedy these major shortcomings. We cannot accept to see a major economic and cultural power reduced to a "regional non-power". The time has come for a choice in favour of a fully-fledged European union as the backbone of a wider pan-European architecture. That choice can no longer be delayed.

*Action by the Presidential Committee*

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**REPORT**

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee  
by Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly*

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1. Europeans will see the second half of 1990 as a period of deep-rooted changes. On the one hand, the end of the cold war and the birth of a new Europe were consecrated in the Charter of Paris and, on the other hand, the invasion of Kuwait showed our countries the need to stand firm against new threats. In both cases, the Presidential Committee believed the potential of the modified Brussels Treaty should be brought into play.

***I. Political action***

***(i) The Gulf crisis***

2. When the Gulf crisis broke out, the Presidency of the Assembly informed the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council of its concern at the gravity of an aggression which violated international law and was accompanied by many infringements of human rights. It also expressed its concern that the Council should ensure that Europe's security interests were taken into

consideration. In other words, it was for the WEU Council to meet to examine, in the context of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, a situation which was an obvious threat to peace and endangered economic stability.

3. It became clear that these views largely coincided with those of the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council since the French Minister for Foreign Affairs quickly convened an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the WEU Council.

4. It was only appropriate that, on that occasion, there should be a dialogue between the Council and the Assembly. The Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council acceded in full to the Assembly's wishes since, on 21st August 1990, at the close of the ministerial meeting, a joint meeting was held with the Presidential Committee. The Assembly's steering body was able to discuss with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence of France and the Secretary-General of WEU the events that had just occurred and the positions the Council had adopted in response. At the close of this



meeting, the Presidential Committee issued the communiqué reproduced at Appendix I.

5. Continuing its meeting without the ministers, the Presidential Committee asked the Defence Committee and the Political Committee to prepare, each within the sphere of its responsibilities, a report on the Gulf crisis and to submit it to the Presidential Committee so that recommendations on this highly topical matter might be communicated to the Council without delay. The Assembly's steering body was thus exercising its powers under Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure to act on behalf of the Assembly between sessions.

6. The two committees instructed to prepare reports on the Gulf crisis agreed to meet on 20th September. The Presidential Committee was convened to meet at the close of the two committee meetings to examine their conclusions and adopt two recommendations for immediate transmission to the Council.

7. In the meantime, the violation of European diplomatic premises in Kuwait City by Iraqi forces marked a further infringement of international law.

8. On 18th September 1990, a second extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers was therefore convened at which it was decided "to strengthen the WEU co-ordination and to extend the co-ordination at present operating in the maritime field to ground and air forces" and "to identify the forms that these new deployments will take, to seek to ensure that they are complementary, to harmonise the missions of member states' forces and to pool their logistic support capabilities as required".

9. Reporting on the Council's work, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed to brief the Presidential Committee, the Political Committee and the Defence Committee, meeting at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 20th September, on the political framework of the action by member countries, deployments and the co-ordination of measures being implemented.

10. The Political and Defence Committees then adopted their reports. The Presidential Committee discussed them the same day and adopted Recommendations 488 and 489, which were immediately communicated to the Council. This action by the Presidential Committee is submitted to the Assembly for ratification.

11. It may therefore be considered that the dialogue between the two WEU organs on a matter that affects security and peace has proceeded satisfactorily.

12. The Presidential Committee felt that, in view of its importance, the Assembly should follow the Gulf question vigilantly. The President

therefore led a four-member parliamentary delegation to obtain information on the co-ordination of European naval forces deployed in the region under the aegis of WEU.

13. So that the Assembly may debate the Gulf affair in the light of the most recent developments, the Presidential Committee asked the two committees concerned to present two new reports at the December session. Since it is to be expected that the Chairmanship-in-Office will make a detailed statement on the matter, the Assembly will certainly be able to address recommendations to the Assembly based on an in-depth examination of a situation that is steadily deteriorating.

#### *(ii) Security in Europe as a whole*

14. While WEU has been able to play a major rôle in co-ordinating European forces in the Gulf to ensure application of the embargo decided upon by the United Nations, it is not yet playing the rôle one might expect of it in terms of security and guaranteed peace in Europe.

15. The Presidential Committee for its part wished to propose a line of action. Before the meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Paris from 19th to 21st November 1990, the Presidential Committee therefore, still in the exercise of its responsibilities under Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, transmitted a message to the Council (see Appendix II) making several recommendations on the defence of European security interests. The Presidential Committee also asked the President of the French Republic to transmit a message to participants in the Paris conference (see Appendix III).

16. The Presidential Committee believed the problems raised by the organisation of security throughout Europe were so important that they should be discussed by representatives of the parliaments of all European countries.

17. It therefore decided to organise a symposium to be held at the end of the first quarter of next year on the new circumstances of European security. The President of the Assembly will keep the Assembly informed of preparations for this important event.

18. Conversely, the extremely full time-table of international meetings in the last three months made it impossible to hold the meeting between the Presidential Committee and the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council which usually precedes ordinary ministerial meetings of the Council. Since the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council has met Assembly committees twice, the Presidential Committee did not consider it should insist on the application

of this practice, but it wishes to emphasise that it considers this omission, which is regrettable even if justified, to be an exception and not a precedent.

## **II. Administrative action**

### **(i) Budgetary questions**

19. On 20th September, the Presidential Committee adopted a draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990. Once the work included in the supplementary budget for 1989 to allow the Assembly to receive the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations in the conditions provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly had been almost wholly completed and accepted, it proved essential to adjust the initial estimates and assess the supplementary sums required. The fact that the initial estimates were exceeded is due in particular to work being carried out to modify or complete the initial programme such as repairs to the air conditioning in Room A, the installation on the roof of equipment to produce iced water for the air conditioning, etc. The Presidential Committee also felt that, since the national delegation offices had been transferred to the second floor, it was essential to install a video message system and receivers on that floor.

20. It was possible to complete all this work a few days before the June session with excess expenditure of only 5%, which may be considered a satisfactory result.

21. At its meeting in November, the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee therefore recommended that the Council approve the draft supplementary budget for 1990.

22. Approval having been given on 29th November 1990, the budget concerned came into force on the same date in accordance with Rule 47.2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

23. On 20th September 1990, the Presidential Committee also adopted a draft budget for the financial year 1991. There was a significant increase in Head I of this budget concerning the structure of the Office of the Clerk since it provided for an increase in the number of permanent staff of the Assembly with the creation of six new posts, including two grade A posts for senior officials to be recruited.

24. The WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, composed of the Council's budget experts, considered unacceptable the creation of posts or the regrading of others requested by the Assembly since they resulted in an increase in the Assembly budget as a whole that could hardly be reconciled with the aim of zero growth.

25. The President of the Assembly wrote to the Chairman of the Council asking him to support the Assembly's requests, which correspond to its concern to have the wherewithal to carry out its tasks effectively (see letter at Appendix IV).

26. Not until Thursday, 29th November, did the secretariat of the Assembly receive by telephone a few indications about the result of the Council's discussions. It would appear that it did not accede to the Assembly's wishes since it agreed only to the creation of two grade A posts at a level lower than that requested and refused the creation of corresponding posts for executive staff. Furthermore, it apparently insisted on a corresponding reduction in the Assembly's operating budget, at least for one of the two posts. The problem raised by the Council's attitude will be discussed in the appropriate Assembly bodies.

27. It is important to stress that estimates under Heads II to V, in the management of which the Assembly has budgetary autonomy, were worked out in the light of experience. In a spirit of economy and to offset the increase in estimates under Head I, the overall increases under these heads are lower than the foreseeable rate of inflation in France.

28. The present report on the action of the Presidential Committee between sessions can do no more than record this latest information. Your Rapporteur can but regret that he has not yet received the prior opinion of the Council provided for in the procedure described in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

29. In this particular instance, the opinion of the Council will inevitably arrive too late for the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee to be able to discuss it after in-depth reflection before the session. Because of the Council, the budget debate will therefore be somewhat impromptu, which is especially regrettable in that it relates not to minor problems but to the possibility for the Assembly to have, at a particularly serious international juncture, the essential wherewithal to exercise its tasks as the parliament of European defence.

### **(ii) Choice of a logo for the Assembly**

30. The Presidential Committee approved the choice proposed by Mr. Ewing on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

31. However, to make the logo clearer, it was agreed to add the initials UEO-WEU. The Presidential Committee congratulated the committee for the standard of the result obtained at least cost.

32. This logo should allow the Assembly's graphic identity to be enhanced on all its written texts once a graphic chart has been drawn up covering all the principles for using the logo. As a result, texts will be more homogenous and therefore more effective.

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33. In conclusion, I wish to underline the contrast between the Presidential Committee's satisfaction regarding its dialogue with the Council at political level and its displeasure at the dilatory budgetary procedure and the inadequate results obtained. I therefore express the hope that the Council, in the concern it shares with the Assembly to promote Europe's security and defence identity, will review the positions taken on its behalf in administrative matters.

## APPENDIX I

*Communiqué issued at the close of the meeting  
of the Presidential Committee on 21st August 1990*

The Presidential Committee of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU met in Paris following the meeting of the Council of Ministers of that organisation. Representatives of all member countries and all political groups were present.

Fully informed by its talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence of France, Chairmen-in-Office of the Council, and with the Secretary-General of WEU, the Presidential Committee approved the conclusions reached by the Ministers.

In particular, the Presidential Committee expressed its indignation at the violation of international law represented by the invasion and annexation of Kuwait and Iraq's threats to Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. It considered that fundamental human rights had been seriously violated by the taking of hostages among foreign nationals. Finally, it expressed the utmost concern at Iraq's threat to member countries' economic life and that of developing countries.

It urged Iraq to apply United Nations Resolutions 660 and 662 immediately and welcomed the fact that the Council had stressed the importance of the rôle of the Arab countries in this affair.

## APPENDIX II

***Message to the Council adopted by the Presidential Committee  
on 31st October 1990***

The conference beginning in Paris on 19th November closes one period of history and starts another.

Ideological confrontation has disappeared with Eastern Europe rallying to the principles on which the institutions to the West of the continent are based. Yet new risks are emerging with the rise of nationalism and the spread of particular interests.

Security is therefore no longer based on the organisation of defence alone but increasingly on the establishment of a new international order. To the prevention of war by deterring aggression must be added the organisation of peace by persuasion so as to base order not on the constraint of force but on a harmony of wills. In this undertaking, Western Europe will occupy a vital position. While an all-European order still has to be established, the Western Europe now being organised is at one and the same time a model, a pole of attraction and a factor of peace.

This organisation, however, is still incomplete. What is being pursued is monetary and political matters and will not be complete if not extended to defence questions. In this connection, it is for the Council to underline the importance of the undertakings that nine Western European states entered into in the framework of the modified Brussels Treaty.

The spirit of this treaty is expressed in its preamble which, in particular, affirms the resolution of the contracting parties "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe" and "to associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination".

Since WEU is one of the cornerstones of the future European union, its Council should contribute here and now to the success of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe that is to be opened in Paris on 19th November. The heads of state or of government taking part in the CSCE meeting will formally close the period of confrontation or tension which was characteristic of the twentieth century until its last decade and determine the institutions and all the arrangements for establishing an order of security, peace, freedom and respect for human rights throughout Europe. It is for the WEU Council to specify the nature of Western Europe's participation in a new collective security system in Europe.

There must be a conjunction of the political, economic and military aspects of a policy to establish an all-European order. The WEU Council for its part should endeavour to pursue and consolidate the disarmament process that is already under way. To this end, it should ensure the harmonisation of the positions of the member countries. European interests in disarmament questions must be defined and the correct implementation of the agreements concluded must then be monitored through an independent verification system, including the use of satellites.

Furthermore, the Council should promote guaranteed frontiers. The creation of a conflict prevention centre will bring an atmosphere of mutual confidence that is the condition for lasting peace. This body should play a growing rôle in reducing risk factors and inquiring into any activities that might appear to endanger peace. Its implementation should be the subject of consultations in the Council.

The success of this vast undertaking will require a deepening of the intra-European dialogue for which the Paris conference will lay new foundations and which the Assembly, for its part, will endeavour to develop at parliamentary level.

In short, the WEU Assembly, which wishes all-European co-operation to be based on agreements and existing institutions, conveys to the heads of state or of government taking part in the Paris conference its good wishes for success. It urges the WEU Council to ensure here and now that existing organisations are given tasks which correspond to the new rôle that they will have to play in a vastly-changed international context. Our countries have to find a balanced structure allowing a harmonious convergence of the efforts undertaken in three axes of co-operation: Western European, Atlantic and all-European. The Assembly intends to give the Council its full support in this task.

## APPENDIX III

*Message to heads of state or of government participating  
in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe  
adopted by the Presidential Committee on 31st October 1990*

The conference beginning in Paris on 19th November closes one period of history and starts another.

The heads of state or of government taking part will formally close the period of confrontation or tension which was characteristic of the twentieth century until its last decade and determine the institutions and all the arrangements for establishing an order of security, peace, freedom and respect for human rights throughout Europe.

The WEU Assembly, which wishes all-European co-operation to be based on agreements and existing institutions, conveys its most ardent wishes for success.

It is their task to pursue and consolidate the disarmament process that is already under way and promote guaranteed frontiers. The creation of a conflict prevention centre will bring an atmosphere of mutual confidence that is the condition for lasting peace. This body should play a growing rôle in reducing risk factors and inquiring into any activities that might appear to endanger peace.

The success of this vast undertaking will require a deepening of the intra-European dialogue which the WEU Assembly, for its part, will endeavour to develop at parliamentary level.

## APPENDIX IV

*Letter from Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly,  
to Mr. Dumas, Chairman-in-Office of the Council,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*

Paris, 20th November 1990

.....

I have been informed by the Assembly secretariat that the Council's Budget and Organisation Committee did not adopt a position on the Assembly's staffing requests and that the Permanent Council would be taking a decision on the subject in the very near future.

I can but stress that an increase in the number of staff in the secretariat of the Assembly is absolutely necessary to meet the consequences of the enlargement and reactivation of WEU.

In exercising my mandate as President, I have been able to see quite clearly that it is essential to create the posts of Secretary to the Political Committee and Head of the Research Office, together with the executive staff mentioned in the budget.

It also seems to me evident that the secretariat of a parliamentary assembly such as ours must have a Portuguese official and a Spanish official to facilitate its relations with the representatives and authorities of the two countries which recently acceded to the modified Brussels Treaty.

I should therefore be particularly grateful if you would ask the Council to accede to requests which are based solely on the concern to ensure that the parliamentary assembly of European security has the means that are strictly necessary for the exercise of its tasks.

.....

Robert PONTILLON

H.E. Mr. Roland Dumas,  
Chairman-in-Office of the Council,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
37, Quai d'Orsay,  
75700 PARIS.

APPENDIX V

*Logo of the WEU Assembly*





*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 479 to 489*

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**RECOMMENDATION 479 <sup>1</sup>**

*on the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe –  
prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe <sup>2</sup>*

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The Assembly,

I

- (i) Welcoming the fact that the developments which started with the perestroïka movement in the USSR and continued in many Central and Eastern European countries in 1989 at last make it possible to consider establishing a new, peaceful order throughout Europe;
- (ii) Considering, nevertheless, that there is still much uncertainty about the future and stability of those countries;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction the considerable progress made in the CFE negotiations and gratified that the countries concerned are considering starting further negotiations, shortly after a first agreement is signed, to reduce even further the level of forces and armaments in Europe;
- (iv) Welcoming also the convening of a conference of heads of state or of government in 1990 to give new scope to the CSCE process;
- (v) Noting the broad convergence between proposals by Eastern and Western European countries to give Europe as a whole economic, juridical and cultural structures designed to organise a new European order;
- (vi) Anxious, however, not to precipitate the premature disbandment of organisations which have so far ensured peace in Europe since this would make it more difficult to establish this new peaceful order and considering that the bases of European security should be maintained for as long an interim period as necessary;

II

- (i) Welcoming the progress made towards reuniting the German people in a single political system, which is one of the main aims that the WEU member countries set themselves in 1954;
- (ii) Considering that the attainment of this aim implies a negotiated agreement between the two German states and noting that it calls for an understanding on the status of unified Germany between the two states and the four responsible powers;
- (iii) Considering that the countries of Europe as a whole are concerned by the formation of a new German state at the heart of Europe;
- (iv) Considering that the permanency of the present frontiers of Germany must be confirmed by a prior undertaking by the two German states, together with one by the other European countries, for the creation of a German state not to jeopardise what has been gained in European integration nor to be an obstacle to the establishment of a new peaceful order in Europe;
- (v) Noting that many provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty apply, for fifty years at least, to the Federal Republic of Germany and that they cannot be infringed without a revision of the treaty;
- (vi) Recalling that the Council has decided to proceed with such a revision as soon as the accession of Portugal and Spain becomes effective;
- (vii) Considering that the geographical situation and strength of a unified German state make it undesirable to grant it neutral status;
- (viii) Noting also that the integration of the entire German territory in NATO seems unacceptable to many Central and Eastern European countries;

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd March 1990 during the extraordinary session (3rd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1216).

(ix) Considering, however, that it is essential for the new German state to be integrated in a European collective security system with which the United States and Canada remain associated and constituting in itself the nucleus of an all-European security system;

### III

- (i) Noting that in a period of instability it is hardly desirable to add to the degree and variety of uncertainty and hence the maintenance of the alliances is a factor of peace and order in Europe as long as a new security order has not been organised throughout Europe;
- (ii) Considering that the reduction of armed forces stationed in Europe makes it necessary to conduct an immediate review of the deployment of NATO forces;
- (iii) Considering that the forces of the WEU countries will have a larger part to play in this new deployment than heretofore;
- (iv) Considering that all the western countries have to limit their military expenditure;
- (v) Considering, therefore, that closer co-operation between WEU member countries for their joint security is becoming essential;
- (vi) Considering that, for this reason, the European members of the alliance will have to exercise greater political responsibilities, particularly in regard to arms control, organising the collective security of Europe as a whole and defence against any threat from outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty,

### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

#### I

1. Draw without delay the first conclusions from the study it is conducting into the consequences of a CFE agreement for Europe's security and inform the Assembly accordingly;
2. Extend this study subsequently to cover all the consequences of the changes in Eastern Europe;
3. Prepare carefully a joint position for the WEU countries in regard to matters within its purview that are included in the agenda of the CSCE;

#### II

1. Inform the Assembly whether the commitments entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany under the modified Brussels Treaty are also valid for a unified German state;
2. Before any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, analyse the consequences of a devolution of the Federal Republic of Germany's commitments to a unified German state for the application of the treaty and the platform adopted in The Hague, paying particular attention to:
  - (a) co-operation between WEU and NATO, provided for in Article IV of the treaty;
  - (b) implementation of military assistance in the conditions laid down in Article V and paragraph III.4 of the platform of The Hague, specifying on which frontiers member countries are now obliged to contribute to the defence of Germany;
  - (c) application to any state that succeeds the German Democratic Republic of Article VII according to which the high contracting parties will participate in no coalition directed against any of them;
  - (d) implementation of Article VIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, Protocols Nos. II, III and IV and, in particular, Annex I to Protocol No. III on determining the level of forces, renunciation of the production of certain armaments and control of the application of the relevant undertakings;
  - (e) respect for Article XII fixing the period after which each member country shall have the right to cease to be a party to the treaty;
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of this analysis;

4. Ensure that the states participating in the conference that will define the status of Germany are duly and fully informed of these results so that they may take account of the guarantees offered by the modified Brussels Treaty for the security of both Germany and its neighbouring countries and for the establishment of a new peaceful and secure order in Europe;

### III

1. Explore forthwith the possibilities offered by WEU as a medium for assessing possible threats to member countries and for research into the prospects of an all-European security area for which it might eventually be an appropriate framework, in particular:
  - (a) for defining a sufficiency threshold in defence matters;
  - (b) for analysing the concept of shared security;
  - (c) for developing means of arbitration, confidence-building measures and disarmament;
2. Use WEU as a lever for a new European security order in which it might:
  - (a) guarantee the intangibility of its members' frontiers, including those resulting from the unification of the two German states;
  - (b) ensure respect for the commitments entered into by its members in the context of agreements limiting forces or armaments or the non-production of certain weapons;
3. Assess the level of forces that WEU countries should deploy for Europe's security and agree on a fair sharing of the efforts required;
4. Use the modified Brussels Treaty as the juridical basis for the presence of forces of member states on the territory of other member states insofar as their presence would help to strengthen a peaceful order in Europe;
5. Convene regular meetings of chiefs-of-staff of member countries to examine European armaments requirements, thus giving political impetus to the standardisation and joint production of such armaments;
6. Draw up a programme for the joint organisation of verification measures required for the application of the CFE agreements;
7. For this purpose, pursue further its study of the possibility of setting up a European observation satellite agency;
8. Have the WEU Institute for Security Studies organise a permanent exchange of information with the Eastern European countries on military deployment in Europe and the application of the CFE agreements;
9. Keep the public regularly informed of work carried out by its specialised groups to allow European public opinion to become aware of co-operation in the framework of WEU.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>*to Recommendation 479*

I. The strategic situation in Europe is undergoing far-reaching changes. The study undertaken by the Council on the consequences of a CFE agreement on European security is a long-term process and it would be premature to draw on it for final conclusions while the politico-military situation in Europe is evolving so fast.

At the Ministerial Council meeting in Brussels on 23rd and 24th April 1990, Ministers were briefed on how far thinking had progressed on the subject, a subject which was one of the main points of their discussion. Since the CFE agreement was crucial to the establishment of peace in Europe, they reiterated the importance they attached to its conclusion. More generally, Ministers instructed the experts to work on the formulation of a joint approach to all questions relating to European security, in particular with a view to the CSCE summit.

II. The treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany, signed in Moscow on 12th September, expressly gives the united Germany the "right to belong to alliances, with all the rights and obligations arising therefrom", specifying that this right is not affected by other provisions contained in the treaty.

The provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty have not, therefore, been called into question by unification. The WEU Council thus took note of a declaration by the German Representative on 3rd October that the united Germany will be a full member of Western European Union and that "the overall obligation to provide assistance in case of armed attack referred to in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and all other provisions of the set of treaties shall apply with immediate effect to the whole territory of the united Germany".

## III.

1. The concept of sufficiency of the level of a country's forces is one of the foundations of the future military order in Europe as it will ensue from the CFE agreements. Progress with negotiations on CFE and confidence-building measures is being closely monitored by the Council. The general aims of these negotiations, together with the institutional arrangements that will be set up under the CSCE, are equal security for all, greater stability in Europe and lesser disparities in the field of conventional weapons.

2. The inviolability of frontiers is a general principle of the Helsinki Final Act, and it applies to all CSCE member countries.

With regard to the monitoring of arms control agreements, WEU member countries share the belief that each agreement calls for adequate verification procedures.

Thus, the limitation of specific categories of the conventional military capability of the states party to the CFE negotiations is being covered by the Vienna CFE negotiations, and it is in this context that compliance with the commitments entered into by the states party will be guaranteed.

The provisions concerning the non-production of certain weapons are laid down in the non-proliferation treaty on nuclear weapons or the relevant protocols to the modified Brussels Treaty, and are monitored by the controls specified in those agreements.

3. It is the responsibility of WEU bodies constantly to reflect on the concept of defence and the military needs arising from that concept in order to guarantee the security of each country. This thinking helps to arrive at a useful evaluation of the contributions that Europeans can make to their own security, and therefore to the security of all their allies.

Nevertheless, each member state retains its sovereign right to decide on the size and structure of its own forces.

4. The presence of the forces of one state in the territory of other WEU states is regulated by specific agreements. The modified Brussels Treaty does not regulate the question of stationed forces and provides no legal basis for such a presence.

New prospects for European security are being opened up by the remodelling of the European strategic landscape, and these should be explored. The review of the modified Brussels Treaty envi-

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th November 1990.

saged by Ministers at the time of WEU's enlargement to Portugal and Spain will be one aspect of this general issue. It is in this context that thought should be given to the most appropriate means of strengthening cohesion and co-operation among member states and also to the question of the composition of WEU.

5. The chiefs-of-staff met for the first time in the history of the organisation on 27th August 1990. This meeting showed that member states have the capacity to arrive at joint military responses to an exceptional situation, and they are conferring together as to the advisability of holding more meetings as and when necessary.

6. A study of the procedures for the implementation of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe is one of the priority areas of the Council's work. The specific task is to optimise the verification procedures which will be implemented for member states. This co-operation covers exchanges related to the training of teams of inspectors, the inspection methods drawn up and the measures planned in order to derive maximum benefit from the inspection rights to be granted to WEU countries: the inclusion of inspectors from other member countries in national teams and preference for other member states in the transfer of active quotas not taken up. Several partners have recently conducted or are planning to conduct joint training exercises.

7. Following the report by the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space set up by the Ministerial Council on 3rd April 1989, Ministers requested at the Council meeting on 23rd April 1990 that "concrete proposals should be submitted to them at their next meeting, *inter alia* with a view to the possibility of establishing a satellite verification agency". Since that date, the ad hoc sub-group has held many plenary meetings, convened meetings of experts and paid visits to the satellite installations of member countries. Specific proposals will be laid before Ministers at their next Council to enable them to take a decision.

8. The rôle of the WEU Institute for Security Studies is to carry out analyses and forward studies and to promote a European security identity. One of its tasks is to develop contacts with officials and research workers in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These contacts will help to improve the flow of information on politico-military questions in Europe, whether on disarmament or on defence policies.

9. The Brussels Ministerial Council of 23rd April 1990 fortunately resumed the practice of issuing a communiqué, the public expression of the joint position of member states on major politico-military issues of the day.

In the same way, the conclusions of the extraordinary Ministerial Councils in Paris on 21st August and 18th September 1990 were brought to the attention of the general public. The rôle played by WEU in the current Gulf crisis has been widely acknowledged, especially as the communiqués issued after the first meeting of WEU chiefs-of-staff in Paris on 27th August and the ad hoc group for the co-ordination of naval operations in the Gulf in Paris on 31st August gave the public detailed information on the implementation of ministerial decisions.

The Presidency also welcomes the fact that the Assembly is actively contributing, through the efforts of its members and through the activities it arranges itself, to improving the public perception of WEU's rôle. Quite apart from the normal procedures, this is why the Presidency attaches particular importance to the provision of information to members of the Assembly, as testified by the hearing of its Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Political and Defence Committees on 20th September 1990.

**RECOMMENDATION 480 <sup>1</sup>**  
***on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance* <sup>2</sup>**

1. THE ASSEMBLY recalls that Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty closely associates WEU's activities with those of NATO and that NATO is still the essential guarantee of Europe's security because it is the only framework in which the deterrent power of the United States can be used for the benefit of Europe.

It recognises the progress made towards limiting armaments but notes that the Soviet Union has not yet taken any decisive steps to reduce its forces and armaments and still remains the leading military power on the European continent.

It considers that the security situation in Europe has been fundamentally changed through the democratisation processes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe and the opening of borders, including the one between the Federal Republic and the GDR.

It wishes the CFE negotiations to be concluded rapidly, a new mandate to be drawn up by the CSCE for a subsequent reduction in the level of armaments, exclusively defensive military systems to be established and negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons to be started immediately.

It welcomes the development of the CSCE and the efforts made in that framework to establish a new peaceful order in Europe.

It considers that in the context of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures, the Vienna negotiations and other forums significant steps are being taken to improve the security situation in Europe.

It considers that, with the increasing pace of European developments and the changing nature of security problems, planning for European security co-operation must be accelerated.

It considers that, in the new circumstances, Western European countries will have to play a larger rôle in this planning process, which will require closer co-operation between WEU member states.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council do its utmost to facilitate the United States Government's action to maintain and strengthen the association of the United States with the organisation of European security by:

- (a) asserting itself as the European pillar of the alliance, inter alia by moving the seat of its ministerial organs closer to that of NATO;
- (b) asking those of its members which do not participate in the NATO integrated commands to examine to what extent the new situation and the new rôle to be played by NATO allow them to associate their armed forces more closely with joint deployment;
- (c) keeping the Assembly constantly informed of the discussion that is to be held on the reorganisation, rôle and future of NATO in the context of the transformation of the military pacts into political alliances following arms reduction agreements;
- (d) tightening its links with the European members of the Atlantic Alliance which are not at present members of WEU;
- (e) ensuring that member countries make a military effort sufficient to guarantee a balance of conventional forces between the West and the Soviet Union;
- (f) for this purpose, fixing the troop levels that each of them undertakes to place at the service of joint defence and providing for these undertakings to be revised in conformity with future CFE agreements;
- (g) ensuring maximum security in Western Europe with a minimum deployment of forces and urgently studying the conditions in which multinational units might be set up;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (3rd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1225).

- (h) organising, in the framework of a general reduction in military expenditure and the level of armaments, fair burden- and responsibility-sharing in the alliance and between WEU member countries.

2. THE ASSEMBLY considers it necessary for a reunified Germany not to be neutral and that it be integrated in the European Community and play a full part in an all-European security system as soon as it is set up by the CSCE and, during a transitional period, a search be made for solutions acceptable to all concerned with maintaining balance and peace in Europe.

It also considers that reunified Germany must formally recognise the frontiers with its neighbours resulting from the second world war and recognised by the Helsinki agreements.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council facilitate the search for a status for reunified Germany which ensures that it participates in the collective security of Western Europe while giving the Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European countries the political and military assurances necessary for maintaining a balance of forces and advancing future negotiations on peace and disarmament.

It also RECOMMENDS that the Council ensure consultations between its members on matters on the agenda of the negotiations on the status of Germany between the two German states and the four powers directly concerned.

3. THE ASSEMBLY considers that recent developments in certain non-European countries, particularly in the Near and Middle East, are a new danger to international peace and the security of Europe. It notes that the Atlantic Alliance is making no provision for the necessary guarantees against such threats but that any initiatives Europe may take to counter them help to strengthen American confidence that the alliance is operating correctly.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council make regular assessments of all possible threats to European security and inform the public of the results of its work on security in the Mediterranean.

4. THE ASSEMBLY hopes that the difficulties now arising in the CFE negotiations, in particular over the level of air forces, will be rapidly overcome, that an agreement will be concluded in 1990 and that further negotiations will be started before the end of the year to speed up the reduction in the level of forces and armaments in Europe.

It welcomes the steps taken by the Council to co-ordinate member countries' action for applying an open-skies agreement and for ensuring the effectiveness of verification operations.

It RECOMMENDS that the Council contribute to the success of the disarmament negotiations and enable member countries to play an active part in verifying and implementing future agreements by:

- (a) taking an early decision on the joint production and use of observation satellites;
- (b) widening the decision taken in Brussels on 23rd April in order to organise a permanent exchange of information between its members on the results of each one's verification operations;
- (c) organising co-operation between member countries and, possibly, other European members of NATO for training the staff necessary for carrying out these operations.

5. THE ASSEMBLY notes that Western European security continues to be guaranteed through implementation of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council fulfil that guarantee by ensuring that member states make an effort to facilitate the rapid conclusion of the first phase of the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament and urge the immediate commencement of Vienna II negotiations.

6. THE ASSEMBLY notes that the limitation of forces and armaments in Europe will lead to a reduction in arms production and troop levels in national armies.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council exercise its mandate and at last give the necessary impetus to the establishment of interoperability of armaments used by NATO and the standardisation and joint production of armaments by member countries by:

- (a) assessing the requirements of European security in this area during the period of implementation of the CFE agreement;
- (b) fostering understanding between arms-producing firms in member countries, inter alia through harmonisation of relevant national legislation, as suggested in the study conducted by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee in April 1982;

- (c) having the WEU Institute for Security Studies give priority to studying the economic and social consequences of a potential reduction in the activities of the arms industries and the number of persons employed on defence work.

It RECOMMENDS that the Council take steps to prepare for changing military strategies and doctrines and to adjust to the new situation in Europe: whilst retaining defensive capabilities, the present strategy of forward defence and flexible response in Europe will have to be re-examined and in this context the deployment of the armed forces may have to be changed.

It welcomes the decision of President Bush and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group to terminate the follow-on to Lance programme and to cancel any further modernisation of United States nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe which indicates the willingness and ability of the alliance to take the initiative in a rapidly changing situation.

7. THE ASSEMBLY welcomes the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies are now open to exchanges of views and information with the West on defence and security matters.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council help to restore mutual confidence between Eastern and Central European countries and Western European countries by holding, together with the WEU Institute for Security Studies, exchanges of information with appropriate bodies in the Soviet Union and the Eastern and Central European countries on matters relating to security, disarmament and verification, as decided on 23rd April 1990.

8. THE ASSEMBLY welcomes the Council's efforts to help to inform the public about its work. It notes with satisfaction that, for the first time, the Council has given it a document in which the IEPG gives it information about its activities. It considers, however, that this policy of openness is still inadequate, which is detrimental to the cohesion of NATO.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council provide the public with more information about the work of its dependent organs and the results they obtain. It also recommends that it ask the presidency of the IEPG to report regularly and directly to the Assembly on its activities.

9. THE ASSEMBLY notes that the decisions taken by the Council on the abolition of arms control and of the Standing Armaments Committee have in fact impaired the WEU ministerial organs' relations with NATO. It welcomes the steps taken by the Council to develop other forms of contact.

However, it RECOMMENDS that the Council resume the practice of asking the NATO authorities for an opinion on matters within their purview raised by Assembly recommendations or written questions from members of the Assembly.



## REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>

### *to Recommendation 480*

1. With the total disruption of the strategic landscape in Europe, the Atlantic Alliance will be performing its mission in a profoundly different context. It has embarked on a searching review, conducted at different levels, to determine how it should fulfil that rôle in the future.

The debate has been launched and it is impossible to prejudge the outcome. Each of the allies is making a specific contribution to ensure that the future configuration will reflect the cohesion of the alliance in the new circumstances with due regard for the concerns of each of its members.

The structure of the joint defence effort cannot be determined at this phase, nor can its outline yet be decided. It should also be borne in mind that, in the final analysis, the size and composition of each state's armed forces are matters of national sovereignty.

The WEU Council is keeping this issue on its agenda. There is concertation on both WEU's own tasks and how to include those tasks in the broader Atlantic framework. This concertation keeps in mind that WEU is an organisation whose vocation is distinctly European, and one which makes a specific contribution to the building of Europe.

2. The treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany, signed in Moscow on 12th September 1990, re-established the unity and full sovereignty of Germany. On 3rd October, the day of German unity, the WEU Council adopted the communiqué, the text of which is cited for the Assembly's information:

"The Council of Western European Union (WEU) rejoices at the culmination today of the process of German unification, following the signature in Moscow of the treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany on 12th September. Today, the aspirations of the German people to complete the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination become reality. The Council welcomes the peaceful, democratic nature of these historic changes, which contribute further towards building a just and lasting order of peace in Europe.

Together with the recent changes in Europe, German unification marks the end of the division of our continent and contributes towards the achievement of the fundamental aims of WEU: European unity and integration.

The Council of WEU welcomes the statement made today by the German Permanent Representative that the united Germany is a full member of Western European Union.

On this historic day, the Council shares the joy of the German people."

3. The Gulf crisis has met with a co-ordinated response from WEU member states, with the Assembly being kept duly informed. This action demonstrates WEU members' capacity for joint mobilisation.

WEU keeps a close watch on the general situation in the Mediterranean, several of its member countries having borders along that sea. This is a field for discussion and consultation to which the Council attaches constant importance. A specific ad hoc group on security in the Mediterranean meets regularly.

4. The verification of CFE agreements is one of the fundamental aspects of negotiation, since it underpins their credibility. The Council has wasted no time in devoting its full attention to this subject. For example, the standard method it devised for using gathered data has subsequently been adopted by the Atlantic Alliance.

The importance of observation satellites in verification, and also in crisis monitoring, was justification for the request by the Ministerial Council in 1989 for a study on the feasibility of WEU developing its own capability. As a result of the assiduous efforts that have been made since that time, Ministers will be able to reach a decision on the subject in the near future.

5. The corpus of pertinent provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty helps safeguard the security of WEU member countries. The platform on European security interests, adopted on 27th October 1987, spelt out these provisions in the contemporary politico-military context. To base the guarantee of WEU members' security on Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty would be to reduce the scope of that guarantee.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th November 1990.

WEU member countries are naturally aware of the issues affecting their security which are at stake in the Vienna CFE negotiations. They have spared no effort to bring about a satisfactory conclusion to the CSCE summit to be held in Paris on 19th November, and are already thinking ahead to a complementary phase.

6. Co-operation in the production of armaments is an extremely complex question embracing military, political, economic and social aspects. Many bilateral and multilateral programmes have been implemented, while others are under way or being planned.

For internal organisational reasons, the Council decided to wind up the Standing Armaments Committee on 1st July 1990, but co-operation on armaments is a subject still requiring careful consideration by member countries, in addition to the co-operation efforts they are making elsewhere, especially within the Independent European Programme Group.

The economic and social implications of trends in the arms industry together constitute one of the elements of this wide-ranging question.

7. In setting up the WEU Institute for Security Studies, one of the Council's objectives was the development of exchanges with countries in the central and eastern part of our continent. In accordance with the decision reached by Ministers at their meeting on 23rd April 1990, the Council for its part is establishing information contacts with the states in the region. The first such mission took place this autumn, with a joint visit by the Presidency and the Secretary-General to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and this will be followed by the forthcoming visit to Poland.

8. The IEPG is a body independent of WEU and could not, in respect of its activities, refer to a body to which it is not attached.

9. Although developments over the previous decades have undoubtedly modified the form of contact between WEU and NATO, the changes have occurred against the background of a complementary European and Atlantic approach to security, without calling into question the solidarity that exists among all members of the Atlantic Alliance.

The Council's replies to Assembly recommendations or written questions from its members are given in this spirit.

RECOMMENDATION 481 <sup>1</sup>*on Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union* <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the recent developments in Europe which promise a dramatic reduction in East-West tension;
- (ii) Considering, however, that the establishment of lasting security greatly depends on decisions which have to be taken forthwith;
- (iii) Aware that the democratic evolution in the countries of Central Europe faces growing problems of internal argument and traditional nationalism;
- (iv) Convinced that progress in the Vienna talks, both on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) and on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM), is an essential prerequisite for stability and security in Europe;
- (v) Stressing the necessity to continue arms control negotiations immediately after the signing of the first CFE treaty;
- (vi) Certain that further cuts in weapons and force levels in Europe are desirable but that they must be agreed collectively and not decided unilaterally;
- (vii) Noting the convergence of views on arms control between WEU member countries and a growing number of Warsaw Pact countries;
- (viii) Recognising that few nations, in the East or the West, continue to have the financial means to maintain defence spending at former levels;
- (ix) Determined that there must be greater European co-operation in the field of defence and security, especially over arms control in general and verification of agreements in particular;
- (x) Pleased that the NATO nations have tabled a series of measures in Vienna which are setting the pace for the forthcoming CFE treaty;
- (xi) Saddened that the French Prime Minister's proposal of 7th September 1989 that WEU should start a specific programme of immediate co-operation with regard to verification and disarmament has not yet been taken up by the Council;
- (xii) Encouraged, however, by the proposal on 23rd March 1990 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany to create a centre for verification in Europe, which echoes previous French ideas on the necessity for transparency and reciprocal openness;
- (xiii) Recalling that Recommendation 465 proposed the creation of a European observation satellite agency to assist in the verification measures agreed by each member country;
- (xiv) Welcoming the fact that the Council is studying a possible WEU contribution to the CFE verification system based on the enhancement of European capabilities and the pooling of all member country's assets;
- (xv) Convinced of the urgent need for a *European verification centre* and struck by the fact that the ideal nucleus for such a body is WEU, plus those other states (signatories of the forthcoming CFE treaty) desiring to take part;
- (xvi) Suggesting that the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, together with the Secretary-General, should immediately begin consulting not only member states but other interested nations from both East and West which meet the necessary requirements with a view to their participation in the work of this centre,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Take the action necessary to create, under WEU auspices, a *European verification centre* in which all states which meet the necessary requirements, from both East and West, be invited to participate.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Lord Newall on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1223).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL**

***to Recommendation 481***

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

RECOMMENDATION 482 <sup>1</sup>*on observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament –  
guidelines drawn from the symposium <sup>2</sup>*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), now taking place in Vienna, are likely to lead to an agreement within a year's time;
- (ii) Considering that European nations have played a substantial rôle in these negotiations and will also be signatories to a future CFE treaty in their own right;
- (iii) Aware that a future CFE treaty will also include extensive arrangements for verification and exchange of information considered as confidence-building measures by all parties concerned;
- (iv) Conscious that, apart from co-operative measures of verification, national or international technical means of verification, in particular satellites which can be employed without the co-operation of the contracting party whose territory is under investigation, are of perennial importance in the entire verification process;
- (v) Taking into account that verification satellites can also be employed to monitor territories in the world where new security threats might arise;
- (vi) Stressing the need for Western European nations to develop an autonomous European verification satellite capability in order to meet their responsibilities in a changing security situation while at the same time strengthening the alliance as an equal partner;
- (vii) Aware that all the technological and industrial capabilities required for the establishment and operation of a full-scale verification satellite system are available in the WEU member states;
- (viii) Aware of the plans for a research and technology project on satellite surveillance technology in the framework of the Independent European Programme Group's Euclid programme;
- (ix) Recalling that the European Space Agency has gained invaluable competence and experience in managing complicated international space programmes including earth observation,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Decide as a matter of urgency on the establishment of a WEU satellite image-processing and interpretation agency;
2. Reach decisions on further steps for establishing a full-scale European verification satellite system without delay, taking into account the time necessary for developing the various segments, such as optical satellites, ground stations and, in a later phase, synthetic aperture radar satellites and data-relay satellites.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document 1230).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL**

***to Recommendation 482***

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

RECOMMENDATION 483 <sup>1</sup>*on the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)  
and Western European Union* <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that, in the Rome declaration of October 1984 revitalising WEU, the Council stated that WEU should provide political impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters and reiterated that this is a key rôle for WEU;
- (ii) Believing that reductions in East-West military confrontation in Europe should lead to a necessity for rationalisation, diversification and, where appropriate, specialisation so as to manage overcapacity in defence-related industries;
- (iii) Aware that the possibility of substantial troop reductions on the part of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as of withdrawals of United States military manpower from Western Europe will heighten the significance of weapon effectiveness and sophistication in deterrence at a lower level of in-place forces;
- (iv) Conscious that reductions in defence budgets must be anticipated which will put a premium on the benefits of arms co-operation to secure value for money and on the utilisation of the most economic productive and maintenance capacities for defence equipment;
- (v) Anticipating that, whilst the United States' political and nuclear guarantees to the security of Western Europe will remain, pressures of public opinion in the United States will induce congressional initiatives for reductions of transatlantic co-operative equipment programmes in favour of procurement from United States domestic sources;
- (vi) Mindful that the IEPG operates in a political vacuum sustaining no significant information programme on its work and winning no European constituency of support for its activities;
- (vii) Convinced that the IEPG can offer, through the harmonisation of operational requirements and re-equipment timescales as well as through a concerted European military research programme, cost-effective defence equipment programmes to meet the challenges of a rapidly evolving security situation in Europe, and that its work merits more substantial backing,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Arrange for the presidency of the IEPG to address the Assembly once a year to inform it about developments in European armaments co-operation and to answer questions from members;
2. Organise the regular circulation of progress bulletins to the Committees on Technology and Aerospace and Defence of the Assembly of WEU to sustain a better appreciation of the work of the IEPG among key political opinion formers in Europe;
3. Ensure that the Commission of the EEC is formally informed on a regular basis of the work of the IEPG so as to sustain a beneficial dialogue on issues of mutual interest such as the maintenance of Europe's industrial base, technical capability and competitiveness;
4. Build on the welcome creation of a small permanent secretariat of the IEPG in Lisbon by concentrating the support of the presidency there and by establishing a strengthened corpus of specialist expertise through longer detachments of procurement experts to the secretariat;
5. Pursue vigorously the initial stages towards more integrated European military research under the auspices of the Euclid programme by increased joint funding and the rationalisation of existing national defence research establishments;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document 1228).

6. Explore with the Commission of the EEC possibilities for some acceleration of harmonised European company law to facilitate fair cross frontier competition and the processes of transnational merger, acquisition and collaboration between defence companies;
7. Maintain efforts to secure a more genuinely open defence equipment market in Europe by universal distribution of contract bulletins and data collection and exchange whilst ensuring that the interests of the member defence industry countries are secured.



**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 483***

The Council shares the interest expressed by the Assembly in its Recommendation 483 in strengthening relations between WEU and the IEPG.

This interest has been conveyed to the United Kingdom Presidency of the IEPG, by whom it was registered in a spirit of open-mindedness.

The IEPG already keeps WEU regularly informed on the content of its activities, and the exchanges between the IEPG and the Council in this field appear to be satisfactory.

It would be difficult to go further and to seek the creation of a formal link between the IEPG and the WEU Assembly.

Given the informal nature of the IEPG – one of the reasons for its existence and its success – and the fact that its composition does not correspond with that of WEU, it could not be envisaged as things now stand that the IEPG should be subjected to what might be regarded as the first step towards parliamentary control by the WEU Assembly over the IEPG.

While the WEU Council shares the Assembly's positive views on the rôle of the IEPG, moreover, it has no authority to state opinions as to its method of operation, nor to seek to influence the outcome of its deliberations.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th November 1990.

**RECOMMENDATION 484 <sup>1</sup>**

***on WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations  
concerned with security and European defence <sup>2</sup>***

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- (i) THE ASSEMBLY is aware that it is important for WEU to take full advantage of the work of the various research institutes concerned with security and defence and which are capable of exercising considerable influence on public opinion and politicians, thus contributing to the enlargement of the public debate on these questions;
- (ii) It welcomes therefore the fact that the organisation of relations with such institutes in and beyond Western Europe and the development of greater public awareness of European security questions are among the tasks of the newly-created WEU Institute for Security Studies;
- (iii) It is gratified that according to the Council's reply to Recommendation 474 the institutes's unclassified work will be widely available to the public;
- (iv) It is happy that one of the tasks of the institute will be to establish and keep up-to-date a data bank for research and information purposes;
- (v) It recalls that its services have so far no means of access to computerised documentation systems established in various research institutes and documentation centres;
- (vi) It considers the advantages WEU could derive from closer collaboration with appropriate non-governmental organisations capable of giving maximum publicity to the organisation's aims, initiatives and achievements and promoting a public awareness of European security questions in all countries concerned.

THE ASSEMBLY therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council:

1. Grant the WEU Institute for Security Studies the broadest possible independence for its work, including the development of fruitful relations with parliamentarians, the media and the public and for establishing an active information policy;
2. Allow the Assembly appropriate access to the institute's documentation data base for its own work;
3. With the help of the institute, develop closer co-operation with those international non-governmental organisations which are particularly representative within the organisation's sphere of competence and, by their activities, are capable of contributing to promoting a European security identity and inform the Assembly of the action taken.

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Stegagnini on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations (Document 1226).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 484***

The Institute for Security Studies is an original creation in terms of both its vocation and operation. It is the first institute to be set up at a European and international level with the aim of helping to develop the European security identity. Its function is both internal, in that it contributes as and when necessary to the work of the Council and its working groups, and external in that its work is also directed to senior officials in third countries, to all sectors of public life concerned with security problems, and to international public opinion in general.

Whereas, institutionally, it comes under the authority of the Council pursuant to Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, the ministerial decision of 13th November 1989 setting up the Institute stipulates that the work of the Institute shall be carried out "independently and objectively". In particular, it is the Institute's responsibility to devise its work programme by developing the widest possible network for contacts and co-operation with the outside world, including those international non-governmental organisations concerned with security questions.

The activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies are set against a background of a heightened European awareness of security issues. The Assembly has helped bring that about by an intense effort over many years to alert politicians to these issues and to keep public opinion informed; the Council welcomes this contribution. Appropriate co-ordination between the Institute and the Assembly will promote this objective, with the Institute for example allowing the Assembly access to its unclassified documentation.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 9th November 1990.

RECOMMENDATION 485<sup>1</sup>*on the future of low flying*<sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling the motion for a resolution on the banning of low-altitude military training flights, tabled by Mr. Büchner and others<sup>3</sup> on 5th December 1988 (Document 1169);
- (ii) Aware that the effects of low-altitude flying are suffered in all member states of WEU, as well as in most other European countries, including those of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation;
- (iii) Considering the easing of tension between East and West;
- (iv) In view of the prospect of agreement in Vienna to make substantial reductions in certain categories of conventional weapons including combat aircraft;
- (v) Convinced that it should be possible to make greater use of simulation in preparing pilots for low-altitude flight;
- (vi) Stressing that there should be greater consultation and agreement between member states to share the burden of low-altitude flight training;
- (vii) Recalling that in the past the Council has forwarded certain recommendations of the Assembly to the NATO authorities,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Include the subject of low-altitude flying and attendant problems in its own agenda and urge the NATO authorities to do likewise, with the aim of making an urgent study of the ways in which the universal European problem of low-altitude flying may be attenuated in the future, including research into public knowledge of and attitudes to the problem;
2. Ensure that the general and specific points made in the present report are taken into account and, in particular, fully examine the following suggestions with a view to their adoption by NATO and national governments as norms for the future:
  - (a) in peacetime, minimum heights for low-altitude flights over urban areas to be not less than 300 metres;
  - (b) interception exercises and formation flying at low altitude to be banned in the vicinity of heavily populated areas;
  - (c) aircraft speed to be limited to 420 knots maximum, so that noise is reduced;
  - (d) very low-altitude flights (i.e. those at less than 75 metres) to be authorised only over training areas of sufficient size and consideration to be given to suppressing the use of all such areas in peacetime, to be reactivated only in time of tension;
  - (e) all low-altitude flying to be banned between 10 p.m. and 8 a.m. (even in training areas) and generally on Sundays and bank holidays;
  - (f) the authorisation of night low-flying routes to be subject to agreement by national authorities;
  - (g) all necessary training for flights at low and very low altitude in "real" conditions to take place in areas where geography allows such flights without causing considerable disturbance to the population;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1222).

3. MM. Biefnot, Holtz, Eicher, Pécriaux, Stoffelen, Schmidt, Mrs. Luuk, Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Scheer.

- (h) although the current state of simulation techniques cannot completely replace actual low-altitude flying, consideration to be given to further research and development with the aim of improving low-altitude flying simulation (the high financial cost would be more than justified);
- (i) consider, in addition, ways in which the unsocial aspects for aircrews of training in areas overseas or remote from home bases might be alleviated;
- (j) the standard of the equipment of various types of aircraft should not be the only factor for determining low-altitude training techniques and conditions;
- (k) whereas, formerly, low-altitude training flights in potential zones of action were desirable for making use of geographical data and for tactical reasons, the greater perfection of navigational aids has virtually removed the need for visual contact, thus allowing such training to be carried out in other more sparsely populated areas;
- (l) units of the air forces of WEU member countries must be able to conduct low-altitude training with realistic advance warning, after an analysis of the actual threat, which at the present time does not justify exercises based on the hypothesis of a few hours' warning time.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 485***

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Military training flights are regulated by each state within a national context, in compliance with international commitments where these have been entered into. Neither WEU nor any other organisation is empowered to intervene in this field and to lay down regulations applicable to member countries.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th November 1990.

RECOMMENDATION 486 <sup>1</sup>*on developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I)* <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the tightening of defence budgets in all allied countries;
- (ii) Conscious of the serious intentions of both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to reduce their conventional armed forces;
- (iii) Considering that a combination of reduced conventional forces and limited defence budgets calls for improved co-operation between allied forces in order to employ troops and equipment most efficiently;
- (iv) Convinced that an integrated allied command, control and information system as it is now being planned by NATO will act as a force multiplier and will greatly improve the performance of the lesser-armed forces that will be available in the future to guarantee peace and security for Europe;
- (v) Convinced that some systems for command, control, communications and intelligence, in particular those for airborne early warning and control and for stand-off surveillance and targeting, could also play an important rôle in the process of verification of conventional arms reduction agreements;
- (vi) Convinced that the systems mentioned in paragraph (v) could greatly contribute to building confidence about military matters if members of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO agree to open their skies for unarmed aerial surveillance flights over their territory as proposed by President Bush in May 1989,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge member governments to endorse NATO's planning for an integrated command control and information system for Allied Command Europe and to provide the required financial means;
2. Study the possible rôle of European and multinational aerial systems for stand-off surveillance and targeting and of airborne early warning and control in the process of verifying the implementation of a CFE treaty, and in the framework of a future open skies agreement.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Technicological and Aerospace Committee (Document 1229).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL**

***to Recommendation 486***

No reply has yet been received from the Council.



RECOMMENDATION 487 <sup>1</sup>

*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union  
for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990* <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for 1989 (revised) and 1990, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;

(ii) Considering that:

- (a) the budget of the Secretariat-General for the financial year 1990 may be considered provisional insofar as the proposals to create seven new posts, withdrawn at the request of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, will be considered subsequently on the basis of a management survey to be conducted by a specialised body;
- (b) in doing this, the Budget and Organisation Committee has relinquished responsibility for organisation, which is part of its attributions;
- (c) the "liquidation" version of the 1990 budget of the Paris agencies is based on a wholly theoretical assumption and is therefore liable to be changed significantly;
- (d) the operating budget of the WEU Institute for Security Studies has not yet been drawn up;
- (e) the Assembly is consequently unable to express an opinion on the abovementioned budgets;

(iii) Regretting that:

- (a) the Council has decided not to pay additional indemnities to officials not recruited by the WEU Institute for Security Studies;
- (b) the participation of representatives of the staff of the co-ordinated organisations in negotiations on procedure for adjusting salaries does not appear to correspond to their legitimate expectations;
- (c) there is no agreement between the secretaries-general of the co-ordinated organisations to facilitate the movement of staff from one organisation to another, which would have been very useful on the occasion of the winding up of the Paris agencies,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Reconsider the composition and mandate of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, in particular its responsibility for organisational matters;
2. Support the action taken by the staff associations of the co-ordinated organisations with a view to playing a more effective part in negotiations on staff employment conditions;
3. Ask that the question of the movement of staff from one organisation to another be included in the agenda of a forthcoming meeting of the Committee of Secretaries-General of Co-ordinated Organisations in order to work out means of fostering and facilitating such movement.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lord on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1218).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 487***

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1. The Budget and Organisation Committee fulfils all of the mandate it has been given and there is no plan whatsoever to modify its responsibilities. Its members are the delegations designated by member countries to sit on that Committee.

The Budget and Organisation Committee may, if it thinks fit and with the Council's approval, call upon independent experts, who then provide their technical opinion, which in no way releases the committee from its responsibilities towards the Council.

2. Negotiating procedures within the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts are currently under review, the conclusions of which have not yet been agreed.

Staff associations may nevertheless make their views known now if they differ from the recommendations finally adopted by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts. Mention of this is made in the report setting out the recommendations to the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations, who will thus take due note of the fact.

3. The Secretary-General has proposed to the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General of the co-ordinated organisations that the question of the movement of staff from one organisation to another should be put on the agenda of one of its forthcoming meetings. The Assembly will be informed of the outcome of the committee's deliberations on this subject.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th November 1990.

**RECOMMENDATION 488<sup>1</sup>*****on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:  
operations in the Gulf<sup>2</sup>***

1. The Assembly approves the action taken by the Council in invoking Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty as a result of Iraq's aggression against and occupation of Kuwait.

The Assembly welcomes the Council's readiness to place WEU co-ordination in the context of the implementation of United Nations Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.

The Assembly supports the Council's decision, not only to convene the meeting of the Ministerial Council, but also to constitute an ad hoc group to cover the Gulf crisis especially to call the first meeting, under direct WEU auspices, of the chiefs of defence staffs.

The Assembly believes that the Council should remain open to the idea of further co-operation and co-ordination at different levels over all aspects of operations in the Gulf area and therefore RECOMMENDS that the necessary steps be taken to formalise the Gulf and hoc group to consider policy and implementation on a day-to-day basis, as long as the present crisis lasts, and urges all WEU nations to provide maximum information to the operational cell being run in the French Ministry of Defence.

2. Concerned that the proliferation of vessels in the Gulf area could lead to problems in the very near future, the Assembly RECOMMENDS that further consultations take place immediately at governmental level to establish common command and control in the various Gulf zones already agreed and further RECOMMENDS that urgent measures be taken to harmonise rules of engagement at least within each zone, and ensure that recognition procedures (IFF) are properly co-ordinated between all aircraft and naval units to assure the safety of friendly forces.

3. The Assembly considers that WEU could play a useful rôle in helping to co-ordinate (perhaps in conjunction with other agencies) logistic support, reinforcement and resupply for the Gulf operations and that WEU nations' assets for sea- and airlift might be provided, in some cases where combat forces, for whatever reason, may not be available, and RECOMMENDS that the Council study the options for providing such assistance without delay.

4. Disappointed that the transatlantic presentation of WEU's contribution to support the United Nations' efforts to solve the crisis in the Gulf has yet to have an impact, the Assembly RECOMMENDS that the Council establish forthwith a liaison office in Washington to serve as a channel for North American links and as a matter of priority to convince the United States' Administration that direct dialogue with WEU is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at present. The Council should make every effort to ensure that WEU is perceived as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

1. Adopted by Presidential Committee on 20th September 1990, in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure.

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1243).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 488***

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1. The extraordinary ministerial meetings convened on 21st August and 18th September 1990 enabled WEU policy in the Gulf crisis to be defined and the necessary decisions taken in response to the crisis. An ad hoc group of foreign affairs and defence representatives was instructed to co-ordinate the action by member states. To date, it has met five times and may be convened at any moment if circumstances should warrant. It has, in particular, set up a WEU naval co-ordination unit in the naval staff headquarters of the presidency. This unit centralises all the data supplied by the defence staffs of the member states and draws up a summary which it then circulates in return. It also produces a daily update of the situation of all merchant vessels in the Gulf region, which it transmits to the other capitals.

2. Joint specific guidelines concerning the co-ordination of WEU member states' naval forces in the region were adopted on 31st August. They established a framework for joint action regarding the missions of WEU fleets to enforce the naval embargo, rules of engagement, preferential zones of operation, the exchange of information, logistic and operational support and co-operation structures. This internal co-operation within WEU in no way precludes contact with the other naval forces in the region, notably the United States forces, with whom co-ordination is entirely satisfactory.

3. As mentioned above, the guidelines on naval forces relate in particular to the co-ordination of logistic support for this armed service. That support is co-ordinated to the maximum extent so that optimum use can be made of the vessels deployed. Further guidelines were adopted on 30th October concerning logistic support to the ground and air forces of WEU countries deployed in the zone. Specific co-operation measures, principally concerning the transport of units and equipment between Europe and the theatre of operations, are now under way.

4. The co-ordinated action by WEU in the Gulf region is a practical reality that is visible to all the third countries, notably by the United States, in the theatre of operations. In the naval sector, the general conference in Bahrain on 9th and 10th September 1990 at which all the naval commanders in the zone met to discuss the enforcement of the embargo against Iraq was co-organised by WEU – as represented by the presidency – and the United States. Two other similar conferences, covering a smaller geographical area, have already taken place. In future, these meetings will be more frequent. Prior to all such meetings there is co-ordination on all the agenda items among the commanders of the WEU countries' fleets in the zone, thus demonstrating that WEU is operating as a full partner in the region.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th November 1990.

**RECOMMENDATION 489<sup>1</sup>*****on European security and events  
in the Near and Middle East<sup>2</sup>***

1. The Assembly welcomes the holding of an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Council in Paris on 21st August 1990 to implement Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty with a view to co-ordinating member countries' action following Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

It welcomes the fact the Council invited the countries taking part in European political co-operation to attend its meeting and that Denmark and Greece were represented, as was Turkey.

It welcomes the fact that the Council placed its action in the framework of the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions and asked the Security Council to define additional measures that would be necessary in applying an embargo on Iraq and the territory of Kuwait. It welcomes the fact that Security Council Resolution 665 meets this request and that it stresses the need to make maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, the first of which was the visit by the Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, to Amman.

The Assembly notes that, in adopting without delay several Security Council resolutions on the first international crisis following the East-West rapprochement, the United Nations has emerged from the paralysis forced upon it by the cold war and the opposition between the military blocs to become the guarantor of peace and international order. It welcomes the fact that WEU, by the decisions taken at the extraordinary meeting of its Council of Ministers on 21st August 1990, affirmed the prestige and authority of the United Nations in the first major international crisis since the end of the cold war and just when a new international order is emerging.

Recognising the importance of co-ordination with the United States, it also welcomes the fact that the Council has expressed the will to support efforts by the Arab states to find a political solution to the conflict.

Finally, it welcomes the establishment of a system of co-ordination of member countries' naval and air action in the Gulf.

It **RECOMMENDS** that the Council pursue the undertaking thus started and make the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait a prior condition for any settlement of the conflict.

2. The Assembly has noted with satisfaction that useful consultations between member countries and the Soviet Union helped to ensure the adoption of Security Council Resolution 665.

It welcomes the fact that, at the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly on 27th September, the Twelve reached agreement with the Soviet Union to adopt a joint statement on the situation in the Gulf region.

It **RECOMMENDS** that the Council pursue and develop these consultations in order to maintain and develop the cohesion shown by the international community in imposing respect for the embargo against Iraq.

3. The Assembly has noted with indignation the many violations of the law of nations committed by Iraq and in particular:

- the threat to use chemical weapons which is a violation of the “ Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare ” that was signed in Geneva on 17th June 1925 and entered into force on 8th February 1928. This threat is particularly serious since chemical weapons were effectively used during the war against Iran and, in particular, against the Kurdish people;
- many violations of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian persons in time of war;
- violations of the 1961 Vienna Convention on the protection of diplomats.

It therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council use every means at its disposal to terminate these violations and bring Iraq to destroy its stocks of chemical weapons under international control and make

1. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 20th September 1990, in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure.

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pieralli on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1242).

reparations for the wrongs inflicted upon foreign nationals detained in Iraq against their will and those inflicted on diplomatic representations in Kuwait.

4. The Assembly notes that the twelve EEC countries have announced their decision to afford economic assistance to Arab – and other – countries victims of the embargo against Iraq. It considers this to be a positive decision and **RECOMMENDS** that the Council consider the possibility of convening a conference on Euro-Arab co-operation bringing together the member countries of the EEC and of the Arab League.

It is gratified that the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers in Paris on 21st August provided an opportunity, on the same day, for a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs of the twelve European Community countries to examine the political aspects of the crisis and, in particular, the question of the hostages held by Iraq contrary to international conventions. It considers this to be a good example of task-sharing and close co-operation between WEU and the Twelve.

5. The Assembly considers that the weakness shown by the international community in ensuring that the Iraqi Government respects human rights is one of the sources of the conflict. Many eastern and western countries bear the responsibility for supplying Iraq with a powerful, dangerous military arsenal during and after the war with Iran.

It recalls that it has denounced the delivery of arms to Iraq and illegal transactions in advanced military technology by banks and producing firms in a few member countries of WEU and in the United States.

In Recommendation 475, it also made detailed proposals for terminating the arms race in Iraq and in all Middle Eastern countries.

It regrets that the Council's reply was hardly satisfactory and, in the light of current events, wishes greater attention to be paid to those proposals.

6. The Assembly regrets that, in many cases, the United Nations has been unable to ensure the application of resolutions adopted by the Security Council. It fears that if this situation persists it may lead to new and serious crises.

The Assembly considers that, after Iraq has been made to respect the Security Council decisions and international law, the international community and the United Nations must demonstrate the same cohesion in employing all political and diplomatic means and adopting vigorous measures of economic and political pressure to obtain respect for Security Council decisions by confirming Israel's right to exist within sure, recognised frontiers and the right of Palestinians to self-determination. This would bring about the end of Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. Similarly, a political solution to the present conflict may help to create conditions favourable to a settlement of the Lebanese problem and the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon.

It therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council implement without delay the provisions of Assembly Recommendation 475 adopted in December 1989 which underlined the importance of convening an international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations.

7. The Assembly strongly endorses the appeal made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, for immediate humanitarian assistance for the hundreds of thousands of refugees from different countries who are leaving or who have left Iraq via Jordan.

It therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council ask the governments of member countries to take part in this humanitarian effort.

8. The Assembly notes that, for the second time, Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty has been the basis for co-ordinated action by member countries to foster the restoration of a peaceful order threatened outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.

It therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council maintain and strengthen in any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty the commitments in that paragraph and ensure that no country is asked to join WEU if it is not effectively prepared to fulfil these commitments.

9. The Assembly notes that none of the WEU member countries alone has adequate means of taking effective action in the Gulf.

It **RECOMMENDS** that the Council analyse the shortcomings that have thus emerged, particularly in regard to monitoring and data-processing, and speed up consideration of measures to be taken to remedy this situation on the basis of Recommendation 482 on observation satellites.

10. The Assembly welcomes the fact that arbitration by the revitalised United Nations, security through an alliance of WEU countries against aggression and, in Vienna tomorrow, disarmament may help the emergence of a new system of security and international co-operation.

Finally, to achieve this end, it RECOMMENDS that the Council make intensive use of all the prospects revealed by the dramatic crisis in the Gulf for achieving as quickly as possible an effective European defence organisation.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL**  
***to Recommendation 489***

No reply has yet been received from the Council.



*Written questions 285 to 287 and replies of the Council***QUESTION 285**

*put to the Council by Mr. Pontillon  
on 16th January 1990*

Can the Council say:

1. how it intends to improve its public relations effort following the WEU seminar on changes in public perceptions of European defence;
2. what proposals the Secretary-General has made in this connection;
3. whether it is prepared to include the problem of WEU's information policy in its agenda as a matter of urgency with a view to examining specific initiatives, e.g.:
  - (a) publishing guidelines for the press at the close of meetings of the Permanent Council;
  - (b) preparing and publishing easy-to-understand basic information documents for widespread circulation in all member countries;
  - (c) creating a WEU periodical in the official languages of all member countries for the dissemination of articles, communiqués and news about WEU activities;
  - (d) establishing WEU information offices in the European member countries of the alliance and, in particular, in the United States and Canada;
  - (e) inviting member governments to release more information about WEU;
  - (f) defining methods of organising opinion polls at European level;
  - (g) strengthening co-operation with groups, associations and private institutes in order to enhance the interest aroused by studies on Western European security matters;
  - (h) strengthening co-operation, discussions and exchanges of views with industrial associations, trades unions, cultural associations, educational establishments and universities;
  - (i) using television as a means of presenting WEU;
4. in the light of the abovementioned considerations, whether it is prepared to grant the financial means WEU needs to pursue a public information policy;

5. whether it is prepared to follow up my proposal to set up a WEU public relations committee composed of representatives of both the Assembly and the Council?

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**

*communicated to the Assembly  
on 30th November 1990*

1. The Council shares the honourable member's concern that public opinion should be kept fully informed of WEU's activities. It considers that the momentum generated by WEU reactivation must be reflected in an active public relations policy. This active approach is all the more necessary at a time of profound structural change in the international situation and of acute crisis in one part of the world.

To ensure that the outside world is more familiar with the rôle of WEU, two types of action have been stepped up: informing the public of the Council's position on major security problems of the day and, where appropriate, the measures taken in response to topical events, and creating an awareness of the changing features of the strategic landscape and their effects on the emergence of a European security identity.

The Council believes that, at this stage, such action should be conducted in a variety of ways through WEU bodies, each adapting its own particular approach, rather than through the setting-up of specific new communication structures. Furthermore, members of the different bodies act as an interface in informing the public in their own countries about WEU.

2. Over the past six months, no fewer than six press communiqués have been issued at the end of the major meetings held by the Council at different levels.

This occurred at the three Ministerial Councils that have met since the beginning of the year. On the Day of German Unity, the Permanent Council issued a communiqué on this great event and its implications for WEU. The first chiefs-of-staff meeting in the history of the organisation, held on 27th August 1990, was also the subject of a press bulletin, as was the work of the ad hoc group on WEU co-ordination in the Gulf crisis. Given the importance and also the diversity of all this information, the aim is to provide as comprehensive a briefing as possible on the organisation's thinking and decisions.

3. As part of its rôle to stimulate debate, it is for the Presidency to assume responsibility for

political information. It fulfils that responsibility towards the Assembly, to which the country holding the Presidency regularly presents a report on the Council's work. When justified by the circumstances, arrangements are made for the additional briefing of parliamentary representatives, as in the case of the hearing of the Council Chairman-in-Office before the Political Committee, following the two extraordinary Council meetings on the Gulf crisis. Finally, the Presidency ensures that third countries are informed of WEU activities, particularly when measures adopted by WEU affect them directly.

4. The WEU Secretary-General also has an important task in the area of public relations and contact with the press. Through his involvement in international seminars, meetings with leading political figures and interviews with the press, he helps to ensure that the voice of WEU is heard in the debate on security. The Secretary-General's quarterly information letter to the President of the Assembly provides substance for the dialogue with the Assembly. The Secretariat-General also issues press releases, information and leaflets and is currently increasing its efforts in this direction.

5. The creation of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, which started work on 1st July 1990, is in a sense also a response to the need for information. One of the Institute's missions is to stimulate the public debate on the various aspects of European security and to contribute to the emergence of a European security identity. The Institute has already made very many contacts with study and research centres in WEU member countries and elsewhere in Europe. It has itself organised three seminars in Paris, which have been attended not only by Foreign Ministry officials but also by leading European figures concerned with the security issues addressed there: security in the Mediterranean, new security structures in Europe and the political union of the Twelve.

The WEU Institute for Security Studies does not confine its contacts to European research institutes specialising in security questions but is also in touch with leading academics, industrialists, journalists and parliamentarians. In particular, the Institute has taken the question of the European arms industries as one of its priorities: a seminar is about to be devoted to the subject and will be attended by many representatives from industry and the financial world. On a more general level a data bank is being set up by the WEU Institute for Security Studies and will be accessible to all parties concerned with the debate.

6. Finally, the Council welcomes the impetus given by the Assembly in informing public opinion; its members can, in their respective parliaments, play a useful rôle in mobi-

lising opinion on European security, and more particularly on WEU's efforts in the new European context.

## QUESTION 286

*put to the Council by Mr. Eicher  
on 6th June 1990*

### *A new European security order*

James Baker's speech in Berlin on 12th December 1989 is today the reference for the United States Department of State's policy towards the concept of a new European security order. In any event, the extension of the CSCE process that the United States wishes must not result in it replacing the Atlantic Alliance or lead to its disbandment. The allies, too, seem to uphold this point of view.

On the contrary, the Atlantic Alliance, oriented towards a more political rôle and about to modernise its strategy, including nuclear strategy, will remain the essential element of European security. In the words of Mr. Genscher, the strengthening or even institutionalisation of the CSCE will be intended to establish *additional* structures for co-operation.

Does the WEU Council of Ministers intend to play a specific rôle in the establishment of this new security order and in the definition of this complementarity between western structures and the future all-European structure?

*No reply has yet been received  
from the Council.*

## QUESTION 287

*put to the Council by Mr. Eicher  
on 6th June 1990*

### *German unity*

At the beginning of May, a commentator said of the two-plus-four conference that, while initially intended as a means for the victorious powers to organise unified Germany's return to the concert of nations, it was in the process of turning into haggling over the price to be paid for a Soviet withdrawal from the German scene.

Three of the six participants in the conference are major members of WEU (the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom). Has the WEU Council served as a framework at least for informal discussions on the German question? If so, what is the Council's position?

*No reply has yet been received  
from the Council.*

***Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe  
for European security***

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the Political Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Lemoine, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Alternate for Mrs. Staels-Dompas) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: *Verbeek*), Beix, Böhm, Brito, Candal, Caro, Coleman, Collart, Cuatrecasas, Eich, Fabra, Forni (Alternate: *Seitlinger*), Foschi, Goerens, Hirschler, Koehl, van der Linden (Alternate: *Eisma*), Lord Mackie, MM. Martinez, Martino, Müller, Natali, Péciaux, Pieralli, de Puig, Roseta, Sarti, Sir William Shelton, MM. Stoffelen, Thyraud, Ward.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***  
***on the consequences of developments in Central and  
Eastern Europe for European security***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the adoption by thirty-four countries of the Charter of Paris for a new Europe and the signing of the agreement on the limitation of conventional armaments;
- (ii) Recalling that implementation of the principles set out in the security basket of the Helsinki Final Act is an essential condition for advancing the entire CSCE process;
- (iii) Welcoming the fact that the states participating in the CSCE have decided to set up a conflict prevention centre which they consider to be a first step towards the creation of a true political instrument allowing them to settle all disputes that may arise between them;
- (iv) Considering that, because of the imminent meeting of heads of state or government of the Twelve in Rome, the present report can present only provisional conclusions,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure, at the Rome summit meeting, that the requirements of European security in the new situation are guaranteed;
2. Promote implementation of the decisions taken by the CSCE, in particular by:
  - (i) ensuring that the conflict prevention centre carries out its tasks in optimum conditions;
  - (ii) giving strong impetus to the monitoring of disarmament agreements, inter alia by setting up a centre for processing data obtained by observation satellites, and inform participating countries of its conclusions;
3. Propose to the CSCE the continuation of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe and, after the Helsinki conference, promote further stages of disarmament and guarantee stability in Europe;
4. Keep the Assembly continuously informed of the progress of negotiations relating to the organisation of Western Europe and security and co-operation in Europe.

## ***Explanatory Memorandum***

*(submitted by Mr. Lemoine, Rapporteur)*

### ***I. Introduction***

1. The extraordinary session of the Assembly in Luxembourg on 22nd and 23rd March 1990 was devoted entirely to a debate on the prospects offered by the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe since the previous summer which made it urgently necessary to think about preparing the first stages of a new just, peaceful and secure order in Europe. These deliberations led to the adoption of Recommendation 479.

2. Since then, developments in the region in question have been so swift and extensive that it is essential for the Assembly to pursue the task it started in Luxembourg on the basis of the new facts that have emerged in the meantime. It is particularly important for the Assembly to adopt a further position since vital decisions may be taken between now and the end of the year, either at the meeting of heads of state or of government of the thirty-four countries taking part in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to be held in Paris from 19th to 21st November 1990 or at the intergovernmental meetings of member countries of the European Community to be held in Rome on 14th and 15th December 1990 with a view to moving towards the establishment of economic and monetary union and political union.

3. In this context, the next ordinary meeting of the WEU Council, which is to be held on 10th December 1990, i.e. between the abovementioned two meetings and after the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly, will be of special importance. However, this timetable also means that it will not be possible to finalise the report that the committee is to submit to the Assembly until very late in the day if all the elements necessary for drawing conclusions and making useful proposals are to be included.

### ***II. Developments in Eastern Europe since the Assembly's extraordinary session in Luxembourg***

#### ***(i) The Soviet Union***

4. The economic crisis and disputes about how to solve it continue to raise very serious problems, on the one hand for the people, who are facing growing shortages, and on the other hand for the government and parliament, which must agree on how to reform an economic system marked by dirigism.

5. The difficult transitional period leading up to the introduction of a market economy (which would still to a certain extent be regulated) that has been decided upon in principle in spite of deep-rooted divergences over the procedure to be followed between Prime Minister Ryzhkov's moderate reformers and Mr. Yeltsin's radicals may make matters even worse. The fact that on 24th September 1990 the Soviet Parliament granted full powers to Mr. Gorbachev until 31st March 1992 so that he might rule by decree on measures necessary for carrying out reforms in the entire economic system might facilitate the application of these reforms but also worsen the constitutional conflict, inter alia with the Russian Republic, over the sharing of legislative powers.

6. The liberalisation process is continuing with the Supreme Soviet's adoption on 12th June 1990 of a law guaranteeing the freedom of the press and the media's creative rights; laws on religious freedom in the Soviet Union and on the establishment of a multi-party system have also been passed. At the same time, constitutional conflicts continue to raise problems for the central authorities following attempts by a number of republics of the union to become more independent. Account must first be taken of the serious tension that emerged after the three Baltic states declared their sovereignty on the basis of the illegality of their annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940. Although the two parties involved have apparently agreed to avoid carrying their differences too far (on 30th June 1990 Moscow lifted the embargo on oil and natural gas imposed on Lithuania on 17th April once the Lithuanian Parliament had suspended its declaration of independence), the problem complicates the preparatory work on reorganising the structures of the union.

7. The election of Mr. Yeltsin, on 29th May 1990, as President of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, the largest republic in the Soviet Union, and the approval by the Congress of Deputies of the Russian people of a proclamation of sovereignty by which the constitution and laws of that republic would have priority over those of the union marked a further stage in the conflict emerging between the rival legislative authorities and executives. This trend is not sparing other Soviet republics. On 20th June 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan adopted a declaration on the sovereignty of the republic in the framework of a renewed Soviet federation. On 16th July 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine proclaimed a Ukrainian republic which would not be a member of an alliance and whose

territory would be free of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the declaration specifies that it is not intended to withdraw from the Soviet Union. However, on 13th October 1990, this republic concluded a treaty of good neighbourliness with Poland, the first a Soviet republic has signed directly with a foreign country. This treaty provides for an exchange of diplomatic representations.

8. On 27th July 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Byelorussia proclaimed the republic's sovereignty, announcing, *inter alia*, neutrality and renunciation of nuclear weapons. The same day, the Supreme Soviet of Moldavia declared itself the supreme authority in the region. On 10th August, the autonomous republic of Karelia proclaimed its sovereignty without wishing to withdraw from the union, on 22nd and 23rd August 1990, the republics of Turkistan and Armenia in turn proclaimed their sovereignty and, on 25th August 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan adopted a declaration on that country's sovereignty.

9. It is certain that none of these events facilitates the work started in the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on a new treaty laying new bases for relations between the central authorities and the republics of the union in which all the republics concerned are nevertheless participating, with the exception of the three Baltic states which seem to prefer separate negotiations. However, following demonstrations by tens of thousands of students in Kiev, the Ukrainian Parliament decided not to sign a new treaty on the union as long as Ukraine did not have a new constitution.

10. A new ethnic crisis came to the fore on 4th June when clashes between Kirgis and Uzbeks broke out in the town of Osh in Kirgiziya, causing about ten deaths and a hundred wounded. At the end of October, the Soviet army had to intervene in Moldavia following steps by the Turkish Gagauz minority who wished to declare their own republic within the Moldavian republic and organise local elections.

11. Another factor of uncertainty is the future rôle and internal situation of the Soviet army. There is no denying that, whereas in the previous forty years the army had been a main factor of power and stability in the Soviet Union, it is now facing a serious crisis. On 14th June 1990, Marshal Akhromeyev informed the Supreme Soviet that the unsolved social problems of armed forces and a press campaign to discredit the army had created alarming discontent.

12. It is indeed the Soviet army which, with the end of the East-West confrontation and the withdrawal of its forces from Eastern and Central Europe, has been the big loser, not just

in political influence but also psychologically and socially. The problems are particularly difficult for the some 360 000 Soviet forces stationed on the territory of the former GDR who will have to be repatriated, with their families, by 1994. In spite of the considerable assistance the German Government has undertaken to provide in financing and organising this withdrawal, the situation is difficult, particularly for maintaining the morale and discipline of troops on a territory where they have nothing to do and are left to their own devices in what has become a capitalist environment without being able to enjoy it. A rise in the number of deserters is therefore only one of the consequences to be expected.

13. Psychologically, it is certainly not easy for such a powerful body as the Soviet army to understand why the political leaders have made concessions to the West, particularly in regard to German unification, but this may also be true of other sectors of the Soviet leadership. In any event, the Soviet Government saw fit to explain Soviet external policy publicly in a special article by Mr. Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in *Pravda* at the end of June 1990.

14. While it is difficult to discern stabilising factors in internal developments in the Soviet Union, some are to be found in the international reputation acquired by the Soviet Union since Mikhail Gorbachev came to office. The new guidelines of Soviet external policy are clear in most areas of its international relations where there have been sometimes spectacular changes compared with the positions defended by the Soviet Union for more than forty years.

15. In Europe, by renouncing its stubborn opposition to the idea of unified Germany being free to choose its alliances, i.e. by agreeing to the GDR leaving the Warsaw Pact and Germany as a whole being a member of NATO and by undertaking to withdraw its troops from the territory of the former GDR by the end of 1994, the Soviet Union has removed the main obstacle to the settlement of the German problem and at the same time has cleared the way for establishing a new security system in Europe which will have to take account of very different facts and prospects from those existing until last summer.

16. The new direction being followed by the Soviet Union includes the establishment of relations with various institutions at European level, i.e. the Council of Europe, the European Community and WEU, and also with NATO, with which it established diplomatic relations in July 1990.

17. At international level, the Soviet Union is now an observer in GATT and the IMF, whose Executive Director was informed in Moscow at

the end of July that the Soviet Union was prepared to negotiate its accession to that institution. However, this accession will raise many problems because of the Soviet Union's growing external debt which Soviet leaders find alarming.

18. The new atmosphere in Soviet-American relations at the latest summit meeting between Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev allowed progress to be made towards lessening and even eliminating their political and military rivalry and also towards co-operation over worldwide problems of concern to the United Nations. Thanks to this new understanding between the two world powers, it was possible, for the first time, to reach agreement on sustained action by an overwhelming majority of the member countries of the United Nations in order to face up to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

19. While it may be inferred that the Soviet Union's new international policy made a decisive contribution to ending the cold war, the attribution of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mr. Gorbachev may give psychological support to the Soviet leader in his efforts to stabilise the country's internal situation since much uncertainty still remains. The first concerns developments in Soviet society, the Communist Party and democratic, non-communist parties. Any progress towards democratisation and liberalisation of the country depends on these developments. The second uncertainty, linked to the first, is whether the country will be able to overcome its enormous economic problems and by what means. A third uncertainty concerns the difficulty of maintaining constitutional cohesion in the Soviet Union as a whole in the teeth of centrifugal tendencies that are emerging in many of its republics. Finally, it must not be forgotten that the Soviet army, in spite of its loss of influence, is still one of the most powerful in the world, with a nuclear and conventional arsenal that continues to ensure that the Soviet Union not only has the wherewithal to use force when it considers it useful but also a political arm which it can use to impose its will in disarmament negotiations or in future discussions on the Soviet Union's place in a new European security order.

20. Regarding developments in the Soviet Union, account must also be taken of the fact that Marxist-Leninist ideology, if not wholly disowned, has in fact been abandoned and is no longer either a factor of internal cohesion or a matter for external emulation. The Soviet Union has therefore stopped assimilating capitalism with imperialism, i.e. using upheavals in the third world to disturb international order, and no longer considers that it is encircled by a capitalist world determined to destroy the motherland of socialism. It is therefore no longer, nor

is it likely to become in the near future, a disrupter of internal order, but has every interest in stability and disarmament.

*(ii) Developments in other Eastern European countries*

21. As regards the Eastern European countries which, with the exception of Albania and Yugoslavia, are so far the Soviet Union's allies in the Warsaw Pact, two groups of countries should be distinguished. The first consists of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, which now have non-communist democratic governments, while Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia continue to be governed by communist régimes that have been reformed in very different ways. However, the special case of Albania should not be neglected.

22. In the case of Poland, it is first coming to grips with the difficult task of overcoming its economic difficulties. Abroad, it has to organise its future relations with unified Germany in a manner satisfactory to both countries so as to make a significant contribution to a stable, peaceful order in that part of Europe. There are good prospects of success in this area following the fixing of Poland's western frontiers as set out in the treaty on the final settlement with Germany, which will be confirmed by a treaty between the two countries and by their determination to conclude a wide-ranging treaty of co-operation.

23. At the same time, it is clear that Poland, on whose territory there are not only minorities of German origin but also Byelorussian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Slovak ethnic groups, while there are Polish minorities beyond its frontiers, is worried about internal developments in its great neighbour to the East, the Soviet Union. In addition to its relations with the Soviet central authorities, Poland has started to establish direct contacts with neighbouring republics, i.e. Ukraine, the Russian Republic, Byelorussia and Lithuania, in order to strengthen co-operation, stability and security in its eastern frontier regions and guarantee the rights of minorities.

24. Czechoslovakia, for its part, is faced with the difficult task of introducing the economic reforms it believes necessary for which, like Poland, it has an urgent need of effective assistance from Western Europe. Furthermore, the country is trying to reorganise constitutional relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks. Czechoslovakia, a key country of Central Europe, is very actively endeavouring to promote a new all-European security system on the basis of the CSCE and, at the same time, to strengthen regional co-operation with Italy, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Austria in the pentagonal framework.

25. Hungary is perhaps the country that has moved the furthest away from the alliance in which it was formerly incorporated. Its parliament has asked the government to start the process of withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and, as well as establishing diplomatic relations with NATO, its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jeszenszky, addressing the Assembly on 7th June 1990, asked for his country to be associated with Western European Union. Finally, Hungary has asked for association status in the European Economic Community with a view to subsequent accession.

26. In the case of Hungary, moreover, there are clear signs of a problem that arises to varying degrees in several regions of Eastern Europe, i.e. that of the large Hungarian majority in Romania. Rioting broke out in the region of Tirgu Mures in Romania on 19th March 1990 following a strike by students of Hungarian origin calling for teaching in the Hungarian language. There were several deaths and about a hundred wounded. Tension also arose between the Romanian and Hungarian Governments when the President of Romania criticised Hungary for having encouraged the Hungarian minority to provoke incidents. Furthermore, in Romania, there are also German, Croat, Serbian and Bulgarian minorities, whereas there is a Romanian minority outside its frontiers, particularly in Soviet Moldavia.

27. According to certain observers of developments in Romania, the revolution that overthrew the Ceausescu régime at the end of 1989 has not yet been completed. They say the revolution served only to change the leaders but not the former régime as such. In any event, when presidential and parliamentary elections were held on 20th May 1990, Mr. Iliescu, the candidate of the National Salvation Front, obtained more than 85% of the votes cast, which led to counter-demonstrations in the streets of Bucharest in June that were repressed by the police with the help of miners loyal to the government. Uncertainty about the future of democratisation in Romania is also affecting the pace of economic reforms which are as essential as external assistance in this area.

28. The situation is uncertain in Bulgaria, too, where the first elections since 1946 were held on 17th June 1990 as a result of which the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which succeeded the former Communist Party, obtained a majority of seats in parliament (211 out of 400). Growing political tension and economic difficulties in the country, where there is a large majority of Turkish origin, left their mark on discussions at the thirty-ninth socialist party congress at the end of September. The government is therefore trying to implement a vast reform programme in order to introduce a market economy. New leg-

islation should also allow private firms greater freedom and also authorise foreign investments.

29. Where Yugoslavia is concerned, problems stem primarily from the difficulty of maintaining a federation between several ethnic groups in spite of the centrifugal forces which are gathering strength. Constitutional and ethnic conflicts in the country have recently increased to such an extent that the prospects of safeguarding the country's unity seem more and more remote.

30. Having been one of the most isolated countries in Europe, Albania has taken the first step towards the outside world, inter alia by restoring diplomatic relations with a number of countries including the Soviet Union. On 5th and 6th June 1990, the country took part for the first time as an observer at a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs of the CSCE to which it has applied for full membership.

31. Finally, it must be admitted that all the Eastern European countries are facing enormous economic and social problems and need massive aid in order to emerge from slumpflation and improve the living conditions of their people. Any worsening of the economic situation might have dangerous repercussions, particularly in regions where there is tension stemming from the conflict between opposing political forces or hostile ethnic groups. Although at the moment there is no sign of a major crisis in the region that might affect European security, the situation is still unstable.

### *III. Settlement of the German problem*

32. On 12th September 1990, only ten months after the fall of the Berlin wall and six months after the first free elections in the GDR, the ministers for foreign affairs of the four second world war victorious powers having special responsibilities and rights in regard to Germany as a whole – i.e. France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States – together with their opposite numbers from the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic met in Moscow to sign the treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany.

33. This title conceals the fact that the two plus four, as they were called at the Ottawa disarmament conference in February 1990, managed to reach agreement on international conditions for German unification to the satisfaction of all parties concerned after only four plenary negotiating meetings.

34. As regards the consequences of this settlement for European security, all concerned, and particularly the WEU Assembly, have



reason to welcome the provisions of this treaty since they give satisfactory answers to a number of the concerns expressed in Mr. Pontillon's report and in Recommendation 479 on establishing a just, peaceful and secure order.

35. For instance, the following should be recalled. On *frontiers*, Article 1 confirms that:

"The united Germany shall comprise the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Democratic Republic and the whole of Berlin. Its external borders shall be the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and shall be definitive from the date on which the present treaty comes into force...

The united Germany and the Republic of Poland shall confirm the existing border between them in a treaty that is binding under international law.

The united Germany has no territorial claims whatsoever against other states and shall not assert any in the future.

... the constitution of the united Germany (shall) not contain any provision incompatible with these principles."

In accordance with these provisions, the inter-German treaty on establishing German unity, concluded on 31st August 1990, deletes Article 23 of the federal constitution (Basic Law) which covered the possibility of other parts of Germany joining the Federal Republic so that, following the accession of the GDR, German unification would be an established fact. Article 146 of the Basic Law was also amended for the same reason.

36. At the end of October, German-Polish negotiations started in Warsaw with a view to concluding as soon as possible a treaty confirming the present frontier between the two countries and an agreement covering every aspect of bilateral co-operation, including the problem of minorities of German origin in Poland.

37. As for *unified Germany's membership of NATO and WEU*, Article 6 of the Moscow Treaty confirms that "the right of the united Germany to belong to alliances, with all the rights and responsibilities arising therefrom, shall not be affected by the present treaty". This means that the wish expressed several times by the Government of the Federal Republic that unified Germany should remain a member of NATO is no longer questioned by the Soviet Union.

38. Under this agreement, the inter-German treaty on the establishment of German unity confirmed that the North Atlantic Treaty and the modified Brussels Treaty will be among the

international agreements concluded by the Federal Republic whose field of application will be extended to unified Germany. In regard to WEU in particular, the Federal German Government had already asserted on 30th July 1990 in answer to a question without debate put by the German Delegation to the WEU Assembly that:

"Under international law, the Brussels Treaty and its protocols also apply to unified Germany."

This was officially confirmed on 3rd October 1990 in a statement by the German representative to the WEU Permanent Council.

39. Article 3 of the Moscow treaty also confirms unified Germany's *renunciation of the manufacture and possession of and control over nuclear, biological and chemical weapons*.

40. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes to *reduce* within three to four years the *level of troops in the armed forces of unified Germany to 370 000* (land, sea and air forces). Moreover, according to Article 4:

"... the united Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will settle by treaty the conditions for and the duration of the presence of Soviet armed forces on the territory of the present German Democratic Republic and of Berlin, as well as the conduct of the withdrawal of these armed forces which will be completed by the end of 1994."

To solve the problems raised by this withdrawal, the German and Soviet Governments have worked out agreements on financial arrangements for stationing Soviet forces in unified Germany during a transitional period and their subsequent repatriation. The Federal Government has undertaken to pay about DM 12 000 million towards the cost of withdrawing Soviet troops. However, the agreements will be signed only when German unification becomes effective. The Federal Republic and the Soviet Union have also initialised a treaty of good neighbourliness, partnership and co-operation which provides for co-operation in all areas of the economy, science, technology, cultural affairs, the environment and humanitarian matters.

41. On the deployment of allied forces on the territory of the former GDR and in Berlin, Article 5 of the Moscow Treaty provides that:

"Until the completion of the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces from the territory of the present German Democratic Republic and of Berlin in accordance with Article 4 of the present treaty, only German territorial defence units which are not integrated into the alliance structures... will be stationed in that territory

as armed forces of the united Germany. During that period... armed forces of other states will not be stationed in that territory or carry out any other military activity there.

... armed forces of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America will, upon German request, remain stationed in Berlin...

Following the completion of the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces... units of German armed forces assigned to the military alliance structures... may also be stationed in that part of Germany, but without nuclear weapon carriers. This does not apply to conventional weapon systems which may have other capabilities in addition to conventional ones but which in that part of Germany are equipped for a conventional rôle and designated only for such. Foreign armed forces and nuclear weapons or their carriers will not be stationed in that part of Germany or deployed there."

42. Finally,

"The French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America hereby terminate their rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole...

The united Germany shall have accordingly full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs."

Since these provisions, and the treaty as a whole, can come into force only when ratified by the parliaments of the contracting parties, it was decided in a separate agreement that the four powers would suspend their rights and responsibilities in Berlin and Germany until ratification.

43. With this settlement of the German problem, the results of which will be presented at the CSCE summit meeting in Paris, the long period of division of Europe and Germany following the second world war and of East-West confrontation came to an end in conditions which, only a year ago, would have seemed to be a figment of the imagination.

44. Thus, the joint aim set out in 1954 in the convention on relations between France, the United Kingdom and the United States, on the one hand, and the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other, taken up again in the final act of the nine-power conference creating WEU, has become a total reality: "The achievement by peaceful means of a unified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic consti-

tution, like that of the Federal Republic, and integrated within the European Community."

45. It is gratifying that the integration of unified Germany in the Atlantic Alliance and Western European Union will enhance the security and stability of Western Europe and of the alliance as a whole. The prospects thus opened up, together with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the abandonment of its attempts to impose a communist order there, now allow the necessary conditions for organising European security to be fixed.

46. The determination of the government and people of unified Germany to continue and strengthen Germany's links with the West and in Europe should not be doubted, even without knowing the results of the first elections in unified Germany, to be held on 2nd December. Nothing suggests that the electorate of the eastern part of Germany will show a less European spirit than that of the western part. At the same time, as Mr. Genscher stressed in his address to the Vienna conference on conventional disarmament on 30th August 1990, the Germans are well aware that unification must not upset the balance of forces in Europe or jeopardise the security interests of any European state. Similarly, they realise that Germany's allies expect it to assume greater responsibilities for joint defence, which may include an engagement outside Europe in certain cases, the Gulf conflict being an example. In a message to all the governments of the world on 3rd October 1990, Mr. Kohl, the German Chancellor, said:

"Germany unity having been restored in full sovereignty, the Federal Republic of Germany is now prepared to take part, including with the use of its armed forces, in measures taken by the United Nations to maintain and restore peace. For this purpose, we will make the necessary internal arrangements."

47. While welcoming this announcement and understanding the reticence hitherto shown by Germany in regard to the use of its armed forces outside its territory and the area of application of the North Atlantic Treaty, your Rapporteur considers that WEU, particularly through the intermediary of its Assembly, should encourage its German partner not to place, in the framework of a constitutional revision, unduly strict limits on its ability to take military action, so that it will be quite free to decide on its participation, with its armed forces, in any peace-keeping operation in the framework of international organisations of which it is a member.

48. In the new circumstances, it is essential to consider carefully all the measures which may seem necessary in Europe in regard to joint defence. The intention announced more or less

unilaterally by several countries of the alliance to make very large cuts in their armed forces stationed on German territory, seems to follow logically from the reduction of the Soviet threat. However, any decisions to be taken must be based on treaties in force, including Protocol No. II on forces of WEU, under Article VI of which the United Kingdom has to:

“continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting capacity.”

Since, in accordance with this protocol, the United Kingdom undertook not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of member countries or of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, any major reduction must be discussed and agreed by the WEU Council. This also applies to all matters relating to the redeployment of other allied forces in Europe, which must be discussed and co-ordinated in the framework of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with a new concept which must be worked out urgently on the basis of the treaties and, in particular, the platform adopted in The Hague. It is not just a matter of reconsidering the forward defence strategy and studying the possible consequences of a new strategic formula for the deployment of allied forces, but also of re-examining the conditions governing the deployment of short-range nuclear systems.

49. Since allied forces have ensured joint defence for the last thirty-five years and allowed confidence to be restored and the closest co-operation to prevail among all the member countries of the alliance and of WEU, the worst that could happen would be to give the public the impression that it was now intended to withdraw “foreign” or even “occupying” forces from Germany. While Germany cannot continue indefinitely to be the only country to have allied forces on its territory, Recommendation 479, advocating that the modified Brussels Treaty “be used as the juridical basis for the presence of forces of member states on the territory of other member states insofar as their presence would help to strengthen a peaceful order in Europe”, is now more topical than ever, as is the proposal being discussed in the WEU Council to set up multinational forces which might include American units. If one examines Protocol No. II on forces of WEU, which is part of the treaty, one cannot fail to be astonished that the Council’s reply to Recommendation 479 affirms that “the modified Brussels Treaty does not regulate the question of

stationed forces and provides no legal basis for such a presence”.

50. In this context, co-operation and future understanding in defence and security matters between the two countries that will have to play the biggest rôle at the centre of the European continent, i.e. France and Germany, will be decisive. The two countries took exemplary measures of co-operation by setting up the Franco-German Council and the Franco-German brigade, which became fully operational on 17th October 1990. In the interests of all Europeans, it is essential for this co-operation to continue to bear fruit after the establishment of a unified German state.

#### *IV. Problems for the organisation of Europe*

##### *(i) The future rôle of the CSCE*

51. The end of the East-West confrontation and the division of Europe, together with liberalisation and democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe, accompanied by the end of the Soviet Union’s rôle as the power guaranteeing the communist order in Eastern Europe are encouraging the alliances to start to view their respective vocations and rôles from a different standpoint.

52. The Atlantic Alliance drew the first consequence from the new situation in the proposal for a joint declaration that it addressed to the Warsaw Pact on 6th July 1990 in which the two pacts “solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE final act”.

53. The signing of a declaration on non-recourse to force between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the eve of the summit meeting between heads of state or of government of the thirty-four CSCE member countries held in Paris from 19th to 21st November 1990, will mark a major step in the process of reducing the military rôle of the alliances and consolidating efforts to establish all-European co-operation and security structures grouping all European countries, together with the United States and Canada. The signing of a Charter of Paris for a new Europe on 21st November 1990 at the close of the Paris conference will therefore give strong impetus to the evolution of this process which will henceforth take the form of two-yearly summit meetings and meetings, at least once a year, of ministers for foreign affairs in the framework of the “Council on Security and Co-operation in Europe” which has been set up.

54. In assessing what may be expected of the strengthening and institutionalisation of the CSCE process in security matters, it must be recalled that it was first a matter of finding a means of attending to the interests of the Soviet Union, which was afraid it would lose its influence and right to intervene in European affairs by withdrawing its forces from Central and Eastern Europe and giving up its prerogatives in Germany. Account also has to be taken of the Soviet Union's security interests which it considers to be less well protected with the Warsaw Pact as it now is, compared with the Atlantic Alliance.

55. The other Eastern European countries will find in the CSCE an all-European framework that can bring them a new standard of security. However, the positions of these countries towards the new rôle of the CSCE seem ambiguous. On the one hand, some of them – including Czechoslovakia and Poland – are actively promoting the establishment of an all-European security system based on the Helsinki process, but in the same countries there is still some support for the idea that there can be no real security outside the alliances, and this is leading certain countries, such as Hungary, to try to establish closer links with the Atlantic Alliance and WEU.

56. Any attempt to develop all-European security co-operation must result in greater security for all participants and not the reverse. This process should therefore be considered complementary to the present system of alliances, but this does not prevent new elements being grafted on to this process at a later stage.

57. With this aim in mind, it is essential to encourage the United States and Canada to play an active part in this new process. Here, it is gratifying to note that, at the beginning of October 1990, the United States hosted a meeting of CSCE ministers for foreign affairs held for the first time in New York.

58. All the thinking that will be necessary in order to help to ensure the success of new forms of co-operation in the CSCE should take into consideration the scope of the Helsinki final act, which covers a very vast range of subjects of which security is only one. While it seems probable that the thirty-four CSCE countries will manage to reach agreement in many areas, matters become more complicated in the case of security from the moment one steps beyond general principles to tackle more tangible matters. For instance, difficulties arose when it was decided at the Vienna conference to adopt a mandate for opening negotiations on conventional forces in Europe and the mandate was limited to the member countries of the two alliances. The very extent of the process involves opportunities and risks, the former stemming

from experience that joint interest in obtaining results in a specific area may lead to progress in others. Conversely, stumbling over one matter may also hold up progress in other matters. In this context, the risk of splitting up the process into several sub-processes handled separately must not be overlooked once the institutionalisation stage is reached. It is therefore essential to safeguard the coherence and political nature of the entire process in which the development of regional co-operation must be included. In security matters, it is for WEU in particular to help to ensure that the new all-European co-operation in this area is developed to the advantage of all other areas, since security is the key factor in this new system.

59. In regard to the WEU Council's position towards the CSCE, the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report reproduces the text of the communiqué issued at the close of the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers held in Brussels on 23rd April 1990, according to which:

“The CSCE is the framework within which all Europeans, together with the United States and Canada, can establish new relations and develop co-operative structures capable of assuring each one of them that peace and stability will be maintained and their legitimate interests safeguarded.”

60. Your Rapporteur does not know to what extent the Council is making concrete proposals to make a diplomatic contribution to preparations for the CSCE meeting in Paris and the future development of that process, but if one compares its public statements with the detailed positions on the same subject adopted by the European Council in Dublin on 25th and 27th June 1990 or those of the North Atlantic Council published in Turnberry on 8th June 1990 and London on 6th July 1990, one can but be disappointed at the lack of substance in the WEU declaration.

61. While it cannot be denied that the relevant Council bodies such as the Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group are making every effort to work out a joint approach by WEU countries to the CSCE summit meeting, one may nevertheless wonder why the Council of Ministers is being so shy about publishing its conclusions and proposals. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that many observers feel WEU is used only to repeat or defend decisions taken in other forums, even if this is not justified.

62. The security basket of the CSCE gives WEU particular responsibility in continuing to assert Western Europe's concept of how to carry out proposals to set up specific institutions.

63. This concerns inter alia the establishment of a conflict prevention centre which is to be located in Vienna. According to the Charter of Paris for a new Europe, this centre will have the following duties and structure:

“During its initial stage of operations the centre’s rôle will consist in giving support to the implementation of CSBMs such as:

- mechanism for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities;
- annual exchange of military information;
- communications network;
- annual implementation assessment meetings;
- co-operation as regards hazardous incidents of a military nature.

The centre might assume other functions and the above tasks are without prejudice to any additional tasks concerning a procedure for the conciliation of disputes as well as broader tasks relating to dispute settlement, which may be assigned to it in the future by the Council of the Foreign Ministers.”

In this connection, the German Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Adam Schwaetzer, said in an address in Berlin on 5th October:

“This centre... will be the starting point for consultation procedure centred on dialogue, co-operation and the prevention of conflicts. Its first specific task should be to recognise possible military crisis situations and to help to eliminate them as soon as possible: it is therefore particularly appropriate to implement confidence measures providing for exchanges of military information and examination of unusual military activities.

The centre will develop through the tasks that it will be given by the council of ministers for foreign affairs. It must therefore have a non-restrictive mandate: its future tasks will be to defuse causes of political conflict by joint agreement with its members and to find common solutions to conflicts affecting security and co-operation in Europe.”

64. This description seems to correspond to the compromise reached at the meeting of CSCE ministers for foreign affairs in New York between those who wished to give this body a more political mandate by setting up some kind of security council and those who preferred a more technical information body.

65. Starting with the less ambitious model, while leaving open the possibility to extend the

mandate of the centre at a later stage, many questions must be discussed, only some of which can be tackled in this report:

- Will participation in the centre be compulsory or voluntary?
- Will it be possible for facts established by the centre to lead to sanctions and, if not, how will a conflict be settled?
- What geographical area will the centre’s activities cover?
- Will there be a CSCE steering committee and who will its members be?
- To what extent will WEU be represented as an organisation in conflict prevention activities?
- What will be the relationship between the tasks and activities assigned to this centre and those of the joint centre for verifying disarmament agreements, now being defined, inter alia, by WEU?

66. Since all these questions are at the very heart of WEU’s responsibilities and experience, the Assembly expects the Council to play a leading rôle in working out the details of this undertaking and keep the Assembly permanently informed of its work in this area. In particular, this concerns the peaceful settlement of disputes where the Charter of Paris defines new forms of co-operation which will be discussed in detail at the meeting of experts to be held in Valletta from 15th January to 18th February 1991.

67. In matters relating to disarmament and the limitation of armaments, the CSCE should henceforth be the principal forum for conducting the necessary negotiations on outstanding problems so that the agreements concluded have a wide area of application. It is therefore gratifying that, in Paris on 21st November 1991, the thirty-four countries participating in the CSCE meeting voted in favour of “discussions and consultations among the thirty-four participating states aimed at establishing by 1992, from the conclusion of the Helsinki follow-up meeting, new negotiations on disarmament and confidence and security building open to all participating states”.

*(ii) The parliamentary dimension of all-European co-operation*

68. In the London declaration of 6th July 1990 on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance, the NATO heads of state and government were inter alia in favour of creating in the framework of the CSCE:

“a parliamentary body, the Assembly of Europe, to be based on the existing Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (the French text uses the words ‘à

établir *sur le modèle* de l'actuelle Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe'), in Strasbourg, and include representatives of all CSCE member states."

69. In a resolution adopted on 27th September 1990, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe proposed in particular that the CSCE summit meeting:

"... provide for continuous parliamentary involvement in the CSCE process, through an Assembly of Europe (based on the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe). The Assembly of Europe would be the interlocutor of CSCE governments and any intergovernmental CSCE institutions to be established."

70. It also recommended that the Committee of Ministers:

"declare before their colleagues of the other twelve CSCE participating states their unequivocal support... for the principle that the Parliamentary Assembly at Strasbourg should be the basis for an 'Assembly of Europe', constituting a forum for debate on all fields of activity for which the CSCE will retain competence, as well as being the natural interlocutor of ministers and of any future CSCE secretariat."

71. While paying tribute to an initiative aimed at enhancing the rôle and responsibilities of parliamentarians in managing European and international political problems, at the same time increasing interparliamentary contacts, your Rapporteur believes the idea is good insofar as the new CSCE structures will probably strengthen the governmental and ministerial aspects of Europe in face of which parliamentary Europe must not be neglected.

72. As always, the difficulties lie in the details. They start when one tackles the idea of making the Assembly of the Council of Europe the interlocutor of "any intergovernmental CSCE institutions to be established". If, for instance, the CSCE decides to create a centre for the prevention of conflicts, WEU and its Assembly should be called on to shoulder their responsibilities.

73. Since the security basket continues to play an important rôle in the process as a whole, it is essential to work out methods of co-ordination with relevant parliamentary bodies in these matters in order to avoid duplication of effort. One way might be to have representatives of the WEU Assembly take part in a liaison committee which might be set up to meet between sessions of the "Assembly of Europe".

74. Another problem stems from the United States Congress's hesitation about accepting the

structure of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as a model for the Assembly of Europe. However, the harmonisation of this plan with the idea of a European confederation put forward by the French President must also be taken into consideration.

75. Since the creation of a parliamentary dimension for the CSCE process raises a number of problems, it would be desirable for the inter-governmental CSCE meeting in Paris to give the appropriate parliamentary authorities the responsibility and time to work out co-ordinated methods satisfactory to all concerned. These methods should nevertheless be based on the principle of national delegations as in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the WEU Assembly, criteria for determining the number of seats perhaps being left open, and they should at the same time strengthen the interest of the North American democracies in playing a full part in the undertaking.

76. WEU and its Assembly have every reason to make an active contribution to the establishment of the new all-European co-operation system on the basis of the final act. Even if this process is apparently being concentrated increasingly on economic, humanitarian, ecological and social matters, security aspects must not be forgotten and here our organisation must shoulder its responsibilities, which are not confined to purely military aspects as is sometimes believed.

### (iii) *European integration and Eastern Europe*

77. Europe's opening towards the East is confronting the European Community with the problem of reconciling the aims it set itself of strengthening its internal integration by setting up the single market, monetary union and political union, on the one hand, and the question of its enlargement, on the other. The number of European countries determined to join the Community is growing and it will be difficult to satisfy all these requests without jeopardising the progress of internal integration. Furthermore, procedure for a more flexible form of association with the Community for some of the interested countries can but be a transitional solution in the majority of cases. However, at the present juncture it seems essential to study methods of organising and co-ordinating the indispensable economic assistance urgently needed by all the Eastern European countries if they are not to collapse and to ensure that the economic evolution of countries wishing to establish closer links with the Community is such as to facilitate their subsequent integration.

78. The success of the EEC makes it Western Europe's principal pole of attraction in the eyes of the eastern countries and they cannot be con-

fronted with a choice between joining a military alliance or giving up the prospect of one day belonging to the Community. Turning the EEC into a military alliance might also make the Soviet Union bring pressure to bear on the eastern countries to induce them to renounce their approaches to the Community.

79. In spite of the reticence of a minority of its member countries, which give priority to developing relations with the Eastern European countries, the European Community is determined to face up to the situation by giving strong impetus to every aspect of its internal integration. It was as a result of a joint initiative by the French President and the German Chancellor on 18th April 1990 that the European Council decided to hold an intergovernmental meeting on political union in Rome on 14th December 1990 at the same time as that on economic and monetary union.

80. Now that we are examining the many proposals made in the meantime by Community bodies on ways and means of including the security dimension in this undertaking, it is high time to remind the Council that it is primarily for WEU to give its views on incorporating this vital element into a political union which, otherwise, would be incomplete, as the Council of Ministers rightly underlined in its platform on European security interests.

81. The Council's almost total silence regarding a discussion which has been continuing in the Community framework for several months is particularly hard to understand since the WEU ministers not only underlined in the abovementioned platform and in the communiqué of 23rd April 1990 that they were committed to building a European union, they also asserted that the modified Brussels Treaty was "an important means to this end" and that the treaty "marked one of the early steps on the road to European unification".

82. Since the European Community countries are considering completing procedure for ratifying the agreements on political union before the end of 1992, it is not enough to note that at the present time most of the countries concerned prefer to leave the existing institutions unchanged. The political union, with all its consequences, is on the agenda and, if WEU does not give its views, decisions will be taken elsewhere with no guarantee that account will be taken of all the essential factors that should feature in the security and defence dimension of the future political union.

*(iv) The organisation of security and the rôle of WEU*

83. Proof that there is not yet a European security identity was recently given by the simple fact that two WEU member countries,

France and Germany, have just concluded bilateral treaties of co-operation with the Soviet Union containing provisions governing bilateral relations in the event of crisis whose content reveals a somewhat different approach from the security point of view.

84. It is in WEU that problems in achieving a defence identity must be identified, this being an essential aspect of a European political union. This first requires political will on the part of member governments to hold such a debate and to do so in WEU. It then requires an open debate on the differences of views which still exist between certain member countries on the final terms of this identity. In this debate, it can be seen without difficulty that the modified Brussels Treaty offers an appropriate framework for achieving a synthesis allowing differences over the aims of the undertaking to be solved.

85. The treaty contains elements of European integration in its preamble and Articles I, II, III and, especially, V; Atlantic elements are to be found in Article IV, Protocols II, III and IV and the final act of the nine-power conference, and there is an "out-of-area" element in Article VIII which has proved to be particularly useful during the two Gulf crises. All these elements form a whole whose components must be carefully examined to determine whether they should be retained, developed, modified or deleted in the framework of a European political union. In any event, it would be vain to try to pick out at random an isolated part of the modified Brussels Treaty for incorporation in a new Community treaty, as the European Commission proposed in its opinion of 21st October 1990 on the possible revision of the Rome Treaty.

86. From a procedural standpoint, WEU might apply several methods to determine which areas should be the subject of a joint policy. It might adopt a selective or a general approach on the basis of common values and interests, as Mr. Dumas, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, recently said at his press conference in Venice on 6th October 1990 and when speaking in the French National Assembly on 9th October 1990.

87. Where structures and institutions are concerned, one may fully agree with the assessment made by Mr. Delors, President of the European Commission, who noted in an interview granted to *Le Monde* on 12th October 1990 that "in defence matters the Twelve would be wrong to place the institutional question before the fundamental questions. The institutional aspect is the consequence, but also the cement, of political choices...".

88. In order to provide the necessary "cement" referred to by Mr. Delors, Belgium suggested an interesting idea, i.e. that the presi-



dency of the European Council should coincide with that of the WEU Council, which seems difficult to achieve if the two organisations continue to have a different number of member countries. However, a new development may emerge from the invitation to Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Turkey to attend extraordinary meetings of the Council on the Gulf crisis as observers. This is in line with current thinking on the enlargement of WEU to include all member countries of the Community provided, however, that such enlargement does not weaken the cohesion now achieved in WEU. In such conditions, WEU might be placed under the aegis of the European Council while being left intact.

89. From a practical standpoint, the WEU Council of Ministers affirmed on 23rd April 1990 that reinforcement of Europe's security identity was "destined to be given concrete expression in the form of close, and even new co-operation between the member countries". If such co-operation is achieved, it will be an ideal way of making a valid contribution to efforts to achieve political union in this area. Although the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council gives no details in this connection, the Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. van Eekelen, gave some interesting points in an article published in the NATO Review<sup>1</sup>, in which he pays particular attention to the expediency of creating multinational forces:

"Firstly, these might serve to demonstrate European solidarity in matters of security policy, and secondly, to assist the European/United States relationship by easing the aggravation over burden-sharing.

Examples of multinational co-operation already exist of course, and offer useful points of departure. Contributions from different countries could best be at brigade level or above."

90. On the question of American participation in the project, the Secretary-General believes that:

"European units could be twinned with their North American counterparts. Indeed, the interest shown by the United States authorities at the highest level indicates that the United States Government realises the potential of such a concept for a credible future military link with Europe. It is up to the Europeans to make proposals for new arrangements with North American troops. Variable geometry would allow for either European multinational units or mixed European/American forces."

91. Such a concept is quite appropriate as the start of a constructive European reaction to the United States invitation to "partnership in leadership" in the alliance and its politico-military bodies, since it shows the Europeans' will to have the Americans maintain both a political and military presence in Europe. It also implies further thought about the development of relations between WEU and NATO on the basis of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly where military co-operation is concerned, now that, for the first time, the chiefs of defence staff of WEU member countries have met on the occasion of the Kuwait crisis.

92. The need to ensure European security with due account for reductions in conventional forces under the CFE treaty means not only defining new concepts in WEU but also revising alliance strategy and structure as a whole. This is an area where a WEU approach might show to what extent member countries are prepared to pursue an identical policy. This should be proved also in preparations for future post-CFE conventional disarmament negotiations.

93. Another problem that calls for a WEU approach is the review of the future rôle that nuclear weapons may have to play in Europe, and in particular the need for negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons.

94. It is in the context of verification in particular that WEU's work seems to have grown, with the plan to create an observation satellite system. Apart from the information given by the Council in its thirty-sixth annual report, the Secretary-General of WEU specifies that:

"Arrangements for co-operation are being set up... including work on a programme of trial inspections between member states, on multinational participation in national inspection teams, and on inspector training courses. This work is carried forward through regular meetings of specialist working groups of the Council, held at the Secretariat-General in London...

Adequate, coherent and co-ordinated verification of the provisions of the treaty will be of decisive importance. As part of an intensification of the WEU work in this area in recent months, experts are assessing common European requirements as well as existing national capabilities and projects with a view to setting up a European space-based observation system. Such a system would comprise a satellite component and a WEU agency for the exploitation of satellite images. It would have three goals: to contribute to the verification of conventional arms control agreements, to monitor crises with

1. Building a new European security order: WEU's contribution, NATO Review, No. 4, August 1990, pages 18-23.



security implications particularly outside Europe – and to monitor environmental hazards.”<sup>2</sup>

95. If, as we hope, this already very well-advanced preparatory work leads to firm decisions at the level of the Council of Ministers, the question will have to be solved of co-ordinating this project with that for the conflict prevention centre to be created in the framework of the CSCE in which WEU will have a major contribution to make.

96. Finally, the new Gulf conflict has again shown that WEU must strengthen its efforts to make use of all the means offered by the modified Brussels Treaty to avert more rapidly and effectively the dangers that might arise outside Europe. By so doing, it could form a hard core that might be joined by any like-minded countries participating in all-European co-operation.

97. The cohesion necessary for creating a joint defence and security identity depends also on the spirit in which WEU member countries consider the juridical basis for such cohesion, i.e. the modified Brussels Treaty. In this connection, it is interesting to note that, for some time, there has been a tendency for the treaty to be presented increasingly to the public as the “1948 treaty”. Indeed, WEU owes its origins to the defence organisation set up under the Brussels Treaty signed on 17th March 1948 between the United Kingdom, France and the three Benelux countries.

98. However, the true birth certificate of Western European Union as we now know it is the Paris Agreements of 23rd October 1954 modifying and considerably amplifying the original treaty to such an extent that a treaty of quite a new character came into being, not only with the accession of Germany and Italy to the modified treaty but also with the United Kingdom commitment on the mainland. Conversely, the 1948 treaty provided for a specifically European deployment with integrated military commands. If the governments consider that the 1948 treaty is still the juridical basis for a military alliance, the full consequences must be drawn, particularly for the deployment of forces in the event of withdrawals of American forces from Europe calling in question the application of Article IV of the modified treaty. Europeans would then have to operate their deployment themselves and jointly, pending a possible return of American forces if a crisis made this necessary.

99. According to Article XII, the “treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence, signed at Brussels on

17th March 1948, as amended by the protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty” is to remain in force for fifty years.

100. Without wishing to enter into juridical discussions about the interpretation of the treaty, an assessment should nevertheless be made of the political implications of the position adopted by the governments of two member countries, the United Kingdom and Germany, which have expressed the opinion that the reference date for denouncing the treaty is 25th August 1948, i.e. the entry into force of the initial treaty. As long as there is no other concrete prospect guaranteeing that all the elements necessary for Western Europe’s security will be incorporated into a true European political union, it might be dangerous to wish to dispense casually with a juridical basis for collective security which is proving increasingly effective.

### *V. Conclusions*

101. The fundamental upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe not only disturbed the political order in that region of the world, they also ended the old system of East-West balance which, until summer 1989, was based on the division of Europe and a system of opposing political philosophies and military pacts. Whereas Germany recovered its unity quite freely by choosing to be anchored to the democracies grouped in the Atlantic Alliance, the situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is still in a state of evolution. The new order that will be established in that part of the world is not yet clear. We are living in a transitional period during which the emergence of new risks and dangers cannot be excluded. They may stem either from the serious economic crises facing most of these countries or from the revival of nationalisms that might be a consequence of being released from the old constraining order imposed by the Soviet Union.

102. The disappearance of this order left a vacuum which means that the countries concerned are faced with the problem of seeking new guidelines and a reference framework in which they can settle themselves and in which they can find a new standard of security and prospects for their future existence.

103. It is thanks to the soundness and homogeneity of co-operation and integration built up by the western democracies as a whole, in particular those of Western Europe, since the second world war that the latter will be able to assume the weighty responsibility of working out a new system of security and all-European co-operation to fill the vacuum in the East. However, the western democracies would be mistaken not to rely on the strengthened founda-

2. NATO Review, No. 4, August 1990, page 22.

tions of the tried institutions they have set up, particularly in security matters; they must, on the contrary, pursue and increase their efforts until the aim of a true political union has been attained.

104. At the same time, the establishment of all-European co-operative structures by institutionalising the CSCE should provide an essential additional means of allowing Eastern Europe to participate progressively in new forms of co-operation extended to the whole of Europe by means that remain to be defined.

105. As for laying the bases for new all-European co-operation in security matters, it is mainly in WEU that joint proposals for the agenda of the CSCE summit meeting to be held in Paris should be worked out and transmitted. This applies to the definition of the essential

principles of this new co-operation and also the creation of any structures that have to be created. It is above all in regard to the introduction of machinery for verification and the prevention of conflicts that WEU should work out firm proposals.

106. The Assembly expects the Council to ensure that the new forms of all-European co-operation strengthen the security which WEU and the Atlantic Alliance now guarantee for Western Europe.

107. The Assembly also expects the Council to work out here and now, in close co-operation with it, a joint concept of the conditions for including the security and defence dimension in a European political union and present it in the framework of preparatory work on that union.

*Consequences of developments in Central and  
Eastern Europe for European security*

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AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Brito and others*

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1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (i), add the following new paragraphs:

“ Welcoming the end of the division of Europe and of the East-West confrontation and the progress towards democratisation and liberalisation in the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries;

Concerned nevertheless at the alarming decline in the economic situation in Eastern Europe in view of its possible unforeseeable repercussions;

Recalling Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty in which all WEU member countries undertook to promote the economic recovery of Europe; ”

2. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (ii), add the following new paragraphs:

“ Emphasising that European security would be threatened if areas of instability emerged in Eastern Europe;

Considering that the strengthening and institutionalisation of the CSCE process offer the peoples of Europe new prospects and improved security on the basis of a strengthened system of all-European co-operation;

Considering that the strengthened CSCE should henceforth be used as the principal forum for advancing disarmament and the limitation of armaments; ”

3. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (ii), add the following new paragraphs:

“ Welcoming the fact that the final settlement of the German problem has made it possible to anchor Germany as a whole to the Atlantic Alliance and allowed the German people to be united in freedom, thus enhancing stability and security in Central Europe;

Considering that Germany’s undertakings in regard to recognition of its present frontiers with Poland, confirmation of its renunciation of ABC weapons and the limit placed on the levels of its armed forces are exemplary measures that are likely to strengthen the confidence of all European countries; ”

4. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (iii), add the following new paragraphs:

“ Supporting the steps being taken to establish an assembly of Europe, on the basis of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which would give the parliamentary dimension to the CSCE process as decided by the Paris summit, while recalling its own responsibilities in all areas covered by the modified Brussels Treaty;

Recalling that WEU has special responsibility in the establishment of a new European security concept based on the doctrine of sufficiency and taking account of the situation that will exist after the treaty on conventional disarmament has been signed;

Considering the maintenance of United States and Canadian armed forces in Europe to be an essential factor for guaranteeing the future security of Europe in a new environment; ”

5. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Play an active part in building the new all-European system of co-operation and security and give it useful impetus based on the co-operation structures set up by member countries in the framework of WEU, the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance; ”

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1. See 12th sitting, 6th December 1990 (amendments agreed to).

6. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:  
“ Give strong impetus to the European Community’s efforts to organise and co-ordinate assistance to the economies of the countries concerned; ”
7. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:  
“ In accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty, examine from a military standpoint the consequences of the reduction in tension in Europe following the progressive withdrawal of Soviet troops and define, in preparation for examination in the Atlantic Alliance, a new concept for the deployment of allied forces in Europe; ”
8. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraphs:  
“ Follow up the intention it expressed in Brussels to strengthen co-operation between member countries in security matters so as to open the way for a possible European union associating the European Community, European political co-operation and WEU;  
Pursue its efforts to ensure that current thinking about the creation of multinational forces is set in the context of a European security dimension;  
Work out, with due account for the specific nature of European security interests, a European position for revising the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance in order to maintain Europe’s security in a new environment;  
Develop means of countering more quickly and more effectively any dangers which may arise out of area;  
Examine the expediency of regular meetings of chiefs of defence staff of WEU member countries;  
Re-examine the rôle of deterrence in the new European security context;  
Take the decision to create an observation satellite agency. ”

*Signed: Brito, Finsberg, Mackie of Benshie, Martinez*

*Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly  
for the financial year 1991*

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*Letter from Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly,  
to Mr. Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France,  
Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

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Paris, 5th December 1990

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In my letter of 20th November 1990, I stressed the extent to which the estimates in the Assembly's budget for increasing the number of staff in its secretariat were justified. You can therefore imagine my disappointment, which is shared by my colleagues, on taking cognisance of the Council's opinion on our annual budget which reached me only after the opening of the session. We note that the Permanent Council has confined itself to allowing the Assembly to create two senior posts, at grades lower than those requested, the cost of one of which must be offset by savings to an equivalent amount in the operating budget so that the Assembly's total budget shows zero growth.

On this point, I should be very grateful if you would point out to the Council that these compensatory savings are particularly unrealistic since the operating budget submitted to the Council, instead of following inflation, was intentionally reduced to attenuate the financial implications of creating the posts requested.

Furthermore, the Council has refused to allow the recruitment of executive staff who are at present too few in number to meet requirements.

More generally, I believe the attitude adopted towards the Assembly shows little regard for fairness in view of the refusal of the proposed regradings and of the practical necessities of the operating means granted to the Assembly.

Nor does the Council appear to be respecting the Assembly's independence in the administration of its secretariat. This is clear from its decision to assign a specific post to a Spanish national and another to a Portuguese national as well as its proposal to approve a regrading that the Assembly had not requested while rejecting the regradings included in its budget. It is the Presidential Committee that is responsible, within the framework of the credits and posts in Head I of its budget, for appointing, transferring and promoting the staff of the Assembly on the proposal of the Clerk. The Council can decide neither the nationality of the holder of a post nor which post should be regraded.

In these circumstances, the Assembly wished to avoid an immediate and possibly public confrontation with the Council. It therefore decided to accept the renewed budget, on which there is no disagreement, and to submit in a supplementary budget its proposals for adapting the structure of the Office of the Clerk to the enlargement and reactivation of WEU. This document will allow all the WEU bodies concerned to re-examine the problems to which the Council has offered only a very incomplete solution.

I hope you will be good enough to draw the attention of the Permanent Council to the importance of the draft supplementary budget which will be presented in order to allow the Assembly at last to have the wherewithal to carry out its tasks at this new juncture.


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Robert PONTILLON

H.E. Mr. Roland DUMAS,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council



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